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Abstract 
This thesis develops an in-depth understanding of a specific case at the intersection 
of extreme right politics, marketing and language. More specifically, the research 
focuses on a Flemish extreme right party, the Vlaams BlolvVlaams Belang which 
provides a rich site of enquiry for the analysis of political communications. 
marketing strategies and discursive processes. Critical discourse analysis of the 
verbal and visual elements of Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang publications reveals, 
on three levels, the strategic use of lexical, rhetorical and other linguistic devices 
to brand and differentiate the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang from other political 
parties. The thesis demonstrates that the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang manages to 
legitimate its political product by dismissing unfavourable features (such as racism 
and xenophobia), and repackaging them (as nationalist) for a wider audience as a 
ready-to-consume product that achieves electoral success. The main contributions 
of the thesis are fourfold. First, the research provides a marketing-related 
explanation of the success of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang. The pervasiveness 
of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang's discourse in Belgian politics makes the 
analysis of the party interesting in its own right. The critical discursive analysis 
reveals the underlying market-orientation of the party and the methods and 
techniques that the party uses to communicate and persuade. Second, this research 
demonstrates that marketing can be used to advance an ideological discourse that 
places consumption in a central position in people's lives. The application of 
critical discourse analysis thus provides a novel and valuable contribution to the 
understanding of political marketing. Third, the thesis sets the stage for furthering 
understanding of how marketing is deployed with increasing sophistication outside 
its traditional, commercial domain, and, more specifically, in politics. Finally, 
critical discourse analysis has an emancipatory goal in uncovering ideologies, and 
providing a voice to the silenced and the oppressed. This thesis is located firmly 
within that tradition with political reflexivity implicit throughout. 
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Chapter 1: Marketing and Politics: a match made in 
heaven? 
1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces my thesis, a four-year research project aimed at studying 
the marketing of an extreme right party, the Flemish Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang. 
First, the objectives of the research are identified, together with the reasons for 
studying the extreme right's marketing strategies and communication. Second, the 
research questions are stated. Third, the methodological approach, critical 
discourse analysis, is briefly outlined. Finally, the structure of the thesis is 
described with a summary of the content of each chapter. 
Research objectives 
The overall aim of the research is to provide an in-depth analysis of the discourse 
of an extreme right party, the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang, and propose an 
alternative approach to the study of the extreme right, namely a critical discursive 
approach to the marketing and communications of a specific political party. 
J'Vhy study the marketing of an extreme right party? 
Consumption has now been established, through the influence of marketing 
thinking, as a 'dominant force' in society (Brownlie et at., 1999). This forcl? 
extends beyond the commercial realm into other spheres of human socil?ty and the 
13 
"discourses of marketisation and commodification are increasingly intruding into 
new realms of life such as relationships, politics and family" (Hackley, 2003: 
1328). Business models and commercial discourses are becoming perYasiYe in 
political and social contexts (Norris, 2004; Hertz. 2001). Politicians have adopted 
a commercial logic in order to cater to this 'market' of citizen-consumers 
(Brownlie, 1997) and political parties are often managed like businesses 
(O'Shaughnessy, 1990). The 'marketisation' of politics and political discourse 
could arguably be linked (as cause and effect) to disillusionment, apathy and 
alienation from political parties, especially among the younger generation (Norris, 
2004). Thus, marketing, as a 'dominant force,' seems to have created a political 
consumption that enables involvement in social life, and the creation and 
maintenance of social relationships enriched 1 by this consumption representing 
values which consumers feel unable to express through traditional channels 
(Putnam, 2000, in Gibson et al., 2003; Brownlie et al., 1999). The notion of 
political consumption is therefore not only a challenge for marketing as an 
academic discipline, but also for political parties if they want to make politics 
meaningful to their electorate (Dermody and Scullion, 2001) and if they want to 
understand the citizen-consumer. The production of politics by (professional) 
political actors is also influenced by marketing. The application of marketing 
techniques in political practice seems increasingly widespread and substantial 
sums of money are spent each year on political advertising, much of which goes to 
I For the time being, the argument focuses on consumption as a mode of expression in 
contemporary society. and holds the rather uncritical view that consumption is "liberating" (see 
Firat and Vcnkatesh (1995) for discussion}. 
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communication professionals, through channels very familiar to mainstream 
marketing scholars and practitioners. 
The extreme right 
The issue of interest for this thesis is the behaviour of political parties and the way 
that they seek to market themselves to potential voters. To explore the 
pervasiveness and potential use of marketing in the political sphere, it was deemed 
appropriate to focus attention on a specific area of politics: the extreme-right. The 
success experienced by the extreme right across Western Europe, and the 
persistent loyalty of its voters raises many issues which have sparked the interest 
of academics and society. My own experience in Belgium, where the extreme right 
has been persistently successful since the start of the nineties, combined with my 
business education background, allowed me to consider the explanatory potential 
of a marketing outlook for the study of the extreme right. Although a wealth of 
research has been dedicated to the extreme right and to the reasons for its 
contemporary re-emergence, the research has mainly adopted political, 
sociological and historical perspectives. Being primarily interested in marketing 
and broader societal issues, my attention was drawn to the extreme right's 
apparent market-orientation, and the potential role of marketing in the extreme-
right's attractiveness and persuasiveness. 
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The Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang 
The variety and the diversity of the political parties regrouped under the label 
extreme right makes the study of the 'extreme right' particularly complex (see 
chapter 2). Studying the 'marketing of the extreme right' is a colossal project, 
beyond the scope of a doctoral research project. Therefore. the topic was narrowed 
down to a particular case, the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang, which was selected as 
an exemplary topic for this research. The Vlaams BlolvVlaams Belang (i.e. 
Flemish Block/Flemish Interest) is a successful extreme right political party of 
Flanders, the northern region of Belgium. The Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang is a 
successful extreme right party which has been able to gain more and more voters 
since the beginning of the nineties to become a major figure in the current Belgian 
political landscape. In addition, the party provides interesting insights as to how a 
political party can successfully apply marketing strategies in that the party leaders 
recommend in internal documents the use of marketing to enhance their 
representatives' political campaigns. 
2. Research questions 
This research project tackles the following general questions: How do extreme 
right parties market themselves? What are the marketing strategies and techniques 
used (with a particular focus on branding)? For example, how are the national 
identity and the 'community' of nationals defined by the extreme right and how 
are the exclusionist and discriminatory discourses of the extreme right packaged in 
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order to become 'acceptable' and legitimate, therefore gaining wider support? The 
variety and the diversity of the political parties regrouped under the same label 
makes the study of the 'extreme right' particularly complex (chapter 2). This is 
why an extreme right party, the Belgian (Flemish) Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang 
has been selected for the purposes of this research (chapter 4). The Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang is one of the most successful, articulate and organised 
extreme right parties in Western Europe and as such provides a rich set of data for 
a research project on marketing and extreme right politics. The specific research 
questions can be summarised as follows: 
How does the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang mobilise marketing and political 
persuasion to gain popular support and acceptance? 
J - "How does the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang market itseip What are the 
marketing strategies and techniques used? " (chapter 8) 
2 - "How does the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang manufacture its trademark 
discriminatory discourse in a persuasive way that has gained acceptance 
and legitimacy in the Belgian political scene?" (chapters 6 and 7) 
This research is a multidisciplinary project which requires a methodology that 
explores and enables emergent themes. Critical discourse analysis provides such 
an analytical framework and proved invaluable (chapter 5) in addressing the 
research questions and in dealing with the particular discursive nature of the 
project. 
3. Methodology 
A critical fonn of discourse analysis is adopted for this research. Critical d i s c o u r s ~ ~
analysis (CDA) as a methodological framework is concerned with discourses as 
the instruments of power and control, and discourse as an instrument of the social 
construction of reality (Van Leeuwen, 1993). The basic assumption of CD A is that 
there is a dialectical relationship between discursive events and the context in 
which they are embedded (de Cillia et aI., 1999: 157). Through discourse, social 
actors constitute knowledge, situations, social roles as well as identities and 
interpersonal relations between social actors (de Cillia et aI., 1999: 157). CDA 
seeks to unveil the web of domination, power, discrimination, and control existing 
in language (Wodak, 2001). This particular approach of CDA should prove 
particularly useful for the study of discourses with powerful ideologies, yet with 
hidden effects and hidden power relations (Meyer, 2001) which can be found for 
example in populism and marketing. In this project. the object of investigation is 
the persuasion and the construction and marketing of alternative realities, in subtly 
or overtly racist and nationalist discourses (arguably a feature of the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang's discourse). More specifically, Wodak's discourse-historical 
approach provides a detailed method for approaching the discourse of the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang, and the tools to gain insight into the online discourse of 
extreme right parties. 
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4. Thesis structure 
Literature review 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the contemporary extreme right a recurrent 
political phenomenon of the Western European political landscape. Theories and 
explanations of their success highlight the complexity of the phenomenon. Chapter 
3 discusses issues related to marketing and political marketing, and its relevance to 
the conduct of politics. Chapter 4 presents the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang in 
detail, and provides an overview of the Belgian political landscape. 
Methodology 
Chapter 5 presents the methodological framework adopted in this research, 
focussing on its discursive approach. The critical discourse analytical framework 
is described and its relevance in addressing the research questions is discussed in 
detail. The chapter ends with an illustration of the method applied to a selected 
text from the Vlaams Blok. 
Empirical study 
Chapter 6 focusses on the textual and verbal elements of the Vlaams Blok and 
Vlaams Belang's publications. Critical discourse analysis uncovered various 
argumentation strategies. The chapter also explores the rhetorical strategies of the 
party, and the way language (vocabulary, grammar, rhetoric) is used to construct 
persuasive arguments, articulate argumentation strategies, and eventually gain 
voters' trust. Chapter 7 tackles the \'isual elements of the Vlaams Blok and Vlaams 
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Belang's discourse. The contention is that the analysis of the Vlaams Blolv Vlaams 
Belang's discourse does not end with the party's use of language. The yisual 
elements are analysed using critical discourse analysis, specifically adapted to 
apply to images. The visual analysis raises issues of representation, and national 
identity: e.g. a European identity vs. an Islamic identity. Chapter 8 addresses the 
marketing strategy of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang. More specifically, it 
addresses issues concerning the party's positioning and segmentation of the 
Belgian political market. This chapter demonstrates the tangibility of the 
marketing orientation of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang management. It also 
indicates how a study of marketing assists in an understanding of the evolution of 
the party's discourse. 
Conclusion and discussion 
Chapter 9 brings together the various concepts highlighted in different literature 
and the key findings from the empirical chapters. The discussion provides a 
synthesis by specifically addressing the research questions, how they were 
addressed throughout the project, and highlights the original contributions of this 
thesis. Finally, chapter 10 provides an overall view and highlights the 
contributions of the thesis. Limitations and suggestions/implications for future 
research are the final section of this last chapter. 
Chapter 2: The Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe: 
an overview 
1. Introduction 
This chapter sets out to provide an overview of the literature dedicated to the 
analysis of the Western European extreme right. The extreme right is a fascinating 
topic for a range of studies linked to politics, historical studies, sociology, and also 
marketing and communications, as the chapter aims to show. The chapter tackles 
issues related to the definition and description of the extreme right. This is 
followed by a discussion of the extreme right parties' success across Europe. Then, 
the particular elements of the nature of the extreme right party and the ideology of 
this political family are highlighted. First, the current 'extremist' political situation 
in Western Europe is presented. 
The extreme right in Europe: a modern and pervasive phenomenon 
Between 1980 and 2003, so-called extreme right (or far-right) parties were very 
successful in many countries, such as France, Austria, Italy and Belgium (Mudde, 
2000). In France, lean-Marie Le Pen went through to the second round of the 
presidential elections in April 2002. The Freedom Party (FPO) was included in the 
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coalition government of Austria2. In 2001, extreme right parties were invited to 
enter in coalitions to secure parliamentary majorities by centre-right governments 
in Italy, Denmark, Norway, and Portugal. The extreme right wave is, as Betz 
(1998: 6) notes, "one of the most significant political developments of the past few 
years" in Western Europe. Only a handful of European countries, such as Sweden, 
Finland and Ireland, have seemed immune (so far) to the rise of the extreme righe 
(Nollet, 2000). 
Parties that are successful today represent a new breed of right-wing extremism, in 
the sense that they have little if no affiliation to inter-war Nazism and fascism. 
According to Camus (2002), the successful parties of this family are the ones that 
have been able to modernise and offer a mix of ultraliberalism, xenophobia, 
authoritarianism, a social affairs' discourse, and the acceptance of democracy, 
(hence their label of a "parliamentary" movement4 (Camus, 2002; Mudde, 2000; 
Betz, 1998). Hainsworth (2000) also argues that today's extreme right is very 
much the product of contemporary developments, and not a return to a fascist and 
Nazi past. Ignazi (1997) considers far-right parties' emergence to be a response to 
the post-industrial area and the new postmodern values it has created. This 'new 
2 The Austrian FPO experienced failure on the 24 November 2002 and during the elections of 
January 2003 (Camus, 2003). 
3 Nollet (2000) notes that that the extreme right is completely absent in Iceland and in micro-states, 
such as Monaco, Lichtenstein, Andorra, Saint-Martin and Gibraltar. It is beyond the point of this 
thesis to explain this 'anomaly'. Instead, it is the growing significance of extreme politics in the 
Western European political landscape that is puzzling and of interest here. 
4 Mudde (2000) has identified another type of extreme right party, the "extra-parliamentary groups" 
which remained loyal to fascism. Those groups have been marginalised because of their extreme 
intolerance and violence which has alienated public opinion. The "parliamentary" extreme right 
parties have been carefully distancing themselves from the factions' actions in order to avoid the 
negative association with violence, fascism and anti-democracy (Camus, 2002; Collet, 2000; Betz, 
1998). 
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breed' of right-wing extremism has some particular attributes as well as a 
modernised discourse. It is characterised by a constantly changing, issue-oriented 
political strategy "that combines verbal radicalism and symbolic politics with the 
tools of contemporary political marketing to disseminate their ideas among the 
electorate" (Betz, 1998: 2; emphasis added). 
The success of extreme right parties across Europe is a concern to political actors 
and society in general, because of their radical stance and xenophobia, their 
growing popular acceptance, and their introduction to legitimate governing 
institutions. If unsettling, their growing success is also puzzling, given their 
authoritarian and discriminatory discourse. Many researchers have aimed to 
provide explanations for their appeal. The extant literature on the extreme right has 
been conducted mainly by social scientists, political scientists and historians who 
have studied different aspects of the extreme right parties including: ideology (e.g. 
Mudde, 2000; Freeden, 1994; Gardberg, 1993); historical roots (e.g. Davies and 
Lynch, 2002); the reasons for their existence and the profile of the voters (e.g. De 
Witte, 1996); explanations for the parties' success (e.g. Kitschelt, 1996; Koopmans, 
1996; Betz, 1994); country-specific analyses of the extreme right movement (e.g. 
Davies, 2002; Fieschi, 2000; Tarchi, 1996); the affiliation with fascism (e.g. 
Eatwell, 1996; Mudde, 1996); and "ideologico-cultural" dimensions focussing on 
their political programmes and xenophobic discourse (e.g. Anastasakis, 2000: 6). 
These perspectives provide interesting insights into the phenomenon. but 
sometimes conflicting theories (e.g. the conceptualisation of the extreme right vote 
as protest \'s. ideology-oriented (see Coffe. 2004)). Interestingly, no author has 
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focussed on the way the extreme right communicates, packages its candidates and 
messages, and generally, uses modem marketing techniques to manufacture a 
desirable offering in the political marketplace. This research sets out to fill this 
identified gap, and to provide an additional explanation for the success of the 
modem extreme right. 
Interest in the extreme right movement is not limited to scholars. Politicians, 
media and citizens have also come to realise that the extreme right is not an 
ephemeral or marginal phenomenon but a real force striving to penetrate 
democratic institutions and mainstream politics (Anastasakis, 2000). There is also 
an interest in the "impact of far-right political mobilisation within national 
societies and Europe" and in finding ways to strengthen democracy by dealing 
with the implications of the extreme right (Anastasakis, 2000: 3). Extreme right 
politics is complex (not least because of the deeply emotional and visceral 
reactions it inspires) and it is necessary to provide first a description and 
discussion of the significant inter-related terms used in this research. 
2. The definitional mire 
The interchangeable use of the words denoting extreme right parties by the media 
may lead to confusion. Confusion is not limited to the 'non-experts' in the field. It 
is worth noting that even among scholars there is little agreement about definitions 
and terminology (McLean and McMillan, 2003; Anastasakis. 2000; Hainsworth, 
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2000; Mudde, 2000). Across the broad literature dedicated to the extreme right, 
words are "used synonymously and without any clear intention" (ivludde, 2000: 
13). Anastasakis (2000: 4), in a comprehensive analysis of the literature available 
on the topic, highlights the plethora of terms existing in literature: "radical right 
and far right" (see Cheles et aI., 1991); "mimetic or nostalgic fascism" (see Griffin, 
1993); "new populism" (see Betz and Imrn erfa 11 , 1998); "radical right-wing 
populism" (see Helms, 1997); "new right" (see Minkenberg, 2000); "new post-
industrial extreme right" (see Ignazi, 1997) and "new radical right" (see Kitschelt, 
1995)". Such labels are used according to each authors' respective emphasis on 
specific characteristics of the extreme right (Anastasakis, 2000). These various 
definitions highlight the far-right's "organisational complexity and ideological 
heterogeneity" (Griffin, 1993, in Anastasakis, 2000: 5). 
The vagueness of many of the definitions leads to the lack of a broadly accepted 
classification of parties belonging to the extreme right (Mudde, 2000). For 
instance, scholars disagree on some 'borderline cases', i.e. whether to classify a 
party as conservative or ultra-conservative instead of as extreme right (Gooskens, 
1994; in Mudde, 2000). The Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (Austrian 
Freedom Party or FPO) illustrates the issue well. On the one hand, the FPO is 
considered by Gallagher et al. (1995, in Mudde, 2000) to be a liberal party, and 
should not be labelled as extreme right. On the other hand, Mudde (2000) and 
McLean and McMillan (2003) unambiguously classify the FPO as belonging to 
the extreme right. It is interesting to note that the parties themselves often reject 
the label of 'extreme right' (Mudde, 2000), and adopt more flattering self-
description (e.g. conservative and nationalist party). For instance, the Vlaams Blok 
in Belgium is described as a "culturally racist, separatist, and authoritarian party of 
the ultra-right" (Swyngedouw, 1998: 72), but for its supporters it is a mere 
populist, ethnocentrist protest party (Swyngedouw, 1998). 
The classification and descriptive complexity also derives from the dynamic nature 
of political parties. Parties are not static: they develop and may discard issues (e .g. 
the centrality of immigration policies) in favour of others, as a result of the 
changing social base of their electorate (Mudde, 2000). To deal with this, the 
extreme right is defined here as a political family, whose members share common 
characteristics but also feature differences that classify them into subtypes, such as 
'modem', and 'post-industrial' extreme right parties, or 'old' and 'traditional' 
parties (Hainsworth, 2000; Mudde, 2000). This broad qualification acknowledges 
the specific and particular nature of the different political parties within the 
broader extreme right-wing movement (Hainsworth, 2000). 
Among the different terms5 available to refer to the phenomenon under enquiry 
(such as right-wing radicalism and populism), the 'extreme right' is the one chosen 
throughout this thesis. Scholars in Europe tend to use the label 'extreme right' 
(Eatwell, 1998: 3), or 'right wing extremism' (Mudde, 2000). 'Extreme right' is 
broadly accepted as the "most satisfying collective noun" (Mudde, 2000: 16). 
Although there are disagreements on what constitutes an extreme right programme, 
5 For the dctinitions of the other related concepts, such as right-wing radicalism and populism. sec 
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Mudde (2000, 1995) notes that the other recurrent elements in literature on 
extreme right parties are: 'nationalism', 'racism', 'xenophobia', 'anti-democracy' 
and 'the strong state'. Therefore a party featuring a combination of nationalism, 
xenophobia, law and order and welfare chauvinism6 can be classified as belonging 
to the extreme right family. 
3. The Western European Extreme Right 
3.1. Electoral successes: possible explanations 
Scholars provide a range of explanations for the success and longevity of extreme 
right parties. In Anastasakis's (2000) overview of the literature on the extreme 
right, he indicates that the success of the extreme right can be explained by four 
constitutive dimensions: 1) the fascist legac:\,'; 2) socio-economic changes; 3) 
protest politics; and 4) the xenophobic platform (Anastasakis, 2000). First, the 
fascist dimension should not be over-emphasised, because, as Anastasakis (2000) 
and Hainsworth (2000) argue, contemporary European extreme right parties are 
mainly influenced by post-war democracy (fascism is therefore not discussed 
further here). Secondly, the extreme right is considered to be a reaction to socio-
economic changes. Anastasakis (2000: 28) argues that the economic crisis 
experienced by industrialised countries acts as a "catalyst for social distress". 
Immerfall (1998: 249) supports this argument claiming that the success of the 
extreme right is, above all. associated with the uncertainties produced by large-
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scale socio-economic and socio-cultural changes and the subsequent psychological 
stress on the most vulnerable portion of the population. In order to explain the rise 
of the extreme right in the major countries of Western Europe, Immerfall (1998: 
250) puts the emphasis on "economic, political and socio-cultural marginalization 
processes", technological changes and the rise of the global information society. 
However, Mudde (2000) and Anastasakis (2000) note that there IS no 
straightforward correlation between economIC depression and the rise of the 
extreme right. Countries with low unemployment, such as Norway or Switzerland, 
have also experienced a high level of extreme right voting. Betz and Immerfall 
(1998) proposed the following explanation: social dislocation, globalisation and 
economic crisis have led to the rise of anxieties, fear and resentment among the 
socio-economically weakest. Therefore, it is more the fear of unemployment and 
social dislocation than its actual experience that leads people to vote for the radical 
right-wing (Immerfall, 1998: 250). The third dimension that might account for the 
success of the extreme right is the politics of protest. A vote for the extreme right 
is therefore considered as an act of protest against incumbent mainstream political 
parties (but not necessarily against democracy itself). Governing parties are 
deemed responsible for the malaise of the population seemingly unable to solve 
people's problems. Turning to the extreme right is a way to register discontent and 
send a warning to the government. The last explanatory feature is linked to the 
xl!nophohic platform, i.e. to the voters' actual acquiescence to the ideology and 
policies of the extreme right, with its trademark mix of xenophobia. racism, 
exclusionism, opportunism and populism (Hainsworth, 2000; Mudde, 2000). 
Extreme right parties claim discrimination against their 'own people'. in favour of 
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the 'last entrants' (e.g. economIC immigrants and asylum seekers). As a 
consequence, their inflammatory discourse generates and feeds on a climate of 
xenophobia and intolerance (Anastasakis, 2000). This feature leads into the next 
section where the common themes defended by extreme right parties and salient 
elements of their ideology are discussed in further detail. 
3.2. Ideology and electoral themes 
The extreme right is characterised by particular features, such as an inclination to 
ultra-liberalism, authoritarianism, an anti-establishment stance, and xenophobia 
(Mudde, 2000). According to Mudde (2000), a party adopting an ideology 
featuring a combination of nationalism, xenophobia, law and order and welfare 
chauvinism 7 can be classified as belonging to the extreme right family. Other 
common aspects shared by the Western European extreme right parties are the 
acceptance of parliamentary democracy and pluralism (Camus, 2002; Mudde, 
2000), and a claim for national unity and national preference (i.e. granting political, 
economic and social rights only to nationals). In order to understand the nature of 
the extreme right, the next sections describe the key features of 1) xenophobia, 2) 
the economic orientation ofneo-liberalism, 3) anti-establishment, and, 4) 'law and 
order'. 
1 Sec Glossary, appendix 1 
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3.2.1 - Xenophobia 
Xenophobia can be defined as the fear or hatred of foreigners. According to 
Davies and Lynch (2002: 358), such emotions are frequently stirred up by extreme 
right parties in an effort to promote national chauvinism or hostility to immigrants. 
Xenophobia is the feature that unambiguously characterises extreme right policies. 
In many countries, even when there is no large foreign popUlation, extreme right 
parties manage to exploit xenophobic feelings to raise new votes. The Danish and 
Norwegian examples are striking: there are 7% of foreigners in Denmark and only 
2.5% of the Norwegian population are from non-EU origins (Camus, 2003). 
However, the Norwegian Progress Party or Fremskrittspartiet (FPN, ultra-liberal 
and xenophobic right) raised 14.7% of the vote in the September 2002 legislative 
elections; and the Danish extreme right joined a governing coalition in 2001. In 
contrast, in Sweden which has 11 % of foreigners, the Sverigedemokraterna (close 
to the French Front National) won only 1.4% of the votes. This might be a good 
illustration of a 'halo' effect (see Perrineau, 2001: 28): Mayer (1995) explains that 
the extreme right (in her example: the French Front National) realises lower scores 
in localities counting a high concentration of foreigners. In those localities people 
live alongside immigrant populations, while at the periphery with a lower 
concentration of foreigners (or none), fear and fantasies develop. Similarly, Camus 
(2003) suggests that xenophobia-motivated votes are cast due to the fear of 
foreigners, and negative images of foreigners rather than their actual presence. 
A second explanation for the relatively high electoral successes of the extreme 
right lies in the rejection of multiculturalism in ethnically and religiously 
homogenous societies. The rise of xenophobia is attributed to the fear of a loss of 
national identity which is itself a direct consequence of liberal globalisation and 
waves of immigration. The hostility demonstrated by extreme right parties towards 
European integration and enlargement to include Eastern European countries 
(particularly Turkey), can be examined in the light of the same argument. Free 
movement of labour throughout Europe raises the fear that new foreign workers 
may threaten national unity. Nation, national identity and ethnocentrism are central 
to the extreme right's value system (Hainsworth, 2000: 12). Extreme right parties 
postulate a homogenous society where national identity is passed on through blood 
and heredity (Camus, 2003, Hainsworth, 2000). Hainsworth (2000, 1992) argues 
that nation and nationalism are projected as the affective binding that provides 
meaning and identity to the individual in a rapidly changing world. In other words, 
love for the nation and nationalism provide the glue for social cohesion between 
nationals (,who belongs and who does not' is where xenophobia might be 
expressed most blatantly). Loss of identity and moral decay, both by-products of 
the multicultural model, are to be feared. For example, Camus (2003) notes that in 
the rhetoric of the extreme right, the foreigner is depicted as the basis of corruption 
via interbreeding, because as the fecundity of foreigners is very high, society will 
eventually experience the progressive replacement of 'real' citizens by naturalised 
foreigners (Camus, 2003). In such a scenario, everything that is international, 
multinational or global is seen as a threat to the cultural identity and integrity of 
the nation. Examples of such threats include Third-World immigration, Islam, 
communism, multiculturalism and globalisation (Hainsworth, 2000). Issues of 
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identity are therefore considered here as important questions regarding the 
ideology of the extreme right and its rhetoric. 
3.2.2. Socio-economic policy: neo-liberalism and solidarism 
Modern extreme right parties are committed to free-market economICS and 
capitalism (Betz, 1998; Kitschelt, 1995). In their philosophy, the state should not 
intervene in the economy, and the deregulation of the market is favoured. Betz 
(1998) notes that extreme right parties encourage entrepreneurial initiatives and 
small and medium-sized companies. In their programmes, they propose lower 
taxes, cutting subsidies to agriculture and industry, cuts in public-sector spending, 
and large scale-privatisation (Mudde, 2000; Betz, 1998). Some extreme right 
parties also argue for a form of 'solidarism', i. e. a system where the economy 
should be aimed at maintaining the welfare of the whole nation and where national 
solidarity replaces class struggle (Mudde, 2000: 189). It is not unusual to see the 
two positions being presented in the parties' programmes: a form of welfare state, 
along with neo-liberal rhetoric (Mudde, 2000). The 'Third-Way' is often invoked 
as the adequate socio-economic solution. It proposes an alternative system to 
capitalism and communism, lying somewhere in-between both (Davies and Lynch, 
2002). The economic system favoured by extreme right parties is also described as 
being a form of "petit-bourgeois type capitalism" (lmmerfall, 1998: 255), i.e. a 
society of producers where the people get their rightly earned share. All these 
propositions lie within a discourse of welfare chauvinism where policy should 
only benefit the community of nationals, defined by ethnic criteria and blood ties 
(Mudde, 2000). Hence, 'nationals' should have priority over immigrants in the job 
market, for council housing and for health and unemployment benefits. In this 
regard, economic nationalism has become the extreme right's new leitmotiv. 
Protectionist measures are advocated, in order to protect national economies 
against foreign competition (Mudde, 2000; Betz, 1998). This is why, Mudde (2000) 
argues, most extreme right parties reject the EU and its Maastricht Treaty. 
3.2.3. Anti-establishment 
According to Anastasakis (2000), unemployment, economIC receSSIOn and 
personal insecurity are key elements in creating a climate of dissatisfaction 
towards governments and mainstream parties and leads towards a vote for the 
extreme right, which has been conceptualised by some as a protest vote. Many 
scholars, such as Swyngedouw (1998, 1992), De Witte (1996), Eatwell (1998, 
1996), reject this explanation. Eatwell (1998: 27) argues that it is essentially a 
question of rational choice, i.e. the voters choose the party that is closest to their 
policy preferences. Interestingly, it appears that some extreme right political 
parties present themselves as protesters. For instance, the Dutch Pym Fortyn List 
and the German Partei Rechtsstaatlicher Offensive, both experienced local success 
by using protests against governing mainstream political parties as a core 'sales' 
argument (Camus, 2002). Similarly, in Belgium, the Vlaams Blok claims that it is 
the only 'anti-system' party and does not hesitate to present itself as 'different' by 
denouncing the scandals which have compromised the political class: 
"Belgian establishment party politicians do not serve the people. Instead. 
they serve their own parties. their immediate circles and their trade unions. 
Embezzlement of public funds. corruption and political scandals are too 
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common in Belgium [. . .] The Vlaams Blok refuses to play this corrupt game. 
We will always resist the scourge of political appointments and the 
accumulation of sinecures. " (http://vlaamsblok.be/index.shtml) 
It seems that a distrust of the political classes leads to more votes for extreme right 
parties. This is possibly due to the affairs, scandals and corruption in which 
members of mainstream leading parties have been involved (Betz, 1998). Social 
democratic parties are seen here as protecting the more privileged members of 
society (lmmerfall, 1998), such as the skilled and relatively rich workforce in the 
subsidised and protected sectors of the economy (lmmerfall, 1998), and, 
significantly the immigrants. Extreme right parties often claim that state benefits 
are intended for 'foreigners' 8. In other words, voters vote 'ideologically' for 
'protest' parties. 
Immerfall (1998) argues that xenophobic feelings might arise from the frustration 
of seeing foreigners competing for (and unfairly winning) council housing and 
unemployment benefits. Weakening and marginalisation of the fringes of the 
population have been identified by Immerfall (1998:250) as consequences of post-
industrialism and globalisation: downsizing, decreasing wages, and educational 
requirements. Since the growing prosperity of society allegedly does not benefit 
our 'own people', it was shown that extreme right voters tend to be more 
pessimistic about the future than people voting for other political parties 
(Immerfall, 1998). As a consequence, Immerfall (1998) argues, feeling 'forgotten' 
by the political elite, voters tum towards populist parties claiming to speak and 
8 They seem oblivious to the fact that, as argued by Faniel (2003), most immigrants are on the 
bottom rung of society's ladder due to, for example, discrimination in the job market. 
fight on their behalf. Extreme right parties also appeal to the more comfortably-off 
classes by denouncing the high level of taxes and arguing for neo-liberal policies. 
Accordingly, they also win votes from affluent citizens who are dissatisfied with 
high taxes and social regulation that stand in the way of personal advancement 
(lmmerfall, 1998: 252). 
3.2.4. Law and order 9 
The 'law and order' aspect of extreme right parties' policies is related to a belief in 
order and authority, accompanied by a demand for harsher punishments for 
breaking the law. Extreme right parties advocate long sentences, harsh prison 
conditions, and even, for some, the re-establishment of the death penalty (Mudde, 
2000). In their view, a strong state should have a strong police force in terms of 
personnel, equipment and authority (Mudde, 2000). This is congruent with a belief 
that "human life is possible only in a well-ordered community" (Mudde, 2000: 
107). The immigration issue is linked here with crime and insecurity in the rhetoric 
of the extreme right where parties call for a 'zero-tolerance' policy and extreme 
measures, such as the expulsion of foreign delinquents (Mudde, 2000). All these 
elements are clearly apparent in the following quotation from the British National 
Party's website (the BNP can be unambiguously classified as extreme right in the 
British political landscape): 
<l Davies and Lynch (2002: 256) define authoritarianism as the "tendency to value the importance 
of authority rather than pluralism and diversity as a basis for social order [,',]; political leaders in 
democratic systems can also exhibit an authoritarian style of leadership in which they assume the 
mantle of national leadership and act as authority figures", 
,-
.)J 
"We [the BNP] would simply adopt a policy of "Zero Tolerance ", 
replacing liberal concern for the 'rights' of criminals with a proper 
emphasis on the rights of victims, and on the rights of people not to become 
victims. We would toughen up the courts to apply stricter sentences, put the 
necessary resources behind the police and release them from the 
paralysing s t r a i ~ h t j a c k e t t of political correctness ". (FAQ. BNP 
infonnation pack) ) 
3.3. The communication of extreme right parties: an identified 'gap' in the 
literature 
Media coverage has the power to attract and focus audience attention on specific 
problems. Social movements depend heavily on external media to convey their 
messages to influential actors outside the protest group (Smith et al., 2001), but 
they also have the power to exaggerate some events, to reduce others, and 
generally to be the sole arbiter as to what is worth showing (McLeod, 1995). 
Hence an acute problem arises for parties that have limited access to mainstream 
media (whether through news coverage or through purchase of advertising space), 
and for the ones suffering from unfavourable media coverage. The media have not 
always painted a favourable picture of protest groups - quite the contrary 
according to Smith et al. (2001) and McLeod (1995). The mainstream mass media 
are even accused by opposition parties of serving the ruling hegemony and 
alienating the population. For instance, Frank Vanhecke, the leader of the Flemish 
extreme right Vlaams Blok, asked mass media and political leaders to stop their 
· smear campaign' against his party: 
10 BNP Infonnation Pack, F AQ section, in 
http://Content.IE5\WXQB816F\InfoPackWeb[1]\infopackweb\bnp\Faqs.htm , as accessed 
18/0212004 
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"They [the media and political leaders J are co-responsible for the climate 
of intolerance in which Haider, Le Pen and Dewinter are presented as a 
threat to democracy and therefore a legitimate target. To prel'ent ji/rtller 
tragedies I call on politicians and journalists to stop demonising the 
Vlaams Blok. " (http://www.vlaamsblok.be/index.shtml) 
As was shown earlier (see section 3.1., p. 27), research has identified a range of 
possible contributors to the success of extreme right parties (see among others 
Anastasakis, 2000; Kitschelt, 1995; Betz, 1994), exploring, for example, 
"ideologico-cultural" dimensions of the extreme right movement, located in its 
xenophobic discourse (Anastasakis, 2000: 6). The proposition here is to adopt a 
managerial perspective to the study of the success of an extreme right party 
characterised by controversial and undemocratic advocated policies. Most extreme 
right parties have, according to Rensmann (2003), doubled their electoral turnout 
over the last two decades turning new voters into loyal voters. Although citizens 
are increasingly apathetic and uninterested in mainstream politics, their loyaltyll to 
extreme right parties and their willingness to vote, pose important questions about 
political consumption and the potential for a case-study in successful political 
marketing. Lin (2004) also suggests that marketing theory could provide new 
insights to help explain the recent success of the extreme right in Western Europe. 
II For example, according to Swyngedouw el al. (2004), the Vlaams Blok has the most loyal electorate in 
Flanders. Belgium (80%) of voters that voted for the same party 111 2 consecutive elections. 
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4. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the extreme right in Western Europe, its 
nature and its ideological idiosyncrasies. Extreme right politics has attracted a lot 
of interest given its electoral successes. The range of research focussing on the 
extreme right indicates growing concern with the increasing success of extreme 
right parties across Western Europe. They are rich sites of enquiry for scholars 
interested in their enduring appeal across Europe, in a contemporary world where 
citizens have been described as detached from politics. The extreme right was 
conceptualised in this chapter as a political family characterised by xenophobia, 
authoritarism, neo-liberalism and solidarism. The existing literature on the extreme 
right stems mainly from politics, sociology and history, and provides many 
analyses, case studies and theories dissecting the phenomenon from nearly every 
angle. However, the current literature on the extreme right omits consideration of 
the marketing of parties adopting this specific ideology. This project endeavours to 
fill this gap, and explore the explanatory potential of marketing to understand the 
discourse of the extreme right. The next chapter examines political marketing as a 
discipline and as a practice, and discusses the main theories and concepts of 
marketing which could illuminate the observed political activities and processes. 
Chapter 3: Political Marketing: relevance and issues 
1. Introduction 
The rather young discipline of political marketing was developed to respond to the 
evolution of the political actors and political marketplace. Political marketing is 
therefore the focus of the next section, which explores the explanatory potential of 
its theories for the processes observed in political practice. This chapter starts with 
a review of the political marketing literature, with a particular focus on the 
relevant theories for this research (or the lack of them?). The potential weaknesses 
and criticisms aimed at political marketing are also addressed and a venue for a 
'solution' (or possible reconciliation) is offered in the form of a discursive 
approach to the discipline and its object(s) of enquiry, namely marketing within 
the political arena. 
2. Political consumption 
Grasping the meaning of consumption is a challenge for both marketing as an 
academic discipline and for political parties in order to construct politics as 
meaningful to an increasingly cynical electorate. The discussion in this chapter is 
targeted at understanding political consumption and its significance for marketing 
within the civic and political sphere. The political consumption experience takes 
many forms, one of which is voting (Dermody and Scullion, 2001: 1088). Voting 
represents among other things a form of political participation, a granting of 
authority and a feeling of freedom (Dermody and Scullion, 2001). Although vofum, 
the Latin root of voting, means 'ardent passion' (Mitchell, 1990), voters do not 
seem to be animated by anything passionate when they go to the poll (if they even 
bother to vote). A low turnout of the electorate supposedly shows that citizens are 
not satisfied with traditional political actions, such as voting and party membership 
(Mitchell, 1990). For example, in the June 2004 European elections, abstention 
was massive throughout Europe. On average, 56% of Europeans did not vote. 
Only 44% of the French and 380/0 of the British electorate voted; and, in Poland 
(though a recent member of the EU), only 15% of eligible voters went to the polls. 
Political parties and other traditional forms of political participation are apparently 
losing their appeal. 
According to Lees-Marshment (2001: 17), there was a time when loyalty and long-
term support for political parties were strong in Britain. Until the 1970s, the 
British electorate was culturally, economically and socially aligned with the same 
political party throughout their lives (Dean and Croft, 2001). In that' golden age', 
political values and "long-term socio-psychological attachment" to a party were 
transmitted through the political orientation of the family circle (Lees-Marshment, 
2001: 17), through social class, and through socialisation, e.g. by the membership 
of a club or of a trade union. However, voters' loyalty has diminished and voters 
are more critical of political parties (Lees-Marshment, 2001). This breakdown of 
political allegiance seemed to have coincided with the increasing adoption by UK 
political parties of the tools of mass marketing (Dean and Croft, 2001). According 
to Blumler and Gurevitch (1995, in Ward et aI., 2004). voters' apathy can be 
attributed to four socio-economic factors. First, citizens' general contentment in 
Western democracies, explained by the fulfilment of their basic needs, does not 
provide the motivation to take part in traditional forms of political action. Second, 
an increase in leisure time and leisure opportunities has resulted in people 
preferring to spend their free time in more 'entertaining' activities than political 
action (Lees-Marshment, 2001; Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995). Third, the 
trivialisation and 'sensationalisation' of politics in media coverage have turned 
politics into another form of entertainment (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995). Fourth, 
the decline in social connectedness has made people less likely to engage in social 
interactions (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995). Finally, the decrease of support can 
also be explained by the decline of social class division, increasing access to better 
education, and the modification of family structure and its decreasing influence on 
the political orientation of its members (Lees-Marshment, 2001). An additional 
reason for the people's political disengagement could be linked to the politicians 
themselves. Fund-raising (at least in the US) is an important stage in a political 
campaign. The role of money is paramount and with it the interests of the money-
providers (Ridling, 2001; Mitchell, 1990). As a consequence, trust in political 
parties and government has declined and voters' cynicism and apathy has 
increased (Putnam, 2000, in Ward et aI., 2003). For example. a 2004 survey by the 
Unil'ersite de Liege (Belgium) indicated that, if voting was not compulsory in 
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Belgium, one Walloon l2 out of four would never vote 13 . In a 1998 poll. 60 0 0 of 
the French expressed no confidence in political parties (Hertz. 2001). It appears 
that the people have low expectations that they can change the status quo by 
voting. 
Disillusion, apathy, and alienation towards political parties are common features of 
today's electorate, particularly among the young (Norris, 2004). That might 
explain why alternative means of political action (e.g. demonstrations, petitions, 
online protest), or social movements (e.g. single issue groups) are attracting so 
many supporters who want to 'make a difference'. Consumers are using their so-
called consumer sovereignty to initiate the changes they believe are vital to the 
well-being of societyl4; and hence to integrate political or activist values with the 
consumption process. Voters' apathy must not be understood as the complete 
desertion of politics by people (the success of single-issue movements points to the 
opposite), but rather as disillusionment with traditional forms of politics such as 
going to the ballot and belonging to a political party. 
Political parties might have lost sight of what is important to citizens, and what 
might trigger a greater involvement in the more traditional forms of political 
participation (e.g. voting and party membership). It seems that, if there are any 
political parties which have grasped the importance of listening to voters and yet 
12 Walloons are the inhabitants of Wallonia, the southern region of Belgium 
13 In Le Soir, 27 /08/2004 
I ~ ~ Which could be described as the rise of the so-called political consumer, where political 
consumption denotes the embodiment of political values in the act of consumption (Hertz, 200 I). 
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are still able to attract voters, it would be the ones referred to as ·the extreme right' 
(see chapter 2). Extreme right political parties' theses are controversial, sometimes 
undemocratic, but nevertheless increasingly successful in \\'estern European 
democracies. The loyalty of extreme right voters and their systematic turnout at 
the polls is puzzling and raises many questions about extreme right political 
parties' successful connection with voters. Betz (1998) noted, almost in passing. 
that the extreme right use modem tools, such as political marketing, to appeal to 
voters. Betz's (1998) contribution on the topic of the extreme right and marketing 
stopped at this statement. The focus of the present enquiry is thus the (possible) 
marketing-orientation of extreme right parties, and the use of marketing by 
politicians to enhance the persuasiveness of their offering. 
3. Political marketing: theory and practice 
Political parties and politicians have used marketing extensively to achieve their 
political goals and connect with voters but, according to Lees-Marshment (2001), 
so far appear to only borrow marketing tools (e.g. market research, focus groups, 
media campaigns, segmentation, and targeting) in an ad hoc and pragmatic 
fashion. This application of marketing, it is argued here, is a reaction to widely 
acknowledged problems of engagement with the formal political system. 
According to Mortimore (2003), for example, marketing can be used as a tool to 
deal with voters' distrust and apathy. This is evident from the burgeoning 
campaign budgets, and the increasing importance of the influence of political 
consultants in campaign planning (Schneider, 2004; Kinsey. 1999; Plasser et al., 
1999; O'Shaughnessy, 1990). That these political consultants are selected for their 
marketing expertise rather than political commitment or ideology could be an 
indication of the increasing recognition of the utility of a marketing approach in 
politics. As noted above, the need to 'connect' to the politically apathetic and 
those distrustful of the formal political system, combined with the perceived 
success that marketers have had in connecting with fickle consumers, could 
motivate the use of marketing tools and concepts in the political domain (broadly 
following Mortimore, 2003). It is not surprising, therefore, that business practices 
have pervaded the political arena. This is illustrated by TV news reports and in 
newspapers where words and phrases such as exchange, stakeholders, focus 
groups, market research, buying ideas, are commonly used to describe political 
processes and behaviours (see Dean and Croft, 2001; Chilton and Schaffner, 
1997)15. The extent to which business (and marketing in particular) and politics 
share more than jargon has been widely explored by academics in the field of 
political marketing (see among others Lock and Harris, 1996; O'Cass, 1996; 
Shama, 1973). The relevance of marketing concepts, theories and techniques for 
the practice of politics has not been accepted de facto by all. The following section 
provides an overview of the current theoretical development within the field of 
political marketing. 
15 Whether this is a reflection of the pervasiveness of the market ideology or a more conscious 
decision by politicians to use this rhetoric/ideology, is not discussed here. What is interesting is the 
consideration that 1) the use of business vocabulary illustrates the rhetorical power of market 
ideology and 2) as shown earlier, people's 'consumer education' makes them comfortable with the 
rhetoric of consumption. 
3.1. The nature of political marketing: current literature 
Kelley (1956) is, according to Scammell (1999), to be credited with the first use of 
the term 'political marketing', in his study on the increasing influence of 
professional persuaders in politics. For Kelley (1956), 'marketing' essentially 
meant persuasion and was an updating of a familiar theme since the First World 
War, that mass democracy required new instruments of social control (Scammell, 
1999: 723). At first 'political marketing' was used more or less interchangeably 
with 'propaganda' (since the purpose of the activity was the same: mass 
persuasion). The 'new' marketing label reflects partly a quest for a more neutral 
term, since propaganda was being discredited (see discussion, page 55). But the 
use of marketing also reflects the observation that professionals from the 
commercial marketing industry, especially marketing, were increasingly involved 
in political persuasion (Scammell, 1999). 
Kotler and Andreassen (1991: 42) define marketing as a "mindset of consumer-
centeredness" (in Q'Cass, 1996) inside the organisation. Applied to political 
processes, marketing becomes 'political marketing', i.e. the application of business 
practices to politics and the mindset of 'voter-centredness', to use an analogy with 
Kotler and Andreassen's (1991) defmition. In other words, the voter is at the 
centre of strategic marketing decisions within the party. Lees-Marshment (2001) 
adopts a similar view by arguing that political marketing is about political 
organisations adapting business-marketing concepts and techniques to help them 
achieve their goals. Political marketing is not exclusively or primarily concerned 
with political communication or campaign fonnulation (following Schneider, 
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2004). Indeed Shama (1973: 764) defmed political marketing as "the process by 
which political candidates and ideas are directed at the voters in order to satisfy 
their political needs and thus gain their support for the candidate and ideas in 
question" (Shama, 1973: 764). Lock and Harris (1996) have also argued that 
exchange theory is useful to analyse political marketing. In their words, political 
marketing is: 
"as a discipline, the study of the processes of exchanges between political 
entities and their environment and among themselves, with particular 
reference to the positioning of these entities and their communications [ ... ] 
As an activity, it is concerned with strategies for positioning and 
communications, and the methods through which these strategies may be 
realized, including the search for information into attitudes, awareness and 
response of target audiences" (Lock and Harris, 1996: 22). 
Thus it appears that political marketing is a practice and a discipline concerned 
with processes of exchanges and relationships between political entities, about 
techniques borrowed from business marketing, but also about concepts and 
strategies. Political marketing is a holistic process that encompasses the whole 
behaviour of the political organisation and its application of marketing concepts 
(not only techniques) (Ingram and Lees-Marshment, 2002). 'Political 
communications' is a popular subject of enquiry within the discipline of political 
marketing (see for example, Moloney et al., 2003; Blumler, 2001; Dermody and 
Wring, 2001; Caywood and Preston, 1989). But the scope of political marketing is 
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not limited to election periods or to political communications. The concepts and 
theories of political marketing have also attracted much attention from scholars 
(Wring, 1997; Omura, 1979; Shama, 1975, among others). 
Political marketing as a discipline has yet to build a strong conceptual core. but the 
many analogies between consumer marketing and political marketing cannot be 
ignored (see among others Niffenger, 1989; O'Leary and Iredale, 1976; Kotler. 
1975; Shama, 1973). For some, political marketing relies on the double 
assumption, as noted by Needham (2006), that 1) voters' choices made at election 
time are analogous to the choices of commercial products and services made by 
consumers; and 2) by extension, there is a parallel between marketing a consumer 
product and promoting a political party. Baines et at. (2002) argue that the 
differences between political marketing and commercial marketing have been 
overstated. Kotler and Kotler (1999), Butler and Collins (1994) and Shama (1973) 
perceive the marketing in business and non-commercial contexts as similar and 
consequently a broadened marketing concept would be particularly relevant in 
politics. Similarly, according to O'Cass (1996) and Mandelson (1988; in Baines et 
at., 2002). there seems to be a high degree of synergy between political 
campaigning and marketing. O'Cass (1996: 38) goes further stating that "the very 
essence of a candidate and political party's interface with the electorate is a 
marketing one and marketing cannot be avoided". According to Shama (1973) 
many concepts and tools are shared by marketing of goods and services and 
political marketing. Egan (1999) supports this arguing that the 'crossover' of 
concepts from traditional marketing and political marketing is relatively easy. For 
example, a political campaign is, in this view, similar to the product development 
and product launch of a commercial company (Kraus, 1999). Here, both marketing 
and political campaigning are considered as techniques for reaching, informing, 
communicating with, and persuading the electorate (Baines et aI., 2002). 
The stance adopted in this research is somewhat congruent with O'Shaughnessy's 
(2001) and Lock and Harris' (1996) positions, namely that political marketing 
scholars must develop a sound paradigm and relevant concepts; even if it means, it 
is argued here, borrowing from commercial marketing. Newman's (1994) 
argument that political candidates can be considered as specialised servIce 
providers l6 (such as solicitors), or estate agents (Marland, 2003) is attractive and 
should be nevertheless empirically evaluated. If there are indeed differences 
between business marketing and political marketing, a case could be made that 
''political marketing is just as distinctive from commercial marketing as is social 
marketingl7" (Marland, 2003: 106). 
16 For example, the noted similarities between political marketing and service marketing, are first, 
the nature of the product: "intangible, complex, and not fully understood by its customers" 
(Scammell, 1999: 727). Second, the purchase decision is also a more thoughtful process, some 
service products are expensive to purchase with long-term personal consequences (such as private 
health, legal and financial services) (Scammell, 1999). Third, there is a high level of uncertainty 
linked to the purchase because the consumer cannot physically see the product ahead of the 
purchase. There is therefore a high dependence on information, and depending on the 
cost/significance of the purchase, likely to seek out trusted information sources such as consumer 
watchdog media or personal recommendation from the social circle (friends, colleagues, family). 
Successful marketing in these types of service sectors has found to be associated with strategies 
that treat sales not as one-off purchases, but as exchange relationships where the customer invests 
trust (and money) and the producer fulfils his promises (Scammell, 1999: 727-728). 
17 Social marketing is about the "design, implementation, and control of programs seeking to 
increase the acceptability ofa social idea or practice in target group(s)" (Kotler, 1975: 283). 
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Perhaps the key point is the adherence to the marketing concept, and a consumer-
oriented approach that 'puts the customer at the beginning rather than the end of 
the production-consumption cycle' (Scammell, 1999: 725). The marketing concept 
contends that customer satisfaction is best achieved by attention to customer \\'ants 
and the needs at the start, as well as the end, of the production process (Scammell. 
1999: 725). As straightforward as it may seem, this point is still contentious within 
the field of political marketing. This point is discussed in detail in this chapter. The 
development of a political marketing theory is addressed first. 
3.2. Political marketing theory 
Efforts have been made to extend political marketing as an academic discipline 
beyond the limitations of mass marketing theory. These extensions reflect 
advances in both marketing theory and political marketing practice. For example, 
the discipline of political marketing includes studies of exchange and relationships 
between political entities and the way that techniques borrowed from industrial, 
services and relationship marketing are, or could be, deployed by political 
marketing practitioners (see for example Lock and Harris (1996)). As a separate 
discipline, political marketing is developing its 'own' concepts that include the 
total behaviour of the political organisation and the application of marketing 
concepts and techniques as well as the responses of the citizen-consumer (e.g. 
Ingram and Lees-Marshment, 2002; Wring, 1996; Omura, 1979; Shama, 1976, 
among others). This broadening of both political marketing practice and the 
theorising of political marketing has necessitated that political marketing emerges 
as an interdisciplinary subject (e.g., Hunt, 1983; in Henneberg, 2004) studying not 
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just the application of marketing tools and concepts to politics, but also the whole 
range of social theory that informs the study of post -industrial consumer society. 
Not unexpectedly then, the political marketing literature reflects both the \'aried 
intellectual heritage and the eclectic nature of its practice. Attempts to extend the 
discipline seem to be genuine reactions to emergent conceptual and practical 
issues. Unfortunately, because of the seemingly ad hoc development of political 
marketing theory and practice described earlier, the theoretical heart of the 
discipline is currently poorly defined, contested and criticised as thin and static 
(Henneberg, 2004). This is perhaps due to the lack of integration of the new 
developments in marketing scholarship and the dominance of the now contested 
managerialist and mix-management perspectives (Henneberg, 2004). Most harshly, 
because of its lack of a well-developed intellectual core, political marketing is 
even described as something like an "academic parvenu" (O'Shaughnessy and 
Henneberg, 2002: xiv) or as an intellectual arriviste (Bauman, 1997). This pastiche 
of theory has left political marketing as a discipline that: 
"[had] to develop its own frameworks adapting those from the core 
marketing literature and, second that it has to develop its own predicti\'e 
and prescriptive models if it is to inform and influence political action" 
(Lock and Harris, 1996: 16). 
Lock and Harris's 1996 prescription seems still valid nearly ten years later, when 
Henneberg (2004) assessed the state of political marketing theory development 
so 
and arrived at the conclusion that it is static and, so far. quite limited in scope. 
because it focusses mainly on the use of marketing mix-related concepts and tools 
by political actors and on comparative studies of political campaigns. Howc\er. 
efforts are being made to develop sound concepts and theories 18 and the theoretical 
foundations needed to provide a sound understanding of the phenomenon under 
investigation. 
3.3. Relationship marketing 
As a consequence, adopting political marketing as the conceptual foundation in 
this thesis raises some concerns. As a form of solution, Henneberg (1994) puts 
forward concepts from relationship marketing in order to make sense of political 
marketing and to invigorate political marketing theory development. Relationship 
marketing has been developed on the premise that business activities are 
dependent on relationships, and that co-operation and collaboration are more 
important than an antagonistic perspective (Henneberg, 1994: 8). There appears to 
be some consensus in the business world that success is not built on one-off sales, 
but on long-term relationships between the company and the customer. Thus the 
key elements of a successful relationship are trust, loyalty, two-way and honest 
communication (Treasure, 2002; Morgan & Hunt. 1994). The perspective of the 
Nordic School of Services Marketing on relationship marketing is of particular 
interest here. As stated before. the standpoint on political marketing adopted is that 
political candidates can be considered as service providers (Newman, 1994; 
I ~ ~ Sec Journal of Political Marketing (2007) Theory and Concept Development in Political 
Marketing. Vol. 6 edited by Nicholas O'Shaughnessy and Stephan Henneberg 
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Kotler, 1975). In the Nordic School of Services Marketing approach, it is argued 
that the offer of service is co-produced between the seller and the buyer. Services 
marketing encounters are seen as a series of exchanges which together fonn the 
episodic relationship (e.g. logging on to a party website), and ultimately an 
exchange relationship (e.g. loyalty at the poll for the party) (Henneberg. 2004: 10). 
Relationship marketing theories can therefore be used to describe and prescribe the 
tactical and strategic activities of a variety of political actors (Henneberg, 2004: 
10). There are therefore clear similarities between long-lasting service industries 
and political markets (Scammell, 1999). For example, one key concern is the 
significance of reputation, or public image. 
Adopting relationship marketing theories to develop political marketing theory is 
an interesting project that would no doubt enrich the discipline and infonn political 
practice. Potential solutions, though, can also be found in theories and methods 
that have been suggested in both the marketing and political science literatures. 
That which is explored herein is a discourse approach, applied in the marketing 
I iterature to understand identity and power relations in advertising (e.g., Elliott and 
Ritson, 1997; Elliott, 1996) and similarly applied in critical and political fields to 
understand political disputes and political rhetoric (e.g. Schon and Rein, 1994). 
Given the nature of the phenomenon studied and the 'contentious' nature of 
political marketing and the extreme right discourse, a discourse approach IS 
considered appropriate, as is discussed in further detail in the following section. 
3.4. (Political) marketing discourse 
Marketing is, according to Morgan (1992: 137), "better understood as a set of 
practices and discourses which help constitute and shape social relations in 
modem western societies". Far from being a neutral way of looking at the world. 
marketing is, according to critical theory, an ideology-laden phenomenon. In other 
words, marketing is far from being 'neutral' (Morgan, 1992). Marketing discourse 
contributes to the way people view and understand the world. It is "part of the 
process whereby a particular form of society is constructed, one in which human 
beings are treated as things, where identity is reduced to ownership of 
commodities and all social relations are conceived in market terms" (Morgan, 
1992: 154). J f one accepts the idea that mass consumption is the cultural norm in 
20th century western industrialised societies (Morgan, 1992), it follows that 
individual and social identities are constructed through consumption values 
(Morgan, 1992: 137). Marketing builds a context where social agents live and 
interact, and is used as a resource by the same agents to make sense of their social 
context. It is a discourse through which social actors (i.e., organisations, 
consumers, and institutions) understand and attempt to control those social 
processes (Morgan, 1992: 137). Marketing can be understood as an instrument 
which frames and legitimates political discourse in the eyes of voters. The ability 
to connect with voters is a key issue for political parties and it seems that 
marketing discourse is mainly used strategically by parties to make their speech 
'voter-friendly' and encourage the consumption of their political · product' . 
Therefore marketing is used as a form of legitimating discourse to make politics 
accessible to people who have heen socialised by a consumer society. 
Discourse: a brief introduction 
'Discourse' is a central concept in this research and is defined in further detail later 
(see chapter 5, p.89). There are two aspects to the conceptualisation of political 
marketing practice as a discourse. The first argument is that a marketing discourse 
can create a logic that leads people to find solutions to their wants and needs in the 
market. A marketing discourse constructs people as consumers, rather than, say, as 
citizens and our attitudes, expectations and behaviours follow from that broad 
identity construction. Within that broad identity of 'consumer', marketing pro\'ides 
people with the symbolic resources to construct or represent one or more identities 
(all being some variation of a consumer identity) (Morgan, 1992). The ideology of 
marketing, embodied in such a marketing discourse, has contributed to the current 
centrality of consumption in creating meaning and significance in people's lives. 
(Gibson et aI., 2003; Brownlie et at., 1999). Marketers not only help provide for 
the physical needs of consumers but also provide the symbolic material for their 
identity construction and expression. As such, marketing has shaped and continues 
to shape the social sphere by defining the space within which social relations are 
constituted as social exchanges. This discourse appears to have emerged in 
political marketing and constructs voters not as active citizens in civic society but 
as consumers deciding which policies and politicians they will 'buy' with their 
vote. Politicians, on the other hand, play the appropriate role and seek to 'sell' 
themselves and their policy (market) offerings (Savigny, 2004). 
4. Political marketing and propaganda 
The introduction of marketing practices into politics has not been celebrated by all. 
For example, applying a market-orientation to a party is in opposition to the 
traditional view of an elitist democracy where politicians must lead by conviction 
and ideology, rather than being led by public opinion (Butler and Collins. 2003; 
Palmer, 2002; Scammell, 1996). The use of marketing is considered by some as 
unethical because it supposedly manipulates and misleads voters, by promoting 
people with media skills (Baines and Egan 2001; Scammell, 1995; Newman, 1994; 
Sabato, 1981) and favours image over substance (Egan, 1999). Marketing 
supposedly transforms important messages into sound-bites and removes 
rationality from the voters' decision-process (Baines and Egan, 2001; Lees-
Marshment, 2001). Applied to politics, marketing is equated to spin and 
manipulation. It is not uncommon to hear political marketing being spoken of as 
equivalent to propaganda (O'Shaughnessy, 1996; Scammell, 1995; 
O'Shaughnessy, 1990) with all the negative connotations attached to the term 
(Salmon, 1989, in O'Shaughnessy, 1996). For example, in common parlance the 
term 'propaganda' is not only used to characterise a message identified as negative 
and dishonest (Jowett and O'Donne!, 1999: 3), but also to describe the persuasive. 
biased and deceptive communication of totalitarian regimes. A more educated 
approach to propaganda would provide a less 'emotional' description. Propaganda 
has also been described as a one-way communication process in which passive 
audiences are manipulated by political elites (Wring, 1996). Propaganda means to 
disseminate or promote particular ideas (Jowett and O'DonneL 1999: 2), and more 
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specifically it is "the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions. 
manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the 
desired intent of the propagandist" (Jowett and O'Donnel. 1999: 6). Of course this 
definition could be applied in some degree to marketing itself. Similarities 
between propaganda and political marketing do clearly exist. The deliberate intent 
to persuade is central to both. It should not be overlooked that human 
communication is rarely neutral (O'Shaughnessy, 1996) and that persuasion is an 
integral part of human nature (Jowett and O'Donnel, 1999: 47). Therefore the 
persuasive essence of marketing cannot be used to 'dismiss' marketing discourse, 
as being altogether manipulative. 
Differences between political marketing and propaganda 
Political marketing and propaganda share the characteristics that little information 
is passed on to the receiver, controlled media are used and persuasion is central 
(O'Shaughnessy, 1996; Wring, 1996). Political marketing is attentive to the 
audience and holds a customer focus (O'Shaughnessy, 1999), therefore the 
political product can be changed according to the needs of the customers/voters 
and the message is adapted to the audience (O'Shaughnessy, 1996). In contrast, 
propaganda is pushed forward by ideology (O'Shaughnessy, 1996) and does not 
seek mutual fulfilment of needs and understanding (Jowett and O'DonnelL 1999: 
46). The goal of propaganda is to "further the desired intent of the propagandist" 
(Jowett and O'Donnell, 1999:6). O'Shaughnessy (1996: 58) described propaganda 
as didactic: the propagandist is convinced that his or her ideas are correct and 
attempts to persuade the audience to adhere to them. Without marketing's 
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concerns with people's needs and wants, what is actually referred to is a modern 
form of propaganda (Scammell, 1999). It is the centrality of the consumer, or voter 
that sets marketing apart from propaganda. 
Political science typically links the marketing of politics to the decline of political 
cleavages, and the rise of the catch-aU 19 parties (Scammell. 1999). In other words. 
the less clear the ideological divide, the more parties will have to rely on the 
techniques of marketing to manufacture difference, the party's role becoming 
"analogous to that of a major brand in the marketing as a universally needed and 
highly standardized article of mass consumption" (Kirchheimer, 1966: 192). If this 
might be often true, there are however strong examples of the use of marketing 
pioneered by the most-ideologically-committed parties, the New Right in the USA 
and Thatcher's Conservatives in Britain (Scammell, 1995). 
On the view of the discussion above, one cannot help but notice how insubstantial 
are the differences between political marketing and propaganda, and yet how 
fiercely political marketing scholars defend (perhaps understandably) their 
discipline. Critics, influenced by propaganda studies, ask whether marketing 
actually brought anything genuinely new to politics, or whether it is simply a 
version of age-old propaganda activities allied to modern technologies (see 
Scammell, 1995; O'Shaughnessy, 1990). Unsurprisingly, political marketing 
scholars advocate the application of a marketing orientation to the conduct of 
politics, implying (more or less overtly) that marketing is beneficial to democracy 
19 catch-all parties are ideologically broad and inclusive parties. 
57 
(Kotler and Kotler, 1999), and could only contribute to a better representation of 
constituents (Savigny, 2004). These are manifestations of a political marketing 
discourse which presents itself as legitimate and self-evident. 
5. Conclusion 
In conclusion, there is still no consensus about a definition of political marketing, 
"nor even that it is the most appropriate label for the common focus of study" 
(Scammell, 1999: 718). 'Political marketing' is currently competing with other 
labels to describe the same subject. Examples include political management; 
packaged politics; promotional politics; or modem political communications 
(Scammell, 1999: 718). Political marketing has, though, clearly become accepted 
by scholars in Britain, Germany, and the USA, who are attempting to establish it 
as a distinctive sub-discipline which IS developing cross-disciplinary 
political/marketing/communication perspectives to explain the promotional 
features of modem politics and as a tool of analysis of party and voter behaviour 
(Scammell, 1999: 718). 
The most important point made in this chapter is the relevance and usefulness of 
political marketing theory and concepts in addressing the research questions. In the 
view of the above discussion, a straightforward application of managerial theories 
of marketing might be considered weak if not detrimental for the validity and 
credibility of the present research. Political marketing as a discipline is 'under 
development' and there is some promising research which uses the relationship 
marketing paradigm and empirically applies it to analyse and understand political 
practice (see for example Larson, 2002; Dean and Croft, 2001). The locus of the 
enquiry in this thesis is a particularly successful party of the extreme right, the 
Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang in Belgium. The party has shown on several 
instances its use of political marketing for campaigning. The following chapter 
describes the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang, its nature and ideology, in addition to 
explaining in detail the relevance of the choice of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang 
for this research. 
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Chapter 4: The Vlaams Blok and the Vlaams Beiang 
1. Introduction - the political context: the extreme right and political 
marketing 
This chapter presents the specific site of enquiry of the analysis of the marketing 
of the extreme right. As discussed in the first chapter, research has identified a 
range of possible contributors to the success of extreme right parties (see among 
others Anastasakis, 2000; Kitschelt, 1995; Betz, 1994), exploring, for example, 
"ideologico-cultural" dimensions of the extreme right movement, located in its 
xenophobic discourse (Anastasakis, 2000: 6). However, it seems that the extreme 
right literature has overlooked the application of marketing to create a successful 
connection with the voting public. Lin (2004) suggests that marketing theory could 
provide new insights to help explain the recent success of the extreme right. Most 
extreme right parties have, according to Rensmann (2003), doubled their electoral 
turnout over the last two decades turning new voters into loyal voters. Although 
voters seem to be increasingly apathetic and uninterested in mainstream politics, 
their loyalty20 to extreme right parties and their willingness to vote represent a 
potential example of a case-study in successful political marketing. 
~ o o According to Swyngedouw et al. (2004). the Flemish Vlaams Blok has the most loyal electorate 
in Flanders (80°'0) of\oters that voted for the same party in two consecutive elections. 
This chapter aims at presenting the particular extreme right party selected, as a site 
of enquiry for the research. This thesis examines a particularly successful party, 
the Flemish Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang, specifically in the way it has marketed 
its policies to large audiences and experienced increasing support in Belgian 
elections since the 1990s. The perspective adopted here provides interesting 
insights as to how a political party can successfully apply marketing strategies. 
Any organisation that manages to get 25% of market share21 , despite a concerted 
campaign against it (the so-called 'cordon sanitaire' 22, and a number of 
lawsuits23 ), is worth examining, irrespective of one's acceptance of the liberal 
democratic assumption that their product is inherently flawed (i.e. extreme rightist 
with strong features of racist and discriminatory discourse (see Mudde, 2000». 
The Vlaams Blok itself (unofficially) advocates the use of marketing24 to enhance 
its political campaigns. Since 1991, a team of professional advertisers has been 
hired to design the party's advertising campaigns (Vander Velpen, 1992). The 
result of their work was a strong visual campaign that set the trend for subsequent 
21 On June 13th 2004, nearly 1,000,000 people (i.e. 1 Fleming out of 4) voted for the Vlaams Blok 
at the June 2004 elections. 
22 The cordon sanitaire is an agreement signed in 1989 between the main traditional parties 
(Socialists, Liberals, Christian-Democrats, Greens arid Volksunie), to never formalise political 
agreements with the Vlaams Blok. The media followed the lead and little (if at all) broadcasting 
space and time was from then on dedicated to the party (De Winter, 2004). 
2 Three non-profit associations linked to the Vlaams Blok have been sued by the Centre for Equal 
Opportunity and the Fight against Racism, for breaching the law against racism. After years of 
legal proceedings, the Vlaams Blok was condemned in 2004, for racism and the part leaders 
decided to disband the party to avoid further prosecutions. 
24 In an internal document of the Vlaams Blok, the candidates are advised on the best way to lead a 
political campaign. "Political marketing is a global project with which the candidate can organise 
well his or her political activities. The VB is choosing without a doubt an anti-demagogic practice, 
with which we have so often tried to be the voice of the people" (Filip Dewinter, one of the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams elite members, unknown date). The Vlaams Blok stresses the importance of 
marketing as a political instrument, and at the same time rejects the accusation of manipulation, 
spin and demagogic practices that could be associated with the use of marketing in politics (Baines 
and Egan 2001; Scammell, 1995, in Harris, 2001; Newman, 1994; Sabato, 1981). 
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promotional activities. Bosseman (2001) examined the evolution of the Vlaams 
Blok's positioning, targeting and messages from 1977 to 2000. Her work supports 
my observation that the Vlaams Blok has actively used marketing to enhance its 
political impact. In addition, since persuasion lies at the heart of marketing. and of 
'-
political communications for that matter, a particular focus is on the 
persuasiveness of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang's discourse25 and the rhetorical 
strategies used to convince voters that the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang' s offer can 
'maximise their utility' to borrow economists' jargon. 
Understanding the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's discourse can only be achieved 
if one understands the peculiarities of Belgian politics, the circumstances 
surrounding the creation of the Vlaams Blok (Flemish nationalist movement), and 
current developments in the international, European and national scenes. The 
chapter sets out to clarify these contextual issues with a presentation of politics 
and political parties in Belgium. This is followed by a discussion tackling the issue 
of the extreme right in Wallonia and Flanders. The Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang is 
given particular attention: its nature, ideological programme and its voters are 
presented in detail. A particular strategy developed by mainstream political parties 
and media to fight the extreme right, the cordon sanitaire, is discussed, along with 
the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang's communication strategy to reach potential 
voters. regardless of the cordon. 
~ ~ ~ The tenn 'discourse' is defined and discussed in chapter 5. See also Appendix I. for the glossary. 
2. Politics in Belgium: a journey through a political labyrinth 
2.1. The Belgian federal model 
Belgium has been a constitutional monarchy since 1831. In 1993, after several 
revisions of the constitution, the country was transformed into a federal state. It 
was the strained political situation between different communities 26 in Belgium 
that made the shift towards federalism a necessity. Belgium is characterised by its 
three communities: the Flemish (Dutch-speaking) population in the North of the 
country; the Walloons (French-speaking) popUlation in the South of the country 
and a German-speaking minority in the East of the country. Brussels has been 
granted the status of a bilingual region. Brussels is in fact an enclave which has the 
majority of French-speakers, within the Flemish territory (see map of Belgium, 
Appendix 2). 
Early conflicts between the different communities regarding social and linguistic 
supremacy and other cultural claims, led to legislation where the Dutch language 
was finally granted a place in the administration. In 1920-1921, Wallonia 
experienced an acute economic crisis, and after years of marginality, Flemings 
became the majority in Parliament. Linguistic conflicts began putting the Belgian 
~ I > > It is worth noting that Belgian society is divided along three lines: socioeconomic, philosophical 
(Catholics vs. Non-Catholics); and socio-linguitistic (Flemish vs. Francophones) (Dierickx, 1978). 
Despite these deep divisions, the Belgian political system has proved stable. This is due to the 
readiness of the political elite to compromise, which is also known as 'consocialism' (Dierickx, 
1978: 133). Today this is not necessarily the case anymore. After the federal elections in June 2007, 
at the date of printing this thesis (i.e. 3 months later) Dutch-speaking and Francophone political 
parties have not reached an agreement to form a government. The King designated an 'explorer' in 
charge with finding a solution to the actual political CriSIS (see Le Soir. 
http://\\"\\'w .Iesoir. be/actual itelbelgique/l-explorateur-recoi t-Ieterme-2007 -08-29-546548.shtml) 
state into a huge financial deficit, due to higher and higher competition for funds27 
between communities. In 1968, a project to revise the constitution was under 
discussion. The proposal was to construct a new Belgium based on regions and 
linguistic communities, under a federal state model where autonomy would be 
given to sub-national entities, called the Regions, in charge of managing the state. 
Revisions of the constitution took place in 1970, 1980, 1988, and in 1993. The 
revisions provided a new political map of Belgium and there are now five levels of 
competence and power: the federal state, the regions, the communities, the 
provinces, and the communes (or 'towns'). The three cultural Communities are the 
Flemish, the French and the German Communities and there are also three 
Regions: het Vlaams Geweest (Flanders or Flemish Region), la Region Wallonne 
(Wallonia or Walloon Region) and Bruxelles-Capitale (Brussels Capital) (see 
Appendix 2). Each of these entities has a councit2s holding legislative power and a 
government holding executive power, except for the Flemish Community and 
Region which has merged and has a common council and government. The state, 
the three communities and the three regions have their own parliaments, which are 
authorised to legislate and constitute their government29. 
27 For example, when Wallonia invested in the Ariane rocket, Flanders demanded an oceanography 
centre. 
28 Note that at every level, there are different areas of allocation of powers. The federal state's 
jurisdiction lies in the domains of Justice, Social Security and Money, external relations, and 
external commerce. The three regions deal with the matters related to their territory: planning, 
environment, water, energy, economic questions, transport, employment. The three linguistic 
Communities' jurisdiction are related to the issues linked to people, such as training, culture, 
education, health, TV and radio. In addition, the country is divided into ten provinces, which 
~ u r i s d i c t i o n s s are the special schools, leisure, and roads. There are 589 communes (towns). 
9 Site of the Missions Economiques Franfaises, see 
http://www.dree.orglbelgiqueldocuments.asp?Rub=I&F=HTML&Num=1246 
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Belgians vote for their representatives according to the region in which they liye. 
They vote every four years in the federal legislative elections; eyery five years in 
the regional elections; every six years in the province and communal elections: and 
every five years in the European elections6. The elections follow a proportional 
representation electoral system, in which seats are divided between the different 
parties according to the votes cast. 
2.2. Political Parties: the linguistic divide 
In Belgium, there are three main traditional families of parties, with (now) 
independent linguistic wings. The voters choose the candidates in the lists they 
want to vote for, in the language of their region. In the region of Brussels, one can 
vote for either French-speaking parties or Dutch-speaking parties. The main and 
most prominent parties are summarised in the following table: 
Table 1- Political families in Belgium, by linguistic group 
Political French-speaking political parties Dutch-speaking political 
family parties 
Socio- CDH (Centre Democrate Humaniste) CDandV 
Christians 
Socialists Parti Socialiste SP.A -SPIRIT (Socialistische 
Partij .Anders-Spirit 
Liberals MR (Mouvement Reformateur) VLD (Vlaamse Liberalen en 
Democraten) 
Other parties include the greens or ecologist parties, with Ecolo in Wallonia and 
Agalev in Flanders. The extreme right is represented in the North and South of the 
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country in the fonn of the Front National and the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang. 
respectively. 
In May 2003, the extreme right did extremely well in Flanders with the Vlaams 
Blok (the party scored 18% of the votes). On the 13 th June 2004, Belgians voted 
for their local government and for the European Parliament. In \\'allonia and 
Brussels, the Socialists won an overwhelming victory and the Vlaams Blok's 
progression was contained in Brussels. However, the Vlaams Blok (or Flemish 
Bloc) became the second largest party in Flanders with its 32 seats in the Flemish 
government, behind the CD&V with its 35 seats. At the June 2004 elections, 
nearly 1,000,000 people voted for the Vlaams Blok. The Vlaams Blok also won 
seats at the European Parliament (giving it a total of three members of the 
European parliament). The Vlaams Blok became the Vlaams Belang (or Flemish 
Interest) in 2004, after legal problems (which are explained on p. 83). The Front 
National (FN), a French-speaking extreme right party, won 8.14% of the votes in 
Wallonia (from an early 3.95%) securing three seats in the Walloon parliament. 
That result puzzled the other democratic parties, given the FN' s lack of structure, 
of policy, and electoral campaign. The case of the FN is also quite interesting in its 
remarkable lack of success in Wallonia, a region crippled by unemployment and 
crime. Differences in the perfonnance of the Front National and the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang are further discussed in the next sections. 
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2.3. The Extreme Right in Belgium: different parties, different fortunes 
This section presents the Belgian extreme right. At the image of the Belgian 
political scene, the extreme right is divided by language. The Northern region 
counts the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Blok, a party that has been consistently successful 
in Flanders and is even scoring reasonable figures among Brussels' Dutch-
speakers and French-speakers alike. Wallonia has its extreme right party, the Front 
National. The FN represents almost the complete opposite to the Vlaams Blok 
(apart from its extreme right ideology): the FN is unsuccessful, lacks credibility, 
and does not have a charismatic leader and well-articulated policies. 
2.1.1. The Front National: the misfortune of the French-speaking extreme right 
The Front National, or National Front, first emerged in Brussels in 1985, founded 
by Daniel Feret. It was created as a 'brother' of the French National Front (FN), 
even copying the name, logo and acronym of the French FN (Faniel, 2003). But 
since 1989, lean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of the French FN, has withdrawn 
support from the Belgian FN. The FN advocates policies of unity of the country, 
pro-monarchy, ultra-liberalism and anti-immigration. In 1988, the extreme right 
was non-existent in Wallonia. In 1993, it experienced its first electoral successes: 
from 5% at Liege to 14.4 % at La Louviere (Carrozzo, 2002). In 1994 and 1995, 
the FN and Agir (Agir is another minor French-speaking extreme right party in 
Wallonia) experienced some minor success: 175,732 votes for the Front National 
and 42,917 votes for AGIR, in the European ballot. However, AGIR disappeared 
after 1995, because of internal tensions. The FN lost half its votes in lune 1999 
and was considered then as a marginal party (Nollet, 2000). 
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Since then, the FN has suffered a range of internal crises: rivalries. di\'isions, and 
internal struggles (Coffe, 2005a; Faniel, 2003). Its downward slide continued in 
the local elections of October 2000 (Faniel, 2003), and, on 31 sl March 2003, 
Daniel Feret, the leader of the FN since 1985, was sued for the distribution of 
racist leaflets. According to Carrozzo (2002), the relative success of the Front 
National was mainly due to the acute unemployment crisis 30 in Wallonia and 
scandals which tainted the traditional parties. The FN was perceived by voters as 
inefficient and parasitic and lost its popular legitimacy. In that context, the 
temporary success of the Front National has been labelled as a 'protest vote' 
(Caruzzo, 2002). In light of this message, the mainstream political parties adopted 
a new strategy involving being more approachable and in touch with people's 
concerns. Such efforts were rewarded at the following elections, which saw a drop 
in the votes for the FN. However, the June 2004 election results indicated that the 
appeal of the extreme right had not disappeared in the South of Belgium, which 
continues to be burdened by high levels of unemployment and criminality. 
Contrary to its French-speaking counterpart, the Vlaams Blok is much older and 
far more successful. An analysis of the progression of the two parties showed that 
the votes for the FN follow a serrated curve over the last 12 years, while the 
Vlaams 810k has been continuously rising over the last 20 years (Faniel, 2003). 
Coffe (2005a) compared the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang to the FN and tried to 
explain the differences in perfonnance by analysing individual factors. She 
_'0 For exampk. 60,000 lost jobs (coalmines. iron and steel industry) from 1960 to 1990. 
demonstrated that along with political and social factors, the success of the 
extreme right in Belgium is down to the individual parties themselves (Coffe. 
2005a). According to Art (2006) and Coffe (2005a: 90), the reasons for the poor 
results of the FN lie in its poor organisation, and in its lack of leaders, members 
and organisational background. In contrast with the FN, the Vlaams BloklVlaams 
Belang is efficiently structured, well-organised, and has charismatic leaders (Art. 
2006; Carter 2005; Coffe, 2005a). It also has the advantage of the existence of a 
traditionally well-organised nationalist sub-culture, which provides the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang with ideological and organisational coherence (Coffe. 2005a). 
2.3.2. The Vlaams Blok and the Vlaams Belang: background information 
The Vlaams Blok 
The Vlaams Blok was created in 1978 from the merger of two small nationalist 
parties run by radical dissidents of the Volksunie, which was then the most 
important nationalist post-war party (Camus, 2003; Faniel, 2003). Karel Dillen, a 
radical Flemish nationalist from the collaborationist political movement, was the 
instigator of that merger and remained the leader of the new party for many years. 
The new party could tap into the ideological and human resources from a strong 
Flemish nationalist subculture (Art, 2006)31. From 1979 to 1985, the Vlaams Blok 
transformed itself from a minor protest group into a political party. In the mid-
11 By contrast, Art (2006) notes that Wallonia never possessed a strong nationalist subculture: and 
that which did exist was largely from the left. Art (2006) explains that the absence of a nationalist 
subculture in Wallonia largely accounts for the failure of the Front National. In contrast. the 
Vlaams Blok has been able to capitalise on the nationalist ideology and common history to install 
its legitimacy in Flanders (Arts, 2006). 
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eighties, a group of young students under the leadership of Filip Dewinter from the 
Nationalistische Studentenvereniging32, an extreme right syndicate influenced by 
the French Front National, joined the party (Faniel, 2003). Under Filip Dewinter" s 
influence, the Vlaams Blok changed its direction. From a platform claiming the 
independence of Flanders and a complete amnesty for ex-collaborators, it shaped 
itself into an anti-immigrant party (Camus, 2003: FanieL 2003: Swyngedouw, 
1998). Filip Dewinter also launched a restructuring of the party's organisation, the 
development of militant activities, and the introduction of new blood to the party's 
management (Faniel, 2003). Until 1996, the party was run by Karel Dillen, Filip 
Dewinter and Gerolf Annemans. Dewinter is still responsible for the party's 
organisation; Annemans is in charge of nationalist policies focussing on the reform 
of the state, while Karel Dillen is still seen as the unifying force of the party 
(Swyngedouw, 1998: 62). This leadership trio seems to be the stabilising force that 
has ensured the remarkable lack of destructive tensions between the different 
factions and currents in the party. The Vlaams Blok (and the Vlaams Belang) has 
indeed seemed to be able to strike a balance between the core ideologies of 
Flemish nationalism, Flemish separatism, and anti-immigrantlanti-immigration33 
stance (which, according to Coffe (2005b), is the real vote gatherer for the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang). Filip Dewinter, inspired by the example of the French FN, 
32 Translation: The Association of Nationalist Students. see http://www.nsv.be/ 
33 The Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang is a xenophobic party, and as such is considered as an 'anti-
immigrant' party (blaming the foreigners for criminality, unemployment and other societal issues, 
and demanding the immigrants' repatriation (e.g. Dewinter (1992)'s "Immigration: the Solution. 70 
Propositions/or the Resolution o/the Foreigners' Issue"». The party is also an 'anti-immigration' 
party, because it denounces the so-caIled incoherence of the immigration policies of the 
government. The Vlaams Belang has adopted a more pragmatic position by calling for the 
complete assimilation of the foreigners into Flemish culture (instead of forced repatriation), and as 
such reject multiculturalism. Therefore both tern1S, 'anti-immigrant' and 'anti-immigration', are 
\al id to describe the party. 
seems to have been the fust to notice the potential of exploiting anti-immigration 
sentiments to broaden the Vlaams Blok's audience (Coffe, 2005b). This anti-
immigrant policy orientation was fust met with resistance by the supporters of 
Flemish nationalism, and created tensions within the party (Mudde, 1995). 
However, they eventually chose to focus on the electorally rewarding anti-
immigrant strategy and to combine it with their original policy on Flemish 
nationalism (Buelens and Deschouwer, 2002; in Coffe, 2004). 
A String of Electoral Successes 
It is really from the beginning of the nineties that the Vlaams Blok appeared to 
become an electoral force. In the November 1991 elections, the Vlaams Blok 
scored 10.3%, tripling its 1987 result, and winning 18 seats in parliament. That 
day is still known as "Black Sunday,,34 in Belgium (Mudde, 2000). There were 
other Black Sundays to follow. On 13th June 1999, at the Federal elections, the 
Vlaams Blok became the third largest party in Flanders, and the largest in Brussels. 
On 8th October 2000, in the city council elections in Antwerp the party gained 33% 
of the votes. On the 18th May 2003, the Vlaams Blok gained about 18% of the 
Flemish votes (about 750,000 votes) at the federal elections. One in four of the 
electorate voted for the Vlaams Blok in Antwerp. The Vlaams Blok's success was 
not limited to Antwerp; it also won votes in villages where there were no 
foreigners (Swyngedouw, 1992: 83). 
34 The origin of the term can be found in the fact that the far right in Belgium is usually associated 
with blaclc (though this is not the official party colour of the Vlaams Blok), and in the fact that 
elections in Belgium are always held on a Sunday. 
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By 1991, the Vlaams Blok had become the fourth largest party in Flanders (Mudde, 
2000). It even strengthened its position during the European elections, with a score 
of 12.6%. The rising trend continued in 1994 when the Vlaams Blok became the 
largest party on the city council of Antwerp, and consequently entitled to take part 
in the city's administration. However a cordon sanitaire, or quarantine, created by 
the other parties, excluded the Vlaams Blok from entering any governing coalition 
(Mudde, 2000; Swyngedouw, 1998). In the legislative elections in 2000, the 
Vlaams Blok scored 33% of the votes in Antwerp, an increase on its previous 28%. 
It was the largest party in the city, with 19 out 54 seats and the only opposition 
party (Van Der Brink, 2003). At the legislative elections on 18 th May 2003' s the 
Vlaams Blok attracted 150,000 voters (Faniel, 2003) scoring very well in Ghent, 
Antwerp and Brussels (Faniel, 2003). Delwit (2003) claimed that the Vlaams Blok 
has become the first Flemish party in Brussels, because even French-speaking 
voters are voting for the Vlaams Blok. At the June 2004 regional elections, more 
than one Fleming out of five voted for the Vlaams Blok. It became the second 
largest party in Flanders, with its 32 seats in the Flemish government. This 
represented an average 80/0 increase on 1999. It scored nearly 30% in Antwerp and 
20% nearly everywhere else. In 2004, the Vlaams Blok was renamed Vlaams 
Belang (for reasons explained in section 2.3.6, p. 83) and participated in the 
elections in 2006 under the new name. 
It was predicted that, in 2006, when mayors would be directly elected by 
proportional representation, Filip Dewinter would become the mayor of Antwerp. 
This scenario was only prevented by the victory of the Flemish socialist SP.:-\-
Spirit which won 35.3% and became the first party in the city. The party registered 
33.5% of the votes - a slight progression compared to the 2000 elections - but did 
not win any additional seats in Flanders. This was considered as a major victory 
for the traditional parties, because for the first time the progression of the extreme 
right had been stopped. However, Frank Vanhecke, the president of the Vlaams 
Belang claimed victory: "we are the winner of this election". This was not empty 
bluster, because the Vlaams Belang had achieved 20.6% (i.e. an increase of 5.6 °0 
points) in the whole Flemish Region suggesting that the party had consolidated its 
position across Flanders and beyond its Antwerp stronghold35 . 
The Nature of the Vlaams Blok 
Far from being a single-issue party, the Vlaams Blok expresses its views on a wide 
range of issues and in a variety of original literature, within the framework of a 
"comprehensive ideological programme" (Mudde, 2000: 166). When campaigning, 
the Vlaams Blok focusses on three major themes: firstly, the denunciation of 
foreigners; secondly, Flemish nationalism; and thirdly the incompetence and 
dishonesty of the other parties (Faniel, 2003). The Vlaams Blok has also certainly 
benefited from political scandals affecting the other parties. Every time a scandal 
involving the members of mainstream politics breaks in the media it tends to 
confirm the validity of the anti-establishment rhetoric of the Vlaams Blok. The 
party has always positioned itself as an honest party caring for people's rights, and 
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denouncing the 'diseases' of society (along with those responsible for those 
'diseases'). 
The second axis of the Vlaams Blok ideology is the rejection of immigration. It 
has been argued that the Vlaams Blok created "a dominant ideological space" 
(Swyngedouw, 1998: 68) by engaging in anti-immigration agitation in sensitive 
neighbourhoods, where crime and unemployment are high. Part of this strategy is 
the attribution of such problems to immigrants (Swyngedouw, 1998: 68). 
Furthermore the Vlaams Blok presents itself as the only party willing to provide 
clear solutions (i.e. immigrants out) (Swyngedouw, 1998: 68). For example, the 
Vlaams Blok argues that the beneficiaries of social welfare must be Flemish and 
must work in order to receive benefits. For long-term unemployed people (i.e. over 
one year), the Vlaams Blok plans obligatory enrolment in community service, such 
as maintenance of the streets and parks. Women are to be encouraged to stay at 
home, and would receive a 'breeder' salary. Employers are to be strongly 
encouraged to give priority to Flemish people and would have to pay a specific tax 
if they employ foreigners (Nollet, 2000). Thirdly, the Vlaams Blok wants the 
independence of Flanders, and the separation from the Belgian state. It requires the 
redrawing of the borders to include Brussels as its capital. Flanders is to become a 
mono-ethnic state, non-European immigrants will be repatriated and European 
'foreigners' assimilated (Nollet, 2000). 
According to Swyngedouw (1998), the party's complete political programme is 
not transparent to the general public. The party does not mention, for example, in 
public pronouncements some of its views regarding unions, and its corporatist 
social views; which according to Swyngedouw (1998), could revive memories of 
the pre-war period and the Nazi occupation and are at odds with the interests and 
views of the majority of the Vlaams Blok voters (Swyngedouw, 1998). Even 
though many Vlaams Blok officials have roots in wartime Nazi-collaboration, the 
Vlaams Blok argues that it is a new party and avoids any overt association with 
that troubled period (Swyngedouw, 1998: 67). It is perhaps notable that the 
Vlaams Blok is one of the few contemporary extreme right parties which have a 
legacy of links to fascist parties from the inter-war period (Camus, 2003; 
Swyngedouw, 2000). 
2.3.3. Who Votes For the V1aams BloklVlaams Belang? Ideological Voting and 
Protest 
A section on the Vlaams Blok's ideology would not be complete without a 
discussion of those who vote for the extreme right. The electorate of the Vlaams 
Blok seems to be characterised by its strong loyalty to the party. According to 
Nollet (2000), eight out of ten voters will continue voting for the Vlaams Blok in 
the future. It appears that the party has two types of members: activists and paying 
members. The presence of active core groups in different neighbourhoods, namely 
in Antwerp, have ensured the organisation of demonstrations against the presence 
of immigrants, against the building of mosques, and the blaming of immigrants for 
crime and unemployment (Swyngedouw, 2000). 
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The party membership is mainly composed of workers, and people from lower 
socio-economic groups, young people and those without religious faith (Nollet, 
2000). The Vlaams Blok has however attracted voters from all sections of the 
population (Swyngedouw, 2000). Interestingly an analysis of the profiles of 
Vlaams Blok voters in Antwerp shows that the lower the level of education, the 
more likely a person is to vote for the Vlaams Blok, and that blue-collar workers 
represent an important share of Vlaams Blok total vote. However, it appears that 
the Vlaams Blok has also extended its electoral base to white collar workers 
(lower middle-class workers) and to the self-employed. 
Immigration: the vote gatherer 
Studies have indicated that it is mainly the rejection of immigrants that is 
motivating the Vlaams Blok vote, and that a loathing of the political class plays 
only a secondary role in this choice (Nollet, 2000). Billiet et al. (2001) also found 
that the Vlaams Blok's electorate is characterised by a negative attitude towards 
immigrants and a strong repressive attitude towards criminals. Similarly, Coffe 
(2004) has argued for an ideological motivation ofVlaams Blok's voters by noting 
that voters referred to the main policies within the Vlaams Blok manifesto as the 
motivating force of their electoral behaviour (Coffe, 2004). In other words, voting 
for the Vlaams Blok is not a mere expression of protest or aversion to other 
political parties and political institutions. This is an important finding because the 
extreme right vote is often conceptualised as being a form of protest (see among 
others Anastasakis, 2000; Stouthuysen, 1993). On the one hand, in the protest vote 
model, voters show their discontent with all other traditional parties (and political 
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institutions) by choosing the extreme right. On the other hand, ideological voting 
is conceptualised by Downs (1957) as a vote which is inspired by a consideration 
of the party's programme. Voters, in this model, are assumed to know the extreme 
right party's position on a number of issues and support these. Hence, ideological 
voters agree with the stated party line. 
The ideological vote 
In the case of the Vlaams Blok, Coffe's (2004) research shows that the strongest 
detenninant in 1999 for voting for the party was immigration. Flemish nationalism 
and independence of Flanders only encouraged a minority to vote for the party. 
According to the same study (Coffe, 2004), a large majority of the Vlaams Blok 
electorate agreed with the party's position on immigration issues and the only 
other significant motivating theme was seen as 'crime'. These findings do not 
preclude the significance of protest-voting as it is in the nature of the Vlaams 
Blok's political programme to 'be against': against immigrants, against criminality 
and against established parties. Hence both protest and ideology can be used to 
explain the success of the Vlaams Blok (Coffe, 2004). This is an important finding, 
because, according to Coffe's (2004) research, choosing to vote for the Vlaams 
Blok is ideological, i.e. the voters' choice is based on the party's programme, and 
their agreement with the party's policies. Coffe's (2004) fmdings comfmn the 
initial observation about the persuasiveness of the party discourse which must 
have an impact on attracting, convincing and retaining voters. This has important 
implications for this thesis which seeks to highlight the party's communication 
strategies; and also seems to confmn an initial 'intuition' about the quality of the 
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Vlaams Blok's persuasiveness. The communication material of the Vlaams Blok 
has an important place in the party's strategy and significant amounts of money, 
time and effort are spent by the party to ensure that key messages reach the 
intended targets. This is however no easy task, because the Vlaams Blok faces a 
particularly difficult political situation, namely the cordon sanitaire. 
2.3.4. The 'cordon sanitaire': an efficient strategy against the extreme right? 
The cordon sanitaire has been created as a form of 'anti Vlaams Blok' strategy. It 
is in essence a form of political quarantine. All the mainstream democratic parties 
have made the commitment not only to refuse any cooperation with extreme right 
parties, but also not to debate with them on TV (Faniel, 2003). The idea originated 
in 1989, when the leaders of five Flemish parties signed an agreement where they 
would never negotiate with the Vlaams Blok and would not make immigration a 
political issue (Gijsels, 1992; in Mudde, 2000). This agreement was violated some 
seven weeks later when the mainstream parties took an anti Vlaams Blok stance 
but also at the same time used "conciliatory gestures whenever it proved 
opportune" (Mudde, 2000: 89). A new cordon sanitaire was signed a few years 
later, in reaction to the increasing strength of the Vlaams Blok. Local, regional and 
national representatives of the major parties engaged in the new cordon (Mudde. 
2000: 90). This time it proved more effective. For example, in 1994. a cordon 
sanitaire excluded the Vlaams Blok from power in Antwerp's city counciL and the 
situation lasted for six years (Mudde, 2000: 91). The more successful the Vlaams 
Blok was at the polls, the more isolated it became from other political parties. For 
example, in the days following the elections of June 13 th 2004, the Vlaams Blok 
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was the second largest party in Flanders. However, the other Flemish political 
parties were still determined not to form a coalition with the Vlaams Blok and 
were left with no choice but to form an awkward coalition with each other (three 
parties are now needed to form the majority of the Vlaamse Raad, the Flemish 
Council) leaving the Vlaams Blok as the single party of opposition. 
Media Quarantine: Northern vs. Southern media 
Mass media also supported the quarantine strategy by refusing to interview the 
leaders of the extreme right, even during election campaigns. However, the 
strategy proved to be double-edged and has been attacked by the Vlaams Blok in 
the name of freedom of speech. It has actually provided high levels of publicity for 
the Vlaams Blok, arguably allowing them to claim 'victim' status. It has also been 
thought to act as a good excuse for mainstream parties not to debate with the 
Vlaams Blok about current problematic political issues. Currently there are many 
breaches of the cordon sanitaire, especially in Flanders where articles in the press 
are dedicated to the Vlaams Blok and TV debates have been organised with the 
leaders of the Vlaams Blok. For example, a documentary dedicated to Filip 
Dewinter ("De Dag ... van Filip Dewinter", i.e. "The Day ... of Filip Dewinter") has 
been broadcast by Kanaaltwee, a Flemish channel, on the day following the June 
2004 elections. In this programme a journalist followed the Vlaams Blok's leader 
for a whole day, showing him having breakfast at home with his family, working 
and giving his opinions about a wide range of issues (e.g. fulminating against signs 
with Arabic lettering on grocery shops). Criticisms were voiced (mainly in the 
French-speaking press) that this sort of programme provided a complacent and 
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favourable image of the party and its elite. The Flemish press has justified its non-
compliance with the cordon sanitaire by arguing that, because the Vlaams Blok 
has representatives in Parliament, it is the journalists' duty to reflect all points of 
view existing in Belgian democratic society (Lits, 2003). 
It is worth noting that the situation is very different in the North and the South of 
the country. The media quarantine is strictly followed by the French-speaking 
media in the North (Lits, 2003) but in the South, the extreme right party leaders 
enjoy 'neutral' media coverage, just like any other mainstream politician. Some 
commentators see this as harmful because it strengthens the extreme right parties' 
'fame', respectability and visibility (Faniel, 2003). It is argued (Faniel, 2003: 54), 
that this gives voters the impression that the extreme right are parties "like any 
other" making it more difficult and less legitimate to fight the Vlaams Blok and its 
thesis. Consequently, the French-speaking press continues to maintain the media 
quarantine (Faniel, 2003). This stance can be explained by the fact that the media 
do not want to amplify the party's position (Lits, 2003). In 1994, the RTBF 
(French-speaking television) refused to interview the leaders of the extreme right 
and refused legally-granted air-time to the FN during election campaigns (Lits, 
2003). Sued by the Vlaams Blok, the public TV company was declared wrong and 
the whole affair again provided further publicity to the extreme right as a supposed 
victim of a political plot (Lits, 2003). In addition, Lits (2003) argues that this affair 
gave the impression that the extreme right have interesting ideas that should not be 
hidden from the public, implying that the public is not mature enough to take 
sensible decisions. The situation is indeed delicate and the quarantine double-
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edged. On the one hand, the media could let the extreme right parties express their 
opinions, hoping that this will not provide a large audience and legitimate their 
undemocratic arguments. On the other hand, the media could refuse access to 
extreme right parties and thereby provide publicity and 'victimise' them (Lits, 
2003). Facing this dilemma, the media in the North and the South of the country 
have taken opposite stances. In this context, where the Vlaams Blok has a limited 
public forum in which to propagate its message and manifesto it has been forced to 
fmd diverse ways to reach its audience. 
2.3.5. The propaganda machine of the Vlaams Blok 
It is no understatement to say that the political and marketing communications of 
the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang are well developed and organised, especially 
since 1989 when the party started receiving public funding (Swyngedouw, 2000). 
Lits (2003) argues that the extensive fmancial resources of the Vlaams Blok 
(including the benefits from state funding of political parties) have been used for 
wide advertising campaigns and to fund rallies where party members and activists 
can meet the voters who contribute to its electoral success. The Vlaams Blok also 
issues: a quarterly regional publication entitled Eigen Volk Eerst Krant 36 ; a 
monthly party magazine called Vlaams Blok Magazine; a weekly newsletter called 
E-Magazine; brochures presenting the programme of the party or its stance on 
different issues, such as abortion, drugs, and security. A number of books have 
been written by the leaders of the party, such as Baas in Eigen Land 37 (Filip 
36 Translation: Our Own People First Newspaper 
37 II. • C masters In our ountry 
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Dewinter, 2000), Karel Dillen, Partret van een Rebel 38 (Verstraete, 1992) or 
Eurapese Gedichten39 (Dillen, 1991). The party also organises conferences and 
one-day seminars (Swyngedouw, 2000). It is worth noting the existence of 
subordinate party organisations, such as the Vlaams Blok Jongeren (Vlaams Blok 
Youth) (Swyngedouw, 2000). The Vlaams Blok Youth organisation has its OWI1 
brochure and organises a yearly summer 'university' for the young. Local political 
action receives support via airtime allocated to the Vlaams Blok, on TV and public 
radio, under the airtime arrangements for all political parties represented in the 
Flemish Parliament (Swyngedouw, 1998:68). Allocation depends on the number 
of seats in the Parliament. The more successful the Vlaams Blok gets, the more air 
time it gets (Swyngedouw, 1998: 68). The Vlaams Blok has also been targeting the 
French-speaking population of Brussels. In November 1996, the first newsletter. 
both in French and Dutch, was distributed to 450,000 houses. It focussed on what 
the party defined as the big issues facing the capital, such as insecurity, ghettos, 
and taxes. The stated aim was to gain votes from the population of Brussels, the 
city designated by the Vlaams Blok to become the capital of the independent state 
of Flanders. In addition, the Vlaams Blok has not limited itself to paper-based 
literature but has also a well-developed active website (see www.vlaamsblok.be) . 
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2.3.6. The Vlaams Belang: The Return of the Vlaams Blok 
The Vlaams Belang was created in November 2004, after the condemnation of 
three non-profit associations linked to the Vlaams Blok for racism by the Cour de 
Cassation4o. As a consequence, the Vlaams Blok had to disband in order to avoid 
further prosecution. The Vlaams Belang was founded immediately, with the same 
leaders and same structures as the Vlaams Blok. In order to understand the Vlaams 
Belang, it is important to understand the position the previous Vlaams Blok held in 
the Belgian political landscape, particularly because the continuity of leadership, 
ideology and programme has been emphasised by the Vlaams BlokIVlaams 41 
leaders themselves. Coffe (2005b: 217) cites Frank Vanhecke, the Vlaams 
Belang's president, who said that when the Vlaams Blok changed its name to 
Vlaams Belang, nothing would really be changed: "we are changing our name, but 
not our stripes ". 
As explained before, the Vlaams Blok's political programme is articulated around 
three major arguments: frrst, the incompetence and dishonesty of the other parties; 
second, the denunciation of the current immigration policies; and third, Flemish 
nationalism and independence (Faniel, 2003). In 1992, Filip Dewinter argued, in 
the infamous 70-point programme, that what was needed for the protection of 
Flemish identity, and the application of the 'serving one's own people frrst' 
leitmotiv was a halt to immigration and the accelerated repatriation of foreigners, 
along with harsher regulations against criminal and illegal immigrants (Coffe, 
40 The highest institution of justice in Belgium 
41 To stress this continuity, a combination of both names' V/oams Blok/VIooms Belong' is used to 
refer indistinctively to both the Vlaams Blok and the Vlaams Belang, unless stated otherwise. 
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2005b). This argument was softened in 1996, when the repatriation solution was 
replaced by the possibility of assimilation of non-EO immigrants (Mudde, 2000) 
and, in 2000, the 70-point programme was fmaUy discarded (Deweerdt, 200 I). In 
the Vlaams Belang's programme, deportation is now limited to immigrants "who 
reject, deny or combat our culture and certain European values such as separation 
of the Church and State, freedom of expression and equality between men and 
women" (in Camus, 2005). According to Coffe (2005b), the Vlaams Belang is 
now trying to be perceived as a nationalist right-wing party, which still has 
immigration, security and anti-establishment feelings as its driving forces, but 
which has cut the ties with its unsavoury past. The structures and the leaders are 
similar. If the party has softened some of its (legally) problematic stances, it still 
adopts a very clear view regarding immigrants and immigration: Filip Dewinter 
said that: "multiculturalism leads to multi-criminality" (in the Annual Report 2005 
on Human Rights in Belgium). Filip Dewinter leaves no ambiguity about the 
Vlaams Belang's orientation with "any Muslim woman wearing the headscarfwill 
sign thereby the warrant for her repatriation" (,Buitenhof, Nederland 3, 
14/1112004). He also sparked the polemic when he said in an interview by Jewish 
Week (28/102005): "'Xenophobia' is not the word I would use. If it absolutely 
must be a l'phobia" let it be IIslamophobia ",42. 
Along with the 'softening' of their policies, these controlled outbursts might have 
been intended to avoid the alienation of the existing loyal Vlaams Blok voters. 
These seemingly paradoxical stances between xenophobic and islamopbobic 
42 See http://www.filipdewinter.orgipage.php?linkID=238 
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statements, a right-wing conservative rebirth, and subsequent ambiguity lead to the 
need for a careful segmentation of the voters' market and sound positioning of the 
party (see chapter 8). By adopting what seems like paradoxical approaches, the 
Vlaams Belang seems to be aiming at both attracting a larger audience (which 
might be interested in its tough approach on criminality, and/or in its call for a 
greater autonomy for Flanders); and at the same time reassuring the voters of the 
former Vlaams Blok (who were not shy of voting for an anti-immigrant party), that 
the party did not change and would continue defending the nation and identity of 
its people. 
3. Conclusion 
Belgium's particular politics is a mix of community quarrels, calls for greater 
autonomy for the regions and stripping little by little the federal institutions from 
their content and power. In addition, the political scandals that have tainted most 
mainstream parties, the malaise after the Dutroux scandal43, unemployment crisis, 
all of which contribute to the development of the background from which the 
extreme right extracts its theses and gains ground. The Vlaams BlokIVlaams 
Belang is a well-structured and well-managed party (Art, 2006). It is definitely not 
what could be called a single issue party. The party campaigns on the 
43 Dutroux was a pedophile who kidnapped, sexually abused, and murdured several girls in 
Belgium in 1995 and 1996. The coverage of the scandal traumatised Belgium. Discontent against 
Belgian's criminal justice system grew because of a number of shortcomings in the Dutroux 
investigation. 
85 
independence of Flanders, the necessity to purify politics from patronage and 
corruption, and getting rid of foreigners that do not assimilate into Flemish society. 
The Vlaams Belang essentially revives the same themes developed by the Vlaams 
Blok, but attempts to be perceived as a right wing conservative party rather than as 
an extreme right party (label that the Vlaams Blok always rejected anyway). To 
convince voters of the changes, and more generally to con\"ince voters of the 
soundness of the party's ideology, the party has orchestrated memorable 
communication campaigns, with the help of advertising professionals. In addition, 
the party leaders advocate the use of political marketing to organise successful 
local elections. The focus of interest of this research lies in the way the party uses 
modem marketing tactics and strategy, to deploy a persuasive discourse. This 
requires a methodology that acknowledges the nature and complexity of the 
discourses studied, but that could also highlight those (hidden) processes in play. 
As is explained in further detail in the following chapter, a discursive approach is 
adopted in this thesis. Considering the discourse of the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams 
Belang and understanding marketing and political marketing as discourses is 
congruent with the ontological and epistemological stances held by the researcher. 
Those philosophical stances and the relevant research methodology are explored in 
detail in the next chapter, which explains the methodological choices made in 
order to understand the political marketing and persuasiveness of the Vlaams 
Blok/Vlaams Belang as an archetype of the successful contemporary extreme right. 
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Chapter 5: Methodology: Critical Discourse Analysis 
1. Introduction 
This chapter aims at presenting the philosophical assumptions guiding the research 
process and the methodology adopted. This is essential because philosophical 
assumptions are likely to influence the choice of methodology and information 
gathering techniques. It also provides, according to Hudson and Murray (1986). 
philosophical guidelines for further development of the conceptual area. This is 
followed by a section extensively dedicated to the critical discourse analysis 
framework and its theoretical underpinnings. The chapter ends with an illustration 
of the way a critical discourse analysis is operationalised in this research. 
Basic assumptions: social constructionism 
Human experience can be viewed through the lenses of different alternative 
epistemologies. The issue facing the researcher is to choose the most suitable 
paradigm for the needs and goals of the research. This research is located within 
social constructionism (Phillips and Hardy, 2002; Gergen, 2001; Gergen, 1999; 
Berger and Luckman, 1967) taking the position that "reality is produced, 
constituted or constructed through language" (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997: 145). 
Language is considered as constitutive and constructive, rather than reflective and 
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representative (Wood and Kroger, 2000; in Phillips and Hardy, 2002). In such a 
philosophical framework, the core of the enquiry lies in language and discourse. 
This research departs from the more conventional approaches of political 
marketing which endorse positivist epistemological positions of rational choice 
theory (Savigny, 2004). Methodologically, the extant political marketing literature 
begins with simplifying assumptions to produce a generic model from which 
propositions are deduced, and then tested against empirical evidence to establish 
the validity of the predictions (Lees-Marshment, 2001; Butler and Collins, 1994). 
This is not the case in this thesis which positions itself within the social 
constructionist paradigm. The focus of the research on extremist and marketing 
discourses implies that discourse and language hold centre stage. According to 
Phillips and Hardy (2002: 2), "without discourse, there is no social reality, and 
without understanding discourse, we cannot understand our reality, our 
experiences, or ourselves". Discourses construct individuals' experience and 
reality, but also limit them because one has to act within the frame of discourses. 
That said, humans also contribute to the construction and reproduction of 
discourses. A dialectic relationship is installed between discourses and society, or 
social systems, in which they operate (Wodak, 2001; de Cillia et al., 1999; 
Fairclough, 1989). 
Discourse anaZl'sis 
O n ~ ~ of the major roles of social research is to understand and interpret socially 
produced meanings. For instance, discourse analysis focusses on the processes 
whereby the social world is constructed and maintained (Phillips and Hardy, 2002: 
2). Researchers, especially the ones operating within a discourse analytic 
framework, seek to highlight the historically specific rules and conventions that 
structure the production of meanings in particular historical contexts (Howarth, 
2000: 128). The approach of discourse analysis adopted here is similar to Phillips 
and Hardy's (2002: 4) and Fairclough's (1992). Discourse analysis explores the 
relationships between texts, discourse, and context (Phillips and Hardy, 2002; 
Fairclough, 1992). This helps understand, through the analysis of the historical and 
social context, how meanings are constructed and how a broader reality is 
constructed and experienced by people (Phillips and Hardy, 2002). The meaning 
of social life is central in the discourse analysis methodology. Discourse analysis 
seeks to explore the way in which the social reality is produced, and holds the 
assumption that the world cannot be known separately from discourse (Phillips 
and Hardy, 2002: 6) 
2. The notion of discourse 
Fairclough (2003) also uses the word discourse to describe a particular way of 
representing aspects of the world, i.e. the processes, relations and structures of the 
material world, but also thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so on (Fairclough, 2003: 
124). DiscoW'Se can be understood as the actual practice of talking and writing 
(Woodilla, 1998; in Phillips and Hardy, 2002); but discourse is also an interrelated 
set of texts and the practices of their production, dissemination, and reception that 
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bring an object into being (Parker, 1993; in Phillips and Hardy. 2002). Indeed, as 
Fairclough (1989) explained, discourse is part of social practice and contributes to 
the reproduction of social practice. It is constructed through time by the 
interrelations between texts, changes and new fonns in texts, and new systems of 
distributing texts (Phillips and Hardy, 2002: 5). Fairclough uses the word 
discourse to refer to the whole process of social interaction (Fairclough, 1989: 2--l 
emphasis added). What is meant by 'process' is the production of text (where text 
is the product) and the interpretation of text (where the text is the resource) 
(Fairclough, 1989). 
Therefore, different discourses are different representations of the world 
(Fairclough, 2003) at different levels of abstraction. To illustrate this particular 
notion of discourse, Fairclough (2000) analysed the discourse of the Third Way, 
which is a political discourse attached to a particular position within the political 
field. Liberalism, Communism or Thatcherism, are all examples of discourses that 
could be found within the political domain (Fairclough, 2003: 125), and Taylorism 
for example is a discourse of management. Those are all discourses at a high levels 
of abstraction which develops as an articulation of different discourses (Fairclough, 
2003). The notion that marketing is also a discourse is discussed below. 
2.1. Marketing discourse 
Marketing, most commonly recognised as an academic discipline and a business 
practice, could also be understood as a discourse in itself. Morgan (1992: 154) 
critically assessed marketing and considered it as a "substantial and powerful 
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discourse which is currently dominated by a highly positivistic and normati\e 
approach to knowledge". More broadly, marketing discourse contributes to the 
way people view and understand the world. It is "part of the process whereby a 
particular form of society is constructed, one in which human beings are treated as 
things, where identity is reduced to ownership of commodities and all social 
relations are conceived in market terms" (Morgan, 1992: 154). If one accepts the 
idea that mass consumption is the cultural norm in 20 th century western 
industrialised societies (Morgan, 1992: 137), one recognises that individual and 
social identities are necessarily within the scope of and constructed through 
consumption values (Morgan, 1992). Marketing constructs a certain context where 
social agents live and interact, and is used as a resource by the same agents to 
make sense of their social context. Marketing is a discourse through which social 
actors (i.e. organisations, consumers, and institutions) understand and attempt to 
control those social processes (Morgan, 1992: 137). 
Marketing is also an intellectual product, i.e. it is the product of a knowledge 
community in a specific place at a certain time, with interests to defend and 
narratives of identity to uphold (Hackley, 1999: 58). Marketing is often conceived 
of as a way of looking at the world and marketing rhetoric is presented as a 
liberating force for consumers. This view ignores that marketing actively 
constructs a world where individuals build their identities through commodities 
(Morgan, 1992), and is "a particular way of seeing and 'doing' human 
relationships" (Morgan, 1992: 143). Discourses are always ideologically loaded 
(Hackley, 1999: 158) and are ways of providing an account of the world (Hackley, 
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1999: 159). Marketing as a discourse, is no exception and includes particular 
assumptions about the world (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; in Morgan, 1992). 
Morgan (1992) has argued modern society has been pervaded by a market logic 
and a marketing ethos. Goods and services are part of people's self-image (see 
among others Mittal, 2006; Grace and O'Cass, 2002). According to Morgan 
(1992), market mechanisms are used to monitor and evaluate social relations 
(through the monetisation and the commodification of social relations). This might 
explain why marketing has so easily 'invaded' the political arena (see chapter 3). 
Of course, the use of marketing techniques, such as focus groups or voter 
segmentation does not necessarily mean that a political party thoroughly applies 
the marketing concepts adopting a marketing mind-set. It could be argued that 
marketing is merely a metaphor used by parties to make their speech 'voter-
friendly'. In this thesis I examine the extent to which the Vlaams Blok' sand 
Vlaams Belangs' s texts are artefacts of a marketing discourse. The starting point 
of such an enquiry must be to understand marketing as a discourse, and to try and 
shed a new light on the use of marketing discourse/rhetoric by political parties. 
3. The study of discourse 
In the discourse analytical framework, discourses are believed to play a central 
role in structuring the individuals' sense of reality and their notion of their own 
identity (Mills, 1997). According to Fairclough (1989: 74) discourse is part of 
social practice and contributes to the reproduction of social practice. Discourses, 
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via active social subjects in their societal contexts, produce and shape social 
realities but discourses are also shaped by reality. Put in Jager's words (2001: 36), 
discourses "live a life of their own". Discourse analysis approaches discourse as 
constitutive of the social world. Consequently, it does not limit the study to how 
language reflects and reveals phenomena, in the way other qualitative research 
methods44 might do (Phillips and Hardy, 2002: 6). Discourse analysis examines 
the production of reality performed by discourses - which are societal means of 
production - and conveyed by people (Jager, 2001: 36). 
The 'problem' in research about marketing and political discourse is their 'taken-
for-grantedness'. Ideologies naturalise the world views defended in discourse and 
make them unquestioned, because they are invisible to people. The researcher is 
also immersed in those ideological frameworks; he or she holds stronger or weaker 
political values; is in a web of emotions, feelings, attitudes. These two constraints 
- the subject of enquiry and the enquirer - must be taken into account in the 
process of research. The focus on discourse, power and politics already points 
towards a critical approach to marketing and discourse in general. Discourse 
analysis, and more specifically critical discourse analysis, is the methodology that 
should provide the methodological framework to allow a rigorous enquiry into 
political marketing. The next chapter exposes and discusses the critical discourse 
analytical framework and its relevance and utility in this research. 
44 Such as narrative analysis or conversation analysis. 
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4. Alternative Methodologies 
Among the wide range of methods available to the social scientists, the choice \\'3S 
set on discursive methods. The most pragmatic reason being the lack of direct 
access to the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang organisation and members. Therefore, 
any method involving a direct interaction with the party or its members, such as 
(in no particular order) interviews, ethnography, participant observation, 
conversation analysis, functional pragmatics 45 and the like. were considered 
impossible. Indeed, the researcher, a female Muslim from an immigrant 
background, belongs to one of the mam groups targeted by the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang's rhetoric (i.e. foreigners and Muslims). Nevertheless, 
attempts were made to contact the party (emails and a phone call), but both 
attempts were left unanswered. Therefore all methods involving a direct 
interaction with party members were eliminated. The second reason is that the 
Vlaams BlokIVlaams Blok's communication material provides a very rich source 
of information and processes which deserves enquiry in its own right. The 
philosophical stances and the researcher's areas of interest (critical approaches) all 
direct their attention towards research focussing on discourse, power and ideology. 
The relative sensitivity of the topic (the extreme right discourse researched by a 
Muslim Belgian from a non-EU immigrant background) demands a reflexive 
recognition and transparency of the author's political stance. Any claim to 
objectivity, or a lack of reflexivity for that matter, would understandably be met 
4 ~ ~ Functional pragmatics are a linguistic method whose application IS restricted to oral 
communication, and to dialogue texts (Titscher et aI., ~ O O O ) . .
with suspicion and doubt. For these (contextual) reasons, because of the nature of 
the research itself, and because the critical discourse analytical framework's rigour 
and intellectual sophistication and articulation (see previous sections), CDA has 
been chosen as the most appropriate method for this research. CDA pro\'ides a fit 
between the research requirements, its nature, its search for latent processes (e.g. 
ideology and power struggle) and its emancipatory purposes (i.e. the possibility of 
changing the human condition). Thus CDA is the most appropriate research 
methodology to address the research questions of this thesis. It is nC\'erthelcss 
interesting to consider a couple of other discursive methods, such as content 
analysis (representing a more quantitative approach to discourse analysis), in 
addition to criticisms against CDA. 
4.1. Content analysis 
The main difference between CDA and content analysis arises from the nature of 
the object analysed. CDA is a linguistic method: it analyses coherence 
(constituting the meaning of the text) and cohesion (which refers to the 
components of the textual surface, i.e. the textual-syntactic connectedness 
(Titscher et aI., 2000: 227». The analysis of the relationship between these two 
dimensions is confined to linguistic method, while non-linguistic methods such as 
content analysis, focus on coherence. Content analysis, as its name indicates, asks 
concrete questions about the content using rather precise and narrow research 
questions for the purpose of hypothesis formulation (Titscher et at., 2000). The 
content of the Vlaams SlokIVlaams Belang's discourse is not the main focus per 
se. In order to ensure the quality and rigour of the research, and avoid any 
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polemical opinions concerning the theses defended by the Vlaams BloklVlaams 
Belang the content is not debated or refuted. Content, or semantic elements of 
discourse are analysed, but only as a part of the whole discourse analysis also 
including the analysis of strategic and linguistic dimensions. 
In CDA, texts are a manifestation of discourse, and are explained through social 
structures and socio-historic contexts, which are considered as macro-structures 
(Titscher et al., 2000). CDA links the micro-elements of texts to the discourse and 
to macro-structures. Content analysis is more limited in its focus. For example, 
according to Graber and Smith (2005), content analysis is the most widely used 
method for examining political messages. Researchers frequently examine 
messages for cues to underlying political, social, and economic conditions, such as 
international tensions, confidence in government, or fear about economic declines 
(Graber and Smith, 2005: 491). Content analysis focusses on denotional dictionary 
meanings or connotations from extended meaning evoked by the literal messages. 
A weakness of content analysis is the common practice of coding only small 
portions of news stories, thereby omitting many important themes and nuances and 
limiting coding to meanings (Graber and Smith, 2005). Content analysis offers the 
potential for interesting applications and insight in this research. However, content 
analysis offers a rather limited range of advantages, especially when compared to 
CDA. Perhaps a combination of both could provide a more complete picture of a 
given phenomenon. However, the combination of both methods is not considered 
as a priority here, as this research is. in addition to addressing the research 
questions set earlier, an exploration of the potential of CDA for analysing political 
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marketing. CDA appears to be the most appropriate methodology here. but it is not 
without weaknesses and its fair share of criticisms. 
5. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
Given the specific research focus on the strategic use of language by extreme right 
political parties to communicate, persuade, legitimate issues and promote 
particular theses, a discourse analysis approach appears to be the most appropriate 
methodology. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) explicitly focusses on the 
dynamics of power, knowledge and ideology that surround discursive processes 
(Phillips and Hardy, 2002: 20). CDA explains the role of discourse in the way that 
power abuse is constituted and sustained (Phillips and Hardy, 2002; Fairclough 
and Wodak, 1997). The goal is to analyse the "dialogical struggle (or struggles) as 
reflected in the privileging of a particular discourse and the marginalization of 
others" (Phillips and Hardy, 2002: 25). CDA is useful for studies seeking to 
analyse how political strategies are shaped by and help shape contexts. This is why 
it is considered as relevant for a research project which aims to gain further insight 
into marketing and extremist political discourses, because it can help explore the 
key areas of persuasion, ideology, and conflict (Elliott, 1996; van Dijk, 1996; 
Fairclough, 1995). In addition, CDA is particularly relevant for this research 
because its focus lies on the connection between power and meaning and on how 
processes of social construction lead to a social reality that is taken-for-granted 
(Clegg, 1989; in Phillips and Hardy, 2002). 
Discourse analysis is expected to help hunt down and challenge the taken-for-
granted truths (Phillips and Hardy, 2002) which, it is argued here, are the common 
material of the extreme right discourse. For example, experiences and other stories 
about 'minorities', or pseudo-arguments, are presented as facts and used to justify 
racist attitudes (van Dijk, 1993: 125), Apparent truthfulness is an important 
characteristic of a persuasive discourse. The 'facts' are unsubstantiated and claim 
to "confirm" what people are already predisposed to believe as the truth (Jowett 
and O'Donnell, 1999: 158). The next section sets out to provide a thorough 
description of CDA: its theoretical basis and its method of data analysis. 
5.1. Basic assumptions in CDA 
5.1.1. CDA and discourse 
CDA is not interested in language per se, but in the linguistic character of social 
and cultural processes and structures (Titscher et aI., 2000: 146). It is concerned, 
according to Van Leeuwen (1993: 193), with a) discourse as the instrument of 
power and control and b) discourse as the instrument of the social construction of 
reality. The basic assumption of CDA is that there is a dialectical relationship 
between discursive events and the context (situations, social structures, 
institutions, and so on) in which they are embedded (de Cillia et aI., 1999: 157). 
According to Wodak (200 I: 66), "discourses as linguistic social practices can be 
seen as constituting non-discursive and discursive social practices and, at the same 
time, as being constituted by them". Through discourse, social actors constitute 
knowledge, situations, social roles as well as identities and interpersonal relations 
between social actors (de Cillia et ai., 1999: 157). In addition, CDA claims that 
discourses are not only expressions of social practice (Jager, 2001), but are also 
ideological (Wodak, 2001). Accordingly, CDA seeks to unveil the web of 
domination, power, discrimination and control existing in language (Wodak, 
2001). Language is, according to Habennas (1977; in Wodak, 2001), a medium of 
domination and social force. For example, it is through language that power 
relations are legitimated (Wodak, 2001). In accordance with this view, Jager 
(2001: 34) sees discourse as "the flow of knowledge46 - and/or societal knowledge 
stored - throughout all time (Jager, 1999, 1993; in Wodak, 2001) which 
determines individuals and collective doing and/or fonnative action that shapes 
society, thus exercising power." This particular approach of CDA should prove 
particularly useful for the study of discourse with powerful ideologies, yet with 
hidden effects and hidden power relations (Meyer, 2001) which can be found for 
example in popUlism and marketing. 
S.2 Specificities of CDA 
5.2.1. Political involvement of the researcher 
CDA differs in various points from other qualitative methodologies and even other 
text and discourse analysis approaches. First, the difference between CDA and the 
other approaches is the explicit political stance adopted by the CDA researcher 
46 Knowledge is, according to JAger (2001: 33), aU kinds of content which make up consciousness 
and/or all kinds of meaning used by respective historical persons to interpret and shape surrounding 
reality". 
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(Wodak, 2001: 5). The critical discourse analyst is interested in studying social 
problems, such as social inequalities and plays an advocatory role for those 
suffering from social discrimination (Meyer, 2001: IS; Titscher et al., 2000). CDA 
researchers want their research findings to have practical applications (Meyer, 
2001; Wodak, 2001; Titscher et al., 2000). By revealing the structures, the 
researcher acts as a facilitator for change. The role of research is ultimately seen as 
"a guide for human action" (Wodak, 200 I: 10). This orientation of CDA towards 
political involvement and application of the research findings can be witnessed in 
the type of research where a CDA methodology has been adopted. CDA holds the 
assumption that language repeats and legitimates injustice and inequality (Titscher 
et al., 2000). CDA has been applied in the fields of gender, media discourses, 
identity research and research into issues of prejudice, namely racism, anti-
Semitism or sexism (Wodak, 2001; Titscher et al., 2000; also for research on those 
topics see Wodak et al., 1999; Martin-Rojo and van Dijk, 1997; Pedro, 1997, 
among others). Because CDA makes explicit power relations which are frequently 
hidden (Meyer, 2001: 15), it can make people aware of hidden alienating forces 
(Wodak, 2001; van Dijk, 1993; Fairclough, 1989) and, through this awareness, 
empower and emancipate them (Titscher et al., 2000: 147). In other words, "one of 
the aims of CDA is to 'demystify' discourses by deciphering ideologies" (Wodak, 
2001: 9). The ultimate goal in studying extreme right discourse and their 
marketing could be to understand, but also to expose, the strategies of xenophobic 
parties in presenting and marketing ideals that exclude other human beings on the 
basis of their race, culture and/or religion. 
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In all subjectivist research, it is held that the observer is part of what is observed 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). The researchers acknowledge their participation in 
the construction of social reality through the research process itself. The 
researcher's position is the result of discursive processes, and not based on any 
notion of truth (Jager, 2001: 34). Besides, it is accepted in that research tradition 
that research is not value-free because the researchers inevitably influence their 
fmdings and should therefore make sure that the readers are aware of the authorial 
contribution (Watson, 1994). In CDA, value judgements are acceptable in the 
choice of object and questions of enquiry, but are forbidden in the 'context of 
justification,47 (Meyer, 2001: 17). The way in which the researcher using CDA 
arrives at the results and conclusions must be made intelligible and recognisable 
(Titscher et al., 2000). It is also therefore necessary to acknowledge the 
'biography' of the researcher for this research project. In this case, reflexivity is 
implicit, but made obvious, because it pervades the whole thesis. 
5.2.2. Ideology 
Ideology is central in research adopting a CDA approach. Ideology is, according to 
Gramsci (1983; in Titscher et aI., 2000: 144), the means used in a political society 
to achieve the agreement of the majority. Ideologies are considered, within the 
CDA field, as playing a major role in establishing and maintaining unequal power 
relations (Wodak, 2001). The interest of CDA in ideology highlights the ways in 
which meaning is constructed and conveyed in a social context (Thompson, 1990; 
47 Fairclough (1996) also pointed to the fact that the open-endedness of results is required in CDA 
which is interpretative and explanatory (Titscher et a/., 2000). Interpretations are always dynamic 
and open to new contexts and new infonnation (Titscher et a/., 2000: 146) that may change the 
results (Titscher et a/., 2000). 
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in Wodak, 2001). Meanings are produced and reproduced in a dialectic process of 
negotiation (Titscher et aI., 2000: 145). The effects of power and ideology on the 
production of meaning are obscured and acquire a stable form, and they are 
consequently taken as given (Wodak, 2001). This is why dominant discourses 
seem to provide a rational and sensible set of assumed truths beyond doubt (Jager, 
2001). CDA investigates those discourses, reveals their contradictions and the 
means used to make those truths accepted (Jager, 2001). 
5.2.3. History and social processes 
Secondly, another important assumption of CDA is that all discourses are 
historical and can therefore only be understood in relation to their context (Meyer, 
2001: 15; Titscher et aI., 2000: 146). In the CDA tradition, the analysis should 
recognise that the values, norms, laws, rights, and other critical aspects of 
discourse that the researcher uses are also historical outcomes of discourse (Jager, 
2001: 34). While other paradigms in discourse analysis only focus on texts as 
objects of enquiry, CDA also focusses on the social processes and structures 
surrounding the production of texts. It is within those processes and structures that 
individuals create meanings in their interaction with texts (Fairclough and Kress, 
1993; in Wodak, 2001). Discourses are indeed intertextually linked to other 
discourses (Titscher et aI., 2000: 146). Culture, history and ideology characterise 
the context of the discursive event. 
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5.2.4. Context 
The context of an utterance is granted special attention in CDA. This is the third 
specificity of CDA which, just like discourse analysis, holds that it is impossible to 
strip discourse from its broader context. In the analysis, under the discourse 
analysis tradition, it is important to mention the broader discourse, the location of 
individual texts in larger bodies of texts (Phillips and Hardy, 2002). CDA is even 
more concerned by context. This is evident by the relevance of social, 
psychological, political and ideological elements of the context in which the texts 
are embedded and by the ensuing calls for interdisciplinarity and intertextuality 
(Meyer, 2001: 15). Interdisciplinarity and intertextuality are particular features of 
CDA. Intertextuality refers to the perspective that every text is part of a series of 
texts48 to which it reacts and refers, and which it modifies (Titscher et al., 2000: 
146). 
5.2.5. Language and society 
Fourthly, as noted earlier, CDA sees language as a form of social practice 
(Titscher et al., 2000; Fairclough and Wodak, 1997) and holds the assumption of 
mediation regarding the relationship between language and society (Meyer, 2001) 
- or put simply, language determines society but is also determined by social 
reality - while other methods such as conversation analysis, see it as deterministic. 
CDA theory argues that there is a dialectical relationship between a particular 
discourse and the social structure, institutions and contexts (Fairclough and 
48 See for example, the CDA of Corporate Social Responsibility discourse by Burchell and Cook 
(2006), i.e. the appropriation by the business community of the language of the ecological 
movement, and the subsequent creation of the business discourse of sustainable development. 
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Wodak, 1997). CDA analyses language through texts to investigate their 
interpretation, reception and social effects (Titscher et at., 2000: 146). 
5.2.6. Linguistic categories 
A last difference between CDA and other methods is the focus on specific 
linguistic categories into its analyses. While other methods do use linguistic 
categories, CDA focusses on elements such as deixis 49 (e.g. demonstratives, 
adverbs, pronouns), of prime importance for the critical approach (Meyer, 2001), 
because their analysis highlights the characteristics of cohesion and coherence in 
texts and discourses. CDA holds that the operationalisation of discourse depends 
on linguistic concepts, such as actors, mode, time, tense, argumentation (Meyer, 
2001: 25), because they are the basic working components constituting texts and 
discourses (see Titscher et at., 2000). 
5.2. 7. Alternative approaches to the study of discourse 
Within CDA there are two different views on the relationship between language 
and society. On the one hand, there is Fairclough's model, and on the other hand, 
there is Wodak and van Dijk's approach (see section 5.4.1, p.l07) (Meyer, 2001). 
Fairclough's model is, according to Titscher et at. (2000), suitable for the analysis 
of the contexts of social and discursive change, such as in his study of the way 
universities in England are marketed (see Fairclough, 1993). Wodak's approach is 
suited to the analysis of implicitly prejudiced utterances. Her approach facilitates 
49 In pragmatics and linguistics, deixis is a process whereby words or expressions rely absolutely 
on context (e.g. demonstratives, adverbs, pronouns). In other words, its deictic or indexical 
expressions only acquire their meaning only to the speech situation in which they are situated 
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analysis and decoding of allusions typically concealed in such utterances by 
referring to background knowledge (Titscher et al., 2000: 165). Examples of this 
approach are found in the study of the organisation of the European Union (see 
Iedema and Wodak, 1999; Straehle et al., 1999), or the discursive construction of 
national identities (see de Cillia et al., 1999; Wodak et aI., 1999). Wodak's 
approach is the one adopted in this research, because that specific method 1) has 
already been fruitfully applied to influential research (see among others de Cillia et 
al., 1999; Mitten, 1992; Wodak et al., 1999) and has highlighted the way national 
identities and a particular reality are created through discourse (which is of interest 
in this research); 2) is interdisciplinary (as is this research) and combines in its 
analysis historical, socio-political and linguistic perspectives (which are keys to 
understanding the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's marketing discourse). Wodak's 
discourse-historical approach is developed in further details in section 5.4.2. on 
page 110. 
5.3. Limitations: Conversation analysis and criticisms of CDA 
Most of the criticisms directed against CDA come from conversation analysis 
(which is considered as a social scientific approach (Meyer, 2001». Conversation 
analysis treats talk and social interaction as a sufficient object for analysis, rather 
than as a window onto wider social processes or as a medium for data collection 
(Armin en, 1999: 251). According to Schegloff (1998), CDA does not consider 
seriously the discursive material of its analysis. He argued that conversation 
analysis should be carried out first if CDA wants its critical analysis to be linked to 
data, otherwise the analysis is merely ideological (Scbegloff, 1998). The perceived 
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ideology-laden stance of researchers adopting CDA poses problem and prmides 
ammunition to the opponents of the method. According to Widdowson (1995; in 
Meyer, 2001), CDA constructs a biased interpretation and not a proper academic 
analysis. He views CDA as based on ideological commitment, which inevitably 
makes critical discourse analysts select texts that will support their preferred 
interpretations (Widdowson, 1995; in Meyer, 2001). Widdowson (1995) does not 
see CDA as capable of examining several interpretations - in the way any other 
research does/should do - especially because of that ideological bias (Widdowson, 
1995). However, according to Fairclough (1996) such criticism does not take into 
account that, within the CDA approach, researchers are always explicit about their 
positions, contrary to other methods, such as content analysis where, according to 
Titscher et al. (2000), the underlying assumptions held by researchers are often 
more implicit, or simply not determined in advance. By contrast, in the CDA 
framework, the critical analysts must always make transparent their choices in the 
research process (Wodak, 2001: 65). 
5.4. Method 
CDA is characterised by variety in data collection, or in Meyer's words (200 l: 
30), "there is no accepted canon of data collection". The methodological 
approaches of CDA are eclectic: they vary from small qualitative case studies to 
large data samples collected through fieldwork and ethnographic research (Wodak, 
200 I). It is important to note that data collection is considered in CDA as a 
continuing procedure, i.e. with analysis going back and forth from interpretation to 
1()6 
data (Meyer, 2001: 18). This is due to the henneneutic procedure of analysis 
adopted by most CDA researchers (Meyer, 2001: 16). More precisely. thl:? 
analytical procedure is characterised by a henneneutic circle. Here the meaning of 
one part can only be understood in the context of the whole. which is itsdf 
composed by the meaningful elements that the researcher can access (Meyer, 
2001: 16). Even if there is no predetennined recipe of step-by-step instructions, for 
doing critical discourse analysis, a method has nevertheless been selected: it is the 
discourse-historical method developed by Ruth W odak and associates. 
5.4.1. Wodak. Why adopt the historical-discourse approach? 
In this project, the object of investigation is the persuasiveness of the discourse 
and the construction and marketing of alternative realities, in subtly or overtly 
racist and nationalist discourses. The framework developed by Wodak et al. 
(1999) to study discriminatory discourse provides the tools to gain insight into the 
online discourse of extreme right parties and has been adapted to the needs of this 
thesis. The discourse-historical approach was initially developed to study the 
constitution of an anti-Semitic stereotype image that emerged in public discourse 
in the 1986 Austrian presidential campaign of Kurt Waldheim (Mitten, 1992; 
Gruber, 1991; Wodak et aI., 1999; in Wodak, 2001: 70). The approach was further 
developed in studies dedicated to the racist discourse against Romanian 
immigrants and to the discourse about nation and national identity in Austria (see 
Matouschek et aI., 1995; Wodak et aI., 1999; cited in Wodak, 2001: 71). 
Discourses of national sameness ('us') and otherness or difference (' them') are 
identified and analysed in relation to political and social exclusion of specific out-
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groups (Wodak 2001: 70). Without pre-empting the analysis of the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang's discourse, it could legitimately be assumed that. as an 
extreme right party, the categorisation of people and the identification of an 
antagonist group (see van Leeuwen, 1993) could be a feature of the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang's discourse. 
In their article on the discursive construction of national identities and nations , 
Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak (1999) claim that through the 
triangulation in their methodology and methods, they were able to provide a 
detailed picture of Austrian identity in public and quasi-private settings of various 
degrees of formality. They were also able to identify and contrast divergent 
concepts of national identity as well as divergent identity narratives and highlight 
the multidimensionality of the phenomenon under enquiry (see de Cillia et al., 
1999). In order to reach a similar outcome for this specific project, the research 
methodology adopts a similar research design to de Cillia's et at. (1999) and 
Wodak's (2001) where they studied discourse in terms of three interrelated 
dimensions: I) the content/topic; 2) the strategies and 3) the linguistic means and 
forms of realisation. 
Dimensions of discourse 
In the .first dimension - content - de Cillia's et al. (1999) distinguish between 
semantic macro-areas present in the discourse under investigation. The second 
dimension - strategies - refers to "more or less accurate and more or less 
intentional plans of practices adopted to achieve a particular sociaL political, 
lOH 
psychological or linguistic aim" (Wodak, 2001: 73). For example, they identified 
constructive strategies50, where persuasive linguistic acts serve to build a particular 
national identity and establish solidarity and identification with the . \\'e-group'. 
and at the same time distancing and marginalising from the 'others' (Wodak, 
2001; de Cillia's et al., 1999). There are also identity perpetuation and justification 
strategies which attempt to maintain, support and reproduce national identity, to 
support continuity. In that scheme, the immigrants are constructed as a threat to 
national identity (Wodak, 2001; de Cillia's et al., 1999). Justification and 
legitimation strategies are used to defend and preserve the problematic narrative of 
controversial events in national history. The third dimension of discourse analysis 
looks more specifically at the linguistic means and the forms of realisation, with a 
focus on lexical units, argumentation schemes and syntactical means expressing 
the preliminarily identified strategies (Wodak, 2001; de Cillia's et aI., 1999). In 
this third dimension, particular attention is granted to the use of pronouns such as 
'we', 'you' or 'them', the use of metonymy, synecdoche, personification and their 
particular effect on discourse, its persuasiveness, and so on, always in accordance 
with the strategies in action in the given discourse. It is worth pointing out that the 
discourse-historical approach finds its focal point in the field of politics, where it 
tries to develop conceptual frameworks for political discourse (Meyer, 2001: 22). 
so Transfornlation strategies are used in order to transform the meaning of one well-established 
aspect of national identity into another. Dismantling and destructi \c strategies serve to 
demythologize or demolish existing national identities or clements of them, 
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5.4.2. Characteristics of the discourse-historical approach 
In terdiscip lin arity 
The discourse-historical approach is characterised by its interdisciplinarity. the 
principle of triangulation and the ethnographic approach to sources of data 
(Titscher et al., 2000: 158). The first characteristic is the orientation towards 
interdisciplinarity; for example, in their analysis of the discursive construction of 
Austrian nation and national identities, de Cillia et al. (1999) combined historical, 
socio-political and linguistic perspectives. Similarly in this project, an eclectic mix 
of approaches is used, for example marketing theory, argumentation theory, 
rhetoric and persuasiveness, and political theory, to name only a few. The content 
of an utterance must be confronted with historical events and facts, as well as 
published reports in order to highlight intertextuality. Texts must be interpreted by 
specialists in other subjects, to stay true to the principle of interdisciplinarity, 
which is an important characteristic of the approach (Wodak et al., 1990: 57). In 
addition, texts must be described as precisely as possible at all linguistic levels 
(Wodak et al., 1990: 57). 
Triangulation 
The second characteristic is the principle of triangulation. The validity of the 
favoured interpretations of discursive events must be theoretically justified 
(Wodak, 200 I: 65). This is another reason why Wodak (200) advocated 
triangulation in the discourse-historical approach, where, through different 
approaches and methods, along with varied empirical data and background 
11 f) 
infonnation, bias is minimised. Triangulation pennits exploration of the 
interconnectedness of discursive and other social practices as well as s t r u c t u r ~ s s
(Titscher et aI., 2000: 157). To go back to de Cillia's et al. (1999) article. in order 
to explore the "interconnectedness of discursive practice and extra-linguistic social 
structure", de Cillia et al. (1999: 157) apply the principle of triangulation, i.e. 
several inter-disciplinary methodological, theoretical approaches are used to 
analyse the discourse under investigation. 
Fieldwork and ethnography 
Thirdly, the study should always incorporate fieldwork and ethnography to study 
the subject of the research from the inside, as a precondition for any further 
analysis and theorising (Wodak, 2001: 68). This last requirement for the 
application of a discourse-historical approach of discourse analysis can prove to be 
problematic. Any interviews, participant observation, or direct interaction with the 
Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang has been dismissed at an early stage (because, as was 
explained earlier, there is an issue of direct access to the 'site'). However, in 
Reisigl and Wodak (2001), the authors also restricted their data in their case 
studies. The most important thing is to be sure to contextualise the websites and 
their analysis within their broad socio-political and historical context. If possible, 
other sources of data, such as speeches or programmes, can be added in order to 
complement findings. 
1 1 1 
Context 
In addition to the three characteristics developed above, the discourse-historical 
approach stresses the importance of the 'context' of the discursive events. It is 
important to record setting and context as accurately as possible, giYen the 
importance of context in the understanding and interpretation of the discourse. 
According to Wodak (2001: 65), the CDA approach "attempts to integrate a large 
quantity of available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of 
the social and political field in which discursive 'events' are embedded". In 
addition, the historical dimension of discourse is analysed by exploring the ways 
in which particular genres of discourse are subject to diachronic change (Wodak et 
al., 1994, 1990). Because the discourse-historical approach is characterised by a 
focus on a specific problem and not on specific linguistic devices, the analysis 
draws on an eclectic pool of theoretical and methodological approaches. The 
understanding of the object under investigation dictates the choice of the most 
useful and relevant theories and methods. Besides, there must be a constant 
movement between theory and empirical data. Because intertextual and 
interdiscursive relationships are investigated, it is important to consider 
recontextualisation in order to connect genres, topics and arguments. The historical 
context is granted a particular position in this approach (hence its name). It is 
always analysed and integrated into the interpretation of discourses and texts 
(Wodak, 2001: 70). As noted before, for CDA research in general, practice is the 
ultimate goal. Research findings must enlighten practice, and be applied with the 
aim of changing certain discursive and social practices (Wodak, 2001: 70). 
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The following section provides an illustration of how a critical discourse analysis 
is conducted. A text edited by the Vlaams Blok was selected. because it 
encapsulates the ideology of the Vlaams BlokJVlaams Belang and represents a rich 
source of rhetorical and persuasive textual artefacts. 
6. Illustration: application of CDA. Frank Vanhecke's editorial 51 
6.1. Introduction 
Wodak's et al. (1999) approach to the study of discriminatory discourses provides 
the basis for analysis of the Vlaams Blok and the Vlaams Belang's respective 
discourses. More particularly, a selection of texts from both parties have been 
analysed in detail covering a range of communication materials including brochure 
campaigns, newsletters, leaflets and the Vlaams BlokJVlaams Belang's respective 
websites. The following chapters (5 and 6) provide a full account of this detailed 
analysis. 
The aim of the next section is therefore to provide an illustration of a full CDA of 
an online editorial from the Vlaams Blok. The text was written after the Vlaams 
Blok's condemnation for racism and the announcement of the subsequent 
disbanding of the party. The understanding of the research subject should dictate 
the choice of the most useful and relevant theories and methods. In the case of the 
Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang, Jager's (2001) method has proved particularly 
51 Full tcxt available in http:' \Iaamsblok.bc index.shtml, and Appendix 3 
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invaluable when integrated with Wodak's approach. The combination of the two 
has facilitated a fme tuning of the analysis of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's 
communication material. Therefore, along with the identification and analysis of 
the three interrelated dimensions 52 of the discourse-historical approach (i.e. 
content, strategies and linguistic means), Jager's (2001) model, extends the 
analysis to focus on discourse as a regulating body in terms of what can be said in 
a certain society at a given time but also of what cannot be said or is not said. This 
would cover, for instance, denial strategies, relativising strategies, or strategies to 
remove taboos, and strategies restricting what can be said (Jager, 2001). In Jager's 
(2001: 52-61) method, the main focus is on linguistic instruments such as: 
figurativeness, vocabulary, pronominal structure, argumentation types, and so on. 
The analysis of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's communication material 53 
highlights the presence of strategic and rhetorical devices (such as the ones 
highlighted and described by W odak and Reisigl (2001); and de Cillia et al. 
(1999» which build a coherent argument using emotional cues to enhance the 
persuasiveness of the discourse. Several texts were selected and analysed (see 
chapter 5), but one of those stood out: a text that encapsulates all the elements of 
the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's ideology has been identified and thoroughly 
analysed. It is an editorial written by Frank Vanhecke the Vlaams Blok leader, 
52 Reminder: the three interrelated dimensions are: a) the semantic elements of discourse (i.e., the 
content or the topic); b) the strategies52 adopted to achieve determined aims and; c) the linguistic 
means and forms of syntactical means used in the text (de Cillia et al., 1999) 
53 The selected pages from the brochure were translated into English by the author (a native 
Belgian who is fluent in French, Dutch and English) and then back-translated by a professional 
translator, to ensure the veracity of the translation. Hence, "the cultural distance between the 
researcher and the researched" (Humphreys and Brown, 2002: 932) was minimized. 
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commenting on the condemnation of the party for racism in November 2004 and 
announcing the end of the Vlaams Blok era. This text is also particularly relevant 
because it was written and published right after the court decision. The next 
section provides the full text, also available in Appendix 1. 
6.2. Full Text: "Today We Were Executed But We Will Rise" 54 
"Today (9 November), our party, the Vlaams Blok, has been condemned to death. 
This afternoon, the Belgian Supreme Court upheld the verdict, issued by the Court 
of Appeal in Ghent on 21 April, which declared the Vlaams Blok a criminal 
organisation. In order to preserve our party members from prosecution, we are 
now forced to disband. What happened in Brussels today is unique in the Western 
world: never has a so-called democratic regime outlawed the country's largest 
political party. 
The Vlaams Blok was supported by almost 1 million voters in last June's elections. 
We got 24.1% of the vote in Flanders, where 60% of the Belgian population lives. 
Voting is compulsory in Belgium and no other party was supported by more 
people. Our party has grown continuously for two decades. Since 1987, it has won 
twelve consecutive elections in a row. Belgium, established in 1830 by French 
revolutionaries, is an artificial construct dominated by the Socialist Francophone 
minority in Wallonia. Our party's main objective is the secession of Flanders from 
Belgium. Flanders is the free-market oriented Dutch-speaking and politically 
minorised (sic) northern part of the country. 
We are the democratic voice of an ever growing number of Flemings who, in an 
entirely non-violent way, want to put an end to Belgium. Our electoral strength is 
causing panic amongst the Belgian establishment. A recent opinion poll of the 
Brussels newspaper Le Soir and the Francophone state television RTBF (24 
October) indicates that the Vlaams Blok currently stands at 26.9% of the Flemish 
vote. 
Despite the fact that a political party should be fought in the voting booth, the 
Belgian regime has been harassing the Vlaams Blok with criminal prosecutions 
for over a decade. The Belgian Parliament, where Francophones are 
overrepresented, changed the Constitution in 1999 in order to limit freedom of 
expression. It also voted a series of new laws with the sole purpose of 
54 In http://vlaamsblok.belindex.shtml. as accessed in November 2004. 
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criminalising and de-funding our party, including an Anti-Racism Act and an Anti-
Discrimination Act which define "discrimination" so broadly that every individual 
can be prosecuted on the basis of them. (The text of these infamous bills can be 
found on our website www.jlemishrepublic.org). 
Moreover, according to Belgium's draconian new laws, every member and 
collaborator of an organisation that propagates "discrimination" can be punished 
with fines or imprisonment. Furthermore, the onus of proof has been reversed, so 
that the complainant does not need to prove that the accused "discriminates" or 
propagates "discrimination" but the latter has to prove that he does not. 
Since 1993 the power to prosecute for discrimination and racism was transferred 
to a government quango, resorting directly under the Prime Minister, the so-called 
Centre for Equal Opportunities and the Fight against Racism (CEOFR). This 
quango has now been vindicated by the Supreme Court, an institution composed of 
political appointees, half of them French-speakers. 
Have we ever condoned discrimination on the basis of race? No, but that did not 
matter to the Belgian establishment and its political courts. We were condemned 
on the basis of a selection of excerpts from texts provided by the CEOFR. These 
excerpts were taken from an anthology of no more than 16 texts published by local 
Vlaams Blok chapters between 1996 and 2000. According to the court what we 
wrote was not necessarily untrue, but our "intentions" were of a criminal nature. 
The Ghent ruling, today reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, stated that our texts 
(though some were mere quotes of official statistics on crime rates and social 
welfare expenditure and another was an article written by a female Turkish-born 
V1aams Blok member about the position of women in fundamentalist Muslim 
societies) were published with "an intention to contribute to a campaign of 
hatred" Such a proces d'intention (a conviction based on speculation about our 
supposed motives) is a real disgrace, and the fact that the Belgian judiciary had to 
resort to this proves that no other reasons for convicting us could be found We 
have never propagated, advocated or practised any discrimination. Never. 
The consequences of the conviction are, however, serious. According to the law, 
every member of our party or everyone who has ever cooperated with it, even if he 
has not committed any crimes himself, becomes a criminal by the mere fact of his 
membership of or his cooperation with our party. The Ghent verdict literally 
stated: "Rendering punishable every person who belongs to or cooperates with a 
group or society [. .. J serves as an efficient means to suppress such groups or 
societies, as the lawmaker intended. Rendering punishable the members or 
collaborators of the group or society inherently jeopardizes the continued 
existence or functioning of the group or society [. . .}. " 
Indeed, the reaffirmation of the Ghent verdict by the Supreme Court forces us to 
disband our party in order not to endanger its members and collaborators. 
Therefore, a party congress next Sunday will convene to officially disband the 
party. We will, however, put to the congress the establishment of a new party to 
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defend the political priorities that the Vlaams Blok has a l w { ~ n ' ' fought fur: an 
independent and democratic Republic of Flanders,' the traditional moral values of 
Western civilisation,' and the right of the Flemings to protect their national idenlif,,' 
and their Dutch language and culture. . 
1 thank those who founded our party in 1977 and all 1rho hare supported it in the 
past 27 years. They have fought the good fight. 1 thank our one million voters. 
They deserve a democracy. Belgium does not want to grant them one; )\,e will. 
Today, our party has been killed, not by the electorate but by the judges. 1Ve will 
establish a new party. This one Belgium will not be able to bun'; it will bun' 
Belgium. " . -
6.3. Analysis 
6.3.1. The semantic dimension 
The first dimension in the discourse-historical approach is about the semantic 
dimension, linked to the content of the discourse under investigation. Consistent 
with the party's ideology55, the themes tackled in the Vlaams Blok's website are 
the corruption of mainstream parties, the call for the independence of Flanders and 
the rejection of immigrants. In this editorial text (see "Today we were executed. 
But we will rise", Appendix 3), alternative interpretations are avoided providing 
the impression that there is a unique persuasive account of "what is actually going 
on" (see Teo, 2002), and that the description is of a unique 'reality'. 
Systematically on the party's website (see www.vlaamsblok.be). Frank Vanhecke 
claims that Flanders does not have the status and position it deserves within 
Belgium. 
~ ~ ~ The Vlaams Blok's core ideology is underpinned by a platform claiming the independence of 
Flanders, and on an anti-immigrant stance (Camus, 2003; FanieL 2003; S \ \ ~ m g e d o u w . . 1998) 
"Flanders is the free-market oriented 
marginalised northern part 
Dutch-speaking and p o l i t i c a l ~ l ' '
of the count/T ". 
http://vlaamsblok.be/index.shtml). 
"The Belgian Parliament, where Francophones are overrepresented [ ... J ". 
(http://vlaamsblok.belindex.shtml). 
Therefore rejecting this situation and embracing the Vlaams Blok's vie\\ is normal 
and legitimate, especially since the Vlaams Blok holds that Belgium itself does not 
have any legitimate foundation: Belgium is "[ ... J is an artificial construct [ ... J ". 
6.3.2. The strategic dimension 
The strategic dimension refers to "more or less accurate and more or less 
intentional plans of practices adopted to achieve a particular social, political, 
psychological or linguistic aim" (Wodak, 2001: 73). Several rhetorical devices and 
narrative strategies can be identified in Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang' s discourse, 
which contribute to providing a clear and persuasive narrative for the reader. First, 
the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang' s political and identity struggle is presented in a 
typical 'us' versus 'them' dichotomy. For instance, in the same editorial, Frank 
Vanhecke links Flemish identity to the party's struggle for political existence. 
"[about the creation of the new party, the Vlaams Belang] the 
establishment of a new party to defend the political priorities that the 
Vlaams Blok has always fought for: an independent and democratic 
Republic of Flanders,· the traditional moral values of western civilisation: 
and the right of the Flemings to protect their national identi(v and their 
Dutch language and culture" 
11 H 
Second, dismantling or de-legitimating strategies were also identified in the same 
text where opponents are systematically delegitimated. Dismantling and 
destructive strategies serve to de-mythologise or demolish existing national 
identities or elements of them (de Cillia et al., 1999). For example, Frank 
Vanhecke starts by undermining Belgian identity, by explaining its lack of 
substance: "Belgium, established in 1830 by French revolutionaries, is an 
artificial construct dominated by the Socialist French-speaking minority in 
Wallonia "; and goes on to argue that anti-democratic attitudes are embedded in 
Belgium because the government only serves the interests of a French-speaking 
minority, to the detriment of Flemings: 
"What happened in Brussels today is unique in the western world: never 
has a so-called democratic regime outlawed the country's largest political 
party. " 
"Despite the fact that a political party should be fought in the voting booth, 
the Belgian regime has been harassing the V/aams Blok with criminal 
prosecutions for over a decade. " 
"/ thank our one million voters. They deserve a democracy. Belgium does 
not want to grant them one; we will. " 
Thus in addition to avoidance strategies (where problematic issues are carefully 
avoided, for example with the redefmition of polemical terms and concepts), 
reversal strategies can be identified where the role of victim and attacker are 
reversed. 
"Unequal chances ", "ethnic unemployment ", and the supposed "racism" 
are only a consequence of a perfectly incoherent immigration policy. It was 
the case yesterday, it is still the case today. (Vlaams Blok, 2004; pp. 6-7; 
Appendix 11) 
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Reversal strategies can be identified in several documents from the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang. For example, the Vlaams Blok was found guilty of racism. 
However, Frank Vanhecke argues that this decision was itself based on the 
division between French-speakers and Flemings. For example, it explicitly states 
that the judges, who condemned the Vlaams Blok, are politically appointed, and 
are French-speaking: 
"Since 1993 the power to prosecute for discrimination and racism was 
transferred to a government quango, resorting directly under the Prime 
Minister, the so-called Centre for Equal Opportunities and the Fight 
against Racism (CEOFR). This quango has now been vindicated by the 
Supreme Court, an institution composed of political appointees, half of 
them Francophone. " 
If one follows this line of thought, the condemnation of the Vlaams Blok could be 
interpreted as a political decision based on ethnicity (Flemings vs. Walloons56), 
which would make itself illegal and racist. 
"The Belgian Parliament, where Francophones are overrepresented, 
changed the Constitution in 1999 in order to limit freedom of expression. It 
also voted in a series of new laws with the sole purpose of criminalising 
and bankrupting and de-funding our party [ ... ]. " 
van Dijk (1993; 1991) indicates that reversal strategies are typical in anti-anti-
racist theories, where those who fight intolerance and discrimination are 
themselves accused of being intolerant and against 'freedom of speech'. It is worth 
reiterating that the editorial begins by stating that the Vlaams Blok is a successful 
party representing the Flemish voice. 
'6 The inhabitants of Brussels are referred to as the Brusseleirs (as used in Brussels dialect), along 
with the use of Flemish or Flemings, for the inhabitants of Flanders, and Walloons for the 
inhabitants of Wallonia. 
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"The Vlaams Blok was supported by almost 1 million voters in last June's 
elections. We got 24.1% of the vote in Flanders, where 60% of the Belgian 
population live. " 
"we are the democratic voice of an ever growing number of Flemings 
[ ... ] ,,57. 
In Frank Vanhecke's editorial, it seems that the roles have been reversed and the 
Vlaams Blok opposition to the court decision and the institutions which instigated 
it, is constructed as a legitimate and democratic struggle. This reversal strategy has 
been identified in several instances in the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's discourse. 
For example: 
"Have we ever condoned discrimination on the basis ofrace? No, but that 
did not matter to the Belgian establishment and its political courts." 
"They [the media and political leaders] are co-responsible for the climate 
of intolerance in which Haider, Le Pen and Dewinter are presented as a 
threat to democracy and therefore a legitimate target. To prevent further 
tragedies I call on politicians and journalists to stop demon ising the 
Vlaams Blok. ,,58 
Reversal strategies also involve shifting the focus of attention from one's own 
questionable acts to the motives of those who disapprove of his or her violations 
(Sykes and Matza, 1957). Within the Vlaams Blok discourse, condemners are 
identified and named, mainly traditional parties and the media seen as serving their 
57 http://vlaamsblok.belsite_engelsjndex.shtml 
S8 http://www.vlaamsblok.belindex.shtml 
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interest. For example, in the Frequently Asked Questions section of the \'laams 
I k b · 59 . h' B 0 we sIte ,In answer to t e questIOn 'Is the VB racist?' the party replies: 
"The VB is certainly not a racist parzv; H'e have been branded [racist} by 
the traditional parties and their friends from the media, and the,' blocked 
us in a political monster trial. ,,60 ' 
The argument here is that it is the political will of the traditional parties to 
undermine the Vlaams Blok's credibility and legitimacy that has led to Vlaams 
Blok being branded racist. In summary, by condemning the condemners. 
definitions of racism and discrimination are refuted and reframed as being political 
tools used to limit the Vlaams Blok's freedom of speech. 
6.3.3. The linguistic dimension 
The third dimension of discourse-historical analysis focusses on the linguistic 
means and the forms of realisation, such as lexical units, argumentation schemes 
and syntactical means expressing the strategies identified in the strategic 
dimension analysis. The important feature identified here is the choice of words. 
For example, the heading "A party unlike any other" is a recurring feature of the 
Vlaams Blok's website. It introduces all the leader's columns on the Vlaams Blok 
website (see www.vlaamsblok.be). According to Teo (2000: 14), the function of 
headings is to form a "cognitive macro-structure that serves as an important 
strategic cue to control the way readers process and make sense of the report". It 
announces immediately the party's positioning strategy (stressing its 
54 http://\'laamsblok.bc/afdrukkenlafdrukken.php 
60 http: \ laamsblok. be afdrukkenl afdrukken.php 
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differentiation from other parties). It states that the party is unique and different 
from the other mainstream political parties which are consistently depicted by the 
Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang as corrupt and unreliable. The heading therefore 
embodies a political promise to the reader that the Vlaams Biok is different and 
will do things differently. 
In addition, a repertoire of 'confrontation' has been identified, in the VIaams 
Blok's discourse. The words used in the text strengthen the dichotomy between the 
party and its supporters and their opponents willing to bring it down. It is: a) 
describing the action of the opponents with words such as: ''forces'', "endanger", 
"killed' "bury" "execute" "terrorism" "non-founded renorts" "hate" which , , , ,-.J l r' , 
could associate the opponent' actions with undemocratic and violent practices; and 
b) describing actions related to the Vlaams Biok with: "defend"; ''fought for"; 
"protect"; "the good fight"; "bury" (but only in reaction to the establishment 
attempt to bury the party), which relates the Vlaams Biok's actions to the concept 
of self-defence61 • Other rhetorical devices, such as metaphors and metonyms are 
also present in the analysed texts. For example, across the Vlaams BlokIVlaams 
Belang's communication material, the party portrays itself as "the voice'" of 
Flemish interests and Flemish citizens: "we are the democratic voice of an ever 
growing number of Flemings,,62. 
61 For example, in 1991 the theme of the Vlaams Blok's campaign was self-defence and was 
illustrated by the image of boxing gloves. 
62 http://vlaamsblok.belsite_engelsjndex.shtml 
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With regard to the syntax and punctuation used in the Vlaams Blok's website , 
there is a recurrent use of inverted commas around the word 'discrimination' or 
'racism'. The party questions the definition of the word by the Anti-
Discrimination Act: 
"[ ... J Anti-Racism Act and an Anti-Discrimination Act [which] define 
"discrimination" so broadly that every individual can be prosecuted on the 
basis of them. (The text of these infamous bills can be found on our website 
www.flemishrepublic.org) ". 
The questioning of the significance attached to 'discrimination' is also implied in 
the next paragraph by Frank Vanhecke: 
"Moreover, according to Belgium IS draconian new laws, every member 
and collaborator of an organisation that propagates "discrimination," can 
be punished with fines or imprisonment. Furthermore, the onus of proof 
has been reversed, so that the complainant does not need to prove that the 
accused "discriminates" or propagates "discrimination," but the latter has 
to prove that he does not". 
Every time the word 'discrimination' is used in Frank Vanhecke's editorial, it is in 
quotation marks. This may imply that the party disagrees with the meaning 
attached to the word. Definitions of racism and discrimination are refuted and 
reframed as being political tools used to limit the Vlaams Blok's freedom of 
speech. 
"The understanding of racism is used today as a term of abuse to seal the 
mouth of political opponents. ,,63 
63 http://vlaamsblok.belafdrukkenlafdrukken.php 
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In the party's discourse, racism and xenophobia are clearly reframed. redefined 
and ultimately dismissed within the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang· s 
communication material. This provides a political product which is disassociated 
from its questionable features, and thus becomes less problematic for voters' 
consumption, thereby increasing its appeal in the political market. 
7. Conclusion 
The adopted approach to analysing the texts is critical and interpretative, 
identifying the dimensions constituting discourse, namely the semantic. the 
linguistic and the strategic dimensions developed by Wodak and her associates. 
The critical and discursive approach adopted here necessitated a methodology that 
would address two issues. First, the requirement of a given philosophical stance 
towards reality and scholarly research is recognised. Second, the methodology 
addresses the challenges attached to the analysis of complex, potentially polemical 
and contested discourse: marketing, political marketing and xenophobic and 
discriminatory discourse of the Western European extreme right, and arguably the 
best success story of the extreme right family, the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang. 
The preliminary CDA of an online text of the Vlaams Blok, selected for the 
purposes of illustration has not only demonstrated the richness of the data, but also 
the relevance of CDA in approaching the particular discourses studied. CDA 
indeed focusses on the connection between meaning and power, and uncovers 
taken-for-granted stories and recognises the ideological nature of discourses, even 
the most naturalised and invisible ones. For example, CDA, with its outspoken 
political and emancipatory goals, has already been applied to racist, sexist, or 
identity-related discourses. 
In short, the following chapters include the analysis of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams 
Belang's discourse and marketing. First, chapters 6 and 7 demonstrate that the 
party produces powerful, convincing arguments by deploying textual strategies 
generally (Titscher et al., 2000; de Cillia et aI., 1999; Wodak et al., 1999) and 
more specifically by deploying lexical, grammatical, and rhetorical devices (Butt 
et al., 2004; Tonks, 2002; Jowett and O'Donnell, 2000; Somig, 1989). In chapter 8, 
the focus is on the marketing methods and techniques that are deployed with 
increasing sophistication to build a politically powerful brand. The analysis of the 
Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's discourse provides a deeper understanding of the 
mechanisms of language and discourse in a fusion of politics and marketing. 
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Chapter 6: Discourse-historical analysis of the \Tlaams 
Blok and Vlaams Belang's publications 
1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the key findings of the critical discourse analysis of a set of 
texts produced by the Vlaams Blok and the Vlaams Belang. The chapter aims to 
analyse the written communication material and to highlight the identification of 
the rhetorical and other textual strategies. A critical discourse analysis was 
conducted on a range of publicly available communication of the Vlaams Blok and 
the Vlaams Belang. The methodological framework proved particularly well-
suited to address the complexity and sensitivity/polemical nature of an extreme 
right party's discourse. As explained and illustrated in the previous chapter on 
methodology, W odak' s discourse-historical approach provides the structured 
method to analyse the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang discourse. The discourse-
historical approach of critical discourse analysis focusses on three interrelated 
dimensions of discourse (semantic, strategic and linguistic), and focusses acute 
attention on the socio-historical context of the production of discourse. 
Unless stated otherwise, the combined name Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang is used 
to refer to both the Vlaams Blok and the Vlaams Belang, whenever the argument 
is valid for both parties. This use also highlights the continuity between both 
1 2 ~ ~
parties. The Vlaams Belang is the heir of the Vlaams Blok; a notion confmned by 
controversial comments by the party leaders, despite the softening of the most 
radical stances of the Vlaams Blok. The critical analysis of both parties has indeed 
highlighted a continuity of policies and a continuity of ideology. 
This chapter explores the rhetorical strategies of the party, and the way it uses 
language (vocabulary, grammar, rhetoric) to create persuasive arguments, 
articulate sound argument strategies, and eventually gain voters' trust. The 
analysis of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's discourse has three main 
dimensions (strategic, linguistic and semantic) and this chapter follows the same 
structure (strategic, linguistic and semantic), presenting the most salient features of 
the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's discourse within its specific context. 
Quotations taken from the website, newsletters and brochures have been selected 
for their relevance in order to illustrate the main issues highlighted during the 
critical discourse analysis of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang communication 
material. 
2. Persuasion 
Persuasion can be viewed as a framing concept for marketing (Tonks, 2002; 
Laufer and Paradeise, 1990). Unsurprisingly, persuasion is also an important 
concept in politics. Persuasion could be simply defined as a communicative 
process which aims to influence others. A more complete definition is provided by 
O'Donnell and Kable (1982: 9) who define persuasion as 
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"a complex, continuing, interactive process III which a sender and a 
receiver are linked by symbols, verbal and nonverbal, through which the 
persuader attempts to influence the persuadee to adopt a change in a gi\'en 
attitude or behaviour because the persuadee has had perceptions enlarged 
or changed". 
A necessary 'ingredient' in persuasion as a kind of cause of behaviour change is 
that the person persuaded consciously assents to the pressure of the \'ector of 
influence (Blair, 2004). In other words, the persuadee is free to resist the 
persuasion attempt. This definition of persuasion can be applied in the case of the 
Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang who play the role of the persuader and communicate 
with various audiences (e.g. party members, sympathisers, potential voters, the 
general public, government) via different channels (e.g. the internet, print media 
and TV). The party attempts to persuade and convince (without coercion) the 
audience to reinforce or change their points of view, and grant their vote. The 
desired behaviour pursued by the persuader is the voters' support at the poll, a 
change in attitude and opinion, and ultimately a change in behaviour. The active 
persuader knows that he or she has to appeal to the audience's needs if he or she 
wants them to adopt the message (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2000), because an active 
audience also seeks to have its needs fulfilled by the persuader (Jowett and 
O'DonnelL 2000). Accordingly, political marketing communications is a complex, 
continuing process that produces a type of persuasive message, via symbols, 
verbal and nonverbal devices such as advertisements, websites, colours, 
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photographs, pictures, myths, metaphors and branded merchandise. The political 
party engages in a process of persuasion with the electorate, the general public, 
party members and other parties, etc., in other words, all the relevant audiences. 
Goals of persuasion: response shaping, reinforcing and changing 
According to Jowett and O'Donnell (2000), the goal of persuasion is to make its 
recipient voluntarily adopt a point of view or behaviour. The goals of both the 
persuader and persuadee are fulfilled by the process of persuasion (Jowett and 
O'Donnell, 2000). This sets persuasion apart from propaganda, where only the 
propagandist64 benefits from the communication. Jowett and O'Donnell (2000: 28) 
categorised persuasion's goals as 1) response shaping, 2) response reinforcing and 
3) response changing. First, in response shaping the persuader teaches the 
audience how to behave and offers positive reinforcement for that behaviour 
(Jowett and O'Donnell, 2000). In this scenario, if the audience is rewarded for its 
positive response, then positive attitudes are developed towards what is learnt 
(Jowett and O'Donnell, 2000). This would be the case, for example, in situations 
where the party is aiming its communication at existing members and local 
political candidates. It could be assumed that in this specific case, the audience 
64 The goal of persuasion is to make its recipient voluntarily adopt a point of view or a behaviour 
(Jowett and O'Donnell, 2000). However, a persuader can mislead its audience about its true 
intention. If the people of the audience are aware that the persuader has a hidden agenda, they can 
still voluntarily comply with it. When the audience believes the spoken intent of the persuader, and 
is unaware of his or her true intention, they can be manipulated and it is considered as propaganda. 
"More commonly however, the propagandist exploits an audience's beliefs or values or group 
norms in such a way as to fan the fires of prejudice or self-interest" (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2000: 
34-35). Both parties (persuader and persuadee) have their needs fulfilled. The audience's needs-
the reinforcement of prejudicial or self-serving attitudes - get fulfilled and spoken, but the 
propagandist's needs, even if fulfilled, are not revealed (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2000: 35). 
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might already hold favourable attitudes towards the persuader. An example could 
be found in the internal documents of the organisation (e.g. Brochure: Political 
communication techniques - Part J: The personal campaign of the candidate), 
where the party leaders advocate the use of political marketing for the party's local 
candidates. 
Second, in the response reinforcing scenario, the audience already has a positive 
attitude towards the subject. The persuader reminds them about their positive 
attitude and stimulates them to feel more strongly by demonstrating their attitudes, 
through specified forms of behaviour (Jowett and O'Donnell, 2000: 29). Examples 
of such a form of persuasion are the regularly organised conferences and rallies 
organised by the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang. Open to all, from the mildly 
interested to the enthusiastic party supporters, the aim of such events is to 
reinforce shared goals and identity. For example, the Vlaams Belang Youth camps 
(and formerly Vlaams Blok Youth camps), Summer Universities, the semi-annual 
congress and other thematic conferences (e.g. on immigration, criminality or 
economics) organised by the party would also fit into this category of response-
reinforcing persuasion. 
The third case of persuasion identified by Jowett and O'Donnell (2000) is response 
changing. In response changing, the persuader attempts to make people switch 
from one attitude to another, to change behaviour, or adopt a new behaviour. This 
is the most difficult kind of persuasion, because people are reluctant to change 
(Jowett and O'Donnell, 2000: 29). The persuader has to relate the change to 
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something in which the persuadee already believes referred to as an 'anchor'. 
Anchors can be beliefs, attitudes, values, behaviours, and/or group norms. To be 
aware of an audience's anchors, the persuader must know the audience and 
analyse its needs, desires, beliefs, attitudes and values, along with its concern 
about the social outcome of the persuasive communication (Jowett and O'Donnell, 
2000: 34). The tools of political marketing (market research, segmentation, 
targeting and branding) are useful here (as discussed in chapter 8). This form of 
persuasion may well be the one in which Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang engages in 
the most, since it has to consistently defend itself against political opponents, and 
attract more voters. 
In the case of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang, the main focus lies in response 
changing and response shaping scenarios. These forms of persuasion are 
potentially targeted at an 'external' audience, consisting not only of sympathisers 
and voters, but also of non-sympathetic readers and opponents' audiences, i.e. 
people the party needs to positively influence (which is arguably the most difficult 
task). The analysed texts therefore fall within this category, and the subsequent 
discussion is concerned with this type of persuasion and the marketing strategies 
deployed to achieve response changing and shaping goals. 
3. Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang: most salient features 
A large corpus of documents edited by the Vlaams Blok and by the Vlaams Belang 
has been analysed. There are texts and photographs from campaign and thematic 
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brochures, leaflets, online newsletters, and webpages. Clearly, CDA is a lengthy 
and detailed procedure. This is why among the common themes identified, the 
most relevant and salient are presented within each respective dimension of the 
discourse-historical method of CDA65: 1) the semantic dimension, 2) the strategic 
dimension, and 3) the linguistic dimension. The analysis highlighted the 
complexity of the Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang's discourse, its coherence and 
cohesion, and its persuasiveness. The CDA of the discourse of the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang allows a better understanding as to why this discourse can 
persuade and attract voters. The Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang proposes a corpus of 
well-built arguments, written in accessible language (in French and Dutch). Salient 
quotations from the Vlaams Blok and the Vlaams Belang have been selected and 
inserted to illustrate the points being made. These quotations are easily identified 
in an italicised font and in indented paragraphs. The sources of the quotations are 
indicated, with reference to the corresponding appendix. 
3.1. Semantic dimension 
In the discourse-historical approach, the frrst dimension requesting the attention of 
the critical discourse analyst is the content or semantic dimension. The semantic 
analysis of various texts taken from several sources66 highlights the recurrence of a 
few significant themes. Consistent with the party's ideology67, the main themes 
65 A detailed description of CDA steps and processes is provided in chapter 5. 
66 That is, the Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang's respective websites, thematic brochures and 
campaign brochures 
67 The Vlaams Blok's core ideology is underpinned by a platform claiming the independence of 
Flanders and by an anti-immigrant stance (Camus, 2003; Faniel, 2003; Swyngedouw, 1998). One 
theme is 'also anti-party, i.e. the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang criticises the other political parties as 
corrupt and unconcerned with citizens' interests. 
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tackled in the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's communication material are the 
corruption and incompetence of mainstream parties, a tougher approach to crime, 
the independence of Flanders, and the rejection of immigrants (along with a 
denunciation of the immigration policies and the failure of the 'imposed' 
multicultural model of society). These are addressed in relation to democracy, 
freedom of speech, racism, and the defence of people's interests. These topics 
allow the party to present its political vision and direct the reader's attention 
towards a set of selected societal issues, considered as important or relevant by the 
Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang. 
Each of these most salient themes is analysed in the following section in its own 
right and linked to the other themes. One characteristic of the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang's discourse is its coherence: the developed themes work 
together, reinforce each other, and generally provide well-constructed arguments 
and believable stories. Therefore it should come as no surprise that themes within 
the semantic analysis overlap and are analysed in relation to one another. Each 
subsequent section includes the analysis and discussion of a single topic. 
Quotations from different sources (e.g. website, campaign brochure, newsletters) 
are included and provide an overview of the content of the party's discourse. This 
is not, however, a content analysis, but rather a thematic synthesis of the party's 
views and a collection of core topics developed by the Vlaams Blok and Vlaams 
Belang and their significance and contribution to the overarching Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang discourse. These themes are: democracy, freedom of speech 
and racism; vox populi; selective screening; and reality building. 
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3.1.1. Democracy 
Democracy is a theme frequently developed by the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang. 
The political project of the party is presented as a response to the perceived lack of 
democratic practices in Belgium, and as an alternative (i.e. honest, uncorrupt, and 
resolutely democratic). For example, the general theme of the introductory text for 
a brochure, entitled Brussels, My City - Facts - Reality (Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 
2-3; see Appendix 4), is democracy. More specifically the party addresses the 
many dangers that democracy faces, and the voters' duty to re-instate a cleansed 
form of democracy (by voting for the Vlaams Blok). 
"The judgement of Ghent's Court of Appeal, is the nth signal that 
democracy does not feel well in our country. It is indeed a political trial in 
its purestform." (Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 2-3) 
The author of this text is Frank Vanhecke, president of the former Vlaams Blok, 
and current president of the Vlaams Belang. With "the judgement of Ghent's Court 
of Appeal", the text is referring to the condemnation of the Vlaams Blok by a 
Belgian court. The rest of the text frames this condemnation as a political set-up 
against the Vlaams Blok. The other political parties' resolve to fight the Vlaams 
Blok by any means necessary (i.e. not at the poll) is evidenced by the modification 
of the Belgian constitution to stop state fmancial subsidies68 to the party: 
UAII the parties, Flemish and French-speakers (exceptfor the Vlaams Blok, 
of course), have voted for one modification of the law after another, in 
order to ban the Vlaams Blok and financially dry it out. The Constitution 
68 In Belgium, all political parties belonging to the parliamentary group are financed by the state 
(see van Biezen, 2003). 
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itself was modified for this sole purpose! A people's jury did not inspire 
confidence in the parties in power. Could you imagine that the Vlaams 
Blok benefits from too much sympathy or common sense from our people! 
No. Professional magistrates, who could often be put under political 
pressures, were imperatively necessary. All year long, one talks about 
political nominations in the legal world Do you think that today, all of a 
sudden, at the opportunity of this trial, eminently political, that political 
nominations wouldn't play any role??? "(Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 2-3; see 
Appendix 4) 
Frank Vanhecke leads the reader to the conclusion that the Vlaams Blok was 
framed by political collusion: the result was the legal challenge and the subsequent 
condemnation of the party. According to the Vlaams Blok, such actions (the 
lawsuit and the condemnation) would not have been possible in a truly democratic 
country. This is clearly expressed by: 
"These affairs are common currency in banana republics, they don't have 
their place in democracy" (Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 2-3). 
The comparison of Belgium with a banana republic (i.e. a politically unstable 
country that is often a dictatorship) is used several times in the party's public 
communication material. It seems to express the level of contempt in which the 
Vlaams Blok holds Belgium and its democratic system. 
"/ thank our one million voters. They deserve a democracy. Belgium does 
not want to grant them one; we will. ''(http://vlaamsblok.be/index.shtml.as 
accessed on 1711112004; see Appendix 3) 
In the campaign brochure entitled 'Touche pas a la democratie' (i.e. 'Don't 
meddle with Democracy' (Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 2-3), the party highlights the 
undemocratic practices of the governing parties: 
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"These last months, several facts, which are totally unacceptable from a 
democratic point of view, happened First, one has accepted the right to 
vote to foreigners who refuse to get our nationality, for the next commune 
elections. A large majority of the population is opposed to the foreigners' 
right to vote, and nevertheless, it was imposed on us. " (Vlaams Blok, May 
2004: 2-3, see appendix 5). 
The use of 'us' in this paragraph is significant. The Vlaams Blok explains that, 
because of the imposed cordon san ita ire, no matter how successful the Vlaams 
Blok is at the polls, the mainstream political parties still refuse to form a governing 
coalition with an extreme right party. After the 2004 elections, due to the excellent 
electoral results of the Vlaams Blok, the other parties had to form an awkward 
coalition with all parties thereby leaving the Vlaams Blok as the sole party in 
opposition. Therefore, the situation provided grounds for the claim that the only 
ones opposing the foreigners' right to vote are the voters and the Vlaams Blok, 
subsumed in the word 'us' (which also indicates the solidarity of the Vlaams Blok 
with people's interests). A few sentences later, the Vlaams Blok summarises this 
stance by claiming that: 
liThe parties have proved that they were not interested in the people's 
opinions" (Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 2-3, Appendix 5) 
The Vlaams Blok here stresses the importance it grants to voters and their opinions, 
contrarily to the governing parties. After all, the party's new name - Vlaams 
Belang - means Flemish Interest. The text69 finally makes an allusion to the 
69 For full text of the Cour de Cassation in French, see http://www.juridat.be/jurisljucf.htm. For the text in 
Dutch, see http://wwwJuridalbeljurispdfIRICl04IBIRC04B91.pdf 
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reason for the ban placed on the Vlaams Blok, by mentioning the need for a debate 
on immigration within Belgian society. The court found the three associations (see 
chapter 4, p.83) affiliated to the Vlaams Blok to be guilty of breaching the law 
against racism. However, the Vlaams Blok appears to be deflecting this issue, by 
re-contextualising it as a mere debate on immigration. 
"There is no possible democracy without a broad society debate. No 
debate has any sense without freedom of speech, on as large a scale as 
possible, including on the theme of immigration". (Vlaams Blok, May 
2004: 3) 
In other words, the party explains the situation as a punishment for actually 
tackling the issue of immigration, rather than a condemnation for racism based on 
facts. 
The 70 points programme' and open discrimination 
The party was condemned for advocating discriminatory policies, such as a 
separate education system for Muslim children, or a forced repatriation of all 
immigrants up to the 3rd generation. Those policies are collated in the infamous 
'Immigration: the Solution. 70 Propositions for the Resolution of the Foreigners' 
Issue'S, which was written by Filip Dewinter, in 1992. This pamphlet, 
summarising the party's policies on immigration, served as the justification for the 
creation of the cordon sanitaire, which has been effectively isolating and 
excluding the Vlaams Blok (and the Vlaams Belang) from political power at any 
level of Belgian politics. The following quotation from Filip Dewinter's above 
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mentioned book (also simply known as the '70 points programme') illustrates the 
nature of some of those discriminatory policies: 
"The growing number of foreign children in our education system poses 
a series of problems. The different culture, the uprooting. the 
backwardness at school, and sometimes the different social class are a 
danger for the quality of education provided to our own children. When 
one forces foreign Muslim children to integrate and assimilate in our 
society, we are breaking, in an authoritarian and art(ficial way. the link 
with their own culture. This is why it is necessary to organise a separate 
and independent education system for foreign Muslim children. This 
Muslim education is an education system that must be created ill parallel 
with the existing networks [ ... ]" (Filip Dewinter, 1992; emphasis added)70 
The '70 points programme' was adopted shortly after the Vlaams Blok 
breakthrough in 1991. Although in 200 L the party distanced itself from the '70 
points programme', opponents of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang seem dubious 
about the extent to which the party has actually abandoned the measures advocated 
in the programme in their propaganda and electoral programmes (Haelsterman, 
2001). Haelsterman (2001) notes that the only change is that the 'problematic' 70 
points programme is no longer on sale, and that the party representatives do not 
refer to the programme in public anymore. Discussing further whether or not the 
party has shed the policies advocated in the original publication is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. The focus is instead on the themes developed and how the 
Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang links those to its political manifesto. 
Ideology 
70 Dewinter. F. (1992). "Immigratic: de oplossing. 70 voorstdlen tel' oplossing van her . . _ 
1'J'(,cmdelingenproblemen. Brussel: Vlaams Blok. (translation: Immigration: the solution. 70 propOSItIOns tor 
the resolution of the foreigners' issue.) 
The party manages to link its core policies suggesting that one solution to what the 
party refers to as the lack of democracy in Belgium is an independent Flanders 
which would grant democracy to its people (which, as explained earlier. is a core 
element of the party's ideological programme). The documents published on the 
Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang's respective websites are consistent with the 
party's ideology7!. For example, in an editorial text, 'Today It'e were executed But 
we will rise,72 (analysed in chapter 5, see section 6.3. pp.117-124). Frank 
Vanhecke claims that Flanders does not have the status and position it dcscrycs 
within Belgium (see Appendix 3). 
"Flanders is the free-market oriented Dutch-speaking and p o l i t i c a / ~ l ' '
marginalised northern part of the country [, .. J." 
(http://vlaamsblok.be/index.shtml). 
"The Belgian Parliament, where French-speakers are o\'errepresented 
[ ... J" (http://vlaamsblok.belindex.shtml). 
The perceived marginalisation of Flanders by a Walloon minority and the actual 
financial transfer (called the solidarity transfers) from the richer Flanders Region 
to the less affluent capital of Brussels and region of Wallonia, are a source of bitter 
argument in Belgian politics. 
"It seems that Flanders must pay more for the unemployed Walloons -
and that is only a portion of the annual total of the billions that flow 
from Flanders to Wallonia. The transfers for the unemployment fund are 
growing r a p i d ~ y . . In 1990, they H'ere 220 million euros. 111 1995, it was 
a/readv 380 million euros. In 2000 it has reached 480 million eul'o.\'. In 
2003, the Flemings paid 728 millions for the unemployed Walloons. and in 
71 Reminder: the VB' s core ideology is underpinned by a platfonn claiming the independencc of 
Flanders. and on an anti-immigrant stancc (Camus, 2003: Faniel, 2003; Swyngedouw. 1998) 
" Sec http://\laamsblok.bc /index.shtml72 
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2004 there a temporary record in the transfers with, please, 840 mil/ions. 
A reduction is nowhere to be seen, because the unemployed Walloons are 
never penalised (sanctioned). No problem, we, the Flemings, will pay the 
bill' (Vlaams Belang, in www.vlaamsbelang.be/index.php?p=6andid=10. 
as accessed on the 19/04/2005; see appendix 21; emphasis added) 
According to the party, the independence is necessary for Flanders to access 
prosperity. There are no links (affective, cultural or historical) between Flanders 
and Wallonia. Accepting this point of view is presented as the only logical 
decision, since the Vlaams Blok holds that Belgium itself does not have any 
legitimate foundation as a state: 
Belgium, established in 1830 by French revolutionaries, is an artificial 
construct [ ... ]" (see appendix 3). 
The argument is similar in the Vlaams Belang's rhetoric: 
"We live in a country where prosperity, employment and even the territory 
of the Flemish majority are fundamentally harmed by the political 
aggression of the Walloon minority" (Vlaams Belang, November 2006: 2, 
see Appendix 3). 
The tone adopted here in addressing the North-South disputes has hardened, and 
the Vlaams Belang is urging Flemings more than ever to put an end to the French-
speakers' hegemony, their unfair 'milking' of Flanders and the general lack of 
democracy. 
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Don't meddle with democracy: Subversion of anti-racism discourse 
The Vlaams Blok links democracy with the right to freedom of speech, and the 
rejection of accusations of racism. This link is embodied in the heading, or slogan 
adopted for the brochure Nr 6 (May 2004; see Appendix 7a): "Touche pas a fa 
democratie" (i.e. "Don't meddle with democracy"). "Touche pas a fa democratie" 
is an important sentence, not least because it is the first thing the party says before 
the reader has even opened the brochure. The grammatically correct form of the 
negative form of the verb should be: "ne touche pas a la democratie" (emphasis 
added). The closest English equivalent of this 'incorrect' grammatical use would 
be the inelegant: 'meddle not with democracy'. Since the Vlaams Blok is far too 
careful and professional to allow such a mistake to creep into its texts, it can be 
concluded that "Touche pas a la democratie" - a colloquial usage which is more 
appropriate in spoken language than in written text - might have been 
intentionally used. 
One possible interpretation for this 'incorrect' grammatical usage is informed by 
the anti-racism movement. The phrase: "Touche pas a" became famous in the 
1980s with the slogan "Touche pas a mon pote,,73 of SOS Racisme, a French anti-
racism association (translated as "Don't mess with my mate"). People used to wear 
the recognisable hand-shaped pin sporting the slogan (see Appendix 8). The 
Franco-Belgian border is culturally porous and any major event in France has an 
'1 Translating into: "doll't mess with my mate". see http: www.sos-racisme.org. 
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impact in French-speaking Belgium, namely via the French-media widely watched 
in French-speaking Belgium. 
It is interesting to note that the cover page of the Dutch-speaking version of the 
brochure says "Logish toch" (see appendix 7b), which could be translated as: "it's 
logical", or "all the same". This is another indication that "Touche pas a fa 
democratie" could be interpreted as connecting with existing texts within the anti-
racist discourse (evidence of discursive intertextuality), since the French "Touche 
pas a la democratie'" would be understood by French-speakers, more likely to 
know the "Touche pas a mon pote" anti-racist slogan. This subversion of anti-
racist language by the Vlaams Blok has to be understood in a discourse which 
makes the link between freedom of speech and racism and discrimination. The 
Vlaams Blok, when saying "don't meddle with democracy", argues for the pre-
eminence of democracy (therefore defined by a centrality of the right of free 
speech), over other concerns (such as for example individuals' rights and 
discrimination). 
The subversion of the anti-racist discourse is an interesting feature, consistent with 
the so-called reversal strategy (van Dijk, 1993, 1991), an example of what Strutton 
et al. (1994: 254) described as 'condemning the condemners' strategy. This ploy is 
also evident in the following quotation from the Vlaams Blok's website: 
"They [the media and political leaders] are co-responsible for the climate 
of intolerance in which Haider, Le Pen and Dewinter are presented as a 
threat to democracy and therefore a legitimate target. To prevent further 
tragedies I call on politicians and journalists to stop demon ising the 
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Vlaams Blok." (Vlaams Blok's website: http://www.vlaamsblok.be/index.shtml. 
as accessed in October 2003) 
In the prevIOus quotation too, the party adopts a reversal strategy where the 
condemners become the condemned and where one deflects accusations of 
misconduct by pointing out that those who would condemn are themselyes 
engaged in similarly disapproved activities. The next section discusses this issue in 
greater detail. 
3.1.2. Freedom of speech and anti-racism 
A salient semantic feature is the link made by the party between democracy, 
democratic debate and freedom of speech. In the brochure Nr.6 (May 2004: 3, see 
Appendix 5), the right of 'freedom of speech' is mentioned again to justify the 
party's stance on immigration and racism. The Vlaams Blok considers that 
denying freedom of speech is a breach of democratic rules and rights. 
"Other scandal: the condemnation of the Vlaams Blok for "racism". The 
free expression of your opinions, in this country, is from now on strangled. 
The Vlaams Blok is not a racist party, it o n ~ v v defends in afirm and decisive 
fashion, the rights of the Brusseleirs74. It is the reason why the regime has 
called upon a "tribunal" to put the Vlaams Blok offside". (Vlaams Blok, 
May 2004: 3) 
"We vvant a Brussels where one is still rewarded for one's work. For a 
Brussels where one can freely express one's opinion". (Vlaams Blok, May 
2004: 3) 
' ~ ~ The inhabitants of Brussels are referred to as the Brnsseleirs (as used in Brussels dialect), along 
with the use of Flemish or Flemings, for the inhabitants of Flanders, and Walloons for the 
inhabitants of Wallonia. 
The party tackles accusations of racism, suggesting that freedom of speech has 
been "strangled". 'Freedom of speech' was even chosen as the title of a short 
paragraph (see Appendix 9) included in the brochure FeitenlRealites (Vlaams Blok. 
May 2004) written by Erick Erens, a deputy for the party. The text concerns the 
issue of multiculturalism and the alleged difficulties of cohabitation benveen 
native Brussels inhabitants and foreigners. The Vlaams Blok chooses here to link 
the issue of multiculturalism to freedom of speech, actually unambiguously 
referring to the Vlaams Blok's freedom of speech. As shown earlier, both topics 
are intertwined in the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang's discourse. 
"Freedom of speech: Censored 
Brussels will count soon a majority of inhabitants from foreign origin. due 
to the lax policies of the traditional parties. Every political commentator 
can confirm this: the right to vote by foreigners lvill cause a political 
earthquake in Brussels" (,Brussels a safe city?!' , Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 
9, emphasis added, see Appendix 3) 
The link between the heading and the content is not straightforward. However, a 
familiarity with the way the party tackles issues, and with the context of utterance 
of the previous quotation (campaign brochure for Brussels), directs the reader to 
the often mentioned freedom of speech and the right and duty to denounce the ills 
of multiculturalism. The party claims that its freedom to express its views on 
immigration and the presence of foreigners in Belgium is taken away, and the 
party's voice is censored and silenced. What the other parties call racist and 
xenophobic stances, the Vlaams Blok call the expression of its democratic right to 
express itself on immigration. The Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang's focus on 
l ~ S S
democracy and freedom of speech (usually, the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's 
freedom of speech), is a key theme developed in the party literature. 
Vlaams Belang and racism 
After its legal condemnation for racism, the Vlaams Belang has been more 
cautious, sending coded messages when taking its more xenophobic positions. 
Racism, anti-racism and freedom of speech, however, remain important themes in 
the new Vlaams Belang discourse. It is clear that the themes developed by both the 
Vlaams Blok and the Vlaams Blok have been remarkably consistent. For example, 
in the very first brochure of the Vlaams Belang for Brussels inhabitants: Brussel, 
Bruxelles, Ma Ville, mijn stad (2004) (i.e. Brussels, My City), of the nine featured 
articles, only one 75 is not directly linked to immigrants, multiculturalism or Islam. 
The Vlaams Belang links these three themes, and presents them as highly 
undesirable. These themes are featured in Table 1. 
75 The last topic is about drugs (and about the party's view of zero tolerance and thorough approach to crime). 
146 
Table 2- Content of the first brochure of the Vlaams Belang for Brussels 
Brussels, My City, "The time bomb is ticking ... ", (2004). ' 
Pages Headin2 of the article Content 
1-2 Editorial The dirty and msecure 
conditions of Brussels, and the 
incompetence of the regime in 
4 Islam and freedom of speech 
maintaining law and order. 
The Danish cartoons crisis and 
the so-called 'Clash of 
civilisations' . 
5 Affaire Hariche. Islamic socialism The nomination of Hariche, a 
is progressing foreign-born deputy mayor as 
interim 
6-7 The time bomb is ticking The riots m France and the 
failure of the multicultural 
model of society 
9 Illegal immigrants and public The employment of illegal 
works. immigrants in the construction 
site for the future ministry 
building 
9 Unemployment The unemployment figures for 
Brussels, and the lack of 
qualified workers. 
10 Entrepreneurship is freedom Problems facing independent 
entrepreneurs 
11 When the CP AS of Brussels is into The creation of a multicultural 
"plural" culture (1)76 centre (with a focus on North 
African countries) 
12-13 When blood drips onto the The ritual sacrifice for the 
pavement Muslim Eid (Muslim festivall 
14-15 Drugs: no, thanks. The Issue of lax policies 
regarding drugs (cannabis) 
76 The CPAS (Centre Public d'Action Sociale, Public Centre/or Social Action) is an institution in 
Brussels that provides social services to the most vulnerable portion of the population. They 
provide financial support, but also psychological, medical and social support. It is targeted at 
individuals and families who could not otherwise have access to resources, or are excluded from 
the social security system. The ''plural'' culture refers to multiculturalism. This title is of course 
ironic and critical of the celebration of the multicultural model by institutions such as the CPAS. 
The Vlaams Belang criticises and mocks the word ''plural'' since they argue that the only culture 
celebrated is a North-African one. 
147 
This first brochure published by the Vlaams Belang and distributed to Brussels' 
inhabitants (also called here Brusseleirs) features a story about the Socialist 
Party's questionable nomination of a foreign-born interim mayor, called Hariche. 
to replace the actual mayor on sick leave (see Appendix 10). The most interesting 
feature is the heading of the article: "Affair/File Hariche: the Islamic socialism is 
progressing". Reading the article (see Appendix 1 0) reveals that there is no 
obvious link between the Socialist Party and Islam. Although the deputy mayor is 
a woman of Algerian origin, there is nothing to indicate that she is Muslim, or an 
Islamist. However, the Vlaams Belang makes the link between (foreignlNorth-
African) origin and religion (Islam), and highlights the accession to power (even if 
temporary) of a Muslimllslamist foreigner in Brussels, the capital city of Belgium 
and the capital of Europe. The Vlaams Belang is also attacking the Socialist Party 
here, by suggesting a supposed link between the Socialist Party and lslamism. 
Any alternative interpretations? The guidance for decoding 
The example above indicates the important role played by titles and headings. 
Alternative interpretations are avoided providing the impression that there is a 
unique persuasive account of 'what is actually going on' (see Teo, 2002). the 
description of a unique 'reality'. The problem in the nomination of a foreign-born 
deputy as mayor ad interim is not her foreign origin per se, but rather her supposed 
link to Islamism and her collaboration with the Socialist Party and the Islamists 
(this interpretation is guided by the article's headline "Islamic socialism is 
progressing "). The point has often been made by the Vlaams Blok in the past (see 
Alves Dos Santos Batista, 2004) and by the Vlaams Belang today that the 
I ~ H H
mainstream parties in power are accommodating what the party calls their . new 
electorate ': 
The life of many Brussels inhabitants will become unbearable ill\'e do not 
change the situation. Police do not dare even appear in some 
neighbourhoods, let alone intervene, for fear of riots. Foreign inhabitants 
are considered as votes in the bank,' this is why traditional parties tolerate 
the situation". (Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 9; emphasis added, see Appendix 
9) 
In the Vlaams Blok's brochure Brussels, My Ci(l' (2004). the party tackles the 
same theme: 
"The political world is paralysed by a foreign-born c o m m u l 1 i ~ l ' ' which is 
growing bigger and bigger, because among other, the establishment of the 
right to vote to foreigners and the consequences of the "quick acquisition" 
of Belgian nationality gives an ever-increasing importance to this 
particular electoral group". (Vlaams Blok, 2004: 7, emphasis added; see 
Appendix 11) 
Similarly, the same theme is replayed in an article by the Vlaams Belang dedicated 
to the freedom of entrepreneurship (see Appendix 12): 
"For electoral reasons, those parties holding power do not want to 
'disturb' their 'new electorate'. C o n s e q u e n t ~ \ ' , , there is a series of gross 
injustices, which put a category of 'citi::ens' above laws at the expense of 
the others", (Vlaams Belang, 2004: 10; emphasis added) 
The negative impact of the presence of foreigners is also highlighted on the same 
page where the party sets out to defend the rights and security of small business 
owners. The description provided is easily decoded. 
"More and more, the ven' nature of ollr shops is changing and there are 
other sorts (?f shops laking their' place. This way. neighbourhood hy 
loft) 
neighbourhood, our traditional shops are replaced by shops of a 'third 
kind'" How long is this going to continue? (Vlaams Belan£!. 2004: 10: 
emphasis added, Appendix 12) '-
This paragraph provides a clue as to who is responsible for the changes in the 
nature of the shops. The 'third kind' (between quotes in the original text), refers to 
the science-fiction genre, where the 'rencontres du troisieme Ope' (i.e. the 
encounters of the third kind) refer to interaction or conflict with extraterrestrial 
civilisations, usually describing the first contact or invasions by alien races. The 
codes used by the Vlaams Belang are relatively easy to decipher because they use 
references to popular culture or popular phrases. The notion of invasion is 
therefore clear, as stressed by the opposition between "our traditional shops" and 
the shops of the third kind which are taking their place. The party might be hinting 
here that both cannot cohabit with each other: one is predating on the other's 
environment. This is nothing new in the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang's rhetoric: 
for the good of everyone, Flemings and foreigners alike, one should remain in 
one's own country. This is disturbingly reminiscent of the Vlaams Blok's '70 
points programme' quotation, which was supposedly discarded by the leaders of 
the Vlaams Belang. 
II When one forces foreign Muslim children to integrate and assimilate in 
our society, we are breaking, in an authoritarian and artificial way, the 
link with their Olt'l1 culture. This is why, it is necessary to organise a 
separate and independent education system for foreign Muslim children" 
(Filip Dewinter, 1992) 
Therefore for the good of those children, in order to help them reintegrate their 
culture of origin, special education must be provided. Once again, the notion of 
culture, as immutable, sets people apart and prevents them from integrating into 
the 'host' society. The argument was set out by the former Vlaams Blok, and 
seems still valid for the actual Vlaams Be1ang. 
3.1.3. Vox Populi - the voice of the silent majority 
People's opinion 
An additional popular theme of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang is what can be 
called the vox populi, or the claim that the party represents the silent majority and 
provides a voice to the ones remaining silent, i.e. 'we say out loud what you think' 
could be the party motto: 
"we are the democratic voice of an ever growing number of Flemings" 
(http://vlaamsblok.be/site engels index.shtml, emphasis added) 
"The Vlaams Blok will continue, no matter what, to say what the silellt 
majority of our country thinks. For the 13 th June elections, H'e ask the 
Brusseleirs to emit a clear signal: choose freedom of speech, for 
demOCra(l', for the Vlaams Blok". (Vlaams Blok, May 2004; Appendix 4. 
emphasis added) 
The following quotation links the issues of freedom of speech and democracy, but 
also people's opinion: 
1 .=; 1 
HAnother scandal: the condemnation of the Vlaams Blokfor "racism". The 
free expression of your opinions, in this country, is from now on strangled 
The Vlaams Blok is not a racist party, it only defends in afirm and decisive 
fashion, the rights of the Brusseleirs. It is the reason why the regime has 
called upon a "tribunal" to put the Vlaams Blok offside" (Vlaams Blok, 
May 2004: 2-3, Appendix 5, emphasis added) 
The advantages of this argument are twofold: 1) the Vlaams Blok presents itself as 
the people's party, and 2) it also allows the Vlaams Blok to extrapolate from the 
content of the silent majority's thoughts. The previous quotation contains a clear 
refutation of the accusation of being a racist party, and a justification of the party's 
stance of defending voters' interests. The Vlaams Blok places itself in the 
vanguard of the defence of Brusseleirs, or more generally the defence of their own 
people (consistently with the 'One's Own People First' leitmotiv). The Vlaams 
Belang also positions itself as the people' party: 
"As a popular party we are particularly sensitive to the problems met 
daily by the independent storekeepers." (Vlaams Belang; 2004: 10; see 
Appendix 12) 
This theme may resonate even more with voters after the condemnation of the 
Vlaams Blok for racism. It seems to be confirming the party's claims that the 
opposition is being silenced by any means possible, even by a political trial. 
People's party 
The representation of the silent majority goes hand-in-hand, in the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang's discourse, with the denunciation of the lack of respect by 
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governing parties for voters' opinions and interests. The Vlaams Belang illustrates 
the incompetence of the governing power: 
"The management by the old parties has made Brussels insecure, dirty and 
woebegone. With impossible traffic, where the inhabitant feels like 
foreigner, and has only one solution: to leave, in the same way that most of 
the companies have done" (Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 22, Appendix 14) 
and 
"We blame the old political majorities of our communes for their lack of 
initiatives in favour of independent workers. We are blaming them for 
never tackling the real problems ". (Vlaams Belang, 2004: 10, Appendix 12) 
The Vlaams Belang also notes the lack of popular support the traditional parties 
are getting at the polls, highlighting the fact that the 'voters know better': 
"As we already know, less and less voters wish to still vote for the 
sclerosed traditional parties which refuse to face the truth" (Vlaams 
Belang,2004: 10, Appendix 12). 
The document finishes by pointing at what the party itself could do to represent the 
people fairly and democratically: 
"We want to help and give value to honest storekeepers and chase those 
who benefitfrom the laxity andfear of the authorities. Let us show together 
that it is possible to tackle the real problems, legally, democratically, but 
with determination and without weakness" (Vlaams Belang, 2004: 10, 
Appendix 12). 
"This is why it is very important to also vote here for people who will 
defend your interests ". (Vlaams Blok, 12, Appendix 13). 
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The Vlaams Blok's and the Vlaams Belang's popularity at the polls is a selling 
point that the party reiterates as often as possible. 
Vlaams Blok: 
"The Vlaams Blok was supported by almost 1 million voters in last June's 
elections. We got 24.1% of the vote in Flanders, where 60% of the Belgian 
population lives. Voting is compulsory in Belgium and no other party was 
supported by more people." http://vlaamsblok.be/index.shtml, November 
2004; Appendix 3) 
Vlaams Belang: 
"Since 8 October, we have become a really popular party, with already 
many hundreds of local sections and representatives." (Vlaams Belang, 
November, 2006: 2; Appendix 3). 
In contrast, according to the Vlaams Belang (commenting on the elections of 
November 2006), the mainstream political parties are only interested in the pursuit 
of power, per se. 
"In fact, what does Verhofstadt want? He wants to stay in power at all 
costs. In that sense he is not much different from Yves Leterme, who wants 
to come to power at all costs. The first one has been cheating us for seven 
years now, the second one might very well start cheating us as of next 
year" (Vlaams Belang, November 2006: 2, Appendix 6). 
This explains the incredulity of the Vlaams Belang when the voters did not punish 
the Socialist Party at the polls for the corruption scandals tainting the party in 
Wallonia. 
"In spite of all the recent corruption scandals, the Walloon voters hardly 
sanctioned the PS. The reason is that they realise that the skulduggery in 
Wallonia is financed mainly by the Flemish tax payers. An extra reason, 
therefore, to bring the flow of billions from Flanders to Wallonia to an 
end" (Vlaams Belang, November 2006: 2, Appendix 6) 
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Beyond the denunciation of the corruption within the Socialist Party, the Vlaams 
Belang highlights the differences between Walloons and Flemings, calling for a 
separation from people who keep voting for corrupt parties against all good sense. 
Accordingly, it is in the Flemings' interests to separate from such lackadaisical 
people (i.e. Walloons would not pay their bills anyway, claims the Vlaams Belang). 
The Vlaams Belang often calls for a referendum, where the people would be able 
to express their opinion on key issues, such as the independence of Flanders, or the 
Turkish membership of the EU: 
((The Vlaams Belang parliament members have already introduced twice a 
proposal to launch a referendum in every European member state about 
the entrance of Turkey to the EU. To give European citizens the right to 
express themselves about this fundamental issue is to strengthen the EU's 
democratic legitimacy. " (Vlaams Belang, 2005: 10, Appendix 15). 
This is consistent with the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's conception of 
representative democracy. The interesting aspect of this semantic dimension is the 
'selective screening' and the careful choice of topics and issues to tackle. 
3.1.4. Selective screening of content 
One feature of the Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang website is a selection of 
newsworthy national and international stories grouped in the website rubric 
Actualiteit (i.e. News, in www.vlaamsblok.be). and Actueel (i.e. Current, in 
www.vlaamsblok.be). The party often features news linked to dramatic 
developments in the Belgian political scene (e.g. corruption scandals, attacks 
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against the Vlaams Blok and on the Vlaams Belang), or mere news in-brief (petty 
crimes, murders, especially when the perpetrators are foreigners). They also 
regularly feature international events, particularly stories linked to Islam, terrorism, 
and the 'War on Terror', etc. These stories from the website are also sent out in the 
free weekly newsletter to registered subscribers. Monthly magazines published by 
the Vlaams Blok and the Vlaams Belang also feature a selection of news. For 
example, the following headlines have been featured in the Vlaams Belang 
magazine: Dertiende Overninning op Rij (i.e. Thirteenth Victory in a Row, Vlaams 
Belang, November 2006: 4-5; see Appendix 16): 
• Islamic-TV 
• CNV- Christian Trade Union 
• Exit Dedecker77 
• Brainwashing 
• Infortainer Leterme 
• Mustapha A. 
In an analysis of these stories, it appears that they reinforce the anti-foreigner 
stereotypes (e.g. Mustapha A. is a recidivist criminal who murdered a jeweller; 
Islamic TV, which is about the lack of integration of foreigners), or they are about 
anti-parties feelings (e.g. Christian Union; In/otainer Leterme; and Exit Dedecker). 
The Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang always comments on, and interprets news 
forecasts and by analysing those short sound bites, it appears that the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang is merely reiterating its official stances and policies on 
77 Note: Jean-Marie Dedecker is a Flemish politician and a moderate nationalist belonging to the 
NV-A; Jean-Yves Leterme could appointed Belgium's new Prime Minister as soon as a 
government is formed (in 2007?). At the time of writing, Belgium has been without a government 
for 96 days. 
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particular matters. This might be intended to indicate that: I) the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang is right when prophesying crises and problems, and 2) that 
the party's programme is not only in tune with current society's ills but also has 
the solutions. 
In the Vlaams Belang brochure Leejbaar Vlaanderen (i.e. Liveable Flanders; 
October 2006), the stories featured are linked to themes which enable the Vlaams 
Belang to present the main points of its political programme. The party's 
magazines also feature articles from party members, or excerpts from articles or 
books by different authors whose ideas resonate with the party's policies and 
positions78. The advantage of using articles from different sources (or by merely 
quoting 'experts') is that they provide credibility and legitimacy to the party's 
position. The magazine could thus be interpreted as a resonator which amplifies 
the sound bites of the party's programme. 
Selective newsworthiness 
The magazine, brochures and newsletter provide a striking illustration of selective 
screening of newsworthy events around the world. The selected stories help the 
party illustrate the relevance of its political programme. For example, the so-called 
Danish cartoons crisis provided the Vlaams Blok with the opportunity to assess 
and amplify their views about the failure of multiculturalism. 
78 For example the Vlaams Belang uses quotations from Fallaci, O. (2001), The Rage and t h ~ ~Pride 
(La Rabbia e I'Orgoglio, 2001), an inflammatory and polemical book about the (undesuable) 
presence ofIslam in Europe. 
157 
"One preaches for sacrosanct integration, but one encourages diversity 
and multiculturalism. It is only when we will have the courage to tackle 
problems from another point of view that solutions will draw in profile. 
One must recognise the failure of the multicultural myth" (Vlaams Blok, 
2004: 6-7; see Appendix 11) 
The 9/11 events also provided fuel to the Vlaams Belang in warning against the 
next big threat to Western values and democracy: the (Muslim) enemy within. One 
text in the Vlaams Belang's Leejbaar Vlaanderen brochure (October 2006: 16-17) 
was titled: "While Europe was sleeping" (from Bruce Bawer, 200679), presents a 
lengthy article on the clash of civilisations and provides a gloomy depiction of the 
'explosive' situation in a Western democracy hosting a large population of 
(Muslim) immigrants. The riots that flared up in France in Autumn 2005 were also 
constructed by the Vlaams Belang as an example of the problems of immigration, 
and the lack of integration by immigrant communities. The party attributes the 
incidents to a nucleus of radicals and fundamentalists. 
"The dynamics triggering violence are the same here as they are in France, 
and they must be credited to a small nucleus of radicals and 
fundamentalists. " (Vlaams Blok, 2004: 6-7; see Appendix 11) 
Interestingly, the large scale incidents that happened in France in 2005 provided 
the Vlaams Belang with the resources to prophesy a similar crisis for Belgium in 
the near future. 
"The popular saying says: "when it is raining in Paris, you have drops in 
Brussels" happens to be often accurate. It would be illusory to think that 
the situation in our ghetto-neighbourhoods of our big cities is less 
79 Bawer, B. (2006), Terwijl Europa Sliep (While Europe was sleeping). Amsterdam: Meulenhoff 
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explosive than in France. The reality is that the atmosphere is as tense as 
in France" (Vlaams Belang, 2004: 7; Appendix 11). 
More than one year after the riots in French banlieux (i.e. ghettos at the outskirts 
of big French cities), the Vlaams Belang (November 2006: 4; Appendix 16) kept a 
watch on the situation and provided the following news update: 
"Kill as many cops as possible." This message is currently circulating on 
popular French internet pages. Anti-French sites predict that the hot 
autumn of 2005 was just a warm-up. So there is going to be trouble, as the 
toll of last year's heavy riots was heavy. Hundreds of cars were burned, 
and shops were looted. Damage was estimated at about 200 mil/ion euros. 
Almost 3000 rioters were arrested; about six hundred 'youngsters' were 
condemned. 375 got effective penalties, 108 minors were sent to detention 
centres". (Vlaams Belang, November 2006: 4-5) 
In a recent article (November 2006), the Vlaams Belang also used the heading 
'Franse Tijdbom' (i.e. French time bomb). This was similar to other headers 
already used at least twice: 1) it was used as the title for a Vlaams Blok 
colloquium on the problems (and solutions) of immigration ' Immigratie: de 
Demografische Tijdom' (i.e. Immigration, the Demographic Time bomb; see Fig. 
2), and as the general headline of the very frrst Vlaams Belang brochure for 
Brussels (Fig. 1 ). In addition, the drawing on an older brochure8o of the Vlaams 
Blok (see Fig.3), also refers to a time bomb. The imagery and metaphor deployed 
highlight the 'explosive' nature of current issues (demography and immigration) 
and the race against time to deal with those issues. 
80 Dossier. Vreemdelingen, undated (i.e. File: Foreigners) 
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Fig.l Vlaams Belang 
Franse tijdbom' 
L\(\IlGRA TIE: 
H E T ~ ' E S T E N N
VOOA DE ICEL"ZE 
~ ~
---
---
1M.\tlGRA TIE: 
FlSCHE TUDBOI'I 
Fig.2 Vlaams Blok Immigratie: 
de Demograjische Tijdbom' Fig.3 Vlaams Blok.(undated) Dossier Vreemdelingen 
Recycling: the continuity between the Vlaams Blok and the Vlaams Be/ang 
The 'recycling' of headings, key words, slogans and pictures from the Vlaams 
Blok to the Vlaams Belang might illustrate the assistance the party provides to its 
readers (especially to the long-term supporters of the party) in decoding their 
political messages. The Vlaams Belang may seem to have watered down its most 
controversial rhetoric (Erk, 2005), and shed some of the old policies which caused 
the former Vlaams Blok so much trouble. However, true to the words 81 of the 
party leaders that the Vlaams Belang would not be a 'light version,82 of the 
Vlaams Blok, and although the rhetoric keeps within the borders of legality, the 
Vlaams Belang's texts provide sufficient clues for potential voters to decode the 
underlying meanings. Hence, to the untrained eye, unfamiliar with Belgian politic , 
I Immediately after the deci ion of the Cour de Cassation, Filip Dewinter in an interview for the 
VTM (Flemi h TV channel) aid: "it i not cosmetic, but manicure: we are harpening our teeth, 
harpening our claw", Anneman also aid: "we are not toning down our point of l'iew on 
immigrant, we are confirming it". 
2 In Dag Allemaal3, Dewinter tated a few day before the condemnation of the Vlaam Siok for 
ra i m: 'We don't need a V1aams Blok Light' or a 'V1aams Blok Ultra', but a 'Vlaams Blok Plu !' 
Inde d, our programme is not changing at all." 
16 
the Vlaams Belang may appear a nationalist, separatist and conservative party of 
the right. However, close analysis of the Vlaams Belang's discourse indicates 
otherwise. 
The magnifying lens 
This selection and pUblication by the party of the most salient news items provides 
a new dimension of reality where all the news is linked to what is going wrong in 
the world, in Europe and in Belgium. Terrorism. political scandals, crime, death, 
Islamic threat, unemployment and tax burden are all themes in the party' s 
communication which contribute to create a gloomy depiction of the world. The 
Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang plays the role of a lens or magnifying glass, directing 
the eye towards news, events and facts, exaggerating their importance and 
significance in people's lives. This re-contextualisation and reframing is apparent 
for example in the party's discussion of racism, and in what could be called the 
'scenario writing' where the testimonies of 'normal' people highlight a number of 
looming social issues, such as insecurity, fear of crime, public transport problems, 
the difficulties of independent store-owners, etc., which contribute to the larger 
story told by the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang to its readers. In the next sections 
these aspects are examined in more detail. 
3.1.5. Reality construction and semantic manipulation 
In the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang' s discourse, racism and xenophobia are clearly 
reframed, redefined and ultimately dismissed as irrelevant. In this way, the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang provides a political product which is disassociated from its 
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questionable features, and thus becomes less problematic for voters' consumption, 
thereby increasing its appeal in the political market. 
The party, as was shown earlier (with 'Touche pas a mon pote ,), subverts anti-
racist slogans to reframe the issue of racism within a broader and necessary debate 
on immigration and democracy. This subversion of the anti-racist discourse is 
interesting. The questioning of problematic terms and their defmition is facilitated 
using syntax and punctuation, where for example inverted commas are always 
placed around the word 'discrimination' or 'racism' in the party's communication 
material. In this way, the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang questions the definition of 
words in the Loi Moureaux, or Anti-Discrimination Act. Use of the quotation 
marks might indicate that the party disagrees with the meaning attached to the 
word. This is also visible in the next quotation of the Vlaams Blok: "The 
understanding of racism is used today as a term of abuse to seal the mouth of 
political opponents." 83 Definitions of racism and discrimination are therefore 
refuted and reframed as being political tools used to limit the party's freedom of 
speech. 
"Opinion makers and professional « anti-racists» should maybe ask 
themselves whether their exaggerated and unfounded reports about 
"discrimination" and "racism" - using the words of our friends from De 
Morgen84 - do not offer the usoil" in which Muslim fundamentalists' and 
terrorists' seeds of hatred towards the West will easily root. Don't people 
claiming themselves to be uanti-racist" voluntarily offer the soil and the 
83 http://vJaamsbJok.be/afdrukken/afdrukken.php 
B4 De Morgen is a progressive Flemish newspaper which is known for its unsympathetic stance towards the 
Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang. 
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arguments terrorist networks need in order to recruit young non-natives in 
their Holy War against the West?" 
(see http://www.vlaamsbelang.org/index.php?p=6andid-16) 
If "racism" and "discrimination" are often placed between quotation marks, the 
word anti-racists is given the same treatment. This seems to be an interesting way 
of defining and locating the opposition, and de legitimating their actions. Here the 
Vlaams Blok links its activities to exaggerated and unfounded reports of racism 
and discrimination. One could argue that this strategy could have two objectives. 
First, if the reports are about discrimination faced by immigrants in the areas of 
education, housing and employment, then it is natural that the Vlaams Blok would 
reject those accusations on the basis of national preference (hence the use of the 
word "exaggerated"). Second, it also shows that no such things exist 
("unfounded"), i.e. rejecting the existence of racism or even discrimination. 
Therefore 'we' (i.e. Belgians, Flemings, the voters, the party) are not racist, 
providing a positive self-portrayal (another rhetorical technique of flattery: 
showing people in a good light). 
Here, the Vlaams Blok is defending BelgianlFlemish institutions against 
accusations of racism. The argument seems to be that no one likes being called a 
racist, and the extreme right rejects such accusations. If reports are unfounded, 
they must have been created by journalists (the irony can be located in the 
expression "our friends from De Morgen") and other 'anti-racists '. The Vlaams 
Blok argues that the actions of such people have dramatic consequences because 
they provide the ammunition for terrorist groups "in order to recruit young non-
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natives in their Holy War against the West? n. These are \'ery senous claims 
uttered by the party. Using intensity of expression and exaggeration, they serve to 
shift the focus from 'unfounded claims' of racism to the highly serious matter of 
terrorism. The issue of racism and its responsibility has thus been turned around in 
what Van Dijk (1993) calls a reversal strategy where there is a moral inversion, i.e. 
the party is condemning the condemners (following Strutton et aI., 1995). 
This approach to racism and the condemnation of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang 
based on the law against racism, is also evident in the first text by Frank Vanhecke 
and lohan Demol, in a brochure (p.3). In the brochure "Touche pas a la 
democratie" (June 2004), a similar technique has been identified. The Vlaams 
Blok puts "racism" between quotation marks, and later in the same paragraph, 
Frank Vanhecke and lohan Demol also put "tribunal" between quotation marks: 
"Other scandal: the condemnation of the Vlaams Blok for "racism". The 
free expression of your opinions, in this country, is from noH' on strangled. 
The Vlaams Blok is not a racist party, it only defends in afirm and decisi\'e 
fashion, the rights of the Brusseleirs. It is the reason why the regime has 
called upon a "tribunal" to put the Vlaams Blok offside" (Vlaams Blok, 
2004: 3, see Appendix 5) 
This indicates agam the semantic manipulation of the two main words of the 
paragraph: 'racism' and 'tribunal' (see Appendix 5, paragraph 2, lines 16-19). This 
is also in line with lager's (2001) research on discourse. lager (2001: 35) 
conceptualises discourse as a regulating body in tenns of what can be said in a 
certain society at a given time, but also what cannot be said, or is not said. In short, 
the meaning of words (semantic content) is continuously modified, renegotiated to 
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allow a better portrayal of the party. Rather than racist the party defines itself as 
democratic, courageous and nationalistic (putting one's own people's interest first. 
no matter what). 
3.2. Strategic dimension 
After the consideration of the semantic tactics, it is useful to scrutinise the strategic 
dimension of language in use. Strategies refer to "more or less accurate and more 
or less intentional plans of practices adopted to achieye a particular social, 
political, psychological or linguistic aim" (Wodak, 200 1: 73). de Cillia et al. 
(1999) identified for example constructive strategies85 , where persuasive linguistic 
acts serve to build a particular national identity and establish solidarity and 
identification with the 'we-group', and at the same time distancing and 
marginalising the group from 'others'. They also use identity perpetuation and 
justification strategies which attempt to maintain, support and reproduce national 
identities, and support continuities (de Cillia et aI., 1999). In this scheme, 
immigrants are constructed as a threat to national identity. Justification and 
legitimating strategies are used to defend and preserve problematic narratives of 
controversial events in national history. Transformation strategies are used in order 
to transform the meaning of a well-established aspect of national identity into 
another. Dismantling and destructive strategies serve to de-mythologise or 
demolish existing national identities or elements of them (de Cillia et al., 1999). 
For example, Jager (200 1) identified denial strategies and relativising strategies 
85 Transfonnation strategies are used in order to transfonn the meaning of a well-established aspect 
of national identity into another. Dismantling and destructive strategies serve to de-mythologize or 
demolish existing national identities or elements of them. 
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(such as here with the Vlaams Blok's treatment of the thorny issue of racism and 
discrimination) which would also describe the strategies discussed above at play. 
As my research interest also lies in the construction of nationalist identity and the 
construction of 'we-group' vs. 'they-groups', there is a voluntary choice here not 
to limit the analysis of the Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang's discourse to those 
strategies, and instead combine them with the analysis of persuasive strategies. 
Since the Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang's discourse could be unambiguously 
described as extreme rightist (Mudde, 2000), with strong features of xenophobia, 
discrimination, and nationalist sentiments, the strategies described by Wodak and 
her team (W odak, 2001; de Cillia et al., 1999) were identified. As a consequence, 
several rhetorical devices and narrative strategies can be identified in Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang's discourse, which contribute to providing a clear and 
persuasive narrative for the reader. The main strategies identified are: 
(de )legitimating strategies, justification strategies (de Cillia et al., 1999), reversal 
strategies and avoidance strategies (Jager, 2001), and what could be labelled, 
identification strategies. 
3.2.1. (De)legitimating strategies 
What is important to note frrst is that the different strategies are intertwined and 
work with each other, reinforcing their effect. Firstly, the Vlaams Blok's political 
and identity struggle is presented in a typical 'us' versus 'them' dichotomy, as was 
shown earlier. For instance, in an editorial by Frank Vanhecke (see "Today we 
were executed but we will rise", Appendix 3), the party links Flemish identity to 
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the party's struggle for political existence. Second, dismantling or de-legitimating 
strategies were also identified in the same text where opponents are systematically 
delegitimated. For example, Frank Vanhecke starts by undermining Belgian 
identity, by explaining its lack of substance: "Belgium, established in 1830 by 
French revolutionaries, is an artificial construct dominated by the Socialist 
Francophone minority in Wallonia." (see Appendix 3); he goes on to argue that 
anti-democratic attitudes are attached to Belgium because it only serves the 
interests of a Francophone minority, to the detriment of Flemings. 
Delegitimating opponents 
Delegitimating strategies appear to be one of the main strategies in the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang's discourse. These de legitimating strategies contribute to the 
representation of an unflattering portrait of political parties, institutions and other 
political opponents, and a positive portrayal of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang. 
This strategy sets up an 'us' versus 'them' dichotomy regarding a (lack of) respect 
for democracy and, by association, for the electorate (as for example in Vlaams 
Blok, May 2004: 2-3; see Appendix 4). This tactic is clearly visible, when the 
party contrasts traditional parties' actions with the people-friendly attitude of the 
Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang. For example in the following quotation, the party 
stresses its own political legitimacy by the popular support it gets. In such a 
context, the party explains that their condemnation for racism is stemming from 
the party's political opponents, and not from the people. 
"!he C ~ n s t i ~ u t i o n n itself was modified for this sole purpose! A people's jury 
did not inspire confidence to the parties in power. Could you imagine that 
the V/aams Blok benefits from too much sympathy or common sense from 
our people!" (Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 2-3) 
Therefore, it is the party's duty to keep fighting for people: 
liThe Vlaams Blok will continue, no matter what, to say what the silent 
majority of our country says". (Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 2-3) 
This specific text (see Appendix 4) is very rich with utterances which contribute to 
the construction of a (de)legitimating strategy. Another illustration is provided 
where the 'democratic' attitude of the Vlaams Blok is placed in sharp contrast with 
the practices of others (Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 2-3; see Appendix 4): 
"All year long, one talks about political nominations in the legal world Do 
you think that today, suddenly/all of a sudden, at the opportunity of this 
trial, eminently political, the political nominations wouldn't play any 
role??? "(see Appendix 4) 
and, also in: 
ttThis "ministry of truth", set up after the electoral victory of the V/aams 
Blok, falls under the authority of the Prime Minister Verhofstadt, and is 
directly financed with federal credits, and credit from the national Lottery. 
The decision to file suit was taken by a governing board in which, as a 
matter of course, only the ruling parties are represented. " (see Appendix 4) 
ttThis sort of affair is common currency in banana republics, they don't 
have their place in democracy". (see Appendix 4) 
The Vlaams Blok is indicating here that the party does not 'play dirty', but 
respects the democratic process. Frank Vanhecke asks people to express their 
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opinion at the polls, demonstrating a respect for the rules of the democratic game. 
Democracy and popular support are ultimately the most potent weapon for the 
party to establish its political legitimacy. In the words of the Vlaams Blok: 
"For the 13th June elections, we ask the Brusseleirs to emit a clear signal: 
choose freedom of speech, for democracy, for the Vlaams Blok". (Vlaams 
Blok, May 2004: 2-3) 
and the Vlaams Belang's terms: 
"Let us show together that it is possible to tackle the real problems, legally, 
democratically, but with determination and without weakness" (Vlaams 
Belang,2004: 10; Appendix 12) 
This is remarkable in that the extreme right parties are often depicted as being anti-
democratic and radical (Mudde, 2000). Clearly, the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang 
shows it belongs to the category of the 'new wave' of the extreme right 
characterised by an acceptance of the parliamentary system and pluralism, In 
addition to a strong anti-mainstream-party stance (Camus, 2002; Mudde, 2000). 
Nicknaming 
Nicknaming is also a rhetorical weapon used by the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang 
to demean its opponents. Nicknames cannot easily be shrugged off by those who 
have been stigmatised by them because nicknames need not be justified, are 
difficult to contradict or disprove and hence constitute a powerful rhetorical tool 
that has not gone unnoticed by the party. For example, Prime Minister Verhofstad 
is nicknamed Pinocchio by the Vlaams Blok because of the lies he allegedly told 
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voters regarding unemployment. "Ministry of truth" (Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 2-3: 
see Appendix 4) is another example of a nickname that is highly ironical. 
"Moreover, it is a governmental institution, the Centre Ie)!' Equal 
Opportunities and Fight against Racism that filed suit. This "ministry of 
truth ", set up after the electoral victory of the Vlaams Blok, falls under the 
authority of the Prime Minister Verhofstadt, and is directly financed with 
federal credits, and credit from the national Lottel)!. The decision to file 
suit was taken by a governing board in which, as a matter of course, o n ~ l ' '
the ruling parties are represented. 1sn 'r independence beautiful ... " 
(Vlaams Blok, 2004: 2-3; emphasis added; see Appendix 4) 
There is of course no such thing as a ministry of truth, and the quotation marks 
imply exactly the opposite of what the words say. The 'ministry of truth' is 
referring to the Centre for Equal Opportunities and the Fight against Racism. This 
is the institution that took legal action against the Vlaams Blok for racism and 
discrimination. Another possible interpretation is related to a reference to Orwell's 
Ministry of Truth in the book 1984, which is the place where 'history' is rewritten 
as propaganda for public consumption. In this interpretation, it would be easy to 
suppose that the party is referring to the propaganda created by this ministry of 
truth, the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Fight against Racism, (which filed 
suit against the Vlaams Blok for racism) working for the government to demonise 
the Vlaams Blok. 
3.2.2. Legitimating the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang: the quest for credibility 
The Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang is trying to establish its legitimacy as a credible 
political opponent, and more importantly, as an alternative to what the party calls 
the old sclerotic parties. By pointing the finger at the tensions and crises in society, 
while providing 'solutions' (such as the '70 points programme solution to the 
immigration problem'), the Vlaams Blok!Vlaams Belang has constructed for itself 
the role of political underdog and champion of the disgruntled and 'silent' majority. 
According to Coffe (2005b), governing has never been an option for the Vlaams 
Blok, but today the Vlaams Belang has started to present itself as a potential 
governing party, especially at the local level in Antwerp. Coffe's 2005 
observations were accurate. In 2006, the party openly presents itself as ready for 
office and explains the rationale to its voters. The Vlaams Belang is ready for a 
participation in government, even if it is as a junior partner. Frank Vanhecke 
alludes to the future' opportunities' for the party: 
"What we have to do is clear. Since 8 October, we hare become a real 
popular party, with already many hundreds of local sections and 
mandatories. The challenge for 2007 is huge. We do not use a cordon 
against whoever wants to win right-wing Flemish political power is with us, 
but at the same time we have to be very conscious of our OW}] strength and 
of the brilliant opportunities in front of us, in 2007 and even more so in 
2009" (Vlaams Belang, November 2006: 3; emphasis in the original; 
Appendix 6) 
Karim Van Overmeire, a Vlaams Belang senator, is more explicit and explains to 
the readers that the compromise would be temporarily and strategic, but necessary 
for the implementation of the party's programme, for the greater good of Flanders: 
"Our story has a meaning o n ~ l ' ' when we can implement the essence of our 
programme: independence, a stricter immigration policy, a firm approach 
to crime. It is clear now that these points of our programme will not be 
implemented by using more and more decibels to shout original terms of 
abuse from within the quarantine zone. Contrary to lemmings or howler 
monkeys, who follow their instinct, man has the possibility of evaluating 
his situation, considering alternative strategies, and analysing carefully 
who can be opponents and who can be allies, if need he temporarily. A 
shrewd Vlaams Belang is of course much more dangerous than a shouting 
Vlaams Belang in a quarantine zone. It is going to be a difficult but 
necessary exercise. We owe it not only to ourselves. but also to our 
children and grandchildren" (Vlaams Belang, November. 2006: 3; 
Appendix 17; emphasis added) 
In order to indicate its readiness for office, the Vlaams Belang had, among other 
things, to shed some of its most controversial political stances. Many 
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commentators e.g. Van Overloop, 17/1112004) and scholars (see for example 
Erk, 2005) fear that this rebirth is largely a publicity stunt that would allow the 
party to regain a virginal glow and attract new sections of the population, which 
might have been put off by the 'previous' most radical policies of the Vlaams Blok 
(such as the educational apartheid or forced repatriation). The Vlaams Belang is 
certainly popular and is making substantial gains at each election: however, the 
level of support has not been sufficient - so far - to break the cordon sanitaire and 
allow them to take part in government. 
3.2.2.1. Eliciting credibility 
In a state of continuous electoral campaigning, the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang 
must defend its theses, present its version of reality, and dangle before the voters 
the promise of a better future under its direction. It is therefore crucial that the 
party is perceived by people as being credible and able to deliver the promises 
made. The task is Herculean, as the party must still convince, persuade, or induce a 
change in the less radical voters' attitude. Credibility is an important element in 
86 For example the communist PTB (the Belgian Labour Party), see (article 21/06/2006 in 
www.ptb.be/scripts/article.phtml?section=A IAAAABX&obid=27643. as accessed 22 06 2005; 
also Van Overloop ( 17/11,2(04), see 
w \ \ ' \ \ ' . p t b . b ~ s C ' r i p t s / a r t i c k . p h t m l ? s e c t i o n = A A 1 AAAABX&obid=25219, as accessed 2206 12005 
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the induction of attitude change (McLeod et al., 1968). Credibility reflects the 
level of trustworthiness attributed to the source of the persuasive communication 
by the audience (McLeod et al., 1968: 579). To be credible, according to 
O'Shaughnessy (2003: 304), persuasion must be data-driven and evidence-based , 
in our scientific, modem society. Propositions, O'Shaughnessy (2003: 304) argues, 
must not be just asserted but must be "proved". However, Somig (1989) thinks 
otherwise, arguing that the verifiable truth of a message is irrelevant and not 
necessarily what would impress an audience; it is however the way things are said, 
or done, irrespective of the amount of genuine information carried by an utterance. 
This is why, Somig (1989) argues, persuasion must be considered a stylistic 
procedure, i.e. something that has to do with outward appearance. The assumption 
that listeners can draw on the speaker's credibility and trustworthiness can 
therefore only come from the surface of what is said (Somig, 1989: 96). Drawing 
on Somig (1989), it can be assumed that the listener's interpretation of reality can 
be controlled by the devices of persuasive communication. It is this interpretation 
of reality by the voters, and the use of persuasive communication by the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang that is at the heart of this research. 
3.2.2.2. Third-parties' endorsements 
One technique identified that is prodigally used by the Vlaams BlokIVlaams 
Belang is quotation from third parties. It is possible to classify such quotations into 
three broad categories: 1) testimonials from the 'common man' usually related to 
issues in their daily lives; 2) examples from Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang 
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candidates which tackle specific themes of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's 
programme, and 3) quotations from various experts: writers, politicians, and even 
opponents of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang. These are used when they confmn 
the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's points, particularly when they seem to reinforce 
the objectivity, or 'common senseness' of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's 
arguments. This is reminiscent of the device of celebrity and experts' 
endorsements in commercial marketing. According to Somig (1989: 100), the use 
of quotational language has a persuasive quality, "especially in the original 
wording". Indeed it carries conviction, and carries credibility (or "feigns 
credibility" (Somig, 1989: 100)) by exploiting the prestige of the person from 
whom a quotation originated. This persuasive device is often used in the more 
modem of Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's communication material (brochures, 
website, etc ... bearing the heading: "So you've heard itfrom someone else"). 
Storytelling and testimonials from the 'common man' 
Storytelling has been identified as a persuasive strategy (van Dijk, 1993), which 
provides a vivid image of 'facts' and events as being experienced by 'real' people. 
'Testimony' is a characteristic of some commercial advertisements (e.g. for 
mortgages; diet drinks, anti-smoking patches, etc.), where people who the viewer 
can identify with present their experience and advocate the use of a particular 
product or service. In the Vlaams Blok's case, it shows that the ills that the party 
warns about are experienced by normal people, i.e. 'you and me', and forecasts a 
gloomy future for voters, as stressed in the party representative's comments, 
supporting and reframing the 'spontaneous' testimonials. 
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In pages 4 and 5 of the FeitenlRealites brochure (May 2004; see Appendix 8), an 
elderly lady clutching her bag provides a strong visual image to support the text. 
The first quotation is supposed to come from her. The lady is remarkably 
unremarkable. She could be anyone, anyone's friend, anyone's relative. This 
makes her a symbolic figure representing the old and vulnerable. She is also a 
victim: "I have been attacked twice", she says. Once could be bad luck: in the 
wrong place at the wrong time; 'twice' denotes a more serious problem. There are 
no details about the nature of her attacks. Theft? Physical aggression? Assaulted? 
Insulted and abused? The reader is left to guess. There is also mention of her 
friend who was violently attacked by a group of youngsters, and ended up in 
hospital. This frames criminality as violent mugging in the street targeting the 
most vulnerable. One assumption is that the targets are defmed as old women. 
(She is a woman and her friend is a woman. 'une amie' is the word used, and 
words are 'gendered' in French - the assumption is that her friend is also an 
elderly woman, even if there is no indication of the age of that friend). This 
interpretation is guided on the page by the picture and the comments. Similarly, in 
the same brochure (Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 9, see Appendix 12), there is another 
testimonial: 
"1 am scared by the violent anti-Israeli demonstrations. All this calls for 
Jihad and the slogans saying 'Bamas, Bamas, all the Jews in the gas 
chambers'. Come on, it is incredible. I am asking myself a lot of questions 
about the right of foreigners to vote. Although the majority of the 
population is opposed to it, that right was voted for. More than 64,000 
non-European foreigners are going to decide on my future. That's 
unacceptable". (Vlaams Blok, 2004: 8-9; Appendix 9) 
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Those testimonials never 'stand alone'. They provide the material for a party 
representative to comment on the situation, highlight the key issues (here 
respectively criminality and foreigners' right to vote), and provide the party 
solution (respectively: 'zero tolerance' and a watertight immigration policy). For 
example, the following quotation accompanies the previous 'testimonial': 
"The life of many Brussels inhabitants will become unbearable if we do not 
change the situation. Police do not dare even appear in some 
neighbourhoods, let alone intervene, for fear of riots. Foreign inhabitants 
are considered as votes in the bank; this is why traditional parties tolerate 
the situation. However, radical imams put Allah's law above ours, and call 
for homosexuals to be thrown from the top of buildings. The right to vote 
by foreigners must be abolished. This right to vote, along with the most 
flexible nationality code in the world, encourages very few foreigners to 
integrate into society. Whoever wants to acquire citizenship will have to 
pass a citizenship test. " (Vlaams Blok, 2004: 8-9; Appendix 9) 
The paragraph highlights the seriousness of the Brusseleirs' situation: liThe life of 
many Brussels inhabitants will become unbearable if we do not change the 
situation." The use of a strong adjective, such as «unbearable", describes a 
situation where living with foreigners is not possible. This is however only one 
scenario presented by the Vlaams Blok: it is set in a plausible future ("will 
become "), which could happen «if we do not change the situation". The party 
shows that the voters (and the Vlaams Blok) have the capacity to avoid this. 'We' 
is used as a 'solidarity pronoun': it could identify the sole Vlaams Blok, or it could 
represent the Vlaams Blok and Brussels' voters united to prevent this catastrophic 
scenario (the so-called "earthquake '). The technique of juxtaposition can be 
identified here: 
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"However, radical imams put Allah's law above ours, and call for 
homosexuals to be thrown from the top of bUildings. The right to vote bv 
foreigners must be abolished" (Vlaams Blok, 2004: 8-9; Appendix 9). -
The right to vote for foreigners and Islamic fundamentalists are juxtaposed, and 
rhetorically linked. The right to vote is linked to the law of Allah (i.e. the imams 
call for homosexuals to be thrown from the roofs of buildings, which is 
unquestionably criminal). The situation to be changed is described as one of chaos: 
no law, riots, a frightened police, calls for murder, and ... foreigners' right to vote. 
Using juxtaposition, the right to vote for non-EU foreigners was associated with 
anti-Semitism through the reference to Hamas and with Nazi ideology (with the 
reference to "gas chambers"). It is interesting to note the link between the legal 
right to demonstrate in Belgium and the illegal 87 racistINazi slogans allegedly 
shouted during the demonstrations. The party is skilfully arguing that the rights 
granted by democracy (i.e. the right to demonstrate) are actually used for 
undemocratic ends (i.e. to spread violence and hatred), making therefore non-EU 
foreigners guilty of anti-Semitism and unworthy of the rights granted by 
democracy, namely the right to vote. The Vlaams Blok's argument is that the 
situation must be changed: by abolishing the right to vote. 
The scenario vividly created thanks to the two witnesses (the two ladies sharing 
their own personal experience) and reinforced by the Vlaams Blok representative's 
comments is a fairly frightening prospect. It might be intended to generate a range 
of diverse emotions: anxiety (how to change this before it is too late?), fear (the 
.7 In Belgium, racism and racist comments are liable to prosecution. 
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lady clearly states that she is scared in the fITst sentence of her testimonial), 
indignation (granting democratic rights to unworthy people, and letting those same 
people determine the future of 'native' (real) Belgians). The use of short 
quotations and stories from 'normal people' might have been intended to stir 
various emotions through the reader's identification with the 'normal people', to 
generate the will to protect oneself and reduce the levels of anxiety. The anxiety-
reducing alternative proposed is voting for the Vlaams Blok, which proposes to 
protect citizens, maintain Flemish identity and put an end to the 'take-over' by 
dangerous non-EU and mostly Muslim foreigners. 
Marketing and Emotion 
This presence of emotion in the political message of the party is consistent with 
trends observed in commercial marketing. In some commercial advertising 
campaigns, there is an overt aim of arousing emotions rather than communicating 
more rational attributes (Solomon et al., 2002). Research shows that emotion is 
central to persuasive communication (O'Shaughnessy, 1996). In addition, studies 
have shown that emotions are an important factor in the consumers' decision-
process (see Grunert, 2000). This is also true in the political context. It is now 
widely acknowledged that emotions playa significant role in voters' political and 
economical evaluations (Conover and Feldman, 1986; Abelson et al., 1982, in 
Rudolph et al., 2000). Research has shown that emotions influence all human 
behaviour, including political behaviour (Falkowski and Cwalina, 1999). Marcus 
(2000) demonstrated that people's political behaviour depends on their emotional 
state. Research has also demonstrated that emotional attitudes towards a party or a 
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candidate are a good predictor of a voter's decision (Falkowski and Cwalina, 1999; 
Newman and Seth, 1985; Abelson et al., 1982). Emotions are a key feature in 
political messages. The example of political advertising is particularly salient here: 
there is evidence that emotional appeals are dominant in political advertising 
(Tedesco, 2002). An important component of politicians' discourse is related to 
the arousal of strong emotions, such as fear, anxiety, and national pride. It appears 
that the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang might be engaged in such an emotional 
communication strategy in order to better reach and appeal to the reader. A more 
'rational' approach is adopted by using quotations from: 1) the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang representatives; and 2) the experts from various fields, such 
as politicians, scholars, or writers. 
Representatives of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang 
The Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang presents its representatives as competent 
politicians with the expertise and experience to defend voters' interests. For 
example, lohan Demol is always the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang front man for 
Brussels. His forte is security issues in Brussels, e.g. granting more funds and 
powers for the police and a zero tolerance policy against criminals. His profile as a 
former chief of police provides him with the credibility to talk about the topic. 
UA tough approach to all the forms of criminality. Law must be enforced in 
all neighbourhoods. No disguising of the criminality figures when elections 
come near. Police must have the possibility to act more energetically. 
Justice must return punch for punch. As a former police captain. I know 
that zero tolerance works. Only a clearly displayed political will can 
succeed in discouraging criminals. The V1aams Blok is the only one to 
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have such a political will! People must dare again to go out at night". 
(Vlaams Blole, May 2004: 4-5, Appendix 18) 
The vocabulary and tone used in the previous paragraph, such as "punch for 
punch", "tough approach", "I know that the zero tolerance works "; fit the image 
of a former police captain and man of action, highlighting his experience of 
tackling the issue of criminality. lohan Demol's field experience is allied to the 
political will necessary to "discourage criminals", will that is lacking in other 
political parties, according to him. The sentence structure of "Police must have the 
possibility to act more energetically" (emphasis added), might suggest that 
currently the police do not have enough powers. This is a very common message 
conveyed by the party. This is clear in the sentence: "As a former chief of police, I 
know that zero tolerance works". It highlights lohan Demol's field experience, his 
knowledge ("I know''), and is an endorsement of the zero tolerance policy (' it 
works', i.e. I was successful, as chief of police in dealing with criminality). After 
the testimony from the vulnerable elderly (see Appendix 18), this energetic speech 
is designed to be what people want to hear, namely that the Vlaams Blok can make 
Brussels safe and get rid of the criminals: "Only a political will clearly displayed 
will succeed in discouraging criminals. The Vlaams Blok is the only one to have 
such a political will! ". At the same time it highlights the incompetence of the 
government and demonstrates the administration's lack of will to tackle crime, and 
even worse, the lack of recognition of people's fears and concerns: "Media and the 
government keep dwelling on that the "feeling of insecurity JJ is subjective. People 
know that it is reality! ". The suggestion is that the government even manipulates 
figures to boost their popularity before elections: "No disguising of the criminality 
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figures when elections come near". This sentence is interesting in that it has no 
subject. It avoids the party naming those responsible for manipulating the figures, 
and therefore steers clear of any direct libel. The issue of criminality is an 
important Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang campaign theme and 'zero tolerance' is 
often exclusively associated by voters with the party's approach to criminality 
(Coffe, 2004). It is interesting to note that the Vlaams Blok also includes in its 
definition of criminality such activities as: vandalism, illegal dumping, squatting 
and free-roaming gangs of young people (Coffe, 2004). 
Expert quotation 
The Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang use a quoting strategy across their 
propaganda material, websites, campaign leaflets, brochures, magazines and e-
newsletter. In the brochure created to present the Vlaams Belang's views on the 
potential Turkish membership to the EU (see Appendix 15: 5-6), several experts 
are quoted for views which resonate with the party's. Somig (1989: 100) notes the 
persuasive power of the use of quotations with his "don't argue, quote". The 
brochure presents reasons, facts or political experts' opinions justifying why 
Turkey cannot, and should not, be considered for EU membership. So, in order to 
support this point of view, the Vlaams Belang collated a collection of quotations 
from various sources who had voiced negative opinions about Turkish 
membership of the EU: the quoted experts are French, German and American 
politicians, an academic labelled as an 'Islam specialist', and even the Libyan 
president Kadhafi (see Appendix 15: 5-6). The name of each 'expert' is given 
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along with the expert's current position, or occupation (e.g. Valery Giscard 
d'Estaing, Former President of France). 
"I'm giving my opinion: It's the end of the EU!" Former French President 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Le Monde, 9 November 2002 (Vlaams Belang, 
2005: 6; Appendix 15) 
"Following the current trends, Europe's population will include Islamist 
majorities by the end of the 21st century. " Islamic specialist Prof Bernard 
Lewis, Die Welt, 28 July 2004 (Vlaams Belang, 2005: 6; Appendix 15) 
"The Muslim world, including extremists like Bin Laden, is delighted by 
Turkey's entrance to Europe: Turkey is its Trojan horse". Mouammar 
Kadhaji, Libya's President, La Republica, 16 December 2004 (Vlaams 
Belang, 2005: 6; Appendix 15) 
The testimonial of experts is similar to the celebrity endorsement of advertised 
products, and the 'they say' advertisements, which usually carry more weight with 
readers than 'we say' advertising. Audiences tend to give more credibility to third-
party endorsers, such as celebrities, consumers or experts (Wang, 2005; Martin et 
al., 2002) than claims coming directly from advertisers. In this case, the 
endorsements bring more weight to the Vlaams Belang' s arguments against 
Turkish admission, i.e. opposition is a sensible political argument shared by a 
panel of experts. In other words, the party shows it is only trying to defend 
European citizens' interests. 
"If I was a European I would be against Turkey's membership, but I am an 
American so I am in favour. " Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of state, 
HPIDe Tijd, 31 December 2004 (Vlaams Belang, 2005: 6, Appendix 15) 
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A whole section ('in the Media') of the Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang's 
respective websites is dedicated to quoting experts, or providing whole interviews 
or excerpts which reflect, reinforce or justify the party's positions, or simply 
highlight (sometimes ridicule) political opponents with the publications of their 
most 'questionable' comments. 
3.2.3. Avoidance strategy 
The next strategies featuring in the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's discourse are 
the so-called avoidance strategies (as defined by Jager, 2001), especially where the 
party leader reframes their condemnation for racism as merely part of a "broad 
society debate. No debate has any sense without freedom of speech, as large as 
possible, including on the theme of immigration." (Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 2-3; 
Appendix 4). Therefore the Vlaams Blok's stance is considered as a necessary 
position in a democratic regime: "There is no possible democracy without a broad 
society debate" (Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 2-3; Appendix 4). The Vlaams Blok 
describes its stance on immigration as a necessary one for a healthy, democratic 
debate within society. This is, the party argues, only possible if there is real 
freedom of speech, which itself can only be granted by a genuine democracy. The 
rhetorical power of this argument derives from the fact that it cannot easily be 
refuted. This is a very clever move to attenuate (and reframe) the accusation of, 
and condemnation for, racism and discrimination, as part of a wide and necessary 
debate on immigration. 
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By putting 'immigration' at the end of the sentence in: "No debate has any sense 
without freedom of speech, as large as possible, including on the theme of 
immigration" (Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 2, see Appendix 4), the argument seems 
to be that no one is actually tackling the issue of immigration. When a party dares 
to address the issue (here the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang), it should be allowed 
to express "what the silent majority of our country say", accordingly with the right 
to free speech. Once again, this is a subtle tactic. The possible interpretations of 
the text are inevitably in favour of the Vlaams Blok: the party presents itself as 
merely exercising its political right (taking part in a widespread society debate), 
and duty (by voicing the silent majority's opinion). It is a very well crafted text 
that seems to preclude any interpretation (e.g. bigotry and racism) that could be 
damaging to the party's image, credibility and legitimacy, three assets the party 
leaders work hard to build. This might be a reason why the words 'racism' or 
'discrimination' are absent from this text. In itself, the absence of specific words 
or themes is also very telling. One feature of CDA is its recognition that absence 
may say more than presence (Jager, 2001). 
In the brochure Touche pas a la democratie (Vlaams Blok 2004, see Appendix 5), 
the Vlaams Blok, via Frank Vanhecke and Johan Demol, seems to be pursuing a 
legitimating/de legitimating strategy. Political opponents are presented in an 
unfavourable way while, at the same time, the Vlaams Blok and its actions are 
presented as positive and desirable for voters. One could argue that the market-
orientation of the Vlaams Blok is tangible here in the call to the electorate to vote 
only for those who respond to the concerns of the people. But there is also 
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evidence of avoidance strategy, where the party is presented as the only party truly 
committed to democracy. Interestingly, the party ties the issue of racism (and its 
condemnation) to the right of freedom of speech. It defends itself by explaining 
that the party was being punished for expressing people's opinions: "The free 
expression of your opinions, in this country, is from now on strangled." The party 
positions itself very carefully as the party of the people. In essence the party might 
be saying: as your party, we say what you think ("your opinions "); and if the 
regime penalises us for saying what you think, you should not vote for them, since 
they do not respect your point of view ("the free expression of your opinions [ ... ] I 
from now on strangled"). The responsibility for racism (or for the condemnation 
of racism) is therefore shifted to the voters (''from now on", i.e. since the trial). 
Therefore, the reframing of the issue of racism as a debate about freedom of 
speech (which is more fluid and subject to discussion) fits the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang's strategy when tackling accusations of racism and 
discrimination. The party invariably uses these words in quotation marks, thereby 
questioning their accepted meaning, and manipulating the broader issue of the 
societal 'acceptability' of racism. Jager (2001) has identified such strategy as the 
removal of taboos. 
3.2.4. Reversal strategies 
In addition to avoidance and legitimating strategies, reversal strategies were also 
identified. A reversal strategy is encountered when the role of victim and attacker 
are reversed. Reversal strategies can be identified in several documents from the 
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Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang. For example, the Vlaams Blok was found guilty of 
racism. However, Frank Vanhecke argues in the editorial <Today we were executed 
but we will rise ,88 (see Appendix 3) that this decision was itself based on the 
division between French-speakers and Flemings. If one follows this line of thought, 
the condemnation of the Vlaams Blok could be interpreted as a political decision 
based on ethnicity (Flemings vs. Walloons), which would make itself 
condemnable and racist. van Dijk (1993; 1991) identified reversal strategies in the 
anti-anti-racist discourse he studied. In a reversal strategy, the 'racists' accuse 
those who fight intolerance and discrimination of being racist, intolerant and 
opposed to freedom of speech. A similar process is found here; the roles have been 
reversed and the Vlaams Blok opposition to the court decision and the institutions 
which instigated it is constructed as a legitimate and democratic struggle. This 
reversal strategy is used in the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's discourse. For 
example, in the Frequently Asked Questions section of the Vlaams Blok website89, 
to the question 'is the Vlaams Blok racist? ' the party replies: 
"The VB is certainly not a racist party; we have been branded [racist] by 
the traditional parties and their friends from the media, and they blocked 
us in a political monster trial" 
(http://vlaamsblok. be/afdrukkenlafdrukken.php ) 
Reversal strategies also involve shifting the focus of attention from one's own 
questionable acts to the motives of those who disapprove of one's violations 
(Sykes and Matza, 1957). Within the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's discourse, 
88 http://www.vlaamsblok.be/index.shtml 
89 http://vlaamsblok.belafdrukken/afdrukken.php 
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condemners are identified and named as the traditional parties and the media, thus 
serving their interest. The Vlaams Blok argues that it is the traditional parties' will 
to undermine Vlaams Blok's credibility and legitimacy that has led to Vlaams 
Blok being branded as racist. In sum, by condemning the condemners, definitions 
of racism and discrimination are refuted and reframed as being political tools used 
to limit the party's freedom of speech. In order to defend itself against such 
accusations, the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang adopts another particular rhetorical 
strategy. It systematically questions the defmition of racism and discrimination, its 
meaning, and puts the word in square brackets. The Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang 
provides its own definition of the word racism reframing it as a political tool used 
by its opponents. 
3.2.5. Constructive strategies: identification with readers 
The following strategies of identity construction and identification with the readers 
were also encountered in the texts analysed, but featured less prominently than the 
previous strategies of (de ) legitimating, avoidance or reversal discussed above. 
Identification with the reader is an important strategy that fits into the persuasion 
model of Jowett and Donnell (2000) (see chapter 6, section 2, pp.l28-131), as is 
explained in further detail in this section. 
An additional strategy identified by de Cillia et al. (1999) is a constructive strategy, 
where persuasive linguistic acts serve to build a particular national identity and 
establish solidarity and identification with the 'we-group', and at the same time 
distancing and marginalising the 'others'. The party uses this strategy to create a 
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shared fate between the party and the voters; and to identify with their needs and 
concerns. Identification is an important concept of persuasive communication. 
According to Jowett and O'Donnell (2000: 34), persuader and persuadee must 
share common sensations, concepts, images and ideas, even if it is only feigned by 
the speaker. For the persuader's message to have any resonance with the audience, 
the themes of the message must not be perceived by the audience as imposed on 
them, but rather as based on anchors coming from within themselves (Jowett and 
O'Donnell, 2000: 33). It is one role of persuasive communication and rhetoric (to 
give the impression to listener that the idea comes from them (see Somig, 1989). 
Conviction is the primary aim of persuasion, which depends on the parallelism of 
presuppositions and expectations, of referential, associative and affective meaning, 
and consequently is supposed to lead to coordinated, similarly active behaviour. 
Persuasion IS gomg to be most effective when following similar 
affective/evaluative motivations, and when it is based upon parallel or coordinated 
connotations, expectations, preferences and aversions. 
In persuasion, the listener adjusts his or her view to that which is being insinuated 
(Somig, 1989: 98), he or she always identifies himself or herself to a certain 
degree with the speaker. This is why, Sornig (1989) argues that persuasion works 
best among people who speak the same language. People who share similar 
communicative biographies can achieve understanding and agreement with a 
minimum of verbal activity (Somig, 1989: 98). For example, in the short text by 
10han Demo}, An Alternative for Brussels! (Vlaams Blok, FeiteniRealites, May 
2004: 22, Appendix 14) the clear aim is the identification of the Vlaams Blok 
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party (Johan Demol) with Brussels voters. 10han Demol is calling on a shared 
context with "us Brusseleirs". 10han Demol presents himself as one of 'your own'. 
He also provides a positive description of the Brusseleirs and their 'way of living': 
their sparkling lifestyle which is supposedly proper to Brusseleirs (proper to "nous 
aulres", which could be literally translated as 'us others '). 10han Demol takes 
possession of this lifestyle or way of being: it is proper to us (us others). This sets 
up a clear delineation of the category ("no us autres les Brusseleirs") where no 
other group or community could claim to have a similar lifestyle. 10han Demol has 
just created a positive stereotype of what the Brusseleirs are like, which is of 
course a positive self-description. This process is consistent with what Somig 
(1989: 97) has described as mimicry or flattery, where the persuader makes the 
reader (persuadee) see himlherself from a seemingly more agreeable angle, which 
Somig (1989) argues, involves a change of perspective. 
The identification is done throughout with the use of pronouns (see linguistic 
dimension, section 3.3., p. 191), specifically the use of pronouns of solidarity 
(Brown and Gilman, 1960, in Somig, 1989). The pronoun of the first person plural 
(we) is frequently used. It is a kind of 'we' with socialising force. Its intention 
seems to be to create an atmosphere and feeling of shared situational assessment, 
mutual understanding, and common destiny (Somig, 1989: 104). The use of 'us' is 
a fonn of identification by the persuader and the reader/persuadee. For example, it 
is 'us' (i.e. readers and the Vlaams Blok) who are suffering from the foreigners' 
vote. The use of pronouns is discussed in more details in section 3.2 dedicated to 
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the linguistic dimension, where the semantic and the strategic dimensions art' 
further realised. 
3.2.6. Discursive strategies: summary 
The strategic dimension analysis above highlighted interesting processes of the 
Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang's discourse. The themes emerging from the 
analysis are linked to the rejection of the accusation of racism, positive self-
portrayal, and the delegitimating of political opponents. Their claims are 
remarkable III their consistency and simplicity. Reframing the debate or 
accusations to ones' advantage, redefining problematic terms, or adopting a 
reversal strategy where the party is presented as the victim of discrimination, are 
common features of the Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang's discourse. They prove 
so potent because they present the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang as a victim (a 
martyr?), and help the party construct itself as a legitimate and worthy opposition 
party. This is an effective strategy given the damaging effects of the cordon 
sanitaire and 'demonising' of the party by the media and other parties culminating 
in the banning of the party for racism in November 2004. Many linguistic elements 
have already been tackled, such as the use of quotation marks in reversal strategies. 
the use or pronouns for the 'identification with the voter' strategy, and the use of a 
particular vocabulary in delegitimating strategies. Discussing those linguistic 
elements in relation to the semantic and strategic dimensions was necessary in 
order to allow the discussion about the strategic component of the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang's discourse. This highlights the tight interconnectedness of 
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the dimensions. The following linguistic and syntactical dimension discusses in 
more detail the points already alluded to in the strategic dimension analysis. 
3.3. Linguistic and syntactical dimensions 
The third dimension of discourse-historical analysis focusses on linguistic means 
and the forms of realisation, such as lexical units, argumentation schemes and 
syntactical means which express the strategies identified in the strategic dimension 
analysis. In other words, the semantic and strategic dimensions are realised thanks 
to the linguistic means at the disposal of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang. This is 
perhaps the dimension where language is examined at the 'microscopic' level (i.e. 
the constitution of the smallest units of language, the sentence (syntax) and 
punctuation). 
This section focusses on the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's use of syntax, 
grammar and carefully selected repertoire of language to make their stories come 
to life and achieve their full persuasive potential. The main linguistic and 
syntactical features presented here are: 1) grammar; 2) syntax and punctuation; 3) 
the 'spoken delivery'. The section ends with a discussion of the issues of 
vagueness, interpretation and decoding of messages. 
3.3.1. Persuasive grammar 
Grammar plays an important role in rhetoric and should not be overlooked in the 
analysis of the linguistic dimension of the Vlaams BlokNlaams Belang's 
discourse. Butt et al. (2004) explain that grammar works at an unconscious level, 
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which imbues it with its particular power (because it lies beneath the threshold of 
consciousness). The analysis of the fundamentals of grammar is beyond the 
purpose (or interest) of this thesis. However, salient grammatical elements are 
presented here, with the nature of the agentive subjects and the dynamism attached 
to the actors, the fonn of verbs, the syntax and punctuation. 
The Agent and the Passive voice: dynamism and self-portrayal 
A text taken from a campaign brochure90 (see Vlaams Blok, 2004: 3; see Appendix 
5) provides the illustration for a discussion about the rhetorical use of the passive 
VOIce. 
"the foreigners' right to vote has been accepted" 
"It (the foreigners' right) has been imposed upon us" 
"The rules of the democratic game have been changed" 
"Freedom of speech is strangled ... " (Vlaams Blok, 2004: 3; see Appendix 
5) 
A paSSIve VOIce IS encountered when the agent is not directly identified. 
Interestingly in this text, the passive voice is used in the context of describing the 
consequences of the Vlaams Blok's political opponents' actions. Passive voice 
provides the anonymity of an executioner's mask? (as for example in the following 
sentences 'mistakes were made', or 'rules were broken') (Sandberg, 2001). 
However, the sentences (in the active form) following each passive voice, 
explicitly state who did what. By putting those in a 'subject' position in the 
sentence, i.e. the foreigners' right to vote; the rules of the democratic game, 
90 Vlaams Blok's brochure (2004), Liste 10 Bruxelles Notre Ville! Touche pas Q la democratie, 
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freedom of speech, the party puts them to the fore, making these the fIrst piece of 
the sentence, and lending them extra signifIcance. 
More commonly, the use of the passive voice use, in effect, either camouflaged the 
author of an action (Somig, 1989: 102), or diminished the credibility of a 
statement, such as is achieved by the SUbjunctive mood, e.g. in reported speech. 
This passive voice is used in contrast to sentences where the Vlaams Blok is the 
actor: e.g. "we want a Brussels where one is still rewarded for one's supplied 
wor/C' (Vlaams Blok, 2004: 3; see Appendix 5). It confers dynamism on to the 
party's actions, and decisiveness to its political will. The lack of an identifIable 
subject (the French third personal undefmed pronoun 'on', i.e. translated in 
English as 'one') in both consecutive sentences contrasts quite sharply with the 
next sentence where the party states: 
"In June 13th, it is you who will decide on the election results" Vlaams 
Blok, 2004: 3; see Appendix 5. 
The effect is a greater emphasis on the voters' decision: the party addresses them 
directly with 'vous' and 'deciderez', i.e. 'you will decide', or 'you are going to 
decide'. The next two sentences (which are incidentally the last two sentences of 
the text) take a more direct tone, with the use of the imperative mode ("Be vigilant 
so that the free choice of citizens remains a right and stops being flouted. To stay 
free. vote/or the V1aams Blok" Vlaams Blok, 2004: 3; see Appendix 5). 
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Similarly, the sentence including the voters actions, or line of action are in the 
active voice, and the 'voters' are the agent of the sentences: "In June 13th, you will 
go to the voting booth to elect Brussels members of the Flemish Parliament, of the 
Brussels Regional Council, and of the European Parliament" (Vlaams Blok, 2004: 
3; see Appendix 5. The following sentence puts an extra emphasis, with 'it is you' 
on voters' active role: (lIn June 13th, it is you who will decide of the elections 
results". Perhaps it is the case, in order to also illustrate the dynamic, active role to 
be taken by the party representatives (once elected) but also the responsibility of 
the voters to decide and get them elected. This has the effect of empowering the 
voter/reader. 
Illustration 
A text by Frank Vanhecke and lohan Demol (Vlaams Blok, 2004: 3; Appendix 5) 
is dissected here. For clarity purposes, the fragments of text are grouped into three 
tables, according to their agentive subjects, and analysed. The analysis of each 
table provides interesting findings in terms of the verbs used and their 
positive/negative connotations. This being a fairly 'heavy' format, these tables are 
only provided for this page (see Appendix 7) for illustrative purposes. 
The text (in Vlaams Blok brochure Liste 10 Bruxelles Notre Ville! Touche pas a la 
democratie; see Appendix 7) addresses voters in the form of exhortations (through 
the use of the imperative mode in the last sentences). Voters are agents in these 
sentences: they have an active role to play to protect democracy. The verbs 
describing actions to be taken by the voters are all in the future tense of the 
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indicative mood. The indicative mood is used in factual statements and the future 
tense is used for actions to be taken in the future. The verbs used are all 
empowering voters (e.g. "will go", "will ensure that", "will vote", "will decide ", 
and "will think"): voters choose, voters decide. However, the Vlaams Blok is also 
directing those actions (e.g. "We are hoping that you will think about this when 
you are in the voting booth, on June, 13th ') which is one of the six sentences 
highlighted in yellow in the original text). This direction is more visible, with use 
of the imperative mood by the authors of the text in the last two sentences, where 
the Vlaams Blok tells the voter to vote for the party (using the present tense of the 
imperative mood: 
"Be vigilant so that the free choice of citizens remains a right and stops 
being flouted. To stay free, vote for the Vlaams Blok. " 
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Table 3 - VOTER as actor table (Brochure. Liste 10 Bruxelles Notre Ville' 
Ii h l d' . . oue epasa a emoeratle; Vlaams Blok, 2004 : 3 ; see Appendix 7) 
Actor Process Goal Line 
You (dear voter) will go to the vote for the 1-3 
voting booth Brussels members 
of the Flemish 
Parliament; 
Brussels Regional 
Council and 
European 
Parliament 
It's you who will decide the result of the 23-24 
elections 
It's you who ensure that the free choice of 23-24 
citizens remains 
right and stop 
being flouted 
It's you who vote for the Vlaams 24-25 
Blok (to stay free) 
You will think about it 15 
'one' is rewarded for one's work 21 
One can express freely one's 22 
opinion 
In addition, as the next table illustrates, the verbs, referring to the political parties 
as 'actors' (see Table 3), provide a different take than the one for the voters as 
actors (as seen in Table 2). Indeed, the verbs used to describe the other parties' 
actions are negative, e.g. "refuse", "not interested", "did nothing", ''put the VB91 
offside". This highlights the negativity and undesirability of voting for such parties. 
It is highlighted in the third column of the table where the Vlaams Blok explains 
that the other parties are not interested in people's opinion: "The parties have 
proved that they were not interested in the people's opinions". The governing 
parties seem to be engaged in undemocratic practices (the rule for aliens' right to 
91 The party commonly refers to itself with the acronym 'VB'. The usage from the Vlaams 810k 
(VB) has been carried on by the Vlaams 8elang (VB). 
196 
vote; sue the Vlaams Blok) and have the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang describe the 
parties' actions as undesirable, and against voters' best interests. In contrast, the 
verbs used to describe the actions of the party are all positive, e.g. "hope", "want", 
"defend" (see Table 4). The text presents the party as a good alternative to the 
seemingly unconcerned mainstream parties. In a few sentences, where the Vlaams 
Blok holds the agent role (six in total out of 26), Frank Vanhecke and 10han 
Demol have actually tackled the main points the party consistently develops in its 
political communication (see Appendix 5): freedom of speech, security, being boss 
in one's own land, and democracy. 
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Table 4 - POLITICAL PARTIESI'THEY' as actors (Brochure. Lisle 10 
BruxeLLes Notre Ville! Touche pas a La democratie; Vlaams Blok, 2004: 3; see 
Appendix 7) 
Actor Process Goal Line 
All the French- were in favour of granting foreigners 8-9 
speaking parties the right to vote. 
Note: these 
foreigners are 
described as 'who 
refuse to get our 
nationality' 
The VLD (Prime did nothing to stop/prevent this 10-11 
Minister coup. 
Verhofstadt's 
party) 
The parties have proved that not interested III 11-12 
people's opinion 
They are not interested in in people's 11-12 
people's opinions opinions 
They refused a referendum on 12-13 
the question of the 
aliens' right to 
vote 
The regime called a tribunal to rule 19 
out the Vlaams 
Blok (doing 
something to the 
Vlaams Blok) 
''tribunal'' Put the Vlaams Blok 18 
offside 
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Table 5 - THE VLAAMS BLOK as actor (Brochure. Liste 10 Bruxelles .votre 
Ville! Touche pas a La democratie ; Vlaams Blok, 2004 : 3 ; see Appendix 7) 
Actor Process Goal Line 
We are hoping that the voter will 14-15 
remember the parties' 
lack of concern in their 
opinion 
The Vlaams is not a racist party (denegation 17-18 
Blok against this 
accusation! condemnation) 
It Only defends The rights of the 18 
Brusseleirs 
We Will continue Our fight without bending 20 
We Want A Brussels where one is 21 
rewarded for one's work 
Verbs are important as pivots in sentences. They tell the reader about the subject 
of the sentence. The verb phrase, or predicate, expresses an action, an e\'ent, or a 
state of being. Accordingly, sentences either move or stand still (Sandberg, 2001). 
The previous section highlights the importance of the chosen verbs to attach 
positive or negative connotations to the actions of different actors, according to the 
aim of the party. The party portrays those actors positively for the actions 
undertaken by the Vlaams Blok, negatively when verbs are used to signify the 
actions of the Vlaams Blok's political opponents. To link this to the previous 
strategic dimension, the verbs have a role to play in constructing the legitimating 
strategies, for example, or in building a positive/negative portrayal. 
3.3.2. Syntax and punctuation 
Concerning the syntax and punctuation used in the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang's 
website. there is a recurrent use of inverted commas around the word 
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'discrimination' and 'racism' (and the words linked to those words, such as 'anti-
racism', 'xenophobia', 'islamophobia' among others). As discussed in the 
semantic dimension, definitions of 'racism' and 'discrimination' are refuted and 
reframed as being political tools used to limit Vlaams BloklVlaams 8elang's 
freedom of speech. 
The Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang seems very fond of quotation marks. For 
example in Brochure 6 (FeitenIRealiNis, May 2004, Appendix 18) the phrase 
"sentiment d'insecurite", i.e. feeling of insecurity, is placed between quotation 
marks. It might imply that the Vlaams Blok does not consider it as being a mere 
'feeling', but as a reality endured by people. This insecure feeling is a common 
point where the traditional parties and the Vlaams Blok contradict each other. The 
figures relating to crimes clearly record a fall in cases, but the feeling of insecurity 
might be heightened (among the elderly) by the presence of youngsters of foreign 
origin. For the Vlaams Blok, it is important to record those feelings and frame 
them as being 'real'. In this specific case, if insecurity is defined and somehow 
lessened in importance as a subjective feeling by the media and the government, 
the Vlaams Blok presents those feelings as believable, and actually real. lohan 
Demol refers to the crime statistics as 'travestissement' or travesties of figures. 
As discussed earlier, the use of quotation marks (see section 3.1.5., p. 161, for the 
discussion on semantic manipulation of the terms racism and discrimination) 
indicates the party 'negotiation' of accepted terms and questions their semantic 
content. In the following quotation, the Vlaams Blok puts the three following 
words between quotation marks: 'disturb', 'new electorate', 'citi::ens'. 
"For low electoral reasons, those parties holding pmt'er do not 'want to 
'd' t b' h ., l ' IS ur t elr new e ectorate. Consequently, there is a series of gross 
injustice, which put a category of 'citizens' abm'e lml's at the expenses of 
the others". (emphasis added; Vlaams Belang, 2004: 10, see Appendix 12) 
The decoding is fairly easy. Throughout the year (and in the brochure), the party 
has been opposing the right to vote for foreigners, and has opposed the 'Belg snel 
wet' (Quick Citizenship Act) which facilitates and speeds up access to Belgian 
citizenship. Naturalised foreign-born Belgians, in addition to the long-tern1 foreign 
residents, are called in the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang's discourse, the "new 
electorate ". Following the Vlaams Belang, the new-ness of this particular 
electorate highlights the changing nature of politics. The Vlaams Belang argues 
that the mainstream parties, ''for electoral reasons", do not hesitate to alienate a 
part of the population (the former electorate, i.e. to be understood as the 'real' 
Belgian?), and to allow "a series of gross injustices" to please the new electorate 
(to the detriment of the previous electorate). This new electorate is also referred to 
by the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang as "a category of 'citizens'''. The quotation 
around the word citizens between quotation marks is particularly significant. The 
Vlaams Belang does not consider this "new electorate" as proper 'citizens', 
otherwise the party would not be questioning their Belgian citizenship and 
attracting the attention of the readers to the matter with the use of quotation marks. 
This is consistent with the broad discourse of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang 
used in constructing foreigners as living off the generosity of Belgian institutions. 
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and benefiting from rights, but no responsibilities, therefore not qualifying for full 
citizenship. The Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang often laments the fact that Belgium 
has the most flexible nationality granting laws in the world (and proposes to 
'review' (i.e. revoke) the naturalisation of 'new Belgians' up to the third 
generation). 
An effect of punctuation also requiring analysis is the nature of the speech. The 
most salient example here is the 'spoken' delivery, i.e. written texts that 'read' like 
transcriptions of spoken speeches. 
3.3.3. Spoken delivery 
The use of parentheses is fairly common in the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's 
discourse. For example, in a Vlaams Blok publication (May 2004: 2-3), the use of 
parentheses in the following paragraph is examined: 
"All the parties, Flemish and French-speakers (except for the Vlaams Blok, 
of course), have voted for one modification of the law after another, in 
order to ban the Vlaams Blok and financially dry it out. "(Vlaams Blok, 
May 2004: 2-3, Appendix 4) 
The parentheses contribute to the impression that Frank Vanhecke is directly 
addressing the reader by stating the 'obvious' i.e. that the party has not condoned 
any changes in the law. This interpretation is reinforced by the presence of irony, 
and the rhetorical question (and answer) from Frank Vanhecke expressed in the 
second paragraph: 
"Could you imagine that the Vlaams Blok benefits from too much sympathy 
or common sense from our people! No, professional magistrates, who 
could often be put under political pressures, were imperatively necessary n. 
(Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 2-3, Appendix 4) 
The persuasive use of language does not so much appeal to reason but to the 
recipients' expectations and emotions (see section 3.2.2, p. 170). So its purpose is 
not so much to inform, but to make people believe, and, in the end, to act upon 
their beliefs (in this instance to vote for Vlaams Blok). In the brochure 
Feiten/Realites (Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 4; Appendix 18), the sentence starts by 
"indeed", as if prompted by a question which could have been: "Is Brussels a safe 
city? Don't you feel unsafe in Brussels?".92 The text is written as a transcription of 
spoken language. The indignation of the lady is palpable with: "What are they 
talking about, they are living on an other planet those people?". It is 
grammatically incorrect in the written language, but quite common in spoken 
delivery: 'ces gens-la' (meaning literally 'those people there'). In Flemish the lady 
says 'wablief, a Flemish colloquial phrase loosely meaning 'well, please'. In both 
Dutch and French, the translation captures the indignation of the woman about not 
being believed when expressing her feelings of insecurity. 
In the text, "Could you imagine ... ? No, ... " Frank Vanhecke asks (Vlaams Blok, 
May 2004: 2-3, Appendix 4) the questions, and provides the answers himself. It is 
a powerful rhetorical device: the party leader expresses strong emotions in the text 
His indignation is clear in "do you think that today, suddenly/all of a sudden, at 
92 See Appendix 18, there is, vertically next to Johan Demol's picture, the question: "Brussels a 
sale city?!" 
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the opportunity of this trial, eminently political, the political nominations wOllldn 'f 
play any role??? "(Vlaams Blok, May 2004: 2-3; see Appendix 4) the three 
question marks at the end of the paragraph highlight the 'spoken deliyery'. This is 
used more commonly in cartoons, e-mails or instant messaging, than in a \\Titten 
text to indicate extreme surprise (or here indignation). This suggests that the text is 
in the form of 'spoken delivery'. The text also has irony in Frank Vanhecke's 
words: "Isn't independence beautiful..." (or literal translation: "It's b e a l l t ~ / l " . .
independence ... ''), when talking about the organisation that instigated legal action 
against the Vlaams Blok, and alluding to its close links with the Prime Minister 
(Vlaams Belang, May 2004: 2). With punctuation, and some grammatical 
construction, more appropriate to spoken language, the party seems to be reducing 
the distance between the politicians and the readers. The rhetorical questions 
provide a quasi-conversation (questions and answers) between the readers and the 
party representatives which might also be intended to reduce the distance between 
the voters and the party, and provide an impression of straightforwardness and 
unceremonious exchange. 
3.3.4. The effect of the syntactical construction, and level of language 
First of all, the most salient feature here is the statement of 'facts'. Using the 
indicative mood, carefully chosen headings which direct the interpretation and the 
understanding, and the choice of specific words (negative and positive 
connotations, according to the recipient they relate to), seem to allow no room for 
alternative interpretations. These assertions, often without justification or proof. 
are amongst the most direct ways of handling the interlocutor's yiews and attitudes 
(LeBon, 1968, in Sornig, 1989: 99). The Vlaams BlokiVlaams Belang a s s e r t i n ~ l y y
tells stories, re-tells them, guides the interpretation, by not leaving any place for 
doubts, or multiple meanings and ultimately constructs its particular dimension of 
reality. Assertions are indeed an interpretation of reality, i.e. of a reality as it 
appears to the speaker (Sornig, 1989: 99), because assertions are also attempts to 
alter the recipient's perspective. This is after all why the speaker's perspective is 
being verbalised in the first place (Sornig, 1989). This view is in line with the 
belief that not only can language be ideologically used, but that the \'ery use of 
language is ideological (Butt et al., 2004). "Ideology in language follows from the 
fact that we can construct mUltiple versions of the . same' physical, biological, 
social and semiotic events" (Butt et al., 2004: 267). 
This is why the range of possible alternative interpretations in the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang's discourse is reduced to a minimum by its headlines, and by 
using slogans, sound bites, or pictures that had been used in past publications. In 
addition, by directly linking the statements with the party stances and policies, it 
provides a directness and straight talk (uncommon in politics?), and is 
unapologetic in expressing its views. The style is simple, straightforward 
(indicative mood, imperative, using statements of facts), depicting a world as 
essentially black and white, and suggesting that it can provide clean-cut solutions. 
If the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang provides this form of no-nonsense 
communication, the most controversial policies and programmes are still veiled 
and refonl1ulated to avoid frontal confrontation with the targeted actors, or with 
the legal system. This is one reason why critical discourse analysis requires a 
knowledge and analysis of the context in which the utterances were created. This 
leads to the next section on the process of decoding the language of the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang. 
Elliptic language: Obscuring meaning. How to decode? 
In human communication, every message has to be decoded, i.e. the recipient is 
expected to take it upon himself or herself to decipher the message, to complete 
what is left unsaid, to bring light into obscurities and verbalise the implicit (Sornig, 
1989). The reader or listener is not a passive consumer of the content of the media 
text (Watson and Bargiela, 1998). The reader is asked to understand the message 
by decoding the different layers of meaning. The encoding process must of course 
take into account the life experience and profile of the recipient, to ensure a 
successful decoding. The Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang, probably better than any 
other political party, demonstrates an intimate knowledge of its voters, their 
expectations and anxieties (through market research?). It is of course possible that 
the reader or listener does not 'catch' the hidden meaning. One possible 
consequence of the use of rhetorical grammar, and the use of the passive voice for 
example is the obscuring of meaning. Holly (1989: 124) argues that "there is [ ... ] 
a risk that the message cannot be understood because it is too vague, but in the 
long run, repetition and variation of forms will compensate for the occasional 
failure". 
According to Somig (1989: 102), elliptic language forces the recipients to 
complete the utterance and through this mental activity where they busy 
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themselves with what somebody else may have meant, the recipients are lured into 
identifying themselves to a degree with the speaker. This is, Somig (1989: 102) 
argues, simply a consequence of the incompleteness and vagueness of statements 
whose comprehension and acceptance is liable to misunderstanding and depends 
on the recipient's conscious and voluntary cooperation. One consequence of the 
indirectness of any linguistic (and semiotic) interaction is that anybody who is able 
to decipher a message content and purpose which are not manifest, has proved by 
accomplishing this task that he or she belongs to those who can receive and 
process messages without having to be told everything explicitly. 
Vagueness 
Vagueness appears to be a consistent characteristic of the Vlaams Belang 
discourse. The first assumption of many commentators (see Erk, 2005) is that 
disguising and obscuring meaning is necessary for the Vlaams Belang to avoid 
legal harassment but leaves enough clues for the reader to understand the 
underlying message. For example, in the brochure dedicated to the Turkish 
admission to the EU (see Appendix 15), there is an interesting contrast in the 
brochure between precise sources, figures and facts (see for example pp.3-6 in 
Appendix 15) and the relative vagueness of other arguments (see Appendix 15, 
pp. 7- 8), where the party does not provide the source of the ''phoney arguments" in 
favour of Turkish EU membership. On page 8 of the same brochure (in the 4th 
paragraph), the party refers to "a recent study" to substantiate its claim that Turkey 
is not really a secular state. "A recent study" does not say much about the source, 
the date, the type of study. Does this study actually exist? This might be another 
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example of so-called 'common knowledge' used ostensibly to pro\'ide more 
weight to the argument. 
According to Holly (1989), the repetition and variation of forms is also supposed 
to compensate for the 'missed' meaning (Holly, 1989). This might be an 
explanation as why elements directly taken from the Vlaams Blok's brochures can 
be found in the Vlaams Belang's literature. The obvious reason is that both parties 
are actually the same party, therefore a recycling of texts and photos is almost 
inevitable. It would also not be far-fetched to assume that these 'borrowings' are 
voluntary, in that they provide a common universe of symbols and meanings that 
guide the understanding of the reader (see the repetition of similar headlines, Figs. 
1,2 and 3). 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the most salient elements of the Vlaams BloklVlaams 
Belang's discourse. The discursive analysis of the party has highlighted the 
persuasion of the party discourse. For many years, especially since the theme of 
immigration has come to the fore, the party has been consistently increasing its 
electoral base. Discourse-historical's semantic, strategic and linguistic dimensions 
have highlighted important elements and processes present in the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang literature and have contributed to its articulation and 
persuaSIOn. 
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Core themes are developed by the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang and pro\ide a 
consistent picture of Belgian society and Belgian politics, Flanders and democracy. 
The semantic analytical dimension of several documents from the Vlaams 810k 
and from the Vlaams Belang, has shown a careful selection of themes which has 
allowed the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang to focus readers' attention on 
newsworthy events. This way, the party can repeat and reinforce its "vision" and 
political direction. It is worth noting that there is a remarkable consistency 
between the respective semantic dimensions of the Vlaams 810k and the Vlaams 
Belang literature. The party systematically presents itself as the defender of 
democracy. The exaggerated (hyperbolic) claims in the Vlaams 810klVlaams 
Belang communications (with some melodramatic comments from the party 
leaders) regarding democracy, and their constant mocking and denunciation of 
other parties is another example of the focussing and magnifying processes at play 
here. The Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang show the readers where to look and, using 
a linguistic and rhetorical distorting lens, attempts to modify their perspective. 
Issues related to branding, positioning and segmentation that would inform the 
terms used above are provided in chapter 8 (see p.281) which explores in further 
detail the marketing of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang. First, the analysis of the 
Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang's discourse is continued in the following chapter 
which focusses on the images produced by the party. The conceptualisation of 
images as texts justifies the analysis of those images which deserve interest in their 
own right as part of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's discourse. 
Chapter 7: Images as texts: a visual analysis of the \'Iaams 
Blok and Vlaams Belang 
1. Introduction - relevance of the visual 
The aim of this chapter is to enhance the CDA of the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams 
Belang's discourse by undertaking an analysis of the visual elements included in 
the party's communication material. CDA is particularly useful for analysing 
phenomena such as communication patterns in public institutions, media discourse, 
and the constitution of individual and group identity (Anthonissen, 2003). It 
reveals how language is used to convey power and status in contemporary social 
interaction (Anthonissen, 2003: 300). Most work done with a CDA approach has 
focussed on the spoken and written word. However a CDA of the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang's discourse focussing solely on the verbal and textual 
arguments would be incomplete. Indeed, if one accepts that language is only one 
variety of semiotic modes available to people in creating meaning (Anthonissen, 
2003), then visual elements should also be included in the analysis. Visual 
elements, i.e. photographs, images and figures are actually are a major part of the 
rhetorical environment according to Foss (2004). Many authors have also 
recognised that the visual has often been forgotten. with images located In a 
secondary and subordinate relationship to written and verbal text. Thus the impact 
of the visual in the world has been largely ignored (Foss. 2004; Helmers and Hill, 
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2004; Stafford, 1997; Kress and van Leeuwen, 1996). Ignoring this aspect in my 
analysis of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang discourse would mean that a major 
factor in the way the party communicates and creates meaning would haye been 
ignored. Hence this chapter is based on the premise that a consideration of images 
as texts is an interesting and necessary approach that recognises the 
multidimensionality of discourse. 
Several photographs published by the Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang are 
analysed in detail and discussed in relation to relevant strands of literature. An 
appraisal of the theory of visual persuasion opens this chapter and anchors the 
analysis of the visual elements in the same way that the verbal elements were 
considered in the previous chapter. The CDA methodology is structurally adapted 
to the particular nature of the visual elements of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's 
discourse: the 'semantic dimension' encompasses the description of the 
photograph, the subjects, the action; the 'linguistic dimension' becomes the 
'communicative dimension' and tackles a focus on the photographic conventions 
(e.g. focus, type and style of photography), and the 'strategic dimension' focusses 
on the persuasion of the visual arguments and the way viewers' reading is guided 
towards a 'most preferred' interpretation. 
The chapter starts with an appraisal of the centrality of the image for marketing 
and politics. The particular conceptualisation of images as texts in this research is 
discussed in relation to persuasion and rhetoric. This theoretical discussion is 
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followed by the empirical critical 'reading' of a selection of photographs taken 
from various publications of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang. 
2. The centrality of image 
Marketing and image 
Image, its production and consumption, is claiming centre-stage in our consumer 
culture (Schroeder, 2002). For example, brands are developed based on images. 
products are advertised via images, and corporate image is critical for management 
success (Schroeder, 2002). Brands and brand management ha\e become 
cornerstones of accomplishment in attracting and maintaining a profitable 
customer base. Products often compete on image, driven by marketing strategy to 
differentiate themselves via marketing communication and competitive advantage 
(Schroeder, 2002: 23). In essence, marketing is fundamentally about image 
management: "in marketing practice that is most likely to succeed in contemporary 
society, image is primary and the product is treated as merely a variable that 
attempts to represent the image" (Firat et at., 1995: 46). In fact, images constitute a 
large proportion of corporate communications about products and services. 
economic performance, and organisational identity (Borgerson and Schroeder, 
2005). The task of managers has shifted from the production of goods to the 
production of images; and this shift from product to image profoundly affects 
product development and marketing communications (Schroeder. 2002). Image 
has become the starting point for market communications, i.e. an image is created 
and the development of the associated product follows (Schroeder, 2002). 
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A critical stance on image: the issue of power and representation 
Marketing scholars have analysed image, but they mainly focus on ad\'ertising, 
However, this is a rather limited focus considering the much wider relevance of 
image for marketing, for example, in commercial settings where images are central 
to corporate communications about products and services, economic performance. 
and organisational identity. Indeed, marketing images have the power to influence 
how people perceive their world and respond to it (Borgerson and Schroeder, 
2005). Hence, marketing images contribute to the 'reality' into which consumers 
are socialised (Borgerson and Schroeder, 2005). This is of particular concern when 
one considers for example the sexist use of images objectifying women, or the 
xenophobic use of images to construct and emphasise the differences of 'others' as 
problematic and incompatible. The centrality of image in modem politics is also 
widely recognised. Political parties and candidates are often referred to as 
'packaged' (Franklin, 2004), and the careful construction of their image is crucial 
for success. Political image refers to a carefully constructed condensation of all the 
attributes a candidate (or a party) wants to convey to the voters into easily 
rendered visual and verbal symbols (Strachan and Kendall, 2004: 135). Political 
images are symbolic devices which can be constructed with both visual and verbal 
messages (Strachan and Kendall, 2004: 136). 
An approach to the analysis of images 
In this thesis images are considered as cultural texts, and not merely as accurate or 
true strategic pictures that transparently record faces, families, e\'ents, products 
and services (Mick et at., 2004; Schroeder. 2002; Scott. 1994; Borgerson and 
Schroeder, 2005). The stance adopted here is that photographs (the fonnat of 
images focussed upon in the research) are selectively edited and culturalh' 
produced images, which exist within shifting planes of meaning and significance 
(Borgerson and Schroeder, 2005). The starting point of visual analysis is the 
recognition that "images show us a world, but not the world [ ... ] When we look at 
images, whether photographs, films, videos, or paintings, what we see is the 
product of human consciousness, itself part and parcel of culture and history" 
(Leppert, 1997: 3; emphasis in the original; in Schroeder. 2002: 19). 
Asking how images work, how they persuade is not the question addressed here, 
because tackling those questions would enquire into people's beliefs, attitudes, and 
opinions, and how they respond to images, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Rather it is the structure and the use of the image that is explored, by adopting the 
same principles that direct CDA. Images have been analysed not as evidence of the 
who, where and what of reality, but as evidence of how their maker(s) have 
(re)constructed reality, as evidence of bias and ideologically coloured 
interpretation (van Leeuwen and Jewitt, 2001). Images are worth searching to 
uncover the story (stories) provided by those visual elements in their own right. 
Second, as was shown by Anthonissen (2003), in situations of censorship 93, 
infonnation in the conventional fonn may result in criminal liability, so images 
can be used to bypass censorship. It could be argued that the Vlaams BlokiVlaams 
43 Censorship occurs when a government, or a strong institution lays down rigid ruJcs for 
conducting public discourse, and these rules are not readily accepted (broadly following 
Anthonissen. 2003). 
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Belang is in a situation of quarantine and has its discourse restricted by censorship 
(concerning its outspoken racist and xenophobic stances). The other political 
parties and the media have quarantined the Vlaams Blok behind the cordoll 
sanitaire for its outspoken xenophobia and discriminatory policies. Moreo\"er. 
racism is liable to prosecution in Belgium, and the Vlaams Blok has already 
suffered the consequences for its racist discourse, with its condemnation in court 
and subsequent decision to disband. The Vlaams Belang is today under close 
scrutiny and provides a good illustration of self-censorship not only to avoid 
liability, but also to appeal to a much wider electoral base. This is an additional 
justification as to why images must be considered as worthy of analysis as are 
words in this research. Anthonissen (2003: 299) has argued that where censorship 
prevails, semiotic modes other than language emerge and have to be investigated. 
3. Text and image. Persuasion and rhetoric94 
3.1. Text and image 
Images are approached in this research as texts. It is a similar approach to that of 
Barthes (1974: 55) who argues that there is no difference between literature and 
painting, for example, in order to "affirm more powerfully the plurality of 'texts .... 
because, as Helmers and Hill (2004) explain, paint and words refer not to an 
external reality, but to one code or another. Reality, Helmers and Hill (2004) 
added, is always framed by codes that determine what the writer and painter looks 
4-1 Rhetoric is the use of the best means available to make the logic of the argument persuasive to its 
audicncc. 
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at and what mode of representation they select to describe the reality that they 
believe is worthy of vision and representation. 
Images and texts can work together to reinforce a vision of reality. The tight 
relationship between image and text has been noted by Barthes (1977) as existing 
in two categories: 1) where the verbal text extends the meaning of the image (or 
vice-versa), and 2) where the verbal text elaborates the meaning of the image (or 
vice-versa), giving an illustration or a more precise restatement. Kress and van 
Leeuwen (1996) note that the visual component of a text is an independently 
organized and structured message, connected to the written component, but not 
necessarily dependent on it. Images may be analysed without any recourse to the 
verbal or written information which may accompany them, indeed the images 
might have been designed to be self-sufficient. Images are not merely 'nonverbal' 
information that convey more or less the same message that the text might impart 
(Scott, 1994). Images constitute a system of representations - a visual language 
that is both engaging and deceptive (Schroeder, 2002). 
However, textual analysis can show what representations include and exclude, 
what they make salient, and what differences they construct between people, 
places and things (van Leeuwen and Jewitt, 2001: 7). Therefore, visual analysis 
may also include the accompanying text, or even regard word and image as 
indivisible units of analysis (such as in social semiotic analysis of layout, where 
the written serves as a secondary source of information to anchor who and what is 
depicted and what is symbolised) (Van Leeuwen and Jewitt, 2001: 7). Analyzing 
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one without the other would provide an incomplete story. Hence in this thesis both 
the visual and the verbal are considered as the mixed fabric constitutino the 
c 
discourse of the Vlaams Blok!Vlaams Belang. 
3.2. Persuasion and visual arguments 
Persuasion, or rhetorical persuasion, is defined as causing someone to believc by 
means of speech (Reboul: 1991). This is typical of the view that the use of 
language is paramount in rhetoric, or at least envisages speech as essential to 
rhetoric (Blair, 2004: 42). Foss et al. (1985: 11) argue for a broader definition and 
have defined rhetoric as "the uniquely human ability to use symbols to 
communicate with one another". This definition logically includes the verbal, but 
also the visual. 
The advantage of visual arguments over print or spoken arguments lies in their 
evocative power and the sense of realism they convey (Blair, 2004: 51). For 
example, visual images can be used to convey a narrative in a short time (e.g. a TV 
commercial). To be effective, the properties of a visual argument must resonate 
with the audience on the specific occasion and in the particular circumstances. The 
visual symbolism must register immediately whether consciously or not (Blair, 
2004). The visual rhetorician must know and relate not only to the beliefs and 
attitudes of the intended audience but also to the visual imagery that is meaningful 
to it. The persuader must also be sensitive to the surrounding argumentativc 
"space" (Blair, 2004: 52), or context, of the audience. because so much remains 
tacit or unexpressed. In other words, visual arguments are arguments with gaps to 
be filled in by the participation of the audience (Blair. 2004: 52). 
Another important question concerns what historical and cultural modes of yisual 
understanding the audience brings to the situation. Actually. the arguer dra\\s the 
viewer in to participate in completing the argument and the viewer becomes its 
own persuader. Visual arguments are distinguished by their rhetorical power. or 
potential for a rhetorical power greater than that of purely verbal arguments (Blair. 
2004: 52). Blair (2004) argues that the visual element in arguments is most 
significantly a rhetorical dimension, rather than logical or dialectal. Indeed. the 
dialectal dimension stipulates that there is a process of interaction in the arguments 
between the arguer and the interlocutors who raise questions or objections (Blair, 
2004). Images lack this dialectal aspect. The visual makes an argument in the 
sense of adducing a few reasons in a forceful way. It does not permit complexity 
of dialectal moves such as the raising of objections in order to refute or otherwise 
answer them «Blair, 2004). For example, pictures, especially films, are well-suited 
to telling stories. They provide an excellent medium for visual arguments by 
means of narrative construction. People do not just imagine the narrative; they 
'see' it unfolding before their eyes (Blair, 2004). Blair (2004) argues that seeing is 
believing, even if it is invented, exaggerated, or plain lies. The visual brings to 
arguments another dimension: it adds drama and force. The visual has an 
immediacy, a verisimilitude, and a concreteness that help influence acceptance, 
which is not available to the verbal (Blair, 2004). Blair (2004) explains that the 
visual excels in the rhetorical dimension, because visual arguments tend to be one-
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sided (the complications of the dialectical perspectives are not easily conyeyed 
visually), presenting the case for, or the case against, but not together. Political 
cartoons for example are used to make a visual argument. Cartoons are d i s t i n c t i \ ' \ ; ~ ~
because they permit explicitness (with labelling) and precision of meaning 
(distinctive visual traits and caricatures of well-known faces) found in few other 
visual genres (Blair, 2004: 55) 
Clearly then, an appropriate method of analysis is crucial and dependent on the 
nature of the project, on the visual material to be investigated and on the goals of 
the research project (Van Leeuwen and Jewitt, 2001). Political images are 
constructs and any analysis must reveal these constructs (following Van Leeuwen 
and Jewitt, 2001). According to Van Leeuwen and Jewitt (2001: 5), studies aiming 
to change the practices of representation (e.g. the explicit political stance of critical 
discourse analysts; see section 4.4.2.) often choose a detailed and explicit method 
of analyzing construction and its effects, so as to avoid the idea that it is all in the 
eye of the beholder. 
4. Image analysis 
4.1. 'Reading' images 
Image interpretation is never complete or closed (Schroeder. 2002). Interpretations 
are subject to change, to debate and contestation. Images function within culture, 
and their interpretive meanings are subject to change (Schroeder, 2002: 5). In this 
argument, culture is conceptualized, following Schroeder (2002: 6). as a primary 
or constitutive process. as important as the economic or material base in shaping 
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social subjects and historical events - not merely a reflection of the world after the 
event. 
The overwhelming number, variety, and presence of visual elements assaulting our 
eyes interfere with the ability to carefully scrutinize and reflect upon indi\'idual 
images, and lulls viewers into believing that seeing is understanding (Schroeder. 
2002). Photographs appear as if they just are merely visual records of what has 
happened, who was there, how they appear, where and when it happened 
(Schroeder, 2002). The resemblance between a visual representation and the 
subject is one way that photographs tie subject matter to symbolic meaning. For 
example, advertisements often use 'typical' people in advertisements for their 
resemblance to targeted consumers (Schroeder, 2002). Photography's power 
derives from its ability to seemingly represent the 'real' as it is (Schroeder, 2002), 
and to be considered as a historical record of reality (Szarokowski, 1989; in 
Schroeder, 2002: 53). Blair (2004: 51) explains that 'reality' is actually a selected 
perspective presented in a highly structured or filtered way. Photographs are 
indeed selectively edited and culturally produced images that exist within shifting 
planes of meaning and significance (Borgerson and Schroeder, 2005). 
It is also important to recognIse the subjectivity of visual representation In 
studying the commercial landscape (Borgerson and Schroeder, 2005). in particular, 
in this case, marketing communications in a political context. Marketing images 
contribute to the 'reality' into which contemporary consumers are socialised and 
often evade notions of creative interpretation and critical resistance (Borgcrson 
22tl 
and Schroeder, 2005: 7). The persuasIve power of marketing images depends 
largely upon the representational conventions of photographic reproduction: 
advertising, corporate reports, packaging, product catalogues, promotional 
materials. Attaching meaning to marketing interventions is not understood here as 
a one way process (i.e. from the marketer to a passive consumer). The viewers 
generate their own meanings and they bring their own cognitive, social and 
cultural lenses to whatever they see. Accepting the existence of potentially 
multiple meanings does not mean that images can mean absolutely anything to 
anyone, or "float", as post-structural thinking holds (Bailey and Hall, 1992). 
Schroeder (2002) argues that meaning does not "float" because the historical and 
political processes that also generate meaning are not eliminated. Therefore the 
interpretive work of the researcher does not imply fixing a particular meaning in 
time. Photographs, like any other text, are polysemic. It follows that any 
interpretation the viewer makes will not exhaust the significance that might be 
attributed to the image (Ball and Smith, 1992: 18). Any interpretation of 
photographs is not trying to identify precisely what images mean, but rather to 
open up possibilities of meaning (Schroeder, 2002: 49). Therefore, interpreting a 
photograph is acknowledging its representational power, both as an artefact and as 
a bearer of meaning, reflecting broad societal, culturaL and ideological codes 
(Schroeder, 1998). 
4.2. An analytical approach to the Vlaams BlokIVlaams 8elang's images 
Description of the nature of visual rhetoric involves paying attention to: 1) the 
presented elements (i.e. the semantic dimension); and 2) the suggested elements 
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(i.e. the strategic dimension). Identification of the presented elements of an 
artefact involves describing its main features (space, medium, colour, etc.) (Foss, 
2004). This step of identification is referred to here as the communicative 
dimension (the equivalent of the CDA's linguistic dimension). Identification of the 
suggested elements is a process of discovering the concepts, ideas, themes and 
allusions that a viewer is likely to infer from the presented elements (Foss, 2004: 
307). Analysis of the presented and suggested elements engenders an 
understanding of the primary communicative elements of an image and, 
consequently, of the meanings an image is likely to have for audiences (Foss, 2004: 
307). 
The semantic dimension 
The semantic dimension in a discourse-historical approach is linked to the content 
of the discourse under investigation (see section 4.5.1.1.). Similarly, the semantic 
dimension of the visual elements of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's discourse 
tackles the 'content' of the photographs and provides the basis for their 
interpretation. The interpretation of a work of art, photograph, or advertisement, 
begins with its description. A useful starting point for a descriptive analysis is to 
identify and describe persons, objects, places or events in a photograph (Barrett, 
2005). Schroeder (2002, 2006) recommends that the basic features of image must 
be described, along with the characteristics contained within it, such as 
composition, colour, tone and contrast (that are included here in the 
communicative dimension). Visual interpretation is thus not a matter of "getting it 
right", rather it is an exercise in coaxing culturally and historically situated 
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meanings from images. Decoding images begins with a personal understanding of 
symbols, conventions, and stereotypes (Schroeder, 2002). First, it involves 
drawing on one's knowledge, then making connections with a broader set of 
concerns (Schroeder, 2002), because images need to make clear associations in 
order to get their message across (Schroeder, 2002: 39). 
The communicative dimension 
The communicative dimension is the 'parallel' dimension to the discourse-
historical linguistic dimension which encompasses the lexical units, argumentation 
schemes and syntactical. For the visual analysis, interpretive tools include 
information both internal and external to the object, such as context, comparisons, 
denotation, and connotation. The basic interpretive techniques are subject matter 
(e.g. group, models), form (e.g. fold-out ad), medium (e.g. black and white 
photographs), style95 (e.g. harsh, realistic), genre (refers to a type or category of art, 
e.g. group portrait) and contextual issues (e.g. the purpose of the picture and how it 
is presented, encompassing concerns external to the photograph or advertisement) 
(Schroeder, 2002: 119). Comparisons constitute a part of the contextualising 
interpretive process (Barnet, 1997). Comparisons can be made to other 
photographers' work, other work by the same photographer, other images that 
seem connected, as well as cultural products such as other advertisements, novels 
or films. 
95 Style: indicates a resemblance among diverse art objects from an artist, movement, time period, 
or geographic location and is recognised by a characteristic handling of subject matter and formal 
elements" (Barrett, 1996: 31-2; in Schroeder, 2002). 
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The strategic dimension 
In Wodak's discourse historical approach, the strategic dimension refers to "more 
or less accurate and more or less intentional plans of practices adopted to achie\"e a 
particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim"' (Wodak, 2001: 73). In 
the previous chapter, several rhetorical devices and narrative strategies that 
contribute to providing a clear and persuasive narrative were identified in the 
Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang's discourse. For example, the party's political and 
identity struggle is presented in a typical 'us' versus 'them' dichotomy. Similar 
patterns are identified in the visual representations in the Vlaams 810klVlaams 
Belang publications. 
Summary 
The rhetorical power of images has been established in an earlier discussion. It is 
nevertheless important to make clear that visual images are not mere substitutes 
for verbal language. Images do not necessarily speak for themselves, rather as 
noted by Leppert (1997), they make visible a realm of possibilities and potential 
meanings, many of which are difficult to articulate: 
"To talk about an image is not to decode it, and having once broken its 
code, to have done with it, the final meaning having been established 
and reduced to words. To talk about an image is, in the end, an attempt 
to relate oneself to it and to the sight it represents" (Leppert, 1997: 7-8, 
in Schroeder, 2002: 6). 
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The three dimensions are interrelated, and as such discussed without explicitly 
making a distinction between them (unless significant), in order to shorten a long 
and potentially descriptive process. Rather, the most significant elements are 
highlighted and discussed. The following analysis is divided into three sections. 
The first section of the analysis deals with a portrait, and group photographs. This 
is followed by a deeper analysis of the way that 'others' are depicted across the 
Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's communication material. The analysis focusses on 
highlighted 'differences' to be noticed in the 'others', which reinforce the 
stereotypes that constitute the business of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang. 
Thirdly, a focus on identity construction is provided through the analysis of a 
Vlaams Belang brochure which deals with the Turkish admission to the European 
Union. 
5. A visual analysis of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang's material 
5.1. The portrait 
Portraits are the most straightforward representations of identity (Schroeder, 2002). 
However, the superficiality of most portraits must be recognised: the subjects are 
usually smiling, touched up, well lit, and posing. They denote the gap between the 
way people are and the way they would like to appear. The ideology of portrait 
(Schroeder, 2002: 55) is about how one should be, and how one wants to be. 
perceived. 
The portrait analysed to illustrate this point is a joint picture of both Frank Vanhecke 
and Johan Demol, wearing suits and ties, smiling and looking directly toward the len. 
and seemingly towards the reader of the brochure (see Fig.I). On the right vertical 
there is a frame saying "Pour les Bruxellois", i.e. "for the Brusseleirs96". 
Fig.1 Vlaams Blok, Campaign brochure, June 2004: 1 
Frank Vanhecke (left) and Johan Demol (right) 
The size of the portrait is unusual enough to be mentioned here: the photograph of 
both men, shoulder to shoulder, occupies the whole page and is situated on the 
cover page, across the 'editorial' supposedly written by both politicians (see text in 
Appendix 5). It is a long way from the stereotypical representation of the extreme 
96 The inhabitants of 8ru el are referred to as the Brusseleir. (as u ed in Brus el ' old dialect), 
along ith th u e of Flemish or Flemings for the inhabitants of Flanders, and Walloon for the 
inhabitants of Wallonia. 
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right as thuggish, with faces deformed by hate (see photograph97 in Appendix 19, 
of Filip Dewinter, a top member of the Vlaams BlolvVlaams Belang, in a yiolent 
street action). Quite the contrary here, the politicians smile and look directly at the 
viewer. It is a cliche that the eyes are considered as the windows on the soul. Here 
lohan and Frank are attempting to bare their souls, looking straight at the camera, 
and inviting the viewers to trust them. And why shouldn't they? Their apparently 
frank and direct look, friendly smile and clean cut appearance oozes friendliness 
and honesty. The camera position places the viewer on a level with both men. The 
viewer is face-to-face with Frank Vanhecke and lohan Demol, who hold the gaze 
and 'look back'. Providing the photograph of the authors of the texts might have 
been intended to personalize the delivery of the party policy and give them a 
human face (in contrast to the party manifesto, dry and impersonal). The portraits 
seem to elicit credibility: they talk the talk and look the part. 
Similar interpretive processes can be used for the analysis of the group 
photographs of the party's representatives. The photographs of the 'employees' 
and members of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang, represent an element of the 
corporate identity. 
5.2. Group photographs - the corporate identity 
Corporate brand is closely linked to corporate identity (which represents the 
corporate brand). The corporate identity is the "ethos, aims and values of an 
97 See Geerts. N. (2004). hnp:!lwww.resistances.be/rinII19.htm. as accessed on 28/07/2007. 
photograph available in Appendix 19 
organisation, presenting a sense of individuality, which helps to differentiate it 
from its competitors" (Jobber, 2004: 299). The concept of corporate identity, 
which is, according to Gioia et al., (2004), a form of projected image, relates to the 
question of how the central idea of an organisation is presented to its various 
constituencies to achieve the corporation's strategic goals (Olins, 2002). 
According to Jobber (2004), a key element of corporate identity is its visual 
cohesion, which ensures that all corporate communications are consistent with 
each other, and results in a corporate image in line with the organisation's defining 
values and character. 
Corporate or organisational image is the way that organisation members believe 
others view the organisation (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991); or the way the 
organisational elites would like outsiders to see the organisation. This is known as 
the organisational reputation. Organisational reputation refers to outsiders' beliefs 
about what distinguishes an organisation (Bhattacharya and Elsbach, 2002; Dutton 
and Dukerich, 1991). Corporate identity and communication rely on 
photography's representational power to create salient, and strategic images 
(Schroeder, 2002: 162). 
For example, it is quite common for existing companies to undertake 're-imaging' 
by changing the nature of their activities and/or via their communications to make 
their activities/image more "what the customer expects", such as more ethically or 
technologically oriented (Muzellec, 2006). The objective of such re-imaging is to 
reduce the discrepancy between the perception of the outsiders and how the 
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insiders to the organisation "see themselves" (Gioia et aI., 2004). There are other 
options available to the elite of the organisation. The frrst option would be to do 
nothing if the discrepancies are not considered significant. The second option 
would be to highlight and emphasise the socially desirable aspects of the 
organisation's identity (and thus attempt to manipUlate outsiders' perceptions). In 
short, the organisation' managers could either change the way the outsiders 
perceive the organisation, or change the way the members of the organisation see 
themselves (Gioia et al., 2004). In the case of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang, 
there is some evidence that the party leaders chose to change the way people 
perceive the organisation, rather than changing the organisation itself, by changing 
the external perception of the party. For example, Filip Dewinter showed that the 
party leaders had no intention of changing the essence of the Vlaams Blok, when 
creating the Vlaams Belang: 
"We don't need a (V/aams Blok Light' or a (V/aams Blok Ultra', but a 
(V/aams Blok Plus!'. Indeed, our programme is not changing at all." (Filip 
Dewinter in TV programme Dag Allemaal 3) 
However, the party has been placed (partially by legislation) in the position of 
having to undertake a change in image: e.g. by reviewing their policy on 
immigration (e.g. the official discarding of the '70 propositions plan' to solve the 
problem of immigration), in order to appear to move from the extreme right to the 
conservative right. The necessary changes have been defined for public 
consumption as 'obligatory', but the comments made by the party leaders seem to 
reassure their followers that nothing has really changed. The organisation stayed 
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identical (same leaders, same structure, similar discourse), while the 'softening' of 
the image is changing people's perceptions of the Vlaams Blok, from an extreme 
right party to the Vlaams Belang, a right-wing conservative party. 
Group photographs: the unity o/the party 
This strategy might work. For illustration, one can note that there are many 
breaches to the cordon sanitaire in the Flemish media and that a majority of 
Flemings are in favour of removing the quarantine against the party. These might 
be indications that in Flanders, the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang is becoming a 
party like any other. The three following photographs (see Figs. 2, 3 & 4) are 
examined and discussed in relation to issues of representation and contribution to 
the corporate/organisational image of the party. 
Fig. 2 Vlaams Blok 
C mpaign brochure June 2004: Co er page 
2 
Fig. 3 Vlaams Belang 
Political Programme brochure "De Kracht van een Overtuiging,,98 , undated.: 10 
Vos deputes V.B. a Bruxelles {de gauche 0 dro,te}. 
Monique Moens, .los Van Assche, Greet Van Linler, Erland Pisan, Dominielc LooIens, 
Johan Demo/, Valerie 5eyns, Erilc Arclcens, Frederic Erens 
Fig.4 Vlaams Belang 
Group photograph in leaflet "Turkije in Europa? Neen!,,99 
9 Tran lation: The trength of a Con iction 
99 Turkije in Europa? een' mean 'Turkey in Europe? No' 
2 1 
All these group photographs represent a collection of different people. The third 
photograph could easily be interpreted as a family photograph (see Fig. 4), with 
the two women seated in mirrored positions, and a range of different age groups 
(with what looks like the oldest man, at the left, with his hand (protectively?) 
placed on the shoulder of one of the female representatives. They all are dressed 
up, made up, and smiling, gazing at the viewer (the lens of the camera). It is 
important to remember that these groups are staged and these people gathered for 
the purpose of the photograph. This is hardly a chance shot (see the table in the 
middle, or the twin chairs where the two women are seated). These posed and 
'unnatural' photographs contrast sharply with another type of photograph 
deployed in brochures by the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang which could be 
classified as belonging to the genre of 'photojournalism' or narrative image (Lister 
and Wells, 2001). Such contrasting photographs representing 'foreigners' in the 
Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's literature all belong to this category. The point of 
photojournalism is to find 'telling' photos, providing the opportunity for 
interpretive commentary (Lister and Wells, 2001). Interestingly, few of these 
photos have any commentary accompanying them, but rather general 'stories' or 
political speeches from the party representatives about a related topic (e.g. 
demonstrating people and the freedom of speech in Islam, see Fig. 5 for example). 
Favourable self-representation: the issue of power 
The issue of power and the representation of reality are important here. The 
rhetorical power of these photographs is tangible. Schroeder (2002) argues that 
photographs cannot be held as untrue - at least they have not been edited and 
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modified - thereby removing the responsibility of the marketer. Indeed, when one 
asserts or makes a claim 100, one takes responsibility for its truth and may 
legitimately be asked to produce evidence for the claims made (Blair, 2004). But 
images (photographs, cinematic or video images, paintings) do not seem, on the 
face of it, to be capable of being true or false (i.e. to have truth value) (Blair, 2004: 
44). Indeed, Blair (2004) argued that the images can be funny, clever, beautiful, 
but to call them true or false seems to be, at best, using a metaphor, and at worst, 
just inappropriate 101. 
In addition, photographs (especially in the genre of photojournalism) bear a strong 
resemblance to 'reality' (Schroeder, 2002). In other words, photographs hold a 
mimetic capacity for things in the real world (Lister and Wells, 2001). In this view, 
a photograph is a 'trace' or imprint of the real (Sontag, 1978), "because it can 
borrow and carry all of the sign systems and codes (dress, style, architecture, 
objects, body language, etc.) which together with speech, the written word, sound 
and smell, make the world meaningful" (Lister and Wells, 2001: 77). It would 
therefore be unwise to forget that photographs have been taken, selected and 
edited by individuals for specific purposes. The role of the researcher is to 
question the purposes and understand the context and circumstances of the 
production of those photographs. Who represents who and for what purpose? 
lOOFor example, claims such as "my products make you lose weight in 2 weeks" (see e.g. 
http://www.fitwise.coml2_Week_Diet.asp). or "The statistics are clear, he said, foreigners are f ~ u r r
times more likely to commit crimes than Swiss nationals" uttered by Dr SchUler, of the SWISS 
People's Party (in http://gnolu.romandie.comlpostl2197/81868) call for evidence to 'prove' their 
truthfulness. 
101 For example, in the Marlboro advertisement with the cowboy, there is no verbal claim about the 
'coolness' of smoking. One cannot take the photograph of the cowboy as untrue, because the 
meaning conveyed is not propositional. 
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Analysing the photographs representing 'foreigners' can provide some elements of 
an answer. 
5.3. Representation of the 'foreigners' 
In images from the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang literature. . foreigners' are 
represented as a mass of people (groups or a crowd demonstrating for example), 
immigrants, Muslims. Their consistent representation as congregating in large 
groups has the effect of negating their individuality (see for example, photographs 
7 and 8). This might be the visual equivalent of the verbal depiction of 
general(isable) features and stereotypes thus merging them into a coherent group. 
characterized by uniform physical characteristics and deviant behaviours. This 
illustrates the power differential between outsiders (the foreigners) and the Vlaams 
Blok/Vlaams Belang representatives. The power of the party is evident in the 
reification of foreigners and the facilitation of the gaze of the viewers and their 
'disidentification' from the objects of the gaze. Bhattcharya and Elsbach (2002: 33) 
have pointed out that dis identification is a way for people to preserve and enhance 
their self-concepts. Elsbach and Bhattcharya (2001) refer to a large amount of 
research (Dutton et al., 1994; Hogg and Abrams, 1988) which shows that at the 
individual level the identification with a favourable perceived social group 
enhances a person's self esteem; self distinctiveness and self-continuity. The way 
the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang presents itself seems to favour this positi\'e self-
identification with the organisation, in contrast with the disidentification with the 
foreigners, who are negatively represented. 
The photographs representing foreigners purport to show them as they 'truly' are 
and as they 'truly' behave, because photographs arguably ha\e the appearance of 
reality, and are often treated as 'evidence' of past events. as if they are the source 
of objective and disinterested facts (Lister and Wells, 2001). An interesting feature 
is that the subjects never seem to be aware that their photograph is being taken. No 
poses, no make up, no big smiles (as in the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang portrait 
and group photographs), and hence the classification of these photographs as 
'photojournalism'. These images are made to report on e\ents (Lister and Wells, 
2001), and they are characterized by the lack of apparent artifice or display of 
pictorial convention (set up, lighting). It is important because. as Lister and Wells 
(2001: 78) note, "the invisibility of convention seems to speak of photography's 
power to provide direct evidence of event". As a consequence. in its 
communication material, the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang holds the power to 
represent the others the way it wants, with the appearance of straightness, reality, 
and absence of theatricality (that is present in other kinds of photography such as 
advertising, art, or fashion (Lister and Wells, 2001)). 
In the same way that the foreigners do not have a voice in the party's discourse, 
they do not have a 'face' in the party's visual communication. In this scenario, 
foreigners are 'they', anonymous and de-individualised, stripped of what makes 
them unique individuals by their representation as a group. In contrast, the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang representatives are all unique individuals, with their names 
and positions clearly tagged (see photographs in Fig. 3 and 4). The notion of 
distance with the subject of the photographs is also important. For example. in the 
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photograph (see Fig. 5) below, the demonstrators are shot from a distance. while 
there is a superimposed portrait of Valerie Seyns, a Vlaams Belang Bru el 
deputy, in close-up and facing the viewer. The focus and distance (portrait 
photojoumalistic photograph; distant vs. close-up) contribute to this 'anonymity' 
of the foreigners and the dis identification of the viewer with the demonstrator 
and a potential identification (sympathy?) with the party representatives. 
mord on 'Ie o r > t ~ e n n e n n Oe d "vO!l' Men r time 
,slam 5 een Ideologle d,e 1'0 was'e l 
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Fig.5 Vlaams Belang 
Magazine 1: Brussels, My City Magazine, 2004: 4 
In the following photograph, also representing a group demonstrating - in this case, 
Vlaams Belang members - there is a different way of representing a group, as 
party members. 
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Fig.6 V1aams Belang-
In Political Programme brochure "De Kracht van een Overtuiging"I02 , undated.: 28 and 
also on cover page of the presentation brochure of V1aams Belang Youth, Choose 
Flanders!J03 
The difference between the demonstrations, and the ones with immigrants and 
other opponents to the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang, is their orderliness. In the 
photograph in Fig. 6, for example, the subjects are looking directly at the camera, 
in line, orderly and walking behind a banner. This is in strong contrast to the chaos, 
police presence, the green flag with Arabic letters, the racist chanting (as was 
described by a witness, see Appendix 12), the mostly non-white presence, and the 
veiled women. But once again, with the party demonstrators looking directly at the 
camera, it also shows the people's awareness of the presence of the camera, which 
is not the case in the photographs of the 'others' demonstrations. The following 
group photograph of the Vlaams Belang political bureau is also staged and its 
analysis also highlights the issues of individuality and gaze. 
102 Tran lation: The Strength of a Conviction 
103 laam 8elang Jongeren, Kiezen voor Vlaanderen!, Voorsetllingsbrichure Vlaam Belaog 
Jong ren 
2 
The Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang representatives as a team of professional 
Het ,.,til""'" 
Fig.7 Vlaams Belang (Political Bureau) 
"De Kracht van een Overtuiging"I04 , undated.: 7 
The party representatives belong to a team (see Fig.7), oot a herd or amorphous 
mass of unidentified elements. For example, from above, we know that No.1 is 
"Frank Vanhecke, Voorzitter (i.e. Frank Vanhecke, President); No.ll is "Philip 
Claeys, Hoodredacteur Vlaams Belang Magazine" (i.e. "Philip Claeys, Chief 
Editor of the Vlaams Belang Magazine"). The Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belaog's 
members face the viewers; hold their gaze, as opposed to the 'others' who are 
apparently unaware that they are the subject of the gaze. The viewers look at 
images of people (in the case of the foreigners demonstrating) who appear 
unaware of the presence of the camera and, by extension, the possibility of 
becoming the object of someone else's look. Thus, the viewer exerci e a 
controlling gaze (Lister and Wells, 2001: 84). Gaze is an important element in 
photographic analysis (Lister and Wells, 200 I). According to Schroeder (2002) 
the gaze implies a psychological relationship of power, in which the gazer i 
104 Tran lation: The trength of a Con iction 
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superior to the object of the gaze. Social positions and power relations must be 
considered in the analysis of the gaze (Lister and Wells, 2001). There is a 
difference of status between the one who gazes and the subject, e.g. the 'voyeurist' 
tourist gaze, the way men often look at women, and royalty gazing upon their 
subjects (Schroeder 2002; Lister and Wells, 2001). 
5.3.1. Identity Construction and Gaze 
Photographs have the power to construct identity. They construct the identity of 
both the viewers and the subjects photographed, without leaving them the option 
of negotiating their own identity. The people gazed upon are here significantly 
'different'; they are supposed to represent what the viewer is not, in order not to 
threaten the viewer's identity. The 'foreign subjects' do not face the viewer 
directly, and for some their facial features are barely apparent. The absence of 
'face' also contributes to their de-humanisation, and to the process of reification: 
which might help the viewers' identity construction and completely distance them 
from the object of their gaze. The discourse offered has to be decoded. But there is, 
as pointed out by Watson and Bargiela (1998), a forceful potential in the narrative 
for what they called the 'shaping of the receiver's subjectivity' and stance towards 
particular issue. The reader is invited to take an active decoder role, by helping the 
identification with subjects' position within the text (Hay, 1996; in Watson and 
Bargiela, 1998). In this case, it is the non-identification with the subjects that is 
aimed at: the viewer is a mere onlooker watching people/events from a distant 
location, with "the reassurance of otherness" (Lister and Wells. 2001: 86). 
Bailey and Hall (1992: 21) argue that within post-structuralist thinking, identity i 
unfixed (identities are floating, meaning is not fixed and uni ersally true at all 
times, for all people), and can only be articulated as a set of repre entation 
(Schroeder, 2002). In addition, Schroeder (2002) holds, there are sy tern of 
meaning and representational practices that do indeed anchor and fix images. Thi 
is why the notion of representation is important (Bailey and Hall, 1992). Image 
offer viewers an identity, through the meaning-giving process (Lister and Well , 
2001). 
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Fig. 8 Vlaams Blok 1 
Brochure 6: FeitenIRealites, May 2004: 8 
(for the translation of the text on the right, see Appendi 9) 
Foreigners are, in fact, constructed and packaged for the viewers' consumption. 
Every representation of identity has the potential to construct the way society 
represents those categories. For example, in the next photograph there i a crowd 
in a demonstration, with several women in the forefront. All except one are 
covered with Islamic dress (long dress and headscarves). The second woman from 
the left at the bottom of the photograph even wears the recognizable (for Belgian ) 
... 
Moroccan djellaba (a loose outer robe). These representations are recogni able for 
a viewer from Brussels, and represent nevertheless a stereotype of immigrant 
women (many wear the western dress, but not a single one has been photographed 
by the party photographer). 
Fig.9 Vlaams Belang 
Magazine 1: Brussels, My City Magazine, 2004: 5 
If one accepts that representation constructs reality, then the Vlaams BlokIVlaams 
Belang's representations are particularly problematic. They create a dichotomy 
within society, and this division might breed conflict. In the case of the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang' s discourse difference is not celebrated, it is presented as 
deviant and threatening. 
5.3.2. The exception: lone man in a street 
In most of the photographs in the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's communication 
material, foreigners were photographed in groups, part of a multitude 
( ub tantiating the claim that they are swamping the country, ee abo e 
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photographs, and also the 'people-praying-in-the-street' photographs ee Fig. 16 
and 17). This makes the following picture (see Fig.10) interesting: why i thi man 
singled out? The photograph represents a man walking in a street presumably in 
Brussels (Molenbeek is a commune of Brussels) if one reads the graffiti on the 
wall (translated as 'Molenbeek105 wishes you a good Ramadan '). There is a flag of 
Palestine tagged on the wall too and the street is dirty. Why is thi man 
photographed alone? This photograph is significant enough because, in addition to 
being in a Vlaams Blok brochure (Brochure 6: FeiteniRealites, May 2004: 9) it i 
the cover photograph (see Fig. 11) of a Vlaams Belang magazine (May 2005) 
titled "Staat in the Stad", i.e. "State in the City". 
Bruxelles complera bienf6, une rnojorite d ' ~ & i t r J n ~ ~ d'origine 
etrangete Q cause de Ia poIitique /axis'" des. portis trrxlihonnels. Tout 
cammenlafeur po/itique Ie conlinne: Ie drOl' de \/Ole des Mrangers 
causera un siHsme poIifique Q lruxelles. 
Fig. 10 Vlaams Blok 
Brochure 6: FeiteniReaiites, May 2004: 9 
lOS Molenb k i a commune of 8ru sel with a relati ely high concentration of immigrants. 
2 2 
Fig.II Vlaams Belang 
Magazine 5: 02/05/2005: cover page 
The graffiti on the wall could be read as a speech bubble in a comic, expressing 
the man's message to the reader. The wall and the street could also be interpreted 
as actors, subjects in this scenario, as is the man (who is faceless , once again), 
objectified, rendered as a symbol: he is also a feature of the street. 'Foreigners 
have claimed our street' could be the underlying message in this photograph. 
'State in the City' is the title of the brochure whose cover page represents the 
above mentioned photograph (see Fig. 11). The flag is a potent symbol of 
appropriation and the image of the coloniser planting his country's flag on claimed 
territories is a recognizable one. In this case, the street has been claimed a 
Palestinian! Arabic; it is dark, dirty, highlighting the consequences of such 
appropriation. In addition, the message is wishing Molenbeek (not the Mu lim 
Molenbeek inhabitants, but the whole of Molenbeek), a good Ramadan (the 
Muslim holy month). This could be an indication that the commune i already 10 t 
to us . The text (see Appendix 9) accompanying the photograph confirm (and 
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guides) this interpretation, as it claims that Brussels will soon have a majority of 
foreigners, and there are already neighbourhoods where it does not dare intervene. 
In short, this photograph could be seen as representing a window on the future of 
Brussels, if things do not change (i.e. if the party does not reach power). 
5.4. A perfect place, in a perfect world: the Vlaams Blok's Brussels 
On the same theme of the future of Brussels, there are two photographs of les 
Galeries Royales Saint-Hubert (see Fig. 12), and Brussels' Grand Place (see Fig. 
13). Interestingly, there is not a single 'brown face' in those photographs taken on 
a sunny day in the old picturesque tourist area of Brussels. In the picture (Fig.I3), 
there is, in the background, a flower market, old restaurants and buildings, which 
are recognisable trademarks of Brussels Grand Place (town square). In the 
foreground, there is an elderly couple taking a walk, others seems to be buying 
flowers. In Fig. 12, there are people on a cafe terrace having drinks and a couple of 
elderly passers-by enjoying an ice-cream. This scene contrasts sharply with the 
photographs illustrating 'Multicultural Brussels?!" which represent 'foreigners' 
(women with headscarves and bearded men; crowds demonstrating, see Fig. 5 for 
example). The sign-board of Brussels Great Mosque is clearly visible in the top 
right-hand comer (see Fig. 8). Mosques being unambiguously a place of worship 
for Muslims, multiculturalism is linked to the open, visible presence of Islam in 
Belgium. Islam is one of the three religions recognised by the Belgian state, and to 
the stereotypical images of Muslims as being dark-skinned bearded men, and/or 
veiled women. 
244 
OJ 
(/) 
(/) 
2 
CD 
t-
o 
o 
> 
-Q) ~ ~
c: 
c.. 
~ ~
m 
Fig.12 Vlaams Blok 
Brochure 6: FeitenJRealites, May 2004: 22 
Fig.13 Vlaams Blok 
Brochure 6: FeitenJRealites, May 2004: 23 
The two previous photographs (see Fig. 12 and 13) have been included in a 
Vlaams Blok brochure (May 2004) and represent the 'alternative for Brussels' (a 
says the vertical caption, page 22, see Fig. 12: 'Een Alternatie! voor Bru el ). 
The two photographs would not be out of place in a tourist brochure marketing the 
chann of Brussels. The frame of the photograph is 'panoramic and in contra t 
2 ~ ~
with the style and frame of the other photographs (especially the ones representing 
the dereliction and dirtiness of Brussels, see for example Fig. 10 and 11). They arc 
in soft focus, following the convention of the representation of dreams in 
photographs and movies. This represents the promise of the party: Brussels as it 
should be, the Brussels of "our dreams". This is also a photograph of Brussels as it 
was at the exact second when the pictures were taken. This dreamlike Brussels 
therefore 'existed'. This brings in the concept of nostalgia, and the glorification of 
a mythical past that could be reproduced again if the right conditions are created 
(i.e. the party in power; foreigners sent back to their home countries). There are no 
coloured faces in the picture - which is an aberration, since both pictures have 
been taken in two highly touristic areas of Brussels. This highlights once again the 
role (and power) of the photographer in choosing the right place, time, subject and 
scene. Photographs serve as a screen onto which consumers project their own 
wishes, desires, identity and values. This is also true for the Vlaams BloklVlaams 
Belang. The photographs might well be interpreted as expressing the essence of 
the party, i.e. ethnic homogeneity, order, and 'what we are not' (immigrants, 
Muslims, disorderly). 
5.5. Othering - the issue of identity and the Turkish question 
This section provides a visual analysis of a Vlaams Belang brochure which 
documents what could be called the visual construction of difference. This 
brochure 106 (see Appendix 15) has been selected for its identity-related and 
106 Find the brochure at: http://www.\!aamsbelang.orgJindex.php,?p=24&id=2. or for the PDf 
fonnat of the brochure: http://w\,,,'W.\laamsbelang.org/files/brochure turkijc .pdf 
emotional content. It presents the arguments of the Vlaams Belang against Turkish 
admission to the EU. The most interesting feature is that the arguments set out by 
the party are not just verbal but also visual, as is demonstrated in the following 
section. The focus is on identity issues linked to the highly sensitive topic of EU 
enlargement. This is a key political factor for not only the extreme right party and 
its sympathisers, but also for large portions of the Belgian and European 
populations. 
5.5.1. Context 
Turkey first applied to join the EEC in 1959. In 2005, European and Turkish 
leaders officially commenced EU membership talks. Although political elites in 
most European countries have applied pressure to facilitate the Turkish 
negotiations, the opinion of their electorates is clearly unfavourable to such 
enlargement. Across Europe the support for Turkey's admission is not 
overwhelming. According to a Eurobarometer 107 poll (May/June 2005), the 
average support of European citizens for Turkish admission is a little above 
35% 108. The problems predicted as arising from Turkish membership can be 
categorised as economic and cultural. First, Turkey has a population of 70 million 
and the likely increased arrival of cheap labour in the most developed countries of 
the EU is worrying many (especially when one takes into account the fact that EU 
countries are still trying to deal with the arrival of highly skilled and cheap labour 
107 A survey that measures public opinion in the European Union 
108 With the lowest level of support in Austria (10%) and the highest in Hungary (just over 51%) 
(Eurobarometer poll (May/June 2005). 
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from the new Eastern European members). In addition, the so-called cost of 
admission of new countries (e.g. agricultural subsidies) is forecast to be 
phenomenally high for Turkey should it achieve membership. Second, in \\'estern 
Europe (mainly Germany, Austria, and France), European identity is tightly linked 
to Christianity and, although Turkey is nominally a secular state, its population is 
mainly Muslim. There is also the fear of a 'clash of civilisations' bet\\'een the 
West and Islam arising from a supposedly insurmountable clash of values 
(recently highlighted by some commentators after the Danish "cartoons crisis"). 
The negotiations for Turkish admission are considered important and relevant 
enough for the Vlaams Belang to produce a brochure, posters, leaflets, an online 
'Dossier' file (see www.vlaamsbelang.org), and even a book, Turkf!Y: een Brug Ie 
Ver" (i.e. "Turkey: a Bridge Too Far") written by Philip Claeys and Koen Dillen, 
who are both Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang representatives at the EP and co-
authors of the brochure analysed in the next section. Party members present their 
arguments against Turkey'S admission consistently across the range of its different 
communication material. The next section is dedicated to the analysis of a 
partiCUlar Vlaams Belang brochure which has been distributed at a national level 
(in the three regions: Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels, in French and Dutch), and 
is also available on the Vlaams Belang's website. 
This brochure is, interestingly, not blatantly xenophobic or discriminatory (since 
the party has watered down the former Vlaams Blok's inflammatory discoursd. 
However, the most interesting aspect is what is nol said. After the condemnation 
of the Vlaams Blok for racism, the Vlaams Belang is under close watch by 
opponents, and is now choosing its words carefully. Pictures, unlike textual or 
verbal statements, cannot be described as untrue. Because images cannot be 
empirically verified, or labelled true or false (Borgerson and Schroeder, 2005), the 
party can use pictures to provide (and support) its arguments against Turki h 
membership. 
5.5.2. The Visual Construction of Difference 
The brochure in question includes two images (drawings) and seven photograph . 
The analysis is focussed mainly on the pictures, emphasising the form of politic 
of identity noted earlier in the discourse analysis of the brochure. 
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Fig. 15 Vlaams Belang 
Turkey: not a European Nation 
( cover page) 
The cover page (see Fig.I5) contains the heading: Turkey: geen Europese Natie 
(i.e. 'Turkey: not a European Nation') and a European flag, with one of the stars 
replaced by the crescent and star of the Turkish flag. The brochure thus begins 
with a strong visual image to support the 'caption', indicating that Turkey is not 
European. This visual element is reinforced by the first page of the brochure, 
representing people praying in a street (see Fig. 16). 
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Fig. 16 Vlaams Belang 
Turkey: not a European Nation, undated, page 1 
This first picture, which is literally the first message of the party after the cover 
page, provides a powerful visual message. It shows people praying in a street. The 
position of people in the prayer (bowing low) is significant: they do not pray like 
'us-Christians', which emphasises the religious difference. In addition, the 
synchronised positions of the worshippers show a form of order that could remind 
one of military parades: they are a little army already living in our country (this 
interpretation is guided by a former comparison in a Vlaams Blok newsletter 
distributed in 2004, where gangs of African youngsters were described as a 'little 
army'). The faces of the people are not visible, but rather embarrassingly their 
rears (interpretable as insulting the reader?). 
In marketing, pictures are carefully constructed for rhetorical effect. The form of 
the photographs refers to how the subject matter is represented (Schroeder, 2006). 
This particular picture shows a sea of people. It reinforces stereotypes: ' they' 
invade the streets, 'they' are blocking the traffic (by praying on the road) which 
could also refer to the following quotations from the brochure (see Appendix 14): 
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"uncontrollable and unbridled immigration", "militant and intolerant Islam", 
Turkey wanting Europe to "become a Muslim club". 
The fact that no written comment accompanies the picture is an indication that the 
pictures speak for themselves, are telling a story and might support the written 
content of the brochure. In contemporary marketing communications, images 
claim centre stage, says Schroeder (2005). It seems that it is the case in this 
brochure. The absence of direct captions to the picture leaves room for 
interpretation and guess work about the location of where the photograph was 
taken. This vagueness reinforces the rhetorical power of the picture. The street 
represented in the photograph could be in Flanders, Belgium, or anywhere in 
Europe. This might be taken as implying that the situation is identical across 
Europe, in any city, in any country. Similarly the reader is left to guess when the 
picture might have been taken. It does not provide any clues as to why people were 
praying in the street. Is it for a Muslim festival when common prayer is the most 
popular and brings the biggest attendance (and because of the lack of space, some 
mosques cannot accommodate everybody)? Or is it for the weekly Friday prayer? 
Or is it a scene that could be witnessed daily? The choice of taking a picture at this 
particular place seems no accident. 'Bazaar Mecca', the name of a shop in that 
street, embodies this idea of bazaar (' bazar' is used in BelgianlBrussels slang to 
describe disorder) and Mecca, the Islamic holy city in Saudi Arabia where millions 
of Muslim pilgrims gather every year for the Haj, which might imply that little 
Meccas already exist in Europe. But it also carries the image of a particularly 
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conservative and rigid fonn of Islam, especially for women in Saudi Arabia, all of 
which, it is implied, are being imported to 'our streets' . 
It is interesting to note that a similar photograph (see Fig.I7) was used for the 
cover of a brochure from the Vlaams Blok on the theme of immigration, Stop 
immigratie! (i.e. Stop Immigration!). According to Helmers and Hill (2004), one 
of the ways to communicate with people is through intertextuality, the recognition 
and referring of images from one scene to another. The viewer is active in the 
process of constructing a reference (Helmers and Hill, 2004: 5). In this ca e, it is 
via an already 'known' or 'seen' picture 109. 
Fig.17 Vlaams Blok 
Stop Immigration, undated 
This illustrates well that pictures say more than words: they link the Vlaam 
Belang's discourse in the brochure on Turkey to the Vlaams BlokNlaam Belang 
109 I am not arguing that all iewers have een both photograph, but rather trying to. illu trate th 
i ting int rt tuality. The Vlaam Belang' di cour e feeds on the laam Blok dl ourse and 
imagery. 
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core ideology of anti-immigration and Islamophobia 110 where Filip Dewinter, 
quoted in Jewish Week - 28/ 10105 said: ""Xenophobia" is not the word / H'Oll/d 
use. If it absolutely must be a "phobia " let it be "/s/amophobia "). 
5.5.3. The representation of women in the brochure 
The following picture (see Fig. 20 below) represents five people presumably 
outside a mosque in Turkey: four women and one man. All women are wearing 
western clothes, but they are also all wearing the Islamic headscarf. They ha e 
their back to the viewer, unaware that their photograph is being taken and they 
seem to be waiting outside a closed door. This again has a strong visual impact. In 
the context of the brochure thela story being told by the Vlaams Belang, i that 
Turkey (Turks) is waiting for the doors of the EU to open (e.g. "Europe IS door 
will then be open to uncontrollable and unbridled immigration "). 
Fig. 18 Vlaams Belang 
Turkey: not a European Nation, 2005: 9 
Fig. t 9 Vlaams Belang 
'Turkey in Europe: No!', 2005: 9 
Fig.20 Vlaams Belang 
Turkey in Europe: 0, 2005: 9 
110 
.filipdewinter.orglpage.php?linkID=238 
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The two following photographs (see Fig. 19 and 20) represent women wcaring 
headscarves, and a man wearing a long coat, and a cap. It seems that both pictures 
might have been taken in a European country (clue: the arches). This time. the 
arched doors are open, and the people are facing the reader and moving a\vay from 
the doors, maybe implying the way that some of them have already found a path 
and gained admission. In Fig. 20, a group of women (all wearing headscarvcs and 
long coats), are standing in the street (outside what appears to be the same arch) 
apparently waiting for someone, maybe implying that more are still to come. 
Representational choices revolve around issues of exclusion of certain identity 
groups, portrayed social roles, stereotypical depictions, and categorization into 
types. These representational variables often combine to produce epistemically 
closed portrayals (Borgerson and Schroeder, 2005). Van Leeuwen (2000: 314) 
identified several strategies of visual racism. Visual racism involves issues of 
"othering", exclusion and stereotyping (including not just negative cultural 
depictions, but also, as Borgerson and Schroeder (2005) explain, showing certain 
people as homogenous groups without distinguishing individual characteristics and 
differences). In the brochure, Turks are depicted as different: a bearded man is 
wearing a long coat and a cap. and women are wearing headscarves. if not a full 
veil covering the whole body and leaving only the eyes visible. In the three 
pictures where women are represented, they are all wearing the Islamic headscarf. 
In the picture with all male subjects, they are shown praying. It might have been 
otherwise difficult to portray Muslim men by appearance alone; therefore they had 
to be represented in an act of worship directly recognisable as Islamic. This 
highlights the visibility of Muslim people, and Muslim women in particular. The 
party has produced here a representation of a group to be consumed by readers. 
The images reproduce cultural differences (e.g. different prayers and different 
dress). It is interesting to reflect on the role of the photographs in this brochure. 
Are the photographs the 'supporting act' of the text, or do they stand alone, able to 
put across the Vlaams Belang's point of view? The images in the brochure show 
pictures of people from marginalised minorities. These images reproduce cultural 
differences (e.g. they don't pray like us and they impose their different ways on 
us). It is plain that all Muslims are not fanatics, but by showing random Muslim 
people a link is created to the current discourse on a threatening Islam gaining 
ground across the world, and specifically in Europe 
5.5.4. Is it all about Islam? 
By linking Turkey with an Islamic identity via the pictures the Vlaams Belang 
seems to be highlighting its core objection to Turkish membership of the EU, i.e. 
Islam and the culturaVreligious differences which (in the Vlaams Belang's 
argument) do not have a place within Europe. Even if the text had constructed 
other arguments of a political and socio-economic nature, it seems that the story 
indicated by the visual cues of the brochure points to another issue, deemed 
important by the Vlaams Belang, the issue of the 'Islamic threat'. Filip Dewinter 
(28110105, in Jewish Week) shared his view: "Yes, we're afraid of Islam. The 
Islamisation of Europe is a frightening thing". The map of Europe (see Fig.21) in 
the brochure provides support for this view. 
Fig.21. Vlaams Belang 
Turkey: not a European Nation, 2005: 11 
Half of the page represents a map of Europe, where some of the crescents of the 
Turkish flag (the crescent is also the symbol of Islam) are spreading across Europe. 
The countries of the EU have a yellow star and are coloured blue (remini cent of 
the European flag). The Turkish flag might also have had a star, but it i the 
crescents that are spreading, highlighting the infiltration (invasion) of the Islamic 
symbol, the real threat for the Vlaams Belang. The underlying message could be 
interpreted as one where the party is rejecting Islam, via opposition to Turkish 
membership. 
The textual analysis of the brochure shows that the content is interestingly 
'unpolemical'. The Vlaams Belang has watered down the former Vlaams Blok's 
inflammatory discourse, and actually provides in the brochure arguments and 
theses defended by many mainstream politicians across Europe. The photos are a 
priori unproblematic too. However, what is most interesting is what is not said. 
Keeping that in mind, the visual elements of the brochure might 'tell more torie ' 
than the text. 
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6. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the synthesis of the visual analysis of a selection of 
images (mainly photographs) from the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's publications. 
The analysis in this chapter has focussed first on the Vlaams BlokYlaams 
Belang's use of the two most significant 'people' photographs: the indiyidual 
portraits of the leaders and the group images of the Vlaams B 10k! Vlaams Belang' s 
hierarchy. These representations contribute to the image of the party as constituted 
by individuals 'like you and I' and of the party as a tight group, as a team of 
competent individuals. This was contrasted with the representation of the 'others'. 
The contrast is at its most vivid when comparing 'undesirable' others (immigrants 
and Muslims), represented as a group, unorganized and with deviant behaviour 
(e.g. praying in the streets, demonstrating, wearing different clothing), with the 
orderly and clean cut members and supporters of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang. 
One could easily infer that the visual imagery of the party, mirroring the textual 
elements analysed in the previous chapter, constructs a world where 
multiculturalism is absent. The photographs never depict foreigners and Flemings 
in the same frame. What must be read in photographs is as much presence as 
absence. The absence of the members of one group (foreigners) in images 
representing the other (native Belgians) is significant: they belong to two separate 
worlds represented in the party's visual communication. The only photograph 
where a 'white' presence was noted in 'other' pictures was in a demonstration, and 
it was a policeman (i.e, the need to police 'them', to control 'them', see 
photograph 4). This representation is consistent with the party's underlying 
discourse which states that multiculturalism IS a failure and undesirable (see 
previous chapter). 
The CDA of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang's brochures has highlighted 
dimensions of the party's discourse, along with the visual representation of 
'others'. The visual and textual together provide an opportunity for the party to 
present itself in a favourable way (i.e. the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang is the only 
party defending people's interests). This chapter has illustrated how \'isual 
arguments come to support the description of, and the arguments of, the Vlaams 
Blok and Vlaams Belang, for example in favour of a divided world - the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang world - where differences are problematic, undesirable, 
sources of conflict, chaos and disorder. Images worked as support for the verbal, 
but also transcend the verbal meaning. They allow the bypassing of censorship. 
This well-crafted and persuasive discourse and its representation, is gaining 
acceptance through an almost imperceptible adoption in mainstream political 
discourse, with potentially damaging effects on the international scene (e.g. 
immigration is a key theme, and even has its own conference). Images, as was 
pointed out at the start of this chapter, are important in marketing and branding. 
The centrality of the image for marketing and politics, briefly tackled in this 
chapter, is explored in further detail in the next chapter in relation to marketing 
strategy, branding and the identity-building enterprise of the Vlaams Siok and 
Vlaams Belang. Having tackled the Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Selang's discourse 
(textual, in chapter 5) and visual (chapter 6) and demonstrated: I) the 
persuasiveness of the discourse, its complexity and internal coherence: 2) the 
1"8 
-,) 
appropriateness of CDA to analyse populist and marketing discourse at the micro-
level was demonstrated. Marketing and branding are the objects of the next 
chapter, which attempts to understand how the party attempts to control its 'side' 
of the equation (i.e. its persuasiveness and marketing techniques). 
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Chapter 8: The Marketing Strategy of the Vlaams Blok 
and the Vlaams Belang 
1. Introduction - The Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang and marketing 
This thesis started with the premise that political parties and politicians US\? 
marketing to achieve their political goals and connect with voters but, in doing so, 
appear to borrow marketing tools and concepts in an ad hoc and instrumental 
fashion. As marketing is increasingly adopted by political parties (O'Shaughnessy. 
1990), it is moving beyond influencing only tactical matters of communication and 
presentation, towards playing a significant role in policy formulation and long-
term direction (Butler and Collins, 1996). After the discourse-historical analysis 
which focussed on the linguistic, semantic and strategic elements of the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang' s discourse, this chapter moves on to the next level of 
analysis with the exploration of the marketing orientation of the Vlaams Blok and 
the Vlaams Belang, and more specifically aims to highlight the marketing strategy 
of the party as observed/extrapolated from the party's behaviour in Belgium's 
political market. The relevance of image in marketing, in branding literature, but 
also in politics prompts the enquiry into those fields. The question of whether or 
not the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang uses marketing to enhance its political 
effectiveness was assumed from: I) from the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang leaders' 
stance on this issue: and 2) the observation of the party's behaviour. 
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The position the party leaders on political marketing 
Since 1991, the party has employed the service of professionals to develop its 
advertising campaigns and create memorable slogans III associated with 
recognisable symbols (Bossemans, 2001; Vander Velpen, 1992). Officially, the 
party has never worked with any advertising agency, except for the purchase of 
advertising space and boards. In 2004, Filip Dewinter [mally admitted that: 
ItI am the head of a campaign group of 13 people. Among them, there are 
three employees of well-known advertising agencies, who are members of 
our party, and have helped for free to set up campaigns. Who they are, I 
can't say. It would cost them their jobs" (in Het Belang van Limburg l12, 
17/0312004: 4) 
Throughout the last few years' campaIgns, the party leaders have adopted an 
ambiguous position on the issue of marketing. Although party leaders have 
internally advocated the use of political marketing to their local candidates, they 
have publicly adopted an attitude of distaste for the use of 'spin doctors' by other 
political parties. Nevertheless, their adherence to marketing is assumed in this 
thesis, based on the following quotation by Filip Dewinter 113, which 
unambiguously illustrates the Vlaams Blok's active marketing orientation: 
111 There were for example: in 1991, boxing gloves and a "Self-defence" slogan; or in 1999, a 
family and "Boss in one's land', a broom and "Grote Kuis", i.e. "Big Cleaning up"; in 1999, a 
family and "Baas in eigen land", i.e. "Boss in one's land"; a kid pointing a finger and ''Thuis zijn", 
i.e. "at home". These slogans have always been used in combination to the well-known party 
slogan "Eigen Yolk Eerst", i.e. "One's own people first". 
112 Local Flemish newspaper (in the Flemish province of Limburg) 
1 \J Brochure: Politieke Communicatie-Technieken, Deel 1. De persoonlijke campagne van de 
kandidaat. Vlaams Blok Publications. (Translation: Political communication techniques - Part I: 
The personal campaign of the candidate) 
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"Marketing comes from the study of the needs of consumers, and from this 
follows the production of resources which could satisfy those needs. A 
company must study first the needs of its consumers and adapt its 
production according to those needs. Political marketing broadly follows 
the same line of thought. " 
Filip Dewinter justifies the utilisation of marketing strategy by explaining that: 
"Political marketing is a global project with which the candidate can 
organize well his or her political activities. The VB is choosing without a 
doubt an anti-demagogic practice, with which we have so often tried to be 
the voice of the people". 
Filip Dewinter simultaneously stresses here the importance of marketing as 
political instrument, and rejects the accusation of manipulation, spin and 
demagogic practices that could be associated with the use of marketing in politics 
(see Baines and Egan 2001; Scammell, 1995, Newman, 1994; Sabato, 1981). 
There is also considerable evidence (see Bosseman 114, 2001) supporting the 
observation that the party does use marketing, or at least marketing 
communication techniques (as in Bosseman's (2001) research), to enhance its 
political appeal. 
Observation of the party's behaviour 
After the previous chapters' emphasis on the discourse-historical analysis of 
discourse and on persuasion (chapters 6 and 7), this chapter offers some 
explanations about what could be called a different characterisation of persuasion 
which would focus on marketing. Since persuasion lies at the heart of marketing, 
114 Bosseman (2001) examined the evolution of the Vlaams Blok's positioning, targeting and 
messages from 1977 to 2000. 
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an analysis of the party behaviour, more specifically on marketing positioning. 
segmentation and targeting, and branding provides an additional understanding of 
the party's discourse of persuasiveness. Branding and positioning are often 
discussed with reference to one another and they represent the main focus of the 
following pages. First, the relevance of branding to political parties is critically 
assessed. Second, an overview of useful concepts from consumer marketing and 
service marketing is provided. This is followed by the assessment of the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang's marketing strategy and behaviour in the political market 
2. Branding and politics 
White and de Chematony (2001) argue that success in an overcrowded market 
depends on effective brand differentiation. Noble (2006) supports this and argues 
that a product or service must be differentiated from similar offerings on the 
market. Brand differentiation is based on the identification, internalisation and 
communication of unique brand values to consumers (White and de Chematony, 
2001). Powerful brands communicate their values through every point of contact 
they have with consumers (Cleaver, 1999). In commercial marketing, managers 
interpret brands as positioning devices, i.e. something that customers will instantly 
associate with particular functional benefits (de Chern atony and McDonald, 1992). 
However, customers may interpret a brand differently from what is i n t e n d ~ d d by the 
managers. An organisation needs to 'fine-tune' the brand until there is a better 
alignment of the intended positioning and the resultant consumers' positioning, by 
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focussing on functional benefits that are valued by the consumers, rather than 
those valued by the managers (de Chematony and McDonald, 1992). 
Similarly for political brands, Schneider (2004) argues that political brands should 
create a large a differentiation as possible from the products of competitors. 
Significantly, in political branding, long-tenn positioning strategy for the leader 
and party are very important because brands in politics take time to establish but 
can collapse very quickly (Harris and Lock, 2001: 953). In the previous paragraphs 
the existence of political brands is assumed and seems unquestioned. However. 
this is yet another point of contention in political marketing literature, which 
deserves addressing. 
2.1. Political brands: do they actually 'exist'? 
Branding has been established as an important strategic activity of corporations, 
but it is also increasingly relevant to the management of political parties. There is 
however, a lack of discussion on branding in political literature (Needham, 2006). 
Schneider (2004) also notes that the political marketing literature has not 
considered branding as much as it should have done, even if "there are numerous 
indicators not only for the existence of political brands, but also for their relevance 
to party and voter perspectives" (Schneider, 2004: 43). When the intangible 
aspects of political appeal are tackled, a rather narrow focus is put on image and 
reputation (Needham, 2006). The brand is equated with party name, and used as a 
descriptive tem1 rather than as an explanatory variable with strategic implications 
(Smith, 2001; Lock and Harris, 1996; ScammelL 1991). These narrow perspectives 
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overlook the fact that brand building and brand management are, as argued by 
Smith (2001), fundamental tasks in the strategic management of political parties 
(Kotler and Kotler, 1999; Schweiger and Adami, 1999; Kavanagh, 1995). 
Following this line of thought, Needham (2006) advocates a broader consideration 
of branding to improve the understanding of political decision-making and repeat 
purchase at election time. For example, according to Swyngedouw et al. (2004). 
the Vlaams Blok has the most loyal electorate in Flanders and. more generally, 
Rensmann (2003) notes that most extreme right parties have doubled their 
electoral turnout over the last two decades turning neff voters into loyal voters. A 
branding perspective might explain these high levels of political loyalty, since 
consumer loyalty development is a key issue in brand building. 
Brand as an explanatory variable for voters' behaviour 
Needham (2006) also adopts the view that brand-based analyses of politics help 
explain how voters make decisions in an environment of infonnational complexity. 
Brands enable people to routinely decide in the vast array of available choices, 
instead of repeating a complex decision making process (Maathuis et at.. 2004). 
This is also true in the political arena, and particularly true during political 
campaigns and at election time, when voters are overwhelmed by political 
messages. As a way of coping with the flood of infonnation, consumers build over 
time a pool of brand alternatives, and brands have been seen as playing an 
important role in creating customer value (Keller, 1998: 1993, in Smith. 2001). In 
politics. the value-generation dimension of brands leads to the proyision of value 
for the voter in the fonn of greater loyalty to a party and competitiyc advantage 
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(Smith, 2001: 991). This greater loyalty is supposed to lead to increased 
partisanship amongst the electorate. Image, however, provides value to the 
customer by enhancing the interpretation and the processing of information about 
the party and increasing confidence in their voting decision (Aaker, 1991). 
Image 
Some commentators have noted that, in politics, image seems more important than 
issues. For example, in Smith's (2001) analysis of voting behaviour for the ~ O O O 1 
British General Election, there was evidence that image is a greater detem1inant 
than the parties' policies. If voters do not know what the issues are, the projected 
image of the party or leader acts as a facilitator in the choice between different 
alternatives. According to Kotler and Kotler (1999), political candidates must 
build an appealing image and appealing messages, in addition to increasing 
visibility. For electoral success, the candidate or political party must be positioned 
in relation to their opponents and then build an image, a campaign concept and a 
set of policies. Therefore, images, but also issues of branding and positioning, 
assume a central role in this chapter. In addition, the stance taken here vis-a-\'is the 
debate about the relevance of marketing in politics is that marketing orientation, 
strategies and techniques have considerable relevance to the understanding of 
contemporary political parties' behaviour and actions. 
ldent(fied objections 
This view is not unproblematic. For example, Newman (1994) and Luck (1969, in 
Smith, 2001) oppose the view that political candidates and political parties arc 
brands. ln their view, parties could not be considered as brands because they are 
not remotely susceptible to advertising in the way commercial brands are 
(supposedly advertising has no effect on the outcome of an election). According to 
Smith (200 I), politicians cannot use television, radio or advertising to enhance 
positive or offset negative image dimensions as and when they would like. E\'en if 
political parties do adopt the 'manifestations' of brands such as logo, corporate 
looks, music and strap lines, they are not brands (Smith, 2001). These arguments 
rejecting the existence (or relevance) of political brands seem relatively weak and 
could not be used to dismiss the examination of branding relevance in political 
contexts. According to Kotler and Kotler (1999), marketing strategy is at the heart 
of electoral success: "political targets justify brand marketing in a political 
environment without any doubt" (Schweiger and Adami, 1999). Schweiger and 
Adami (1999) are not alone here. According to White and de Chematony (2001), a 
political party, despite the difficulty of defining its marketplace, can consider itself 
as a brand. Schneider (2004: 41) also argues that "political parties and their key 
representatives presumably fulfil the main criteria of impact-oriented brand as a 
firmly anchored, consistent perceptual image in the mind of voters". Schneider 
(2004) argues that political brands hold an important place in the voters' decision 
process. ln short, the existence of political branding is assumed in this research, 
and with this assumption, a careful acceptance of relevant concepts from consumer 
branding literature is useful to illuminate the enquiry. 
2.2. Commercial brands: useful theoretical concepts 
Having accepted the existence of branding, it is necessary to detennine what is 
meant by the concept of branding in this thesis. There is an extant strand of 
branding literature (see Noble, 2006; Jobber, 2004; de Chematony and Dall 'Olmo 
Riley, 1998; Chematony and McDonald, 1992, among others) containing a \\'ealth 
of theories, concepts and definitions for branding in a commercial context. This 
needs to be explored further for its potential explanatory power for political 
branding. In order to resolve the tension identified in the previous section 
(between political brands and consumer brands), it is important to explore the 
commercial brand literature to seek useful concepts with the potential to explain 
processes and behaviours observed in the political marketplace. 
'Brand' is an important concept in marketing literature and in issues related to 
marketing management. In the marketplace, brands are very potent. They can 
evoke strong emotions and command high levels of loyalty (Noble, 2006). For 
example, the Harley Davidson brand enjoys a real cult following across the world, 
with many afficionados even having their limbs tattooed with the brand logo. 
Brand is defined here as a "distinctive product offering created by the use of a 
name, symbol, design, packaging, or some combination of these intended to 
differentiate it from its competitors" (Jobber, 2004: 299). In other words, a brand 
is a multidimensional construct, involving the blending of functional and 
emotional values which (should) appear relevant to consumers in tenns of 
perfonnance and psychosocial needs (de Chernatony and Dall'Olmo Riley, 1998). 
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One of the goals of brand management is indeed to make a brand unique in 
dimensions that are both relevant and desired by consumers (de Chematony and 
McDonald, 1992). 
Based on a review of literature and interviews with brand consultants, de 
Chematony and Dall'Olmo Riley (1998) provided a variety of interpretations of 
brands. They classified those interpretations in three categories: 1) an input-based 
• 115 (. h . perspective l.e. t e way managers drrect resources to influence consumers); 2) 
an output-based perspective (i.e. the consumers' interpretations); and 3) a time-
based perspective (i.e. brand as dynamic entities evolving to meet environmental 
situations) (de Chematony and McDonald, 1992: 52). de Chematony and 
McDonald (1992) argue that unless both input and output perspectives of brands 
are sustained, the outcomes are likely to be an unbalanced strategy and a weak 
brand. In this view, consumers are conceived as actors in the branding process, and 
brand management should be about minimising the gap between the 'intended' 
brand delivered by managers, and the consumers' perceptions of the brand. This 
section of the thesis focusses on the organisation's perspective, or 'intended' 
liS Different interpretations of 'brand' are: in the input perspective: logo; legal instrument; 
company; shorthand; risk reducer; positioning; personality; cluster of values; vision; adding value; 
identity. In the output perspective: image; relationship. In the time perspective: evolving entry (de 
Chematony and McDonald (1992: 19». 
116 The study of the 'output perspective' (i.e. the consumers' or voters' perceptions) of the brand is 
interesting and should provide a holistic understanding of a particular political brand. However, the 
access to extreme right voters and sympathisers is extremely difficult, which would infonn the 
'output' perspective of brand, is impossible for most researchers (Mudde, forthcoming; Art, 2006), 
let alone a Muslim woman. 
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Service brands 
In chapter 3 (see p. 48), political parties were conceptualised as service providers. 
Newman (1994) has argued strongly for this perspective noting that political 
marketing shares similarities with specialised services (see Marland (2003) and 
Kotler (1975)). Therefore, in order to narrow down the analysis of branding 
literature, the focus here is on service branding. If de Chernatony (2001) argues 
that there is no need to develop a different theory for services branding, he 
nevertheless calls for the adjustment of existing goods branding theories to the 
case of services (de Chernatony 2001). From the case studies conducted by de 
Chernatony (2001), it appears that branding is even more important for services, 
because consumers have no tangible attributes with which to assess the brand. In 
addition, it is more difficult to communicate the values of a services brand 
(perhaps not as much for political brands, because voters expect political parties to 
stand for a set of values). The basis of a strong service brand is a clear competitive 
position derived from the corporate strategy. This entails that every member of the 
whole organisation cooperates in delivering the brand's promise and 
communicating the brand's positioning and benefits (de Chernatony, 2001). 
de Chernatony provides a description of the process of building, developing and 
maintaining service brands (de Chernatony, 2001). From the identification of 
external opportunities through market research, to the operationalisation of the 
brand through communication and delivery of the service, de Chematony (2001) 
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tackles all the steps 1 17 of the process. The steps of the "defmition of the brand" and 
"positioning and differentiation" are examined here in further detail, because they 
are the ones with an observable and public manifestation for the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang. When de Chematony (2001: 217) talks about the "definition 
of the brand", he refers to the development of the brand concept. This involves the 
use of "creative judgement, visual representation and language" (de Chematony 
2001: 218; emphasis added). 
The positioning and differentiation of the brand are discussed later in this chapter. 
Language was covered in detail in chapter 6; while visual representation was 
discussed in chapter 7. These dimensions of positioning, differentiation, language 
and visual representation are particularly important functions of the brand, because 
it is necessary to ensure that the brand appears unique to the consumer. Regarding 
the "operationalisation", de Chematony (2001: 217) notes the importance of a 
consistent message across all media and of a service delivery process that matches 
or exceeds the brand promise (de Chematony 2001: 219). 'Positioning and 
differentiation' are the focus of the next section. The relevant theory is discussed 
and helps understand the Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang brand positions in the 
Belgian political market. 
117 The steps are: the identification of external opportunities, the ~ d ~ ~ t i f i c a t i o n n of internal 
capabilities, the definition of the brand, the assessment of the f ~ a s l b l h t y y of ~ e e brand, the 
development of internal commitment, the positioning and differentiation of t h ~ ~ s e ~ c ~ ~ brand, the 
structuring of organisational resources, market testing and finally. the operabonallsabon (see de 
Chernatony2001: 217-219). 
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3. Political Marketing Strategy 
The discussion on political marketing in chapter 3 reached the conclusion that 
consumer marketing might provide a perspective on, and an understanding of. 
observable processes in the political arena. For example, Scammell (1999) 
described political marketing'S enterprise and claims as new ways of 
understanding modem politics. 
"[political marketing] shares with political science a desire to understand 
underlying processes, and therefore to create explanatory models of party 
and voter behaviour. It shares with political communications the key 
continuing interest in persuasion" (Scammell, 1999: 719, emphasis added). 
Positioning, an important concept in marketing, arises from the desire of marketers 
to build a competitive advantage (Smith, 2005). Aaker and Shansby (1982: 56) 
explain positioning as follows: "a product or organisation has many associations 
which combine to form a total impression. The positioning decision often means 
selecting those associations to be built upon and emphasised and those 
associations to be removed or de-emphasised". The way a brand is positioned 
against another helps to clarify in the customer's mind how that brand is different 
and, critically, better (Smith, 2005). In this way it aids the communication of 
differential advantage in a highly competitive and 'noisy' marketplace (Smith. 
2005). 
,7, 
The marketing analysis IS based on the Vlaams BloktVlaams 8elang's 
communication materials, such as brochures, leaflets and its website. The 
advantage of this is that they represent and express the positions collectiyely and 
publicly adopted by the party. They also facilitate a greater depth of analysis of the 
texts created by the Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang, and allow the researcher to 
make inferences as to the nature of the marketing strategy of the Vlaams Blok and 
Vlaams Belang. 
3.1. The strategic behaviour of the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang in the 
political market 
In this chapter, political parties are treated as analogous to commercial 
organisations III the marketplace (following Butler and Collins, 1996). Having 
taken this approach 118, the marketing literature permits the use of a wide array of 
models and concepts (Butler and Collins, 1996). Political parties and commercial 
profit-oriented organisations clearly have different understandings of strategy 
(Butler and Collins, 1996). However, commercial, not-for-profit and public sector 
organisations require a strategic overview of their industry or market (Lovelock 
and Weinberg, 1990; Kotler, 1979). 
In order to understand the strategic choices made by the Vlaams BloklVlaams 
Belang in the political market a well-recognised marketing framework is applied, 
namely the typology of competitive positioning - market leader, challenger. 
118 This approach is adopted for pragmatic reasons - consumer marketing strategy literature IS. rich 
and well-developed (see for example Porter. 1980; Kotler 1994): and line with the discussIOn In 
chapter 2 about political marketing and consumer marketing theories (see p ... D) 
follower and nicher (Butler and Collins, 1996: 33). Although the relative electoral 
strengths of political parties can be estimated using opinion poll data, the real test 
of market position is conclusively determined by periodic elections (Butler and 
Collins, 1996). Thus it is important to recognise that the analysis they provide is a 
collection of 'snapshots' of the Belgian political market at specific times. 
3.1.1. Market positioning 
Butler and Collins (1996), Kotler (1994) and Porter's (1980) broad framework of 
four positions - market leader, challenger, follower, nicher - is used and helps to 
frame the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's position and the evolution of its strategy. 
Market share is the determinant of competitive position in this analysis (Butler and 
Collins, 1996). The electoral results at the poll are taken as the value for the 
market share. 
Market leader 
Notwithstanding questions of industry impact, profitability, reputation and the like, 
the market leader is the player with the largest share of the market (Butler and 
Collins, 1996). This position provides an orientation point within the industry and 
market. Most commonly, the leader is subject to continual attack, from different 
competitors with different strategies (Butler and Collins, 1996). The market leader 
often adopts a defensive strategy aimed at reinforcing its existing image (Butler 
and Collins, 1996). In our specific case, the political market leader position in the 
Flemish Region alternates between the SP.AlSpirit (the Socialists) and the Liberals 
(the VLD 119). However, the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang could be the largest 
party in Flanders and, the largest Flemish party in Brussels, and could claim the 
crown of market leader. For example, in the Brussels' market, Delwit (2003) 
claimed that the Vlaams Blok has become the fIrst Flemish party in Brussels, and 
the statistics have proved him right. As shown in chapter 4, (section 2.3.2, p.69), 
the party also enjoys a comfortable position in Antwerp where the Vlaams Belang 
narrowly lost the mayoral seat in June 2006 to the Socialist SP.A-Spirit (which 
won 35.3%, and became the fIrst party in the city). The Vlaams Belang registered 
33.5% of the votes in Flanders for these 2006 local elections and consolidated its 
strong position across Flanders, making it a serious challenger. 
However, the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's quarantined position implies that the 
party cannot gain access to power. Even if the party has become the largest party, 
its score is not sufficient to make it an inevitable120 governing member. So far, the 
other parties have formed awkward coalitions (liberal, Christian-Democrats 
Socialists and ecologists) to leave the Vlaams Blok in opposition. The market 
leader position is nevertheless claimed by the party. The party presents itself to its 
readers as the actual market leader, the biggest party in the country: 
"What happened in Brussels today is unique in the western world: never 
has a so-called democratic regime outlawed the country's largest political 
party."(Vlaams Blok, http://vlaamsblok.be/index.shtml, emphasis added; 
Appendix 3) 
119 The VLO is the party of Guy Verhofstad, who was Prime Minister from 1999 until 2007. 
120 The Vlaams Belang must score an absolute majority (around 40-45%), which would create a 
situation where the other parties would not be able to form local government without the extreme 
right party. 
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However, as explained earlier, the particular quarantined position of the party 
implies that the party which behaved at its origin as a nicher, is today a serious 
challenger (regardless of the actual scores at the poll). 
Niche 
The critical success factor for the 'nicher' is in carefully defining and successfully 
targeting a market segment where it specialises in sen'ing the needs of its 
customers (Butler and Collins, 1996). Long-term, strong relationships are central 
to this approach (Butler and Collins, 1996). It is not uncommon for organisations 
to engage in multiple niching, but in the political marketing context this raises the 
problems of underpositioning, whereby a party could be perceived as not taking a 
strong, defining stance on any important issue (Butler and Collins, 1996). For 
example, the positions of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang on the centrality of the 
defence of Flemish interest and the plans for Brussels' large majority of French-
speakers 121, is an example of seemingly contradictory positions for its respective 
target segments. If the party publishes nationwide (i.e. Flanders and Brussels) 
brochures, leaflets, website and magazines, there are also regionally-focussed 
publications, such as campaign brochures and local newsletters. An examination of 
those artefacts shows that the party glosses over some thorny issues concerning 
Brussels when addressing Brussels voters. This is normal, since voters in different 
special interest segments may be significantly, if not fundamentally. opposed to 
each other on basic principles (Butler and Collins, 1996). The Vlaams Blok is not 
I ~ I I They would be given 30 years to 'dutch-isation' themselves, 
the only 'nicher' in Belgium. A particular form of niche strategy based on 
language is followed by Belgian parties which only target one linguistic group. 
According to Butler and Collins (1996), there is a danger for niche parties when 
they try to broaden their appeal. They might lose their particular focus (which 
attracted voters at the start, e.g. the extreme right's stance on immigration), be 
drawn into too wide a portfolio of policies and lose votes to more focussed 
opponents for the niche support (Butler and Collins, 1996). The Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang, however, has successfully moved from a 'nicher' position to 
the challenger position. 
From Niche to Challenge 
The implication of the partiCUlarity of Belgium and its linguistically divided 
political market, is that the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang is competing in different 
markets (Flanders and Brussels), and holding different positions. If the Vlaams 
Blok started off as a 'nicher', with rather limited appeal, its situation changed 
dramatically with a string of electoral successes from the 1990s onwards. The 
Vlaams Blok started with 1.8% of the vote at the 1978 elections but moved to 
10.4% in November 1992, and 12.3% in the elections of 21 st May 1995. 
The Vlaams Belang was the second most popular party in the 2004 regional 
elections, with 24% of the vote. Polls in 2007 showed the Vlaams Belang as the 
second or third most popular political party in Flanders, after the Christian 
Democrats (at about 30%), about level with the Socialists (at about 20%). and 
ahead of the Liberals. In the June 2006 local elections, the party scored aboye 3 0 ~ ' o o
in Antwerp. The Vlaams Belang has now reached the fIrst or second position in 
many Flemish towns, such as Schoten (34.7%), Starboek (32%), and Borsbeek 
(28.7%) on the periphery of Antwerp. The party has become a powerful challenger 
that could have participated in government if it had not been effectively 
quarantined by the cordon sanitaire. In 2000, the Vlaams Blok won 14.2% of the 
votes in Flanders, and in 2006 the result across Flanders reached 21.5%. 
The situation is different in Brussels' political market. In 1995, the Vlaams Blok 
was the second Flemish party in the capital, with 30/0 of the votes. The potential for 
an extreme right vote was much higher, since at the same election the French-
speaking extreme-right party, the Front National, scored 7.5 % of the votes. 
Therefore, unsatisfIed with its Brussels results, the Vlaams Blok started an 
offensive targeting French-speakers who were sympathetic to the party's policies 
(i.e. the Front National voters) through, for example, the Open letters to the 
Brusseleirs (see next section, p.281, for a discussion of the party positioning in 
Brussels). 
Just as companies evolve, so do parties (Butler and Collins, 1996). The Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang is a 'nicher' that has managed to broaden its appeal and 
develop its niche. But it is now a more ambitious party reaching out for targets 
outside of its traditional niche. As the Vlaams Belang, the party is now attempting 
to appeal to a broader and more mainstream audience, behaving as a right-wing 
conservative challenger, willing to take up a place in a governing coalition. This is 
illustrated by the following quotation which indicates that the Vlaams Belang sees 
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itself as a viable challenger, by identifying the Socialist party, the strongest party 
in Wallonia as the 'target' to beat: 
"In my view, the main political opponent is the Parti Socialiste, the clearest 
symbol of Walloon State power over Flanders. We must make clear during 
the campaign that neither Verhofstadt nor Leterme have the will or the 
courage to confront the Parti Socialiste." (Vlaams Belang, November 2006: 
7, see Appendix 20) 
More importantly, beyond the rhetorical statement (by identifying Wallonia's most 
powerful political party as the main opponent), the Vlaams Belang has actually 
identified its real political opponents: as the SPA.Spirit (Leterme's 122 Flemish 
socialist party), and the VLD (Verhofstadt I23 ,s Liberal party). The Vlaams Belang 
now considers its competition is represented by the two most prominent Flemish 
parties. In view of the election results, this is a legitimate diagnosis of the political 
market. The Vlaams Belang is not a minor party in Flanders anymore. In 1991, the 
Vlaams Blok was the fourth biggest party in Flanders (Bosseman, 2001). It is now 
one of the biggest parties in Antwerp, where one in four voters chose the extreme 
right party. The Vlaams Blok won the second largest number of votes in the 
regional elections in Flanders in 2004, becoming the second largest party in the 
Flemish Parliament. At the last city council elections, the Vlaams Belang gathered 
33.51 % of the votes in Antwerpl24. The Vlaams Belang for the frrst time stagnated 
in Antwerp; and did not win the mayoral seat as was predicted. The sitting 
122 Leterme might become Prime Minister after 2007's Belgian general elections 
123 Guy Verhofstadt was Belgium's Prime Minster from 1999 till 2007. 
124 This is a slight rise compared to the 32.95 % won in 2000. However, one should note that the 
Flemish socialist party, the SPA (the actual burgomaster of Antwerp Patrick Janssens belongs to 
this party), and is ahead of the Vlaams Belang - which was at that time the first party in the city -
with 35.28 % of the votes, which is a strong rise from their 20% gathered in 2000 (AFP) 
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Socialist Mayor Janssens won against Filip Dewinter. but commentators suggest it 
was by 'cannibalising' votes from his coalition partners. However, the Vlaams 
Belang should not be seen as having 'lost' the elections. Compared to 2004, the 
position of the Vlaams Belang has improved across Flanders (reaching 21. 50 <> in 
2007), and the party has experienced major breakthroughs in several localities in 
Flanders. 
The challenger's behaviour 
The role of the challenger in competitive terms is to depose the leader (Butler and 
Collins, 1996). The challenger may not necessarily be the next biggest shareholder 
in the marketplace, and, indeed, there may be several challengers at anyone time 
(Butler and Collins, 1996). The distinctive feature of the challenger is that it 
pursues an active strategy of becoming the market leader (Butler and Collins, 
1996). Challengers attack; their basic strategic objective requires an aggressive 
approach. The Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang has adopted the appropriate strategy. 
The party targets the leaders' traditional voters, and adopts an aggresslve 
communication strategy, continuously denouncing scandals, incompetence, 
corruption and patronage; and ridiculing the other party's leaders (for example, 
Verhofstadt is often caricatured in the party website, and is also nicknamed 
Pinocchio). The following quotation by Frank Vanhecke also seems to indicate 
that the Vlaams Blok is not considered as a marginal party, but as a party 
expressing the position of the majority of the Flemings - not a minority (or a 
niche): 
" T h ~ ~ .core.of our programme consists of our positions, which are majorit), 
posltlOns In Flanders. We must go on formulating them calmh' and clem'h', 
and we must go on profiling ourselves just as calmlv a ~ d d clearlr ~ s s
reasonable people who want the best for all Flemish people." ( \ , l ~ a m s s
Blok, November, 2006: 7; emphasis added; Appendix 20) 
The electoral system represents a critical factor for a challenger strategy (Butler 
and Collins, 1996). The more proportionally representative the system, the less are 
the rewards of an aggressive stance (Butler and Collins. 1996). Those jurisdictions 
which use the first-past-the-post system, on the other hand. can reward a party 
holding a slight lead in votes with a disproportionate bonus in terms of seats in the 
legislature (Butler and Collins, 1996). Belgium is characterised by a proportional 
system, but the aggressivity of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang is understandable 
from a differentiation point of view. From the start, the party set out to establish its 
difference. In order to make itself heard in a crowded marketplace the party has 
been vocal in denouncing other parties and the ills of society. Wienen (2001). the 
party's spokesman explained the evolution of the party's tactics as starting with 
tough, polarised campaigns, but evolving towards softer broader advertising 
campaigns, as the party seeks to broaden its appeal beyond its initial niche. 
3.2. Segmentation and positioning of a political brand 
Market segmentation and targeting are used to identify the groups of customers to 
whom the marketer wants to direct the products and promotional campaign 
(Newman, 2001). Market segmentation has been used by political parties to select 
the segments of population they wish to target in their appeals (Baines, 1999). 
Once voter segments have been identified, the candidate or party positions itscl fin 
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the political marketplace (Newman, 2001). Positioning has, in fact, long been 
recognised as playing an important role in politics (Mauser 1983). According to 
'-
Trout and Sivkin (1996: 79), "all politics is perception, posturing and positioning". 
Parties position themselves in comparison to their opponents (Smith, 2005). The 
positioning process begins by the assessment of both the party's and the 
opponents' respective strengths and weaknesses (Newman, 2001). For example, 
Tony Blair wanted a stronger Conservative opponent in 2001 to allow the New 
Labour agenda to be seen more clearly by comparison (Smith, 2005). 
Belgian political market 
Belgium is characterised by a fragmented political market. There is a dichotomy 
between the French-speaking and the Dutch-speaking parties. Voters vote, usually 
in their main language, for town council elections, and for the government of their 
respective region (Flemish Region, Walloon Region and the Brussels-Capital 
Region). The Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang competes in the Flemish Region, and 
in Brussels' Region markets. In order to attract both French-speaking Brusseleirs 
and Dutch-speakers the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang has designed and distributed 
magazines specifically targeted at the Brussels audience, with the focus on key 
issues for the Brussels-Capital Region, such as taxation, the important 
concentration of foreigners in Brussels, criminality, and so on. The . face' of the 
Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang in Brussels is lohan Demol, a French-speaking 
Brussels resident and a former head of police. The brochures specially designed 
for Brussels are bilingual, available in both French and Dutch. In the brochure 
"bnmigration ... Open your eyes.''', the party presents its project for an independent 
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Flanders with Brussels as capital. In this pIece, the Vlaams Blok adopts a 
reassuring tone, by saying that Brussels would be granted a bilingual status in the 
new state. The party has developed campaigns and communication materials 
specifically designed for Brussels alongside national documentation (also a\ ailable 
on the website), denoting a careful segmentation of the national political market. It 
is important to note that the Flemish nationalist themes are not tackled in the 
brochures of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang distributed in Brussels. This theme 
is reserved for brochures destined for Flemish audiences in Flanders, where 
Flanders is presented as a 'milk-cow' feeding Wallonia (Ceuppens, 2001), through 
the solidarity transfer from the richer Flanders to the poorer Wallonia and Brussels. 
The financial transfers from Flanders to Brussels are not mentioned either. This 
indicates careful targeting and a consistent positioning of the party, furthering its 
interests. The party positions itself accordingly to the market (Flanders, Flemish 
towns, Brussels) in which it is competing. 
3.2.1. The evolution of the positioning of the Vlaams Blok: the timeline 
Since its inception, the Vlaams Blok has positioned itself as a nationalist, 
solidarist 125 party of the right. This positioning is translated through the themes 
adopted by the party: Flemish independence; a free market; a reduction of taxes; a 
limitation on social security; the repatriation of guest workers; zero tolerance of 
criminality and a total and unconditional amnesty for WWll collaborators (Vos, 
1992, in Bosseman, 200 I). The party started its political career as a protest and 
125 'Solidarism' is a system where the economy should be aimed at maintaining the welfare of the 
whole nation and where national solidarity replaces class struggle (Mudde, 2000: 189). (Sec 
chapter I. section 1.3.2.2) 
opposition party, denouncing the ills of society. Karel Dillen, the Vlaams Blok 
president, in 1991 (restating the points he made in 1981) said: 
"We refuse any Flemish concession. We refuse to put water in our wine. 
We refuse to sell our programme for a ministry portfolio. We refuse to sell 
our principles for anything. Do you want a real opposition on each point? 
Vote for the Vlaams Blok." (Spruyt, 2000, in Bosseman, 2001) 
True to these words, the Vlaams Blok refused a ministerial portfolio in 1991. It 
was entitled to this portfolio because of its 10.3% of the Flemish votes (Bosseman, 
2001). This attitude reinforced the party's positioning as uncompromising, non-
conformist and radical (Spruyt, 2000). The Vlaams Blok had already taken on the 
image of the 'rebel' in 1979, when the sub-heading of De Vlaams Nationalist (i.e. 
the Flemish Nationalist) is: "Therefore, we are standing here as REBEL". In 2000, 
some 20 years later, the profile is similar: 
Ita party unlike any other. The Vlaams Blok is indeed not a compromising 
party, but a programme party faithful to its principles and programme, 
[ ... J, for the Flemish people and the European peoples. A party rooted in a 
great past, but resolutely turned towards the future". (Frank Vanhecke, at 
www.vlaamsblok.be) 
With successes at the polls, the party should have been included in governing 
coalitions. In 1995, the Vlaams Blok wished to participate in a right-wing, anti-
socialist coalition, but the cordon sanitaire excluded the party. The other parties 
were forced into what Gerolf Annemans - a prominent Vlaams Blok member-
called a "monster coalition of six different parties" (in Spruyt, 2000). The party 
wanted to project the image of not shying away from its responsibilities (i.e. 
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representing the people and governing) but it was excluded from power by the 
other parties. Adopting the underdog position could be seen as a yer)' astute 
strategy, locating the Vlaams Blok as the de facto opposition party. The scenario 
was repeated in 2000 at the elections for the Antwerp city council. Although the 
Vlaams Blok gained one-third of the votes, the liberal VLD (the other winner of 
the election) refused to share power with the extreme right. 
In 1997, the party decided to revamp its programme and become a ~ f a s t o e n n partU', 
i.e. a respectable and legitimate party (Spruyt, 2000). Applying communication 
strategies, the expression of the Vlaams Blok discourse was softened, without 
modifying the essence of its content (Spruyt, 2000). Respectability was achieved 
by an acceptance of parliamentary democracy, visible in the Vlaams Blok's 1996 
campaign, and by the removal of ethno-racial wording in their immigration 
policies (Spruyt, 2000). General acceptability was also achieved via the adoption 
of populist rhetoric such as: "We zeggen wat u denkt!" (i.e. "We say what you 
think"), and the use of "Partij van het Volk" (i.e. "Party of the People") (Spruyt, 
2000). In this way the Vlaams Blok transformed itself from a radical party, into a 
potential governing party (Spruyt, 2000). Previously the Vlaams Blok had claimed 
that it was uncompromising, implying an 'all or nothing' attitude. However, the 
most recent stance adopted by the Vlaams Belang is that (temporary) compromise 
is necessary for the well-being of Flanders and its future (see Appendix 17). The 
positioning of the Vlaams Belang is explored further in the next section. 
3.2.2. Positioning of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's brand 
When the Vlaams Belang was created, it left no doubt among observers that it 
would capitalise on the strengths of the Vlaams Blok. The party leaders made clear 
that the new party is not a toned-down version of the late Vlaams Blok. In an 
interview for the VTM (Flemish TV), immediately after the condemnation of the 
Vlaams Blok for racism, Filip Dewinter said about the creation of the Vlaams 
Belang: "This is not cosmetic, but manicure: It'e are sharpening teeth, sharpening 
claws. Every Muslim woman wearing the headscarf signs her return warrant." He 
also added: "we don't need a Vlaams Blok Light' or a . Vlaams Blok Ultra', but a 
'Vlaams Blok Plus!' Indeed, our programme is not changing at all." (Filip 
Dewinter in TV programme Dag AllemaaI3). These last comments are quite 
revealing: they confirm comments made by observers who argued that the changes 
made within the new party would only be cosmetic. The essence of the Vlaams 
Blok has definitely not disappeared (see chapters 6 and 7). This is an 
understandable and very pragmatic choice. The Vlaams Blok had managed to 
build a strong brand with a significantly loyal following. At every election, the 
market share of the Vlaams Belang increases, which indicates that the party has 
managed to communicate its brand's values and that it actually benefits from a 
high level of notoriety. 
Key positioning themes (1): Independence of Flanders and immigration 
The Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang has managed to develop a very clear position, 
which might indicate a carefully thought-out strategy, or at the very least. an 
intuitive political conviction and direction. However. it also seems that the party 
has adopted an opportunistic (pragmatic) approach to politics. The independence 
of Flanders was the original founding principle underlying the Vlaams Blok's 
creation, but the anti-immigrantianti-immigration position has become the most 
salient theme and the most effective vote gatherer for the party. In the 1990s Karel 
Dillen, the Vlaams Blok's founding father, revitalised the party by recruiting 
promising young individuals, among whom was Filip Dewinter (Faniel, 2003; 
Swyngedouw, 1998). Filip Dewinter is a skilled manager and astute politician, 
who was the artisan of the re-organisation of the Vlaams Blok into a modern 
successful political party (Camus, 2003; Faniel, 2003; Swyngedouw. 1998). He 
was the first to recognise the electoral potential of an anti-immigrant stance 126, 
inspired by the success of the French Front National (e.g. 'Les Francais d'abord', 
i.e. 'The French first', which inspired the party's 'Eigen Volk Eerst', i.e. 'Our own 
people first') (Coffe, 2004). In 1987, the party conducted a fierce anti-immigrant 
campaign in the parliamentary elections, which got them two seats in Parliament 
and one seat in the Belgian Senate. In 1991, at what is still known in Belgium as 
Black Sunday, 10.3% of Flemish voters, and 25% of voters in Antwerp supported 
the Vlaams Blok party (Coffe, 2004). 
Key themes for positioning (2): The unique selling proposition 
The pragmatism of the party leaders is also evident in their recruitment of 
communication professionals (Bossemans, 2001; Vander Velpen. 1992). The 
Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang was rewarded for its consistent positioning and clear, 
recognisable communications: the party has been winning votes at every single 
116 Dewinter's ideological input is limited to the immigration theme (\tudde, 2004). 
election (13 victories as in October 2006). In less than 30 years. the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang has become the most popular party in Flanders. t\o Belgian 
'-
citizen could currently ignore or confuse the party's core themes with those of the 
other political parties. The main themes of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang ha\"e 
even become the party's chasse gardee (in other words, the party can claim an 
almost exclusive 'ownership' of these themes (Coffe, 2004)). or the Unique 
Selling Proposition (Olins, 2000) of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang brand. In 
other words, any other party calling for a clampdown on immigration or a tougher 
stance on crime would merely look like an imitation of the Vlaams BloklVlaams 
Belang. According to Keller (2003), good positioning of a brand requires the 
establishment of important points of difference (POD) over the competition at the 
same time as turning policies where disadvantaged into points of parity (POP), 
such as the economy where the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang advocates liberal 
policies. In the light of this argument the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang's decision 
to concentrate on asylum and immigration becomes more understandable. The 
stance on immigration became their distinguishable POD at the start of the 1987 
campaign. The party was successful in raising the perceived importance of 
immigration during the 1987 elections and since then. Butler and Collins (1996) 
also argue that anticipating the preferences of the electorate can be useful for 
challengers. If a policy can be 'branded' before its appeal is widely recognised, a 
party can steal a march on its opponents (Butler and Collins, 1996). Butler and 
Collins (1996) also note that the difficulty with this strategy, however, is retaining 
ownership of the idea once it is popular. The Vlaams Blok has clearly managt?d to 
claim ownership of some key issues (Coffe, 2004) and, in doing so, de\eloped 
other PODs on cnme, immigration, Flemish autonomy and, more recently. 
independence. In short, the Vlaams Belang does not neglect those important PODs 
developed by the former Vlaams Blok and still capitalises on those related issues. 
Other political parties have fairly unsuccessfully attempted to recover the voters 
they have lost to the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang, by hardening their own 
discourse and policies on immigration or Flemish nationalism. This arguably could 
well have contributed to the further legitimating of Vlaams Blok; Vlaams Belang 
policies among the electorate. 
'A party unlike any other' 
As the other Flemish political parties seem to be copying some aspects of the 
Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang's programme (in an attempt to recapture part of the 
electorate lost to the extreme right), the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang in contrast, 
has been trying to convey since its inception an image and a positioning of 
difference from, and alternative to, the mainstream. For example, the title of 
Franck Vanhecke's column on the Vlaams Blok's website 127 is "A Party Unlike 
Any Other". The party has tried to differentiate itself and develop a clear and 
unique position in the minds of voters. 
According to Palmer (2002), one dimension where political marketing has 
replaced traditional forms of policy development is in the use of survey devices 
and focus groups to find out how the electorate responds to various issues and to 
devise policies that would fit the "existing patterns of evaluation" (Palmer. 2002: 
1 ~ 7 7 http://w\\.w.\.laamsblok.be 
353). In other words, the political marketer tries to find out who is persuadable. 
and on what grounds (Maarek, 1995). As Baines, (1999: 407) has pointed out. "all 
political strategy derives from understanding the motives underlying the target 
groups' past voting behaviour and that strategy must be competitive because there 
is only a limited range of options for the voter". O'Shaughnessy (1990: 134) has 
shown that American political consultants make an issue salient, if they identify it 
as a weak spot in the opponent's programme. This might explain why the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang is focussing heavily on the issue of the division of the 
Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV) electoral constituency. The BHY -file 
symbolically represents the struggle between the two main linguistic communities 
in Belgium. Mainstream parties have failed to reach an argument about this 
difficult issue. Flemish parties decided to let the issue remain vague for a while 
because of its potential to bring down the government. The party has been 
extremely vocal about what they refer to as this 'new treason' to the Flemish cause, 
using it as a symbol of the untrustworthiness and inability of mainstream parties to 
make difficult decisions in the interests of the Flemish people. The Ylaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang also uses the issue as another reason why French and 
Flemish-speakers cannot coexist in a united country. This therefore presents 
another opportunity for the party to express its difference and to set out its 
differentiation strategy (i.e. remaining intractable on the topic of Flemish interest, 
taking a position against French-speakers, other political parties and foreigners). 
2(1) 
Targeted positioning 
From one election to the next, from one regIon to another, the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang's focus has been on one particular theme, while the other 
themes are downplayed. For example, the 1987 campaign was fiercely anti-
immigrant (Coffe, 2005b). In Brussels the party downplays Flemish nationalism 
and secessionism, when focussing on the French-speaking voters. The Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang also appeals to Brussels' voters with its strongest themes, i.e. 
immigration and criminality. The topics of independence of Flanders and the 
annexation of Brussels (and its consequent mandatory "Dutch-isation" - i.e. 
making Dutch the only official language) are carefully avoided in the party's 
communication material for Brussels. Targeting the French-speaking popUlation of 
Brussels is a strategic decision to win enough votes to allow the party to gain a 
majority in the Flemish constituent of the Brussels Parliament. If this scenario 
happens, the party would become an essential part of the Flemish constituent of 
the Brussels government and could consequently claim three ministerial 
portfolios 128. 
128 The Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang leaders do not hide their ambition to make the Brussels 
institutions collapse (by stopping its functioning, through the impossibility for governing parties to 
vote for decisions). This could be possible because of the Belgian model and the system of the 
double majority in Brussels. In the Brussels government different ministers (chosen by the majority 
of their respective linguistic groups) have also to be accepted by the majority of the 89 Brussels 
MPs. It is certain that French-speaking political parties would never accept a Vlaams BloklVlaams 
Belang minister, and consequently the institutions would be unable to function and this would 
effectively fragment the Belgian state. This political crisis is not unlikely, and the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang would only need 10,000 more votes reach its objective. This scenario did not 
happen in the June 2004 elections where the Vlaams Belang progressed slightly (from 32 to 34 %), 
but did not score the hoped for 50% of the Flemish votes in Brussels. 
291 
This strategic positioning could be attributed to a strong, coherent and consistent 
communication strategy. The clear evidence is that the Vlaams BlokIVlaams 
Belang's communication material is proving successful in persuading and 
retaining voters. The analysis of a few selected texts from the Vlaams Blok and 
Vlaams Belang have provided examples of their persuasive discourse, and 
rhetorical strategies (see chapter 6) and arguments and these have been reinforced 
with evocative photographs (see chapter 7). There is also evidence here of careful 
orchestration of the brochures, speeches, and website so that all are 'in tune' and 
sending the same message, that the party's main concern is with the voters' 
interests. 
3.2.3. Evolution of the positioning: the case of the Vlaams Belang 
Positioning 
Currently, the Vlaams Belang is portrayed as, and benefits from, a positioning as 
an opposition party, denouncing the ills of Belgian society and the wrong-doing of 
the governing parties. The party is preparing itself for government, and says so: 
"Electoral victories are not an objective per se. [. .. J Our story has a 
meaning only when we can implement the essence of our programme: 
independence, a stricter immigration policy, a tough approach to crime. It 
is clear now that these points of our programme will not be implemented 
by using more and more decibels to shout original terms of abuse from 
within the quarantine zone. Contrary to lemmings or howler monkeys, who 
follow their instinct, man has the possibility of evaluating his situation, 
considering alternative strategies, and analysing carefully who can be 
opponents and who can be allies, if need be temporarily." (Vlaams Belang, 
November 2006: 3; see Appendix 14) 
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The Vlaams Belang presents itself here as uncompromising and honest, but willing 
today - in the interests of the Flemish people - to 'compromise' itself by taking 
part in power. It is therefore positioning itself as a governing party in waiting: 
"The Danish example proves that other scenarios are possible, other than 
quarantine zones [. .. J A shrewd Vlaams Belang is of course much more 
dangerous than a shouting Vlaams Belang in a quarantine zone. It is going 
to be a difficult but necessary exercise. We owe it not only to ourselves, but 
also to our children and grandchildren" (Vlaams Belang, November 2006: 
3, see Appendix 14) 
The Vlaams Belang seems to be following in the footsteps of the Vlaams Blok by 
using strong communications, integrated marketing and precise targeting. 
Ostensibly the Vlaams Belang positioning is different to the Vlaams Blok, but it is 
rather ambiguous, sharing some common elements with the Vlaams Blok, but also 
some differences, at least in the public eye. 
The Vlaams Belang is facing a delicate situation in terms of preserving its 'unique 
selling points' and its loyal following (the Vlaams Blok's). The party is today 
adopting a somewhat paradoxical strategy: a 'softening' of problematic policies 
(linked to immigrants and their rights), with a reassessment of the former party's 
heritage. However, this is paradoxical only in appearance, if one accepts the notion 
of segmentation of the electoral market by the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang. The 
party seeks to gain a wide appeal, by stressing its Flemish nationalist and anti-
establishment policies, and wishes to retain the large anti-immigrant electoral base. 
The outcome of such a strategy is the creation of polemics in the media (e.g. the 
statement that every woman wearing the headscarf should be sent away, or the 
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statement made by Filip Dewinter about his Islamophobia), while the party 
political programme retains its newly acquired right-wing conservative flavour. 
Segmentation 
The segmentation adopted by the Vlaams Belang is interesting. and is especially 
apparent when comparing texts (the so-called Open Letters to the Brusseleirs) 
addressed to Brussels inhabitants and texts targeted at the general public. The 
Vlaams Belang, as a Flemish nationalist and secessionist party, is putting in extra 
effort to win Brussels, set to become the future capital of the Republic of flanders. 
The issue of language, which has enormous significance in Belgium, is completely 
avoided in the party material targeted at the Brussels' inhabitants. This indicates a 
careful segmentation of the political market, precise targeting and prudent choice 
of an appropriate message for each audience. For example, in Brussels campaign 
brochures, the Vlaams Belang carefully downplays the planned future of Brussels. 
Brusseleirs are French-speaking, in an overwhelming majority (90% of the total 
population of Brussels), and feel neither Flemish nor Walloon, and assert an 
identity of their own (see Appendix 11), even if, historically. they are Flemings 
who were francophonised. 
5. Conclusion 
Marketing-orientation 
The adoption of marketing discourse IS not initially obvious III the 
communications of the Vlaams Belang. However, a market-orientation is 
identifiable (from chapter 6 and 7) and manifests itself in rather subtle ways, such 
as careful segmentation and well-targeted segments (e.g. the respective messages 
for Flanders and Brussels have different focus), and consistent positioning. The 
new Vlaams Belang has pragmatically adopted an anti-immigration stance 
(electorally rewarding), and kept their original ideological core of Flemish 
nationalism (its origin and identity base). They have understood voters and also 
attempted to manipulate their perception via, for example, raising the profile of the 
immigration theme from 1987 election campaign onwards. 
Coffe (2004) has shown that criminality and immigration, and to a lesser extent 
Flemish nationalism have become the 'unique selling points' of the party. The 
voters recall these two themes when asked to justify their choice of the extreme 
right party (Coffe, 2004). This is evidence that the party has developed a clearly 
defined positioning in the mind of voters. For a party that claims to 'hate' spin, the 
Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang seems to be highly effective in spinning their own 
position and image. A market(ing) orientation exudes from every pore of the 
party's communications material. The constant call for a 'referendum', to listen to 
the people, to voice people's concerns, and to follow their opinion seems 
'suspiciously' consistent with a party following a political marketing concept (sec 
discussion on political marketing, chapter 3). The next chapter is dedicated to the 
discussion of the main themes of the thesis, and overarching issues such as 
marketing and representation, identity-related issues and the construction of a 
particular 'reality' by the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang. 
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Chapter 9: Discussion 
1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to discuss the main findings and observations from the empirical 
analysis (chapters 6, 7 and 8) in relation to the presented literature review chapters 
(chapters 2 and 3), and embed the issues in broader debates, such as marketing 
representation, identity construction and the' creation of reality'. First, the research 
questions defined at the start of the thesis are reiterated and specifically addressed 
in respective sections. As a reminder, the focus of interest of this research lies in 
the way the party uses modem marketing tactics and strategies to articulate a 
persuasive discourse and communicate with voters. 
2. Research Questions 
The research questions addressed in this thesis link the previous three topics 
(marketing, extreme right politics and Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang): 1) How does 
the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang market itself, i.e. what are the marketing 
strategies and techniques used (addressed in chapter 7)? 2) How does the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang manufacture its trademark discriminatory discourse in a 
persuasive way that has gained acceptance and legitimacy in the Belgian political 
scene (in chapters 5 and 6)7 In short, the research aim was to address questions 
related to the way the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang mobilise marketing and 
political persuasion to gain popular support (at the polls) and acceptance (with 
neutralisation of the most problematic issues of the essentiallv exclusionarY and 
- -
xenophobic discourse). The following sections discuss how the thesis addressed 
the research questions. First, marketing-related questions are tackled; the 
following section addresses reality construction and identity issues. CDA has 
proved its usefulness in addressing the analysis of complex, potentially polemical 
and contested discourses: marketing; political marketing; and the xenophobic 
discourse of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang. 
3. How does the party market itself? 
3.1. The marketing of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang 
The ability to connect with voters is a key issue for political parties and it seems 
sensible to consider that marketing discourse is mainly used strategically by 
parties to make their speech 'voter-friendly', and in this way to encourage the 
consumption of their political 'product' (see chapter 3). There were no blatant 
utterances of marketing rhetoric in the discourse of the Vlaams BlokiVlaams 
Belang, as far as the analysed texts were concerned. However, a so-called 'market-
orientation' could be highlighted, from careful segmentation and targeting (e.g. the 
respective messages for Flanders and Brussels have different focuses) and 
consistent positioning (see chapter 8). The party avoids the pitfalls of an 
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ineffectively marketing-oriented partyl29. For example. the constant call from the 
Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang for a referendum, to listen to the people, to be the 
voice of the silent majority, and to follow their opinion seems 'suspiciously' 
consistent with a party following a political marketing concept (see chapter 3). 
In addition, the Vlaams Belang is adopting an extremely careful management of its 
image. Research has shown that image is more important sometimes than policies 
in influencing voters' perceptions and ultimately their voting behayiour (see Smith, 
2001). Image centrally involves reputation, trustworthiness and credibi lity 
(Scammell, 1995). The Vlaams Belang has developed and nurtured its image of 
respectability and credibility, through a sound marketing strategy. In addition, the 
Vlaams Belang's consistency and never faltering conviction for its ideology has 
allowed it to position itself consistently over time, making necessary adjustments 
'as it goes' (e.g. officially discarding the '70 point programme'; softening its 
communication campaigns and making them more sophisticated, and so on). 
An important point here is the absence of any direct clear reference to marketing, 
or marketing rhetoric in the party's public discourse. In contrast, the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang adopts and encourages the adoption of marketing by its 
candidates in internal documents. This raises important questions about whether 
the use of marketing in politics is considered as 'legitimate' and acceptable by the 
general public, or at least by the people the party seeks to attract. The Vlaams 
l ~ l ) ) Such as blindly following voters' needs and wants. without a core ideology and direction See 
c h a p t ~ r r 2 - discussion of political marketing. 
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BloklVlaams Belang adopts a different approach when dealing with political 
marketing. On numerous previous occasions, the party leaders ha\"e fiercely 
denounced the use of marketing and criticised the 'spin doctors' appointed by 
Belgian mainstream political parties. It is perhaps an indication that today political 
marketing is still perceived as a tool for mass manipulation, regardless of its 
claims of customer sovereignty and empowerment. In the political field, marketing 
discourse and ideology has not yet reached the full naturalisation 130 that already 
makes marketing transparent and unquestioned in other aspects of modem 
societies. This provides a lead for further research in the area of political 
communication, and critical marketing. Nonetheless, I have shown that the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang (quarantined by a cordon sanitaire) is engaged today in a 
political fight to establish its legitimacy as a key player in Belgian politics. The 
party does use using modem marketing techniques and is, for example, one of the 
very first parties to develop its website. The constant success it experiences at the 
polls is an indication that the party has managed to 'reach' the voters and gain 
their support. 
3.2. Evidence of a political marketing discourse 
Marketing discourse contributes to the way people view and understand the world 
(see chapter 3). It is "part of the process whereby a particular form of society is 
constructed, one in which human beings are treated as things, where identity is 
reduced to ownership of commodities and all social relations are c o n c e i \ ' t . ~ d d in 
1:\0 Here, naturalisation refers to the 'invisibility' that marketing could gain thanks to ideologies 
which naturalise the world ,iews defended in discourse and make them unquestioned. 
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market terms" (Morgan, 1992: 154). Marketing builds a context where social 
agents live and interact, and is used as a resource by the same agents to make 
sense of their social context. It is a discourse through which social actors (i. e .. 
organisations, consumers, and institutions) understand and attempt to control those 
social processes (Morgan, 1992: 137). Similarly, political marketing has pervaded 
many areas from political parties, governments, single-issue groups and lobbying 
organisations (Harris, 2001; Harris et aI., 1999; Nimmo, 1999;). Authors belie\'e 
that those organisations think in marketing terms, and more importantly beliel'(! 
that they do marketing management and attempt to integrate the use of marketing 
instruments in a coherent marketing strategy (Dermody and Scullion, 2001; 
Newsman, 1994). Whether or not they actually do is another matter. It is at least 
evidence that marketing 'thinking' and marketing discourse is pervading areas 
beyond business contexts; even if that only means that some leading parties have 
adopted a simplistic and populist 'follower' mentality (Henneberg, 2005). The 
issue with an uncritical adoption of political marketing (or the so-called 'follower 
mentality) is that it is contributing to the disenchantment of the electorate and 
resulting in cynicism regarding politics in general (Henneberg, 2005). Political 
actors as well as political communicators (and to some extent also the electorate) 
believe that marketing has become an essential part of political management in 
many situations. In addition, the belief has also entered the mainstream through 
endless discussions and analysis of spin in the media (Harris, 2001). 
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3.3. Marketing as metaphor 
Marketing could simply been seen as a 'metaphor' or a way to make sense of the 
world and, in particular, of the phenomenon observed. Bowler and Farrell (1992; 
in Scammell, 1999: 720) note that marketing lends a vocabulary and a typology of 
actions to the study of campaigns. Seeing marketing strategies and methods 
everywhere might simply be a consequence of my professional bias. An interesting 
discussion about the contemporary extreme right between a historian specialising 
in Austria, a Germanist, and myself brought this to the fore. Where the historian 
could relate and draw comparisons with past events, the Germanist adopted a 
'cultural' perspective to explain the success and leadership of extreme right parties. 
In contrast, I adopted a more pragmatic, managerial approach. None of the 
explanations or interpretations seemed more prominent or more worthy than the 
others, but the discussion highlighted the importance of the researcher's frame of 
mind while looking at specific social processes. In this case, I adopted a 
perspective unambiguously rooted in a managerial tradition, and shaped by a 
marketing view of the world. Political marketing is clearly located within the 
managerial school of thought (explicitly driven by economic values, see Savigny 
(2004)). This is evidenced by the focus on the marketing concept, the marketing 
mix, and market segmentation. The adoption in political marketing literature of the 
assumptions of the managerial school is explicitly driven by economic 
assumptions (Savigny, 2004: 28; Sheth et al., 1988). 
4. How does the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang manufacture its persuasive 
discourse? 
4.1. Texts and images: a coherent narrative 
CDA has been used to tackle the material from the Vlaams Belang and the Vlaams 
Blok. With some adaptations (e.g. 'linguistic dimension' becomes 'communication 
dimension', see p.223); Wodak's discourse-historical approach has helped the 
analysis and interpretation of the visual elements included in the party's 
communication material. The joint analysis has helped uncover how texts and 
images are used to construct the concept of identity. The party has appeared to 
express its views in a straightforward fashion. For example, the analysis of the 
brochure presenting the Vlaams Belang's theses against Turkish admission to the 
EU has highlighted the necessity of analysing both the textual and the visual 
elements of the party's discourse in an attempt to deconstruct its strategic use of 
language and imagery. 
4.2. Persuasion 
The discursive analysis has highlighted the persuasion of the party discourse. For 
many years, especially since the immigration theme has come to the fore, the party 
has been consistently increasing its electoral base. The Vlaams BlokIVlaams 
Belang has managed to reinforce its position beyond its Antwerp stronghold and to 
gain one-fifth of the Flemish vote in Flanders (Art, 2006). The embedded Flemish 
nationalist sub-culture accounts in large part for the success of the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang in Flanders. The situation in Brussels, with its 90% of 
Francophones, is particular and could be attributed to a great extent to the 
persuasiveness of the party's discourse. The party has become the first Flemish 
party in Brussels where it has managed to persuade French-speaking voters to 
choose a party which has put the 'interests' of the Flemings, Flanders and Dutch-
language at the core of its identity construction (see chapter 4). The \'laams 
BloklVlaams Belang's core themes provide a consistent picture of Belgian society 
and Belgian politics, Flanders and democracy. The semantic analytical dimension 
of several documents from the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang has shown that a 
careful selection of themes has allowed the party to focus readers' attention on 
newsworthy events which allow the party to repeat and reinforce its 'vision' and 
political direction. I argued earlier (see chapter 6, section 3.1.4., p.155) that the 
Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang show the readers where to look and using a linguistic 
and rhetorical distorting lens, attempts to modify their perspective. 
A discursive approach to research focusses on the effects of representation, and its 
consequences and political ramifications (Hall, 1997, in Schroeder, 2002). The 
CDA of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's brochures has highlighted dimensions 
of the party's discourse, along with the visual representation of 'others'. The visual 
and the verbal elements of discourse provide an opportunity for the party to 
present itself in a favourable way (e.g. the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang is the only 
party defending people's interests). This well-crafted and persuasive discourse and 
its representations is gaining acceptance by its almost unnoticed adoption in 
mainstream political discourse, with potential damaging effects on the 
international scene131 . 
The pervasIveness of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang's discourse and its 
increasing respectability (and legitimacy) is worth discussing with regard to other 
political actors' behaviour. For example, today the cordon sanifaire. as a strategy 
to fight exclusionist and xenophobic discourse seems rather obsolete in the current 
climate. Many themes developed by the Vlaams Blok are now exploited by other 
politicians from the mainstream political parties (Van Oer Brink, 2000; Faniel, 
2003). Indeed, through the medium of language, the Vlaams Blok's discourse has 
become powerful enough to influence the main political agenda in Belgium. The 
separation of Flanders from Wallonia is no longer a taboo, voiced only by the 
Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang, but is echoed by other more mainstream parties. For 
instance, Jeanine Leduc, the president of the Flemish liberal party (VLO) 132, 
expressed racist comments in Parliament, and no one protested 133. In other words, 
the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's theses and favourite themes have become more 
and more widespread in mainstream politics. There are two possible explanations 
for this: 1) either the issues debated by the extreme right have become less taboo, 
and therefore more acceptable in open discussions; or 2) in an attempt to recover 
the voters lost to the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang, mainstream parties have 
131 For example, immigration has become a key theme in EU politics, and even has its own 
thematic conference. 1 . 1 ~ ~ The VLO is the main party constituting the governing coalition with the Liberals, SOCIalists and 
ecologists. . 
m Eric Corijn, sociologist and philosopher. co-founder of the "Charte 91" a movement agamst the 
VB (in Van Der Brink, 2003) 
attempted to adopt a similar discourse, if not similar policies to the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang. Of course, both of these hypotheses could be simultaneously 
valid. 
The pervasion of the party's discourse into the mainstream is important, since as 
was shown earlier (see chapter 4), voters cast an ideological \'ote for the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang. Coffe (2004) demonstrated that a majority of the Vlaams 
Blok (Vlaams Belang)'s electorate agrees with the party's position on immigration 
issues. Besides immigration, criminality is also an important theme motivating the 
vote for the extreme right party. The vote for the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang is 
thus ideological, which might explain why other parties have attempted to regain 
votes by competing within the same ideological space. This is a potentially 
perverse strategy because it provides a strong legitimacy and acceptability of the 
extreme right party policies, but does not guarantee votes for the other parties 
(which might be perceived as pale copies). 
4.3. Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang and reality construction 
A visual analysis of the photographs in the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's 
publications has highlighted the issue of how marketing images co-construct 
identity. Images are a powerful medium in shaping people's understanding of the 
world, including the identities of its people and places (Borgerson and Schroeder, 
2005). According to Borgerson and Schroeder (2005), marketing representations 
have the power to make people believe that they know something they have no 
experience of, and the power to influence the experiences they have in the future . 
. 1ll() 
Representational practices have an impact on the way people perceiYe and interact 
with other people. An outcome of representational practice is that people' s 
perceptions, even 'misinformed perceptions', often have the 'weight of established 
facts' (Gordon, 1995: 203). What individuals think they know about others from 
representations of identity can affect how they see, treat and understand other 
human beings (e.g. in the context of racism and sexism (Borgerson and Schroeder, 
2005)). 
Representational conventions III marketing communications draw upon these 
meaning systems, which may reinforce and reproduce damaging images of identity. 
Typified representations of identity increase the probability of human subjects 
interpreting what they experience or have represented to them as (stereo )typical. 
They might increase the illusion that the readers are of 'one kind', the European, 
the Westerner, contrasting with the others (mainly Muslim). For example, in the 
Vlaams Belang brochure' Turkey in Europe: No!', it was noticed that no comment 
accompanies the photographs and drawings. Pictures, unlike textual or verbal 
statements, cannot be held untrue. The example provided by Borgerson and 
Schroeder (2005) of the Marlboro cowboy, where there are no text-based claims, 
highlights that advertisers cannot be held accountable for false or misleading 
claims. Similarly, the party cannot be accountable for xenophobic or Islamophobic 
claims by producing images. Images provide resources for, and hence shape, our 
understanding of the world, including the identities of its people and places 
(Borgerson and Schroeder, 2005). Scott and Batra (2003) argue that marketing is a 
representational system that produces meaning outside the realm of the promoted 
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product or service, and photography, which was granted particular attention here. 
is according to Schroeder (2002), the most pervasive form of communication in 
the world 
It is important to restate the importance of recognising that an image differs from 
the 'objective reality' it is assumed to illuminate. Image is a representation of an 
object. The relationship between image and reality is ambiguous (Alvesson, 1990). 
According to Berg and Gaglirdu (1986, in Alvesson (1990: 377)), there is eyen a 
need for falsification, i.e. showing the organisation as other than it is. An image is 
indeed created, according to Boorstin (1961, in Alvesson, 1990: 377; emphasis 
added), to present and make a certain kind of believable impression. This is not to 
say that they are untrue or false, but rather for some ambiguous representation of 
'reality'. The objective being to draw a favourable and appealing image of the 
organisation for its various publics (employees included) (Alvesson, 1990). This is 
done by highlighting good points of the organisation, and deflecting the attention 
from the bad or weak ones. Ultimately, the goal of image management is to control 
other people's definition of reality. 
The rather straightforward approach to image in the thesis should not hide the fact 
that the concept of image seems to be a particularly elusive. Alvesson (1990) also 
notes that image may also be something existing somewhere in between the 
communicator and the audience. According to Alvesson (1990). the more 
ambiguity characterising the nature of the business and products of an organisation. 
the greater is the significance of its image. This approach fits perfectly with the 
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ambiguous 'business' of politics and the discourse of the extreme right. The 
unacceptability of straightforward racist and discriminatory discourses imposes an 
environment where direct references to the inequality of races, ethnic yiolence. 
anti-Semitism, among others are criminal and undesirable. To gain acceptability 
and political legitimacy, parties and groups which are not unsympathetic to the 
views mentioned above must adopt a discourse and construct an external image of 
respectability and leave enough room for ambiguity to avoid prosecution, and yet 
still attract like-minded individuals. 
4.4. Identity construction 
Identity issues emerged during the CDA of the textual features. but also (perhaps 
mainly) from the visual arguments constructed by the Vlaams Slok and the 
Vlaams Belang. 'Constructed' because photographs are subjective, transient 
images made by a particular person with special equipment at a specific moment 
in time (Schroeder, 2002: 45). 
"Photography and photographs have exerted a profound, foundational 
influence of conceptions of identity and physical appearance, 
appearance and reality, and vision and evidence. It is now impossible 
to disentangle photograph from identity; photography shapes how we 
think of ourselves, how we age, photographs represent who we are" 
(Schroeder, 2002: 45). 
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The way 'people' are portrayed through photographs in the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams 
Belang's brochures is particularly interesting. There is a clear distinction between 
the individual portraits and staged group photographs of the Vlaams Blolv Vlaams 
Belang representatives, and the 'photo-journalism' genre of the subjects 
(immigrants/foreigners) in other photographs. The tensions between the two 
provide the ground for arguing that photographs are not merely support for an 
'objective' reality, but a medium for the political message of the Vlaams 
BlokJVlaams Belang, in addition to being an expression of the party's power. This 
is particularly potent when contrasted with the way the Vlaams Blok Vlaams 
Belang visually represents itself as a people's party, through the portraits and 
group photographs. 
4.4.1. Identities: the construction of closed categories 
The analysis of the brochure presenting the Vlaams Belang' s theses against 
Turkish admission to the EU provided a striking example of identity construction. 
The discourse-historical analysis highlighted the way the Vlaams BloklVlaams 
Belang's texts and images have been used to construct the concept of identity. For 
example, Turkey's lack of democracy, the poverty of the country, the potential for 
massive immigration and its Islamic identity are all arguments against Turkish 
membership. The Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang appeals to 'a European people', 
constructs a European identity and calls for a form of 'European nationalism'. The 
'us-group' is therefore defined by the party's rhetoric as the European, Christian 
nations, and the' out-group' as Islamic countries and/or non-European nations. 
According to Rosoux (2001), identities are created in a process of conyergence 
(what the members have in common) and differentiation (what differentiates them 
from other groups). Accordingly, identities cannot be separated from the concept 
of otherness (Rosoux, 2001: 178). However, it is important to note that that 
process of differentiation is not necessarily violent or aggressiye and it does not 
have to be the result of opposition (Rosoux, 2001). Howe\"er, it appears that the 
Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang needs to exacerbate the differences between 'us' and 
the 'others' and present the two groups as incompatible, making inclusion or eyen 
co-existence undesirable. In other words, the party imagines a European people 
sharing common history and ancestry stressing the political, cultural, historical and 
religious differences between Turkey and the rest of Europe as too significant to 
be ignored. The party has warned that if Turkey was to enter the EU, it is the 
future of the EU itself that could be endangered. 
"ifTurkey Enters the EU ... [. . .} EU external borders will then be extended 
to countries like Iran, Iraq and Syria. The Middle East inferno will then 
literally be at Europe's door. [. . .] Europe's door will then be open to 
uncontrollable and unbridled immigration. And then will come the threat 
of a dangerous confrontation lvith a militant and intolerant Islam. And then 
there will begin an economic drain. And the EU will then become 
unmanageable n. (Vlaams Belang, 2005: see p.3 of Appendix IS) 
4.5. Selective newsworthiness 
An additional occurrence of distorted representation of 'reality' is the selection of 
what is worth talking about. The party selects the newsworthy eyents worth talking 
about. Those events are discussed with reference to the party's electoral themes. 
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Hence stories featuring the criminality and deviance of foreigners a r ~ ~ used to 
highlight the failure of multiculturalism; scandals and embezzlements show the 
corruption and self-interest of the governing parties. Attacks against the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang are framed as an infringement of its freedom of speech. 
evidence of politically correct speeches, and in generaL illustrate the lack of 
democratic practices in Belgium (see chapter 6, p. 135). The resulting picture is a 
gloomy, threatening world, where the only ray of hope comes from the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang. The party is, in its own words, the voice of the silent 
majority. In addition to allowing the expression of whatever the party deems 
beneficial (on the basis that the people think that way but do not dare say it out 
loud), it also provides the justification and popular legitimacy to its theses, even 
the most questionable ones. This popular support is a common feature of the party 
discourse. In addition to presenting itself as the silent majority, the party also 
highlights its popular legitimacy by reminding people of its election results as 
often as possible. 
5. Reality construction and legitimacy- a repackaged offering 
5.1. The Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's discourse and its effect on Belgian 
society 
Reality arises from the shared perceptions created when people communicate with 
each other. How people act and react in society hinges primarily on how they 
perceive and conceptualise their society based on their communications with 
., 1 ' 
.) -
others (Graber and Smith, 2005). Representations are part of the lived experience: 
they construct reality (Schroeder, 2002: 64). A significant finding of the research 
(through visual analysis) is the way people are represented in the party's 
publications (see chapter 7). The Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang representations 
contribute to the image of the party as constituted by individuals 'like you and I' 
and the party as a tight group, as a team of competent individuals. This was 
contrasted with the representation of the 'others'. The contrast is at its most yi vid 
when comparing 'undesirable' others (immigrants and Muslims). represented as a 
group, disorganised and exhibiting deviant behaviour (e.g. praying in the streets, 
demonstrating, wearing different clothing), with the orderly and clean cut 
members and supporters of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang. One could easily 
infer that the visual imagery of the party, mirroring the textual elements, constructs 
a world where multiculturalism is absent. For example. it was noted that the 
photographs never depict foreigners and Flemings in the same frame (see chapter 
7). What must be read in photographs is as much absence as presence. 
Presence is the extent to which an object or concept is foremost in the 
consciousness of the audience members (Hill, 2004). The persuader attempts to 
increase the presence of elements in the rhetorical situation that are favourable to 
their claim because they know that elements with an enhanced presence will have 
a greater influence over the audience's attitude and beliefs. The persuader attempts 
thus to make those elements important enough, present enough to crowd out from 
the viewer's mind, regardless of the logical force or relevance of other 
considerations (Hill, 2004). The persuader then hopes that the process will prompt 
the audience to accept his or her claims based on one or two examples of powerful. 
vivid evidence (e.g. foreigners swamping the country, and having their own way). 
At the same time, the persuader hopes the audience will stop to think about issues 
such as the relevance or actual importance of the evidence «Hill. 2004) (e.g. the 
percentage of foreigners in Belgium, including citizens of other EU member states 
is around 10%). The phenomenon of presence is inherently linked to visual 
perception, for example the image of one starving child is more present than the 
statistical evidence of a million children starving and suffering (Perelma, and 
Olbrecht-Tyteca, 1971; in Hill, 2004: 29). In the Vlaams BloklVlaams 8elang's 
publications, the absence of the members of one group (foreigners) in images 
representing the other (native Belgians) is significant: they belong to two separate 
worlds represented in the party's visual communication. This representation is 
consistent with the party's underlying discourse which states that multiculturalism 
is a failure and undesirable. 
5.2. Treatment of the problematic features of the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang 
discourse 
The most problematic issues in the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang's discourse, such 
as discrimination, xenophobia, or racism, are treated in a way that would dissolve 
their damaging effects for the party. Words are redefined, reframed (e.g. avoidance 
strategy), and the accusations from the anti-racists and other political opponents 
are turned against them (e.g. reversal strategy, see chapter 5, p. 120 and chapter 6, 
p.185). The Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang tells the reader stories, guides their 
interpretation of those stories (e.g. the use of the indicative mood indicates 
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assertions, facts; the use of headings provides the key for the 'preferred' 
interpretation of texts). The result is that the political offering has been 'sanitised', 
repackaged and relabelled from the rather unpalatable 'extreme right' to the more 
acceptable 'nationalist and conservative'. This is especially the case with the re-
branding from Vlaams Blok to Vlaams Belang. If the offering has been described 
as similar, the nature of language seems to have changed, leaving the centre-stage 
to vagueness, innuendo and coded utterances. Although this is perhaps in order to 
avoid further legal prosecution, it might also be intended to continue to appeal to 
the loyal voters of the former Vlaams Blok, while (publicly) discarding the same 
policies and rhetoric that might have appealed to the anti-immigrant voters in the 
first place. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter synthesises the main findings of the thesis, specifically addresses the 
research questions, and discusses key themes, such as persuasion, the Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang's marketing orientation and the issue of reality construction 
and identity-related matters. The use of CDA and the discourse-historical approach 
have allowed a rigorous, in-depth analysis of language use and its underpinning 
processes. Given the importance of these processes and the socio-historical context. 
it was important to broaden the textual and visual analysis to the analysis of the 
party's marketing more generally. Indeed, the potential market-orientation and 
marketing instrumentalism of the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang have also been 
explored in order to address the research questions on the marketing strategies and 
techniques used by the party. The research highlights the pervasin:ness of the 
Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang discourse in Belgian politics and its capacity to bend 
the political agenda to make their preferred issues salient. 
Discourse analysis enables an exploration of the relationships between texts, 
discourses and context (Phillips and Hardy, 2002; Fairclough, 1992). M o r ~ o \ e r , ,
through the analysis of the historical and social context, CDA facilitates an 
understanding of the way that meanings and a broader reality are constructed 
(Phillips and Hardy, 2002). The analysis reveals that the Vlaams BloklVlaams 
Belang has reframed key issues, created a particularly closed definition of national 
identity (see chapters 6 and 7) and positioned it in contrast to the supposed failure 
of the multicultural model. 
Finally, although the relevance of marketing to politics has been widely debated 
and is still an object of contention, the preceding demonstrates that marketing 
techniques and methods are being used by the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang to 
'sell' their policies, their candidates and their party to voters. The importance of 
these findings and observations are brought together in the next, and concluding, 
chapter. The main contributions of the research and its limitations are also 
considered in the final chapter. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
1. Introduction 
This chapter represents the general conclusion of this thesis. First, I provide a brief 
summary of the thesis highlighting the key themes and findings. This is followed 
by a section dedicated to the contributions of the research. These are divided into 
methodological and thematic contributions. The chapter then tackles the 
limitations of the thesis and provides suggestions for future research. The chapter, 
and the thesis, finish with a brief reflexive 'introspection' focussing on how I 
coped with a distorted image of me, my nationality, my identity and my . group' 
for four years. 
2. Summary of the thesis 
My thesis addresses a contemporary societal issue with a novel approach: a critical 
discursive analysis of the marketing of an extreme right party. My research 
originally stemmed from the observation that the extreme right parties seem to 
speak 'the people's language', and to articulate citizens' concerns. The extreme 
right political parties' emergence and re-emergence through the years arc a 
recurrent feature in Western European politics. The extreme right is a popular 
phenomenon of study and the extant research on the topic demonstrates the 
fascination and concern with their growing success across \\'estern Europe. The 
ideology of the extreme right family, with its elements of authoritarism, 
xenophobia, anti-establishment are framed as threats by liberal democrats. In the 
case of the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang, many fear the accession to power of a 
political party that claims incompatibility between cultures (the notion of cultural 
difference and cultural distinctiveness has replaced racism in many modern 
extreme right parties), the undesirability of differences (religious (e.g. Islam, 
Judaism), sexual (e.g. homosexuality), and cultural (e.g. North vs. South)), and 
plain discrimination (through the national preference policies) in terms of 
employment, housing and social benefits. The extreme right literature review (see 
chapter 3) highlighted a lack of research on extreme right communications and on 
any research using a business or managerial approach. This gap suggested the 
possible fruitfulness of an enquiry into the marketing and communication 
processes of the extreme right. This approach is of course not without problems. 
The relevance of managerial concepts to politics has been critically questioned in 
the thesis (see chapter 3). Nevertheless the premises that marketing 
communications could provide interesting insights led to a wider consideration of 
issues of language and discourse. A discursive approach has provided a stronger 
anchorage for the analysis of the extreme right, which has transcended the rather 
contested marketing and managerialist approach to politics. 
The variety and the diversity of the political parties regrouped under the label 
'extreme right' make the study of the 'extreme right' particularly complex (see 
chapter 2). There are no two identical extreme right parties and attempting to 
analyse the extreme right is simply a task beyond the scope of a doctoral research 
project. Anastasakis (2000) has highlighted the lack of a pan-regional study of the 
extreme right which is essentially due, he argues, to the differences between 
political systems and to the diverse nature of the extreme right parties. This is \\'hy 
a single extreme right party, the Flemish Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang has been 
selected for the purposes of this research (see chapter .f). The Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang is one of the most successful, articulated and well organised 
extreme right parties in Western Europe (Carter, 2005; Coffe, 2005a). In addition 
to its interesting profile, the Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang uses political marketing 
strategies and techniques to enhance this profile and the party provides an 
interesting case and rich set of data for my research. The analysis of the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang's discourse highlighted interesting insights as to how a 
political party can successfully apply marketing strategies and deploy a persuasive 
toolkit to attract voters. 
3. Contributions of the research 
The contributions of the research could be summarised and classified in three 
categories: 1) practical applications; 2) methodological contributions and 3) a 
theoretical/epistemological contribution. 
3.1. Practical applications 
I have aimed to set the stage for marketing scholars to enhance the understanding 
of how marketing methods are deployed with increasing sophistication outside the 
traditional commercial domain of marketing, and to consider the consequences of 
the application of a marketing discourse in the civic sphere. EYen if mv research 
did not have any straightforward managerial applications, its goal is in line \\·ith 
the emancipatory goals of the critical discourse analysis tradition of research. The 
results of my research are important to increase the awareness of the public to the 
discursive production of a particular 'reality' where 'the foreigner' is depicted as a 
threat to society. By showing how an extreme right party produces powerfully 
convincing arguments (and consequently gets a substantial proportion of votes), 
my work aims to highlight particular persuasive schemes, especially the' common 
sense' arguments and the taken-for-granted assumptions against the 'other'. I 
expect that, by highlighting these persuasive and marketing techniques, voters will 
be able to critically assess extreme right political communications and be able to 
resist pernicious discriminatory arguments. 
The emancipatory claims of critical discourse analysis put the critical discourse 
analyst in a privileged position. By claming emancipatory and educational 
purposes, I - as a critical discourse analyst - implicitly imply that 1 know best, that 
I have been able to uncover hidden meanings (i.e. hidden to the simple mortal's 
eye) and naturalised ideologies. I make my findings available to the public, in 
order to rectify wrong-doings, discrimination, and injustice in the world (as 
posited by CDA principles, see chapter 5, p.99). Putting oneself in such a 
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privileged position, pretending to be able to do all of that is incredibly arrogant if 
not completely deluded. It is therefore crucial that one shows reflexiyity. The 
analysis I provide is nothing but one interpretation: the researcher is 
himself/herself part of society, influenced by it, socially constructed by the 
discourses he or she seeks to deconstruct. 
3.2. Methodological contribution: application of CDA 
This research makes the novel contribution of applying critical discourse analysis 
to political marketing. The potential of CDA to marketing is considerable. For 
example, Fairclough (1995) has applied CDA to the marketisation of British 
universities (see also Lowrie, 2006). The interest in methodological issues is high. 
Two papers 134, on CDA and political marketing, that I have written with the 
collaboration of my supervisors have been accepted for publication in a generalist 
marketing management journal (the journal of marketing management), and the 
second as a book chapter on current trends and issues in the discipline of political 
marketing. This highlights the potential contributions of CDA in areas outside of 
its traditional playing field (such as racism and anti-Semitism, media discourse, 
identity and gender issues) 
134 Moufahim, M & Humphreys, M. (forthcoming), "Marketing and Identity. The Ylaams Belang 
against Turkish Admission to the EU", in Cultural ISSlies and Current Trends. Haworth Press 
Moufahim, M (2006), Humphreys, M., Mitussis. D. & Fitchett, 1. "Interpretmg DIscourse: :\ 
Critical Discourse Analysis of the Marketing of an Extreme Right Party", Journal 0/ Jfarketillg 
Management, 
3.3. The theoretical insight for understanding the Vlaams Blok and Vlaams 
Belang's success 
Critical political marketing 
A final contribution of the research comes from the premises of a deyelopment of 
a critical political marketing agenda. Critical marketing points of yiew were taken 
in this research, which provide an approach to the study of marketing in a political 
context focussing on ideology and critique of academic discourses. For example, 
marketing practice and consumer culture are understood as fom1s of domination 
(see Denegri-Knott et ai., 2006; Jacobson and Mazur, 1995). The critical position 
recognises that marketing is a powerful economic, social, and cultural institution 
designed to control consumers (Denegri-Knott et aI., 2006: 951). This is, I argue 
also the case in political marketing. Political marketing tends to assertively claim 
its self-importance (quite naturally, I also argue, for a discipline battling to install 
its legitimacy). Approaching the issues of marketing discourse (power and 
dominance) and the pervasiveness and acceptance of political marketing as a 
practice, and a self-justifying political marketing discourse (e.g. political 
marketing is self-proclaimed as a democracy enhancer135 (see Kotler and Kotler 
1999)). In addition, as a premise to critical enquiry, it is important to recognise 
that marketing is not a neutral aspect of politics; and that ethical considerations 
have to be an integral part of any political marketing theory (Henneberg, 2004). 
1J5 By providing the consumer with a product they want, the political process is presented as 
responsive to consumer demand, which in tum is assumed to make politicians more accountable 
(Sa\'igny, 2004: 33) 
4. Limitations of the research 
There are a few limitations to the research that should be taken into account. They 
could be broadly classified into practical applications, methodological issues and 
assumption made. 
4.1. Methodological limitation: content analysis 
As explained in much detail throughout the thesis, CDA was an appropriate and 
relevant methodology which provided the tools for an in-depth enquiry into the 
Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang's discursive practices. However, an approach 
combining CDA and content analysis could have provided a different set of 
findings and consequently a more complete understanding of the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang. For example, in chapter 6, legitimating strategies were 
described as the most prominent and common in the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams 
Belang's publications. It is true for the texts selected and analysed. A content 
analysis accounting for a larger set of texts could provide interesting elements. A 
systematic treatment of given words, such as 'foreigners', 'racism', 'Islam', 
'Muslim' 'crime' would allow the analysis of the context and the circumstances , , 
of utterances. I suspect, after four years of reading, scrutinising and analysing the 
Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang's publications, that there is a recurrent structure, 
or a 'template' for their electoral brochures. For example, the editorials written by 
Frank Vanhecke, the President of the Vlaams Belang, have their own style (mostly 
reading like the transcription of speech) but leaving a (calculated?) impression of 
improvisation and spontaneity. A content analysis could explore those 'suspicions' 
and highlight, for example, systematic elements in Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang 
discourse. 
4.2. The marketing mindset 
The second limitation is the assumption made from the start that there is a 
straightforward relation between the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang's 
communication and its electoral success. The reality is of course not that simple. 
This assumption leaves aside many other explanatory variables, such as the 
characteristics of the electorate, the national and international political context, 
economic conjecture, the role of media, 'race relations', and other essentially 
individual characteristics of the voters. 
In providing details of the Belgian context, the circumstances of the creation of 
texts and publication, and by openly acknowledging my personal input in the 
interpretation, the potential problems linked to this 'simplifying' assumption are 
somewhat reduced. For example, the assumption that I am observing marketing 
behaviours probably comes from a marketing mindset originating from a 
university marketing education. In addition, focussing solely on the organisational 
aspects is perhaps uni-dimensional and would not account much for any theory 
development, even if there are here no claims of generalisability from the single 
case study provided. Instead my interpretive position is acknowledged and 
presented as a strength rather than a weakness. It provides a rich, in-depth analysis 
from an academic perspective, but also from a female trilingual Muslim Brusseleir 
of foreign descent, who has lived in Belgium, Morocco, Britain and China. These 
'biographical' details also situate the interpretation provided. From these details 
emerges another criticism about the outspoken political stance of the researcher. 
However, with such a background how could I be objective? I am not, and I 
cannot be. Critical discourse analysts hold that high quality academic research 
can/should be political too. 
4.3. Political marketing 
A theoretical limitation of the research stems from the theoretical background in 
which it is de facto embedded. The rather weak managerial theories of marketing 
could even be considered as potentially detrimental for the validity and credibility 
of my research. Henneberg (2004) analyses the core of political marketing and 
identified two stances: a narrow position focussing on understanding marketing 
activities in politics and a wider position concerned with a more holistic attempt to 
achieve a breadth of knowledge in politics. From there, Henneberg (2004) 
identifies the current limitations of political marketing theory as coming from the 
focus on the narrow interpretation of political marketing theory. The current 
knowledge in political marketing comes from the areas of campaign management, 
political marketing strategies and comparative political marketing (Newman, 
1994a, Scammell, 1995; Butler and Collins, 1999; Baines and Egan, 2001). The 
managerial focus is only one element of political marketing theory that was 
granted disproportionate academic attention. Henneberg (2004) notes that the 
essence of political marketing remains opaque and that crucial elements are still 
ill-defined in marketing terms, e.g. the exchange process. the 'political product'. 
the 'political market'. 
Henneberg (2004) calls for a research agenda focussing on the ethical dimensions 
of political marketing, on the underlying exchange mechanisms and the interaction 
of marketing activities with the political system. He prescribes the development of 
a theory of political marketing management (Henneberg, 2004; Henneberg 2002) 
where a descriptive understanding of political marketing management would be 
integrated to a prescriptive theory (i.e. that would help political actors apply 
political marketing management techniques effectively and efficiently. As a 
response to this limitation, I should say that my research does indeed subscribe to 
an interpretation of political marketing theory as being concerned with 
understanding existing marketing activities in politics, and provides only a 
descriptive approach (see for example chapter 8, pp.273-294). However, my 
research suggests the potential fruitful contributions of a critical political 
marketing agenda and provides a novel methodological approach to the study of 
political marketing. In addition, the development of a critical political marketing 
agenda (as suggested in 'contributions of the research, see p.32l) is in line with 
Henneberg's (2002) above-mentioned prescriptions. 
5. Suggestions for further research 
5.1. Critical discourse analysis methodology 
Marketing and extreme right: an extended research 
This research has highlighted the potential of critical discourse analysis to analyse 
marketing and discourse. Further research should aim at providing a broader 
understanding of marketing and extreme right discourses. Other subjects. such as 
media discourse and institutional discourse, would provide the basis for the 
analysis of the social context of the production and reproduction of discriminatory 
discourses (which have already been significantly researched, see chapter 5, p.l 00). 
A similar approach could be undertaken to analyse marketing discourse and its 
pervasiveness in socio-political contexts. 
In addition, Henneberg (2004) proposes to adopt an epistemological \'lew of 
political marketing as a 'research lens', a meta-theoretical vehicle for making 
sense of the political processes. I have a-called it the political marketing as 
metaphor approach (see chapter 5, p.90) for understanding political processes and 
behaviours. Exploring this issue in its own right would provide insights for 
theoretical developments much needed to inform contemporary political practice 
(i.e. moving from a descriptive focus to a prescriptive approach and theory 
development). 
5.2. Web-based data 
In my research, online documents were only one variety of texts among a wide 
range of texts. A website-only based analysis (content analysis, design analysis, 
critical discourse analysis) could explore the potential of the internet for radical 
politics and extend the actual understanding of online based political practices (e.g. 
fund-raising, political candidates' blogs, etc.). 
5.3. The Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang 
Direct access to the party should be sought by researchers who would not be 
handicapped as I was by my ethnic origins and religious faith. Howeyer, because 
the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang has been notoriously secretive about its internal 
organisation (Art, 2006), prominent scholars (such as Cas Mudde) studying the 
extreme right have also little insight into what goes on inside the Vlaams Blok (Art, 
2006). Experts in the field still have virtually no knowledge of the organisational 
features of Belgian extreme right parties (the Front National and the Vlaams 
BloklVlaams Belang) (Mudde, forthcoming). However. the Vlaams Belang is 
seeking respectability and acceptance and this might provide an opportunity to 
know the party better. Being provided with a voice, via academic research, could 
represent an attractive opportunity to the party leaders. The Vlaams BloklVlaams 
Belang is one of the best organised extreme right European parties (Carter 2005; 
Coffe, 2005a). Research could focus on the managerial and marketing conduct of 
the party. In addition, an analysis of the evolution of the party from extreme right 
to conservative right would be a fascinating subject in terms of organisational 
cultural change. 
The identification of Vlaams BloklVlaams Belang supporters and their in-depth 
interview could provide insights in terms of some of the concepts covered in the 
thesis, such as image perception, photograph interpretation, research linked to 
persuasion (adoption and rejection of persuasive messages) and branding. 
Contrasting the data from opponents and party sympathisers', interviews would 
prove invaluable to get a grasp of the political branding phenomenon and notion of 
perception of images. 
6. Final words: a reflexive comment 
In a heated debate with my father about Belgian politics and the reasons of the 
extreme right success, he asked me: "If you were a Belgian, wouldn't you vote for 
the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang? I would". This is a thought-provoking question 
for several reasons. First of all, I have always considered myself as a Belgian and 
the question starts with the implication that I am not. Second, by adding "w(}uldn 'f 
you vote ... ", the question states that if I were indeed a Belgian, voting for the 
extreme right would be an option. Third, by the answer . I would', my father 
wanted to show that he certainly understands why a native Belgian would (and, as 
a first generation immigrant, why he would not). Another simpler explanation is 
that I am as stubborn as he is, and probably out of frustration that I would not 
accept his points (that I rather viciously branded as racist), he concluded by this 
polemical question and answer to 'get back at me'! 
The point raised is important. Choosing to study the extreme right brought to the 
fore a few issues linked to identity. The plural identities I endorse were threatened 
by the content of the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang' s discourse that I had to digest 
for four years. The Vlaams BlokJVlaams Belang defends a closed definition of 
identity: to belong to the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams 8elang's 'own people', you must 
fulfil specific characteristics of ethnic origin, culture and faith. I fulfil none. I am a 
French-speaking Belgian from (Muslim) Moroccan descent. Belgium is not 
recognised by the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang. Flemish (Dutch) is the language 
of the future Republic of Flanders, and Islam is certainly not tolerated by the party 
(based on the declaration of the Vlaams Belang leaders, I should even be deported. 
since I wear an Islamic headscarf, see p.84). 
Therefore, detaching myself from the content of the party's rhetoric was 
sometimes difficult. However, I have in the process developed a strong sense of 
justice, and cultural and self-awareness. I am very careful with the xenophobic. 
exclusionary potential of everyday utterances one might unconsciously make, in 
the appraisal of people, behaviours and cultural practices 136. The e x p e r i e n ~ e e of 
studying the Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang has also unexpectedly reinforced my 
European identity and my sense of being Belgian. As a Belgian, I can say that I 
would never vote for the Vlaams Belang. I acknowledge the professionalism of the 
party and their electoral force, I admire its persuasiveness, the articulation of its 
discourse and its sophisticated political marketing. I fear, however, the 
pervasiveness of their arguments, the growing acceptance of the Vlaams Belang's 
'reality' which creates a confrontational and divided society. As an academic, I 
cannot vote for the Vlaams BlokJVlaams Belang either, because I understand how 
the party persuades, manipulates and divides. Their discourse has become 
transparent to the critical discourse analyst I have become. 
136 This is especially true since I have started living in China. a country and a culture at odds WIth 
everything I have known or experienced so far. 
:1.111 
Afterword: the Vlaams Belang and I 
On August 31 st 2007 I finally had my first 'real' encounter with the Vlaams 
Belang. The party organised an international press conference on the theme of 
Flanders' imminent independence. The speeches by Filip Dewinter and h\o other 
politicians were given in Dutch for a press that mainly came from Flanders, France 
and Japan. Non-Dutch speakers in the audience were provided with a document in 
English (but not French). What Dewinter said, advocating, for example, the 
"euthanasia of Belgium" supported my observations and conclusions about the 
party's discourse. Listening to the 'spoken discourse' as it was uttered was a great 
and exciting way to get closure after four years of my research project. It was 
amazing to hear, in spoken form, the key words, arguments and strategies that I 
have identified, analysed and that have consumed my academic life these last four 
years. 
Filip Dewinter has often been described as charismatic, and I could see why. The 
man is clearly a professional communicator. He has the convincing speech of a 
man driven by conviction (for example, he never consulted his notes, unlike the 
two other politicians present). I can understand why people are seduced by his 
demeanour and discourse. I, unsurprisingly perhaps, did not fall for it. A strong 
feeling of uneasiness enveloped me during the conference, and I was happy to 
leave as soon as it was over. It is significant that my presence in the room did not 
go unnoticed, not-the-Ieast by Filip Dewinter himself who stared at me for what 
felt like interminable minutes. My presence maybe surprised him, and perhaps 
caused him some discomfort too. L or what I represent, certainly does not have a 
place in the scenario the Vlaams BlokIVlaams Belang is setting out for what they 
are calling the "New Republic of Flanders" - I knew it, and they knew it. 
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Appendix 1 - Extreme Right Glossary 
Fascism: The term originally refers to the movement led by Benito ~ l u s s o l i n i i in 
I t ~ l y y from . 1 9 ~ 2 2 t ~ ~ 1943 (McLean and McMillan, 2003). It also designates a right-
wmg totahtanan Ideology and philosophy of government that !:dorifies the state 
and nation, and assigns to the state control over every aspect of ~ a t i o n a l l life. It is 
by essence opposed to democracy and liberalism (McLean and McMillan, 2003). 
A fascist regime is supposed to control most industrial and economic activities and 
usually try to achieve popularity by a strongly nationalistic appeal, often mixed 
with racism. The most common assumption about the modem extreme right parties 
is that they are all fascist parties, or at least "in-the-closef' fascists. Howeyer, 
according to experts in the field, most of contemporary extreme right parties haye 
very little do to with fascism (Hainsworth, 2000: Mudde, 2000; Ignazi, 1997. 
among others) and are actually the product of contemporary modem societies. 
Populism. Populism is defined by Davies and Lynch (2002: 332) as being "an 
approach to politics that appeals to the man or woman in the street and casts them 
in a favourable light relative to wealthy, educated and influential elites". The tcrm 
is defined by Betz (1998: 4), as a structure of argumentation, a political style and 
an ideology. The main elements of populism are the belief that there are always 
simple solutions even for the most complex issues of the modem world (Betz, 
1998). Populist parties claim to speak for the common people and they usually 
define enemies and target popular resentment against them: resident foreign 
population, established political parties, immigrants, refugees, are usually the 
favourite targets of populist parties (Betz, 1998), because the populist style is 
about "the constant search to exploit and cultivate resentment" (Immerfall, 1998: 
27). 
The populist approach to politics is widely used by extreme right parties' leaders. 
For instance, the French Front National's Jean-Marie Le Pen experienced "cold 
and hunger", and said once: "the miners, the metal workers, the workers in all 
these industries ruined by Euro-globalisation, the farmers forced into 
bankruptcy .. .I have always fought for the people pushed out of the edge" (in 
Lloyd, 29/04/2002). Similarly, the Swiss extreme right leader, Christophe Blocher, 
uses the fact that he is the son of a poor pastor (although, he is today a billionaire 
managing a multinational company). 
The term "populism" is thus used to describe a political style, instead of a specific 
ideology and it does not differ from the definitions of right-wing extremism 
(Mudde, 2000: 13) hence most extreme right parties are populist parties. H o w e ~ e r , ,
"populism" is also used by some authors to clearly distinguish between far nght 
parties, where the populist ones are the more moderate (Mudde. 2000; ~ a c k c s , ,
1991; Betz, 1994). Immerfall (1998) rejected the term extreme right to descnbe the 
contemporary western European phenomenon and argued that the ~ o r r e c t t l a ~ e l l for 
the phenomenon is neo-populism. Immerfall (1998) also descnbed partlcs as 
radical right-wing parties. 
Right-wing radicalism. The term is used interchangeably with right-wing 
extremism. There is however a slight difference between the two terms: 
"radicalism" means hostility to the constitution whereas extremism is used for 
groups opposed to the constitution, which means that extremist parties are watched 
by the state and can be banned (Mudde, 2000). 
Radical right: is a "loose term used to describe right-wing trends that go beyond 
mainstream conservatism and imply a desire for far-reaching change [ ... ] When 
looking at the political spectrum as a whole, the radical right is largely 
synonymous with the extreme right but excludes hardline traditionalists or 
conservatives who simply want to maintain the status quo" (Davies and Lynch, 
2000: 335). 
Welfare chauvinism: "the fruits of the national economy should come frrst and 
foremost (if not exclusively) to the benefit of their own people" (Mudde, 2000: 
175). In addition to granting political, economic and social rights only to nationals, 
it entails that the state should protect some sectors against foreign competition. In 
this view, the Maastricht Treaty is a threat to the national economy (Mudde, 2000). 
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Appendix 3- Vlaams Blok- Frank Vanhecke's editorial 
(http://vlaamsblok.be/index.shtml, as accessed in :\'ovember 2004) 
TODAY WE WERE EXECUTED. BUT WE WILL RISE 
Today (9 November), our party, the Vlaams Blok, has been condemned to death. 
This afternoon, the Belgian Supreme Court upheld the verdict issued bv the Court 
, -
of Appeal in Ghent on 21 April, which declared the Vlaams Blok a criminal 
organisation. In order to preserve our party members from prosecution, we are 
now forced to disband. What happened in Brussels today is unique in the Western 
world: never has a so-called democratic regime outla\ved the country's largest 
political party. 
The Vlaams Blok was supported by almost 1 million voters in last June's elections. 
We got 24.1 % of the vote in Flanders, where 60% of the Belgian population lives. 
V oting is compulsory in Belgium and no other party was supported by more 
people. Our party has grown continuously for two decades. Since 1987. it has won 
twelve consecutive elections in a row. Belgium, established in 1830 by French 
revolutionaries, is an artificial construct dominated by the Socialist Francophone 
minority in Wallonia. Our party's main objective is the secession of Flanders from 
Belgium. Flanders is the free-market oriented Dutch-speaking and politically 
minorised (sic) northern part of the country. 
We are the democratic voice of an ever growing number of Flemings who, in an 
entirely non-violent way, want to put an end to Belgium. Our electoral strength is 
causing panic amongst the Belgian establishment. A recent opinion poll of the 
Brussels newspaper Le Soir and the Francophone state television RTBF (24 
October) indicates that the Vlaams Blok currently stands at 26.9% of the Flemish 
vote. 
Despite the fact that a political party should be fought in the voting booth, the 
Belgian regime has been harassing the Vlaams Blok with criminal prosecutions for 
over a decade. The Belgian Parliament, where Francophones are overrepresented, 
changed the Constitution in 1999 in order to limit freedom of expression. It also 
voted a series of new laws with the sole purpose of criminalising and de-funding 
our party, including an Anti-Racism Act and an Anti-Discrimination Act which 
define "discrimination" so broadly that every individual can be prosecuted on the 
basis of them. (The text of these infamous bills can be found on our website 
www.flemishrepublic.org). 
Moreover, according to Belgium's draconian new laws, every member and 
collaborator of an organisation that propagates "discrimination," can be punished 
with fines or imprisonment. Furthermore, the onus of proof has been reversed, so 
that the complainant does not need to prove that the accused "discriminates:' or 
propagates "discrimination," but the latter has to prove that he does not. Smcc 
1993 the power to prosecute for discrimination and racism was transferred to a 
government quango, resorting directly under the Prime Minister, the so-called 
Centre for Equal Opportunities and the Fight against Racism (CEOFR). This 
quango has now been vindicated by the Supreme Court, an institution composed of 
political appointees, half of them French-speakers. 
Have we ever condoned discrimination on the basis of race? No, but that did not 
matter to the Belgian establishment and its political courts. We were condemned 
on the basis of a selection of excerpts from texts provided by the CEOFR. These 
excerpts were taken from an anthology of no more than 16 texts published by local 
Vlaams Blok chapters between 1996 and 2000. According to the court what wc 
wrote was not necessarily untrue, but our "intentions" were of a criminal nature. 
The Ghent ruling, today reaffirmed by the Supreme Court, stated that our texts 
(though some were mere quotes of official statistics on crime rates and social 
welfare expenditure and another was an article written by a female Turkish-born 
Vlaams Blok member about the position of women in fundamentalist Muslim 
societies) were published with "an intention to contribute to a campaign of hatred." 
Such a proces d'intention (a conviction based on speculation about our supposed 
motives) is a real disgrace, and the fact that the Belgian judiciary had to resort to 
this proves that no other reasons for convicting us could be found. We have never 
propagated, advocated or practised any discrimination. Never. 
The consequences of the conviction are, however, serious. According to the law, 
every member of our party or everyone who has ever cooperated with it, even if he 
has not committed any crimes himself, becomes a criminal by the mere fact of his 
membership of or his cooperation with our party. The Ghent verdict literally stated: 
"Rendering punishable every person who belongs to or cooperates with a group or 
society [ ... ] serves as an efficient means to suppress such groups or societies, as the 
lawmaker intended. Rendering punishable the members or collaborators of the 
group or society inherently jeopardizes the continued existence or functioning of 
the group or society [ ... ]." 
Indeed, the reaffirmation of the Ghent verdict by the Supreme Court forces us to 
disband our party in order not to endanger its members and collaborators. 
Therefore, a party congress next Sunday will convene to officially disband the 
party. We will, however, put to the congress the establishment of a new party to 
defend the political priorities that the Vlaams Blok has always fought for: an 
independent and democratic Republic of Flanders; the traditional moral values of 
Western civilisation; and the right of the Flemings to protect their national identity 
and their Dutch language and culture. 
I thank those who founded our party in 1977 and all who have supported it in the 
past 27 years. They have fought the good fight. I thank our one million vote.rs. 
They deserve a democracy. Belgium does not want to grant t h e ~ ~ one; we w I ~ l . .
Today, our party has been killed, not by the electorate but by the Judg.es. ~ e e WIll 
establish a new party. This one Belgium will not be able to bury; It wIll bury 
Belgium. 
Frank Vanhecke, MEP 
Vlaams Slok Party Lcader 
Appendix 4 - Vlaams Blok Brochure :\'0. 6 - Brussels, my City - Facts-
Reality May 2004 - pp. 2-3 
Re-establish Democracy! 
The judgement of Ghent's Court of Appeal (Supreme Court), is the nth signal that 
democracy does not feel well in our country. It is indeed a political trial in its 
purest form. 
All the parties, Flemish and French-speakers (except for the Vlaams Slok, of 
course), have voted for one modification of the law after another, in order to ban 
the Vlaams Blok and financially dry it out. The Constitution itself was modified 
for this sole purpose! A people's jury did not inspire confidence to the parties in 
power. Could you imagine that the Vlaams Blok benefits from too much sympathy 
or common sense from our people! No, professional magistrates, who could often 
be put under political pressures, were imperatively necessary. All years long, one 
talks about political nominations in the legal world. Do you think that today, all of 
a sudden, at the opportunity of this trial, eminently political, the political 
nominations wouldn't play any role??? 
Moreover, {literal translation: this trial was filed by a governmental institution} it 
is a governmental institution, the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Fight against 
Racism that filed suit. This "ministry of truth", set up after the electoral victory of 
the Vlaams Blok, falls under the authority of Prime Minister Verhofstadt, and is 
directly financed with federal credits, and credit from the National Lottery. The 
decision to file suit was taken by a governing board in which, as a matter of course, 
only the ruling parties are represented. Isn't independence beautiful. .. {Literally: 
It's beautiful, independence ... } 
This sort of affair is common currency in banana republics; they don't have their 
place in democracy. 
There is no possible democracy without a broad society debate. No debate has any 
sense without freedom of speech, as large as possible, including the theme of 
immigration. 
The Vlaams Blok will continue, no matter what, to say what the silent majority of 
our country says. For the 13 th June elections, we ask the Brusseleirs to emit a clear 
signal: choose freedom of speech, for democracy, for the Vlaams Slok. 
Frank Vanhecke 
President Vlaams Blok 
Senator 
Appendix 5 - Vlaams Blok Brochure 137 - Liste 10 Bruxelles Sotre Ville! 
Touche pas a fa democratie, p.3 (translation: Brussels Our City! Don't meddle 
with Democracy) 
Dear voter, 
On June 13 th , you will go to the voting booth to elect the Brusseleir members of 
the Flemish Parliament, of Brussels Regional Council, and of the European 
Parliament. These elections are not like any other. These last months, se\eral facts, 
which are totally unacceptable from a democratic point of view, happened. First, 
one has accepted the right to vote for foreigners who refuse to take our nationality, 
for the next commune elections. A large majority of the population is opposed to 
the foreigners' right to vote, and nevertheless, it was imposed on us. All the 
francophone parties (MR, PS, CDH) were in favour of this right to vote, resulting 
in that the sole collaboration of the Flemish socialist SPA was sufficient to form a 
majority in the Parliament. The VLD has done nothing to stop this coup. The 
parties have proved that they were not interested in the people's opinions. They 
refused a referendum to be held on the question of the foreigners' right to vote. 
The rules of the democratic games have been changed without allowing the 
population to express itself according to democratic criteria. We are hoping that 
you will think about this when you are in the voting booth on lune, l3 th . 
Another scandal: the condemnation of the Vlaams Blok for "racism". The free 
expression of your opinions, in this country, is from now on strangled. The Vlaams 
Blok is not a racist party, it only defends in a firm and decisive fashion the rights 
of the Brusseleirs. It is the reason why the regime has called upon a "tribunal" to 
put the Vlaams Blok offside. 
But we will continue our fight without bending, in order for Brussels to live in 
safety, so that you can still feel at home in Brussels. We want a Brussels where 
one is still rewarded for one's work. For a Brussels where one can express freely 
one's opinion. On June 13 t\ it's you who will determine the outcome of the 
elections. Be vigilant so that the free choice of citizens remains a right and stops 
being flouted. To stay free, vote for the Vlaams Blok. 
lohan Demol Frank Vanhecke 
Top of the list Brussels - Capital Regional Council Top of list European 
Parliament 
Top of list Flemish Council 
(Vertical) Vlaams Blok the Unique Opposition 
lr Brochure campaign (for 13th June 2004; Region councils, parliaments, and European 
parliament). 
Appendix 6 - Vlaams Belang Magazine ~ r . . 1, Dertiende Overninning op rij, 
Nov. 2006, p.2 
On the way to right-wing, Flemish political power 
'Purple. is alive', 'Purple is there again', 'Purple is doing it again', said the press with 
one VOIce after the so-called policy declaration of Guy Verhofstadt in the Chamber. 
Oh boy, oh boy, what a circus! The VLD of Guy Verhofstadt was sanctioned 
severely by the electorate during the municipal elections, there is yet another series 
?f taxes coming thanks to the champions of virtual 'tax reduction', and the budget 
IS such a complex-less humbug, that we feel vicarious shame. but nevertheless. the 
press applauds unisono. The press (few exceptions confirm the rule). as a feel-
good machine at the service of the Belgian establishment. Why does the VLD still 
need Noel Slangen? (By the way, did it strike you too that nobody reminds us of 
the judicial adventures of Mr Slangen and the clever arguments with which he 
managed to avoid sanctions? Whoever accepts lessons in ethics from a man like 
him is just out of his mind.) 
In fact, what does Verhofstadt want? He wants to stay in power at all cost. In that 
sense he is not much different from Yves Leterme, who wants to come to power at 
all costs. The first one has been cheating us for seven years now, the second one 
might very well start cheating us as of next year. 
Because that is, of course, the heart of the matter. As Filip Dewinter said rightly: 
whether 2007 brings us "Guy Leterme" or "Yves Verhofstadt". it does not change 
much. It is all the same, because as long as they keep the cordon sanitaire in place, 
they are de facto the accomplices or the Stockholm-syndrome stricken hostages of 
the Parti Socialiste. Indeed Leterme has been using a typical "tsjeven" trick for 
months now, giving a double message. He has one story for the Flemish public, 
and another story for the Walloon public. For the Flemish, one can from time to 
time hear some bold pro-Flemish talk, but at the same time he says to the French-
speaking public "do not be afraid", and sends the ACW to make clear that there 
will definitely not be a scission of social security. And the N-V A watches all this 
without reacting, just like in the dossier Brussel-Halle-Vilvoorde ("we do not enter 
a government as long as the scission is not a fact"), gets rewarded for its services 
and keeps attacking the only trustworthy Flemish nationalist party of this country. 
This is the political situation in Flanders in 2006. We live in a country where 
prosperity, employment and even the territory of the Flemish majority are 
fundamentally harmed by the political aggression of the Walloon minority, and in 
spite of that, there is not one single brave politician in the "traditional" parties to 
break the cordon, which lout of 4 Flemish voters rejected. There is not even one 
single politician who dares condemn the fact that Vlaams Belang is currently being 
judged by French speaking judges, in a judicial procedure which is partly 
conducted in French - in the year 2006. Yes, you are reading what you sec. 
What we have to do is clear. Since 8 October, we have become a real popular party, 
with already many hundreds of local sections and mandataries. The challenge for 
2007 is huge. We do not use a cordon against whoever wants to win right-wing 
Flemish political power is with us, but at the same time we have to be very 
conscious of our own strength and of the brilliant opportunities in front of us, in 
2007 and even more so in 2009. 
Frank Vanhecke 
National President 
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Appendix 7 
A- Cover page of the campaign brochure: BruxeUes, notre ville! 'Touche pas 
a la democratie' (translation: Brussels, our city! Don't meddle with democracy)-
FRENCH 
(Vlaams Blok, May 2004) 
B- Cover page of the same brochure in Dutch, Brussel, onze stad! Logish toch. 
(translation: Brussels, our city! All the same) DUTCH 
• (Vlaams Blok, May 2004) 
Appendix 8- The Hand-shaped logo of SOS Racisme 
logo of SOS Racism, 
http://www .sos-racisme.orgl 
Appendix 9- Vlaams Blok Brochure 6: FeiteniRealites, ;\lulticuItural 
Brussels?! May 2004, pp. 8-9 
"I am scared by the violent anti-Israeli demonstrations. All this calls for Jihad and 
the slogans saying 'Hamas, Hamas, all the Jews in the gas chambers'. Come on, it 
is incredible. I am asking myself a lot of questions about foreigners' right to \otc. 
Although the majority of the population is opposed to it, that right was \'oted for. 
More than 64,000 non-European foreigners are going to decide on my future. 
That's unacceptable". 
"Freedom of speech: Censored" 
Brussels will count soon a majority of inhabitants from foreign origin, due to the 
lax policies of the traditional parties. Every political commentator can confirm this: 
the right to vote by foreigners will cause a political earthquake in Brussels. 
Frederic Erens, National President of the VB Youth, Ucc1e {note: Ucc1e is one the 
19 municipalities of Brussels} 
"The life of many Brussels inhabitants will become unbearable if we do not 
change the situation. Police do not dare even appear in some neighbourhoods, let 
alone intervene, for fear of riots. Foreign inhabitants are considered as votes in the 
bank; this is why traditional parties tolerate the situation. However, radical imams 
put Allah's law above ours, and call for homosexuals to be thrown from the top of 
buildings. The right to vote by foreigners must be abolished. This right to vote, 
along with the most flexible nationality code in the world, encourages very few 
foreigners to integrate into society. Whoever wants to acquire citizenship will have 
to pass a citizenship test." 
.., i-
.)-t) 
Appendix 10- Vlaams Belang Brussel's newsletter ~ r . l , , Bruxel/es, Jfa J il/e, 
mijn stad, (2004), p.5 (translation: Brussels, ~ I y y city) 
Affair/File Hariche: the Islamic socialism is progressing 
What the SP {Socialist Party} is wheeling and conspiring is from no\\" clear: in 
mid-December, Thielemans underwent a surgical operation, following which he 
had been replaced for one month. In principle, the substitute must be the first or 
second deputy mayor; in this case everybody was astounded to see that the choice 
was set on the seventh deputy mayor, of Algerian origin, Faouzia Hariche. Hariche 
is perfectly bilingual: French and Arabic. She does not speak a word of Dutch. The 
real Brusseleirs do not find it funny. From Brussels civil servant. one demands that, 
quite rightly, that they are bilingual. However, someone completely ignoring 
Dutch can become the mayor ad interim. 
Even more, the first city of the country has had for one month a mayor of foreign 
origin. In the past, we have noticed that the deputy mayor did not shine by her 
competence. Why getting stressed? The journalist Derk Jan Eppink has literally 
written: "With Hariche as first foreign-born mayor of the capital of Belgium, of 
Flanders and of Europe, the SP plays the North African card. The respect of the 
basic rules is accessory. What matters is power." (Knack, 1111/2006) 
In addition, a little while ago, Hariche nominated her husband Mohamed 
Laghmiche, director of the non-for-profit association "Jeunesse a Bruxelles" 
(Y outh In Brussels) of which she is president. She granted them a subsidy of 
117,000 euros. Mrs Hariche is certainly well integrated in the culture of the SP. 
Erik Arckens 
Appe?dix 11 - Vlaa"!s Blok's (2004) brochure BruxelleslBrussel, Jlijll stad, 
ma ville, Le compte a rebours, pp. 6-7 ( translation: "Brussels. \ly City. the 
countdown") -
The Count Down 
The final toll of the uprising in Paris and other French cities is sadly heavy: at least 
ten d ~ a d : : d ? z e n ~ ~ of wounded, and tens of thousands of burnt cars. The-damages 
remam hmIted m our country, for the moment. A few similar facts have been 
observed in Brussels, Liege, Antwerp, Ghent, Malines (Mechelen) and Lokeren ... 
The popular saying says: "when it is raining in Paris, you have drops in Brussels" 
happens to be often accurate. It would be illusory to think that the situation in our 
ghetto-neighbourhoods of our big cities is less explosive than in France. The 
reality is that the atmosphere is as tense as in France. The dynamics triggering 
violence are the same here as they are in France, and they must be credited to a 
small nucleus of radicals and fundamentalists. 
The authorities are trying to minimise and justify incidents instead of taking 
appropriate measures. The government must draw the conclusions that emerged 
after the riots and fires. "Unequal chances", "ethnic unemployment", and the 
supposed "racism" are only a consequence of a perfectly incoherent immigration 
policy. It was the case yesterday, it is still the case today. 
We have often given the impression that the "more one throws Molotov cocktails, 
the more one receives subsidies". The political world is paralysed by a foreign-
born community which is growing bigger and bigger, because among other things, 
the establishment of the right to vote to foreigners and the consequences of the 
"quick acquisition" of Belgian nationality gives an ever-increasing importance to 
this particular electoral group". Authorities desperately try to be easy with the goat 
and the cabbage {French phrase, difficult to render in English}. The philosophy is 
to provide subvention to Islam as a vector for integration, whereas this policy 
produces the opposite effect. 
One wants to create a targeted employment to the foreign-born, but one remains 
paralysed when it comes to the massive arrival of illegal immigrants. Even better: 
they are regularised! "One preaches for sacrosanct integration, but one encourages 
diversity and multiculturalism. It is only when we have the courage to tackle 
problems from another point of view that solutions will draw in profile. One must 
recognise the failure of the multicultural myth". One should dare debate on 
immigration and integration, honestly, and without politically correct taboos. It is 
the sine que non condition to end the whorl of tension, confrontation and violence 
that our society faces. 
Frederic Erens 
Brussels 
Appendix 12- Vlaams Belang Brussel's newsletter :\r.1, Bruxel/es, Jla Vil/e, 
mijn stad, (2004), p.10 (translation: Brussels, My city) 
Entrepreneurship, it's freedom 
~ s s a popular party we are particularly sensitive to the problems met daily by the 
mdependent storekeepers. The Vlaams Belang organised a few weeks ago. a 
congress under this theme. The Vlaams Blok resolutely opts for the 
entrepreneurship and the respect of labour/work. 
We blame the old political majorities of our communes for their lack of initiatiyes 
in favour of independent workers. We are blaming them to have never tackled the 
real problems. 
As we already know, less and less voters wish to still vote for the sclerosed 
traditional parties which refuse to face the truth. 
For low electoral reasons, those parties holding power do not want to 'disturb' 
their 'new electorate'. Consequently, there is a series of gross injustices, which put 
a category of 'citizens' above laws at the expenses of the others. 
Who knows the life of an independent worker, knows the work to knock down and 
the long hours, just to keep your head above water. 
To do business without risking one's life is finally/really the least the independent 
can demand from a power that does not hesitate to fiscally choke them. 
Of course, to organise activities is a bonus for our storekeeper and efforts must go 
on, but only a secure (securised) commune would be able to favour/promote the 
commercial activities and to attract new businesses/stores. 
More and more, the very nature of our shops change and there are other sorts of 
shops taking their place. This way, neighbourhood by neighbourhood, our 
traditional shops are disappearing. How long is this going to last? 
We want to help and give value to honest storekeepers and chase those who 
benefit from the laxity and fear of the authorities. 
Let us show together that it is possible to tackle the real problems, legally, 
democratically, but with determination and without weakness. 
Appendix 13 - Vlaams Blok Brochure 138 - Liste 10 Bruxelles Sotre Ville! 
Touche pas a fa democratie, p.3 (translation: Brussels Our City! Don't meddle 
with Democracy) 
On June, 13 t \ you will be able to kill two birds with one stone. \\"hen you will 
vote for a list of Dutch-speaking linguistic groups (such as for example. the 
Vlaams Blok), you will be able to choose six representatives for the Flemish 
Council, which has its headquarters in Brussels. next to the Chamber of 
Representatives, and the Senate. Your elected representatives will defend the 
interests of the Brusseleirs in files, such as well-being, health, assistance to the 
elderly and to the handicapped, along with the Dutch-speaking education. But they 
will also have their say in the files that Brussels and Flanders have in common 
such as the Ring {name of the motorway circling Brussels}, the airport, 
employment, etc. 
This is why it is very important to also vote here for people who will defend your 
interests. 
Every Brussels inhabitant, Dutch-speaker or Francophone, who votes for the 
Vlaams Blok, has it in his/her interests to cast his/her vote for this list. lohan 
Demol will lead it and his colleague, the former delegate Erik Arckens, will bring 
his knowledge learnt in the amphitheatre of the Brussels Parliament, to the 
Flemish Council. The other candidates are notably the city councillor Monique 
Moens, and the entrepreneur Rolando Assys. The first substitute is Greet Van 
Linter. 
(Frame) Your Brussels' candidates for the Flemish Council: Erick Arckens (2nd 
candidate), Monique Moens (3 rd candidate and 4th substitute), Greet Van Linter (1 5t 
substitute), Rolando Assys (last of the list and 2nd substitute) and lohan Demol 
(head of the list). 
(Vertical): Vlaams Blok the Unique Opposition 
.,' Campaign hrochurc\38 - Brussels Our City! List 10. Vlaams Blok. Don't meddle with 
Democracy 
Appendix 14 - Vlaams Blok Brochure 6: FeiteniRealites, An Alternative for 
Brussels! May 2004, pp. 22-23 
lohan Demol - More than ever! 
The management by the old parties has made Brussels insecure, dirty, woebegone. 
With impossible traffic, where the inhabitant feels like a foreigner, and has only' 
one solution: to leave, in the same way that most of the companies have done. 
Apart from a city re-planning here and there, of a pavement or a square, which are 
six months late, as dirty and degraded as they were before. our politicians do not 
do anything to improve the situation. 
To make Brussels streets safe and give again to the Brusseleirs an agreeable life 
environment remains our main concern. With the Vlaams Blok, we will be able to 
live again in our city in the sparkling way which is proper to us Brusseleirs. 
Appendix 15 (1/5) - Vlaams Belang (2005) , "Turkey in Europe: No!" 
Cover page 
Turkey: not a European Nation 
Page 1 
Photo of men praying in the street 
Page 
Turkey does not belong to the European Union 
Incredible but true: the negotiations about Turkey's admission to the European Union will start 
in October. For the first time in history, a non-European country will enter the EU. Howc\cr. 
the article 49 of the Treaty about the European Union, mentions that only European countries 
may request to enter the EU. The European Constitution does not foresee at all the entrancc of 
any non-European country. 
Turkey is not a common candidate country. It is also a country which, as it effecti\ely will 
enter the EU, will have the biggest and also the poorest population. Former EU-agriculture 
commissioner Franz Fischler assessed that all the agricultural subsidies to Turkey alone may 
reach 11 billion euro a year. But only 35% of Turkey's working population work in agriculture. 
According to a European Commission's assessment, the total annual cost of Turkcy's 
membership may reach more than 28 billion euro. No one knows who is going to pay for this, 
or with what money. 
Each candidate country must satisfy the so-called "Copenhagen criteria". Turkey, apparcntly 
not. Human rights are constantly violated. As for economy, Turkey does not fulfil at all the 
conditions either. 
To let Turkey enter the EU would be a historical mistake. In the European Parliament, the 
Vlaams Belang representatives will continue resisting these undemocratic schemes, which 
does absolutely not serve EU citizens' interests. 
(at the bottom: Photographs of Koen DillenlFV and Philip Claeys, VB members of 
the EP) 
Page 3- The Risks. 
If Turkey Enters the EU ... 
./ it will be the biggest member state at every EU-meeting and will send the 
largest delegation to the EU Parliament. 
./ And then, Turkey will then become the strongest military force in the EU 
with an army of more than 600.000 men . 
./ And then, EU external borders will then be extended to countries like Iran, 
Iraq and Syria. The Middle East inferno will then literally be at Europe's 
door. 
./ And then, we would have no grounds to refuse candidates like Morocco, 
Algeria or Tunisia. 
./ And then Europe's door will then be open to uncontrollable and unbridled 
immigration . 
./ And then will come the threat of a dangerous confrontation with a militant 
and intolerant Islam . 
./ And then, there will begin an economic drain . 
./ And the EU will then become unmanageable. 
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Appendix 15 (2/5) - Vlaams Belang (2005) , ,- Turkey in Europe: So!" 
Page 4 The borders will be extended ... 
In the Turkish case, the remoteness will not only be geographical. The beginning of the 
negotiation about Turkey's entrance in the EU announces a new era. 
It is totally new that a country where human rights are clearly violated on a large scale will be 
allowed within the EU. The European Commission was already happy when the innumerable 
tortures stopped occurring systematically. In the same time, several European countries 
(among which Belgium) are still welcoming and acknowledging political refugees from 
Turkey. 
It is also hushed up that this candidate state military occupies the territory of an effecti\c 
member. A Turkish troop of more than 30,000 soldiers has been occupying Northern Cypms 
since 1974. The EU doesn't see any problem to negotiate about Turkey's membership. 
Incredible ... 
As well as the fact that Turkey is refusing to recognize one of the current European member, 
namely Cyprus. Cypriot boats are not allowed to moor in Turkish ports. This is also 
"acceptable" by the European Commission and the government leaders. 
It seems that Turkey may do whatever it wants, and has to enter the EU at whatever cost. 
Page 5 -You have heard about it somewhere else ... 
"I have always been enthusiast about Europe. The thoughtlessness with which we 
deal with this entity today makes me sad. Has one of the 25 government leaders 
already once really thought about the possible consequences of Turkey's 
adherence to the EU? Has someone weighed if we are really ready to provide 
enough financial efforts to lift up Turkish people's purchasing power, which is 
even lower than in the countries that recently entered the EU? How are they going 
to keep the institutions in balance with the entrance of a country of 70 million 
inhabitants? A new member as large as Germany? Have they studied this'?" 
State Secretary Willy Claes in De Morgen, 31 December 2004 
"We also minimize the fact that the largest part of Turkey is not European. What 
are we going to say when Morocco wants to enter the EU? [ ... ] It is a death 
sentence for the EU policy." 
Former SP-chairman European Commissioner Karel Van Miert in De Morgen, 21 
December 2004 
"I'm giving my opinion: It's the end of the EU!" Former French President Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing, Le Monde, 9 November 2002 
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Appendix 15 (3/5) - Vlaams Belang (2005) , "Turkey in Europe: So!" 
Page 6 
"If I was a European I would be against Turkey's membership. but I am an 
American so I am in favour." 
Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State, HPIDe Tijd, 31 December 200.+ 
" W ~ e n n listening to the current states' leaders, it seems that eyerything is pleading 
~ g a l l l s t t the . fact that Turkey would be included in a treaty aiming at the 
ImplementatIOn of a common international policy, " 
Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, 'Spath am Abend', 1 April 2001 
"Following the current trends, Europe's population will include Islamist majorities 
by the end of the 21 st century." 
Islamic specialist Prof. Bernard Lewis. Die Welt, 28 July 2004 
"The Muslim world, including extremists like Bin Laden, is delighted by Turkey's 
entrance in Europe: Turkey is its Trojan horse". 
Mouammar Kadhafi, Libya's President, La Repubblica, 16 December 2004 
Page 7 
Phoney Pro Arguments 
"Europe is not a Christian club, so Turkey must be given a chance. 
Christianity is one of the pillars of our European civilization, as well as among 
other things Greece and Rome, and the Enlightenment. However, there is a 
separation between the church and the state, and all the other religions may exist 
here. On the other hand, Islam has nothing to do with that. And why do the Turks 
demand that Europe does not remain a Christian club, while it wants it to be a 
Muslim club? 
.. We have a part of history in common with Turkey". 
lt's all about conflicts and military occupation of parts of Europe by the Turks. It 
was for example the invasion of Constantinople (today's Istanbul) in 1'+53. the 
battle of Lepanto in 1571, the Vienna Pact in 1526 and 1683. In 1974, the Turks 
invaded Northern Cyprus. This military occupation is still going on today. 
"Turkey's entrance gives us a larger internal market, and consequent(l' a higher 
economic growth ". 
It's nonsense. There is already a border-union between Turkey and Europe. 
Business relations between the two entities can easily occur in the current situation. 
Therefore Turkey's entrance wouldn't bring any added value. 
"When Spain and Portugal entered the EEC it was also said that massive 
immigration would follow". 
It's cock and bull. There has been at most a discussion over some practical aspects, 
but no one in Europe had significant objections. The Spanish and Portuguese 
guest-workers who came in the 1960s and 1970s integrated themselves without 
trouble and sometimes were even assimilated. They were Europeans too. 
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Appendix 15 (4/5) - Vlaams Belang (2005) , "Turkey in Europe: .Vo1" 
Page 8 
"We must help Turkey to become a democracy." 
We are already doing that through the billions going each year to Turkev and 
o t ~ e r r countries ar?und the Mediterranean. Europe wants to i m p l e m ~ n t t a 
neIghbourhood polley, because we have no interest in being surrounded by 
unstable, poor and less developed regions. We also have to help Nigeria to 
become a democracy, and Iran, and Rwanda, etc. But those countries do not have 
to enter the EU. Why should Turkey and not Iraq? 
"Once in the EU Turkey will become a real democracy". 
Not so sure. The only opposition power against Prime Minister Erdogan's 
Islamists is the army. Once in the EU, the position of the Turkish army will 
inevitably be undermined. The Islamists use the Turkish EU membership in order 
to counter the army and to take control. It won't be much about democracy 
anymore. 
"We have made some promises to Turkey, and we can't take them back". 
Who are 'we'? No one has ever asked people's opinion. There has never been any 
discussion about Europe's borders. The decision to recognize Turkey as 
candidate-state has not been made democratically. The "promise" dates back to 
1963 and says that Turkey may once enter the EEC. Meanwhile a political EU is 
born. We can't compare apples with lemons. 
"Turkey is a secular state ". 
Officially there is a separation between the church (sic) and the state in Turkey. 
But in the practice, it is quite different. People belonging to a religious minority 
are discriminated against. A recent study has shown massive violence against 
women, forced marriages, ... mostly in the countryside. 
Page 9 
A REFERENDUM FOR TURKEY'S ADMISSION, NOW! 
Referenda will be organised in several EU member states about the European 
Constitution. People have justly been involved in an important decision like the 
introduction of a common constitution. The possible entrance of Turkey in the EU 
is even more serious and determinant for Europe's future than the Constitution. 
However, there is no talk about a public debate on a substantial question like the 
possible membership of Turkey, and even less of the possibility of giving people 
an opportunity to express themselves about it. 
The Turkish question shows off the "often undemocratic" European decision 
making. Almost every opinion poll about Turkey's membership shows that ~ ~ large 
majority of the population is against. In countries like France or Austna thlS 
majority sometimes represent more than 75%. But the European Commission and 
the European Council do not take that into account. 
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Appendix 15 (5/5) - Vlaams Belang (2005) , "Turkey in Europe: So!" 
Page 10 
A Europe going on taking decisions against the will of its people is doomed to 
failure. 
The Vlaams Belang parliament members have already twice introduced a proposal 
to launch a referendum in every European member state about the entrance of 
Turkey into the EU. To give European citizens the right to express themselycs 
about this fundamental issue is to strengthen the EU's democratic legitimacy. 
Turkey is an ally and a friend. 
We can have a privileged partnership with Turkey. 
But Turkey is not a European country! 
"A referendum about such a theme would open a debate with sordid arguments 
about namely, Islam, which will only serve right-wing parties. Our Western 
democracies do not have enough means to control and to manage a public debate 
about such subjects." 
Louis Michel in De Standaard, 4 September 2000 
NOW! 
Page 11 
Names and contact details of the three European representatives: Frank Vanhecke, 
Philip Claeys, and Koen Dillen. Bottom: Party logo, and the European flag. 
Appendix 16 - Vlaams Be.lang Magazine :\r. 1, Dertiende Overllinllillg op rij, 
Nov. 2006, pp. 4-5 (translatIOn: Brussels. My city) 
Exit Dedecker 
"The next one to be thrown out is Jean-Marie", predicted Hugo Coveliers one year 
ago. And when asked when that would happen, the dry but prophetic answer was: 
"On 9 October 2006." Coveliers got it wrong only by 2 days ... The former judo 
trainer was very popular with the right-wing VLD voters. but increasingly less so 
with the VLD's top officials, who took a clear left-wing direction, and attached 
much more importance to their own power and career than to the political 
principles of party interest. In order not to push all right-wing voters to Vlaams 
Belang, Dedecker was kept in for a short time for reasons of political calculation. 
Brainwashing 
Scientists have found out that magnetic stimulation of the brain could be used to 
steer or adjust people's thinking or behaviour. "Real manipulation of thought is not 
for now, but research is progressing very fast", says the philosopher Jan Verplaetse 
in De Morgen (10.20.2006). "I predict that within half a year, it will become 
possible to, for example, let a member of VB {Vlaams Belang} feel 'wann 
empathy' for immigrants. Imagine what this would mean for the polls." 
Brainwashing as the final means to convert those 'sour' and 'intolerant' Flemish 
people to multicultural belief. In certain left-wing circles, nostalgia for the Gulag 
is clearly very strong. 
Infotainer Leterme 
Figures published by the public broadcaster VRT show that Yves Leterme was 
invited to so-called infotainment programmes 19 times, Patrick Janssen 15 times. 
Guy Verhofstadt 14 times, Bert Anciaux 12 times and Jean-Luc Dehaene 10 
times ... Was it not Leterme himself who pleaded for restriction, and who felt that 
politicians should use their time for politics? The fact that he was nearly the most 
frequently invited circus artist on the screen is tarnishing the image the Flemish 
Minister-President had built up carefully. 
Appendix 17 - Vlaams. B e l a n ~ ~ Magazine ~ r . . 1, Dertiende Ol'erninning op rij, 
Nov. 2006, p. 3 (translatIOn, ThIrteenth victory in a row) 
Open Forum 
This month our guest commentator is Karim Van Overmeire, Flemish ~ l P P and 
Senator for the Flemish Community 
Winning the elections is not an objective per se 
On 8 October, Vlaams Belang became the main party in Aalst. We won nine 
percent. For the provincial elections, our results even improved by 11 percent. As 
a result, we got even better results in our canton than at the latest elections for the 
Flemish Parliament. We obtained particularly good results not only in AaisL but in 
the whole eastern part of East-Flanders. The Dender valley and the Waasland are 
definitely one of the potential new poles of growth for our party. 
Stagnation in a few towns brought many of our opponents to the verge of delirium. 
But it seems premature to me to claim that Vlaams Belang has been definitively 
brought to a halt in the communes of Brussels, in Antwerp, Ghent and Mechelen. 
Further progress is still possible. Everything depends on rapidly changing external 
circumstances, on the team and on the power of the campaign. 
Demographic changes are a sword of Damocles hanging over our party, but 
hanging over the whole nation as well. Among the Flemish people, the birth rate is 
simply too low, and the white rush from the cities appears to be difficult to stop. 
Immigration is massive already, and if policy remains unchanged, it can only 
increase. We are quickly moving to a country where only the countryside is still 
mainly Flemish, and where the cities are a sum of ethnic ghettos. How can we 
avoid this? 
This brings us to the question what we are doing. The evolution from a Vlaams 
BlokIVlaams Belang consisting of a handful of anti-Egmonters into a political 
formation with one million voters, is undoubtedly the most spectacular party-
political change since the Second World War. But it is pretty naive to think that an 
increasing number of voters means increasing political power and, hence, more 
chances to see our programme being implemented. Alas, things are not of that 
mathematical simplicity. 
Electoral victories are not an objective per se. The whole Vlaams Belang story can 
never be meant to let a maximum of MPs accumulate a maximum of pension 
rights. Our story has meaning only when we can implement the essence of our 
programme: independence, a stricter immigration policy, a finn approach to crime. 
It is clear now that these points of our programme will not be implemented hy 
using more and more decibels to shout original temlS of abuse from within the 
quarantine zone. Contrary to lemmings or howling monkeys, who follow their 
instinct, man has the possibility of evaluating his situation, considering alternative 
strategies, and analysing carefully who can be opponents and who can be allies, if 
need be temporarily. The Danish example proves that other scenarios are possible, 
other than quarantine zones or Volksunie-type treason. A shrewd Vlaams Belang 
is of course much more dangerous than a shouting Vlaams Belang in a quarantine 
zone. It is going to be a difficult but necessary exercise. We owe it not only to 
ourselves, but also to our children and grandchildren. 
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Appendix 18 - Vlaams Blok Brochure 6: FeiteniRealites, An Alternative for 
Brussels! May 2004, pp. 4-5 
(elderly says: ) "Indeed, I don't feel safe in the neighbourhood. I have been 
assaulted twice. On TV, we hear saying that "criminality has reduced; you do feel 
it, honestly ... " 
What are they talking about, they are living in an other planet those people? Last 
week, a (female) friend has been clobbered by a gang of little thugs and has been 
hospitalized. This doesn't make the headlines; it is our daily fate/daily life/routine" 
(under the photo) Media and the government keep dwelling on that the "feeling of 
insecurity" is subjective. People know that it is reality! (bold in the text) 
Johan Demol Deputy for Schaerbeek l39 
A tough approach to all the forms of criminality. The law must be enforced in all 
neighbourhoods. No disguising of the criminality figures when elections come 
near. Police must have the possibility to act more energetically. Justice mu t return 
punch by punch. As a former chief superintendent, I know that the zero tolerance 
works. Only a clearly displayed political will can succeed in discouraging 
criminals. The Vlaams Blok is the only one to have such a political will! People 
must dare again to go out at night. 
139 cha rbeek i on the nine communes ofBru sel . 
62 
(Vertical) Brn el a afe city . ! 
Appendix 19 - Filip Dewinter (http://www.resistances.be/dewinter.html) 
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Appendix 20 - Vlaams ~ e l a n g g ~ a g a z i n e e Xr. 1, Dertiende Overninning op rij, 
Nov. 2006, p. 6-7 (translatIOn, ThIrteenth victory in a row) 
INTERVIEW 
Frank Vanhecke 
"We quietly pursue on the path we have been following for years now." 
A person staying abroad and following the Belgian media over the last few weeks 
would have got the impression that Vlaams Belang lost the municipal elections. 
I would not attach too much importance to that, we have got used to the fact that 
people try and minimize the growing political force of Vlaams Belang. The facts 
and figures are what they are. I estimate that we will have about 1300 to 1)00 
elected mandataries once the OCMW and police councils have been established. 
This has never happened to a Flemish nationalist activist party before. And it may 
sound like a cliche, but it is the simple truth: those many hundreds of mandataries 
and sections constitute a formidable backbone and an enormous strength. By the 
way, I have the impression that the Flemish people know very well that we are the 
great winners of 8 October. 
It has become almost certain that the cordon will not be broken anywhere. "The 
beginning of the end", wrote a political commentator. Do you agree? 
That is also something we have heard a lot, isn't it? "The beginning of the end", 
"The ceiling has been reached", "The masks are falling", and my personal 
favourite "the brown mushroom is collapsing like a pudding", an image as absurd 
as its content. We never had any illusions about breaking the cordon at the present 
elections. As soon as the "fatwas" of all political party headquarters and even of 
the Flemish minister-president were spoken, we knew how matters stood. The 
cordon is a problem for us, but it is just as much a problem for our opponents and 
competitors. It is unpopular, and it leads to the fact that the right-wing majority 
cannot govern in many municipalities and in Flanders in general. So we should not 
lock ourselves up in any form of self-satisfaction, we must go on establishing 
contacts and building bridges towards all those who are willing to share part of the 
road with us. The only thing we must not do is renounce our principles. That 
would maybe mean the end of the cordon, but it would also be the end of Vlaams 
Belang. 
Some people say that the progress of Vlaams Belang in the big cities is being 
"slowed down" by the legion of foreign voters which was created by SP.A and 
VLD. Is that analysis right? 
It is true that we progress only slightly in Antwerp and Mechelen, and even regress 
slightly in Ghent. Those who exult at that forget that in those cities, and especially 
in Antwerp, we stabilise on very high levels. When, for example, Bart De \Vever 
imagines he is the general of Stalingrad, somebody should remind him that the 
man of the" 18,000 home visits" hardly got 4,000 Yotes. and that Filip Dewinter 
got almost 63,000 votes. Some modesty v.;ould be advisable in such circumstances. 
Of course it is a fact that over the past five years our nationality just fell into the 
lap of about 250,000 foreigners, which means that indeed a formidable "electoral 
foreign legion" was created for the left wing - a phenomenon which we could 
observe earlier at the recent elections in Rotterdam and Amsterdam as well. :-\dded 
to the exodus of autochthonous people from the cities, and the arriyal of an 
important number of new foreigners in the city centres, and on top of that the right 
for foreigners to vote, the picture is complete. This is a yery worrying e\olution, 
not only for Vlaams Belang, but even for society as a whole and for the 
preservation of the freedoms, values and norms of our Flemish and European 
society. It is not too late yet, but in our big cities it is fi\'e to twelve. It is high time 
that more people from foreign origin who are indeed ready to integrate and 
assimilate in our Flemish society let their voices be heard. 
Does Vlaams Belang have to further adapt its strategy? 
We quietly pursue on the road we have been following for years now. The core of 
our programme consists of our positions, which are majority positions in Flanders. 
We must go on formulating them calmly and clearly, and we must go on profiling 
ourselves just as calmly and clearly as reasonable people who want the best for all 
Flemish people and who care for the future of our people. In that sense the 
importance of our renewed and strongly increased presence cannot be stressed 
enough. Every local mandatory can become an ambassador of our party and of our 
ideas - and should behave consequently. 
In the meantime the procedure in the Council of State has been started up to 
deprive Vlaams Belang of party financing. What if we lose? 
That procedure is a shame. The Flemish nationalist party stands in front of a 
college of purely politically appointed judges, half of whom are French speaking. 
The procedure is partly conducted in French, and nobody protests against that. It is 
a procedure which is tailor-made in order to condemn us, so we do not have any 
illusions. Ifwe lose, things will be difficult, but difficult does not mean impossible. 
I dare foretell that our militants will be more motivated than ever to help. We will 
survive all of that. 
What about 2007, with elections for the Chamber and the Senate? Who is going to 
be the main political opponent? 
In my view the main political opponent is the Parti Socialiste. t h ~ ~ clearest sym?ol 
of Walloon state power over Flanders. We must make clear dunng the campaign 
that neither Verhofstadt nor Leterrne have the will or the courage to confront the 
Parti Socialiste. They are much too good as Belgians, much too tied hand and foot 
to Belgian establishment. There is only one trustworthy-Flemish part and that is us. 
This is the message we have to bring in 2007. 
'( -
.) )J 
Appendix 21- Vlaams Belang, in 
www.vlaamsbelang.be/index.php?p=6andid=10. as accessed on the 19/04/2005 
"It seems that Flanders must pay more for the unemployed \\ralloons - and that is 
only a portion of the annual total of the billions that flow from Flanders to 
Wallonia. The transfers for the unemployment fund are growing rapidly. In 1990, 
they were 220 million euros. In 1995, it was already 380 million euros. In 2000 it 
has reached 480 million euros. In 2003, the Flemings paid 728 millions for t h ~ ~
unemployed Walloons, and in 2004 there was a temporary record in the transfers 
with, please, 840 millions. A reduction is nowhere to be seen, because the 
unemployed Walloons are never penalised (sanctioned). No problem. \ \ ' ~ . . the 
Flemings, will pay the bill" (Vlaams Belang) 
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